Daniel Larison

Of Terrorists and Freedom Fighters

Hanson’s Strange Teutonophobia

By Daniel Larison • May 17, 2012, 2:25 AM

Fortunately, Victor Davis Hanson does not teach modern European history:

There is one general rule about the history of the modern state of Germany since its inception in 1871: Anytime Germany has been both unified and isolated, armed conflict has followed.

We often scoff at such quaint historical laws — forgetting that World War I followed from the inability of the French to harness German nationalism after the Franco-Prussian War [bold mine-DL].

The causes of WWI were many and complicated, but I think I am on safe ground in saying that WWI did not follow “from the inability of the French to harness German nationalism after the Franco-Prussian War” (whatever that might mean). Germany wasn’t “isolated” in 1914, and that was part of the problem. It was lending its support to its Austro-Hungarian ally, which had been pursuing a policy in the Balkans that the Russians found increasingly difficult to tolerate, and it was forging closer ties with the Ottomans during the two decades before the war. Germany committed itself to backing the folly of its Austrian ally, which soon turned into a continental war once Russia began mobilizing against Austria and Germany responded by activating its own military plans against Russia and France. The Germans did feel threatened by the Franco-Russian alliance, which had come about partly because of the blundering of German foreign policy after Bismarck. That alliance did not lead to the start of the war by itself, but it guaranteed its escalation. Hanson seems to be reviving the most simplistic description of Germany’s WWI “war guilt” and using it as a starting point for his analysis of contemporary European politics.

Hanson’s poor explanation of the origins of WWI seems to be tied to his latest preoccupation, which is the idea that the eurozone crisis will somehow lead to German “rearmament” and new armed conflict in Europe. As Hanson admits, “The very thought of an armed, powerful — and increasingly exasperated — Germany, furious at its neighbors for a fourth time, seems silly, given the country’s success and security.” Yes, it does. So why has he written an entire column about it?

Posted in foreign policy, history, politics.

16 Responses to Hanson’s Strange Teutonophobia

German_reader says:

May 17, 2012 at 10:07 am

Mr Larison,

I greatly appreciate your column which is always profundly intelligent; and I totally agree with your main point (Hanson’s fears about Germany are just bizarre). However I have to disagree somewhat with your assesment of Austria-Hungary’s actions in 1914: in retrospect they can of course be seen as “folly” because they ultimately led to a continent-wide conflagration that destroyed Austria-Hungary and the entire pre-1914 system. But in my opinion the Austrians had every right to be outraged with Serbia over the assasination of archduke Franz-Ferdinand. The heir to the throne had been murdered by Serbian terrorists who had been trained and equipped by the Serbian secret service, quite possibly with the knowledge of Serbia’s civilian leadership. That just was a provocation too far and would have caused a harsh response by any great power at the time. I’d also say that Russia’s role in all of this (constantly stoking tensions by appeals to Panslavism) was far from benign. I personally have some sympathy for today’s Serbia and believe that the 1999 Kosovo war was highly unjust. But that shouldn’t colour one’s assessment of the situation in 1914. In many ways the Serbia of 1914 really was a “rogue state” destabilizing the Balkans; Austria-Hungary’s reaction to Sarajevo may have been foolish but it was also perfectly understandable.
German_reader says:

May 17, 2012 at 10:26 am

Oh, I see my fast comment wasn’t devoured by disqus…sorry for the double post (disqus is still evil though).
daniel_larison says:

May 17, 2012 at 10:42 am

Thanks for the comment and the kind words. I’m not a fan of this commenting system, either. This is the first time I have used it as a blogger or as a commenter, and I don’t see any advantages over the system we used to have. I will do my best to approve comments as quickly as I can. Thanks in advance to everyone for your patience.

