During the rest of the decade, while Russia rejected American efforts to promote democracy in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Washington grew alarmed at the increasing authoritarianism of Vladimir Putin. ~Ariel Cohen and Donald Jensen

Via Scoblete

When reviewing U.S. policy towards Russia, it helps to describe things accurately. What Russia rejected in Georgia and Ukraine was U.S. support for anti-Russian nationalists who were intent on bringing their countries into NATO after more pro-Russian leaders were ousted in the respective “color” revolutions of 2003 and 2004. Of course, Russia opposed the invasion of Iraq for a number of reasons, but thwarting the promotion of democracy was pretty far down the list of reasons if it was on it at all. As for Afghanistan, the Russians presumably couldn’t care less about democracy promotion efforts there. It was, in fact, Russian support for the initial phase of the war in Afghanistan that helped facilitated the swift response after 9/11. Since the much-derided “reset,” U.S.-Russian cooperation on supplying the war effort in Afghanistan has been a clear, tangible gain for the U.S. Nikolas Gvosdev explains:

Over the past two years, Russia has emerged as an alternative to Pakistan as the conduit of choice for supplies to support the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan. The so-called Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is a logistical corridor (.pdf) “connecting Baltic and Black Sea ports with Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus.” Initially conceived as an alternative transit route for nonlethal supplies, the NDN has grown in importance over the past two years and now accounts for more than half of all U.S. military transit to Afghanistan. That is in part due to the unreliability of supply routes from the Pakistani port of Karachi, which are plagued by security concerns as well as temporary closures by the government in Islamabad. But it is also due to the Russian government’s decision to allow the transfer of military equipment as well as food and fuel across its territory. For the past year, Moscow has permitted U.S. planes to transit Russian airspace carrying troops and weaponry, with up to 4,500 flights authorized annually.

The NDN gives the United States a reliable transit route that reduces the opportunity for insurgents to strangle the Western effort in Afghanistan by blocking the supply routes across Pakistan. The NDN has also been a boon for Russian and other Eurasian companies involved in rail and air cargo transport. Some estimates suggest that NDN generates more than $1 billion in revenue for Russian firms, including state companies like Russian Railways, through what would otherwise be unused capacity. This collaboration creates a set of mutually reinforcing incentives for both Moscow and Washington. Over the past two years, the U.S. side has become much more comfortable in taking advantage of the NDN, while the tangible rewards for Russia include not just amorphous “good will,” but cold, hard cash that Moscow can bank.

Skeptics and opponents of the war in Afghanistan will probably say that finding a more reliable way of keeping the war effort supplied is not very good news, but that hardly applies to critics of the “reset” policy. Whether or not they support the policies in question, Cohen and Jensen do a poor job of acknowledging the gains that supporters of “reset” policy claim for it. At a minimum, these include reduced tensions between Russia and its neighbors in eastern Europe, Russian support for another round of U.N. sanctions against Iran, cooperation in supporting the new government of Kyrgyzstan following the overthrow of Bakiyev, final negotiation and ratification of a new arms reduction treaty, the establishment of a civilian nuclear cooperation deal (i.e., the so-called 123 Agreement), and paving the way for Russian accession to the WTO. On the whole, almost all of the gains claimed since the start of the new policy are on the American side. If anyone has reason to complain about the lopsided nature of the “reset,” it would have to be the Russians.

Cohen and Jensen call for the sort of hectoring of Russia over its internal flaws that spectacularly failed under the previous administration. It might be time to acknowledge that the U.S. cannot constructively shape Russian political developments. Cohen and Jensen claim in conclusion:

If Washington persists and stays strong, the Kremlin is likely to relent and eventually acquiesce. Russia’s current rulers recognize and respect power and policies based on strength, not weakness.

Russian leaders may recognize and respect power, but what we have learned over the last decade is that they don’t take well to being ordered around, provoked, and (as they see it) encircled by an antagonistic coalition of governments. Russian nationalists are no less likely to believe in the importance of uncompromising shows of “strength.” If the U.S. insists on criticizing their judicial system or their government’s authoritarianism, this will not cause the Kremlin to relent, but simply to dig in its heels as it did all during the Bush administration. Political and legal reforms may not come to Russia, but one way to guarantee that they will not is to associate these ideas with American demands.