Nikolas Gvosdev draws attention to weaknesses in U.S. nonproliferation efforts:

This helps to explain why so many countries of the rising South and East have been reluctant to join the United States and Europe in applying punitive sanctions against the Iranian government: They are reluctant to take steps against Iran that would subsequently sign away their own potential rights under the current nonproliferation system to acquire the full panoply of nuclear technology.

The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. approach to Iran’s nuclear program is not providing much long-term guidance for coping with the spread of nuclear technology. Will the strategy moving forward be to use whatever means are necessary to prevent any and all countries hostile to U.S. interests from acquiring nuclear technology? Given the strong incentives that French, Russian and Korean firms have in finding new customers for atomic energy, the notion that the spread of nuclear plants and equipment can be embargoed is unrealistic.

Whenever I see a reference to “international” efforts to pressure Iran on the nuclear issue, I have to remind myself that there is much less international consensus on this issue than sanctions advocates would have us think. Gvosdev explains part of the reason here. As Yousaf Butt has argued previously, another problem is to be found in the NPT itself in that it allows the development of “breakout” capability, so there is currently no legal framework to prevent states from developing these capabilities within the limits of the treaty.

Gvosdev also quotes Brent Scowcroft on the regime change/democracy-as-panacea argument as it relates to proliferation, “Any approach to stemming nuclear proliferation that singles out specific countries . . . is not likely to succeed. . . . And an approach that relies on determining the character of regimes to assess worthiness to use nuclear energy is full of loopholes.” It doesn’t help matters that four nuclear-weapons states no longer or never have subscribed to the NPT, and two of these rank among the worst proliferators of nuclear technology in the world. Intensifying pressure on Iran may eventually push the regime to decide to withdraw from the treaty rather than hide behind it, and that would represent a major blow to the nonproliferation regime.