But the analogy with the Spanish Civil War does not depend on the existence of an unrestrained military struggle between Iraqi factions. The Spain-Iraq parallel contains a deeper lesson for the present. The Spanish Civil War was the first major example of the modern phenomenon of proxy wars, in which local clashes are exploited, and third countries torn apart, in the competition between regional and global alliances. Spain was not a simple war of conquest and pillage, like the contemporaneous Japanese invasion of China and Italian assault on Ethiopia. Rather, Spain represented a confrontation between the politics of the past, represented by Franco, and the politics of the future, embodied in a confused but nonetheless genuine Republic. ~Stephen Schwartz, The Weekly Standard

Schwartz miya is the perfect messenger for likening the cause of hegemonists with that of the Soviet-backed Republicans: as a Jewish convert to Islam and an apologist for Islamists in Uzbekistan, there is not so much obvious contradiction in his admiration for the Republic and hatred for Franco as, say, in Catholic Mario Loyola’s effusive praise of the left’s “finest hour.”  It is telling that a contributor to the Standard sees socialists who became tools of Soviet foreign policy as representatives of the “politics of the future”–the politics of the future evidently involve the murder of innocents, including clergy and nuns.  But how did that future work out for the Republicans and the Soviets?  Now, by “politics of the future” Schwartz miya probably disingenuously means parliamentary democracy or whatever it is that he thinks that the Republic represented between 1936-38. 

Of course, “the future authorizes every kind of humbug,” as Camus said, and people who prattle on about the “politics of the future” should be watched closely.  Those who believe that there is a recognisable “politics of the past” and a similarly recognisable “politics of the future” believe that history is tending towards some discernible end and follows a discernible pattern; in this vision, the wise people side with “the future,” and fools and madmen side with the past. 

That’s nice, except that the you-know-who believed they were establishing a New Order; the you-know-who loved Futurism and were confident that they represented the “politics of the future”–people who use language like this often come a cropper when the future actually arrives and disabuses them of their fantasies and premonitions of long-lasting success. 

But what could be a more obvious way of arguing to persevere in Iraq than to compare our side in Iraq to the side of the…losing side in the Spanish Civil War?  Brilliant.  That will rally everyone to the cause!  Now assuming for a moment that this parallel wasn’t a load of twaddle from an old communist who even now is clearly captivated by the mythology of the Republican cause (though he makes the necessary acknowledgements that this cause was not “stainless”), what would this parallel tell us? 

It tells us that the so-called “politics of the past” won in Spain but lost everywhere else anyway.  It highlights that the connection between the fighting in Spain/Iraq was only provisionally and marginally connected to the larger, later war with which it was frequently associated, and demonstrates that in the larger war Spain/Iraq remains neutral.  It means that even if the modern equivalent of Franco won in Iraq in this preposterous comparison, Iraq would not be a real threat to us, but would eventually turn around and become our ally in the next great struggle against…well, we’ll invent that enemy when we get to that point.  That is, unless we are playing the role of the Soviets, in which case we will win the larger war but later find Iraq allying with our former allies from the struggle against the jihadis.  But in any case this parallel means that “we” could lose in Iraq and still win the larger war.  Besides being rather despicably pro-communist, the analogy doesn’t even accomplish the dubious propaganda goal Schwartz miya sought to achieve.  

Meanwhile, back in the real world, we see that the “politics of the future” did not have much of a future for a very long time in Spain itself, until the Generalissimo saw fit to bring back the monarchy and pave the way for a democratic restoration.  One can only wonder what the post-1945 European world would have looked like if the Second Republic had prevailed and was either subjected to German devastation and invasion or later became a pupil of Moscow.  Europe would likely have been worse off, and I have no doubt that Spain would have been worse off.

But the absurdities don’t end there, folks.  Next we learn:

Spain, like Iraq, was a country without a firm national identity. In Spain, the Castilian aristocracy controlled the state, most of the tax income, the army, and the Catholic Church–the latter an ideological pillar of the old order. As if cast from an identical historical mold, Iraq long suffered under the corrupt and brutal rule of the Sunni elite, which used its clerical wing to help maintain its power.

Like Iraq, Spain lacked a firm national identity, he tells us.  What a laugh!  Now it is true that there have long been strong regional traditions and privileges in Spain dating back to the medieval roots of the several kingdoms in Iberia, but in spite of these Castilian culture and language did come to prevail as the dominant ones in the nation, particularly in the post-1808 era, in a way that has no parallel in a country invented arbitrarily by colonialists.  Spanish nationalism obviously grew stronger after 1938, but we would be kidding ourselves if we pretended it did not exist in some form before that.  If we doubt it, ask Napoleon. 

If Castilian culture served as the definition of Spanish culture, just as the English did when constructing British identity, the Parisians with the French and the Prussians with the German, it was nonetheless based in something substantial; Iraq is a nation in search of a nationality.  The sectarian supremacy of Sunnis cannot reasonably be compared to the regional precedence of Castile. 

Spain was the product of the union of the crowns of Castile and Aragon and gradually acquired a more common national identity over the centuries.  In any case, even if it was not as much of a centralised state with a consolidated national identity such as France started to acquire in the 19th century Spain cannot seriously be compared to the ramshackle nation of Iraq.  To make such a comparison is to be willfully blind to the mountain of differences that separates them.

But the parallel gets even more carried away:

Iraq’s Shia majority resembles the Spanish anarchists–there are many of them, they are militant, and they often seem to have no friends. So the Iraqi Shias, like the Spanish left, are enticed into a dangerous courtship with a totalitarian suitor: Iran plays the role in Basra that Russian Stalinism had in Barcelona.

Should we start calling them Islamoanarchosyndicalists now?  Somehow the Monty Python skit just wouldn’t be as funny if Dennis the peasant said, “Supreme executive power derives from a mandate from Allah, not from some farcical electoral ceremony!”  I like how Schwartz miya makes it seem as the Shia in Iraq are been forced into cooperating with Iran because of circumstances, as if SCIRI and the Badr Brigade had not all along been cooperating with Tehran in full view of everyone.  But now I’m confused–if Iran is the Soviet Union in this delusional fantasy, which part is America playing?  Or do we play ourselves and stay out of Spain/Iraq?  I’m trying to see how this parallel does anything but reduce the neocon position on Iraq to dust.  

But if Iran is the Soviet Union fighting for the “politics of the future,” and are therefore presumably the sorts of people that we should want to see win, why would we then treat Iran as if it were on the side of the “politics of the past”?  Perhaps it would better if we shelved bad historical analogies and dealt with the realities at hand.