So Iran burns its candle at both ends, producing less and less while consuming more and more.
Absent some change in Iranian policy, a rapid decline in exports seems likely. Policy gridlock and a Soviet-style command economy make practical problem-solving almost impossible.
The regime could help itself by making it easier for foreign firms to invest in new production. Remarkably, it has not done this even though the decline in exports, which provide more than 70 percent of state revenue, directly threatens its survival.
While signs of a petroleum crisis in Iran, are numerous, neither the Bush administration nor its critics have recognized them.
Even Iran’s nuclear power program, dismissed by the U.S. administration as a foil for weapons development, is a symptom of petro-collapse. ~Roger Stern
The serious problems in Iran’s oil industry have hardly been a secret to those paying attention. The Economist reported on dwindling Iranian oil production years ago, demonstrating an understanding of the actual energy needs of Iran that has continued to elude most of the people convinced that an Iranian nuclear program could exist only for destructive purposes. Iran could use any civilian nuclear program as the means for building nuclear weapons, but the long-standing assumption of most people debating Iran policy has been that Iran could not possibly have any legitimate reason to develop nuclear power except as a cover for a weapons program. Just look at their massive oil and gas reserves! Why would they need more energy generation? Well, this is why.