Re: Austria and Serbia, I agree that the Austrians had every right to be outraged by the assassination. However, I take a slightly different view of Austria’s decision to declare war, because Serbia agreed to all but one demand in Austria’s ultimatum. Even the Kaiser declared that Serbia’s acceptance of most of Austria’s terms had removed the reason for a war. The initial Austrian response to the assassination was understandable, but plunging into the war after almost all of its demands had already been accepted was what I regard as Austria’s truly disastrous blunder.
ThusBloggedAnderson says:

May 17, 2012 at 11:36 am

Agree with Daniel – Austria’s demands were designed to force a war, and they weren’t going to take “okay” for an answer. David Stevenson:

“The Serbian evidence confirms that Austria-Hungary had good grounds for rigorous demands. But it also shows that the Belgrade government was anxious for a peaceful exit from the crisis whereas the Austrians meant to use it as a pretext for violence. Austria-Hungary’s joint council of ministers decided on 7 July that the ultimatum should be so stringent as to ‘make a refusal almost certain, so that the road to a radical solution by means of a military action should be opened.’”

(… Re: Disqus, I like it – as more blogs use it, it lets me keep up more easily with where I’ve commented, who’s responded, etc. )
MBunge says:

May 17, 2012 at 11:42 am

I’ve read, like, one real book on World War I but even before that, I knew that German nationalism wasn’t a main factor in bringing it about. Is there no one in VDH’s circle who laughs in his face when he brings up stuff like this?

Mike
daniel_larison says:

May 17, 2012 at 11:52 am

Once the July crisis started, German nationalists played their part in tying the hands of their government by making it more politically difficult not to go to war. However, the same is true of nationalists in all of the major belligerent states that went to war in 1914.
German_reader says:

May 17, 2012 at 11:56 am

Yes, you’re of course right about this – many leading Austrians saw the July crisis as the perfect opportunity to “punish” Serbia and actively wanted war, completely disregarding all the Serbs’ attempts for a diplomatic solution. As you pointed out in your blog post, Germany’s assurance of unconditional support for Austria-Hungary was crucial in this respect since it enabled the Austrians to adopt an aggressively confrontational approach they might otherwise have avoided.
All in all a series of avoidable blunders and miscalculations that’s still rather depressing, even nearly a century later.
tbraton says:

May 17, 2012 at 12:43 pm

“I’m not a fan of this commenting system, either. This is the first time I have used it as a blogger or as a commenter, and I don’t see any advantages over the system we used to have.”

I’m glad to see that I am not the only one to think that. When you find out what the advantages are supposed to be, please let me know.
Jack Ross says:

May 17, 2012 at 5:21 pm

I fear your adopted Orthodoxy may be blinding you to, for lack of a better phrase, Russian war guilt. Have you read McMeekin?
andken says:

May 17, 2012 at 11:15 pm

I do see ann advantage: I was not managing to register to comment in the old blog.
andken says:

May 17, 2012 at 11:16 pm

The advantage is that Disqus makes moderating comments easier while do not forcing commenters to register in each blog that they comment.
andken says:

May 17, 2012 at 11:17 pm

There is another thing. This German Bashing by movement conservatives in the US is tiring. So tiring as their French bashing.
ThusBloggedAnderson says:

May 18, 2012 at 10:25 am

Have you read Richard Evans’s review of McMeekin? Less there than meets the eye.

That said, Russia’s general mobilization was hugely important; on the other hand, the German general staff pretty much relied on the Serbia crisis to start the war against Russia that they feared they couldn’t win in another ten years.
daniel_larison says:

May 18, 2012 at 10:39 am

I didn’t address Russia’s role in escalating the war in this post, but I am not at all blind to it. Once Russian mobilization began, the Germans put their plans in motion and there was no clear way to avoid a continental war at that point. The Russian government bears a lot of responsibility for turning what could have been a limited Austrian-Serbian war into one of the worst slaughters in history. After what had happened in the war with Japan and in the 1905-06 revolution, the Russian decision for war in 1914 seems almost inexplicable.
Cornel Lencar says:

May 18, 2012 at 11:27 am

Had the British protectionism measures against the expanding German industrial machine played any role in the arming of Germany and trying to find outlets and expansion in the east?
Sean Nelson says:

May 18, 2012 at 10:10 pm

Ever since 9/11, Hanson’s been more of an ideologue than a scholar. I enjoyed his take on the demise of liberal education and his book, “The Western Way of War.” At st. John’s College in 2001, he gave the best commencement address I’ve ever heard. But he lost his right to be taken at face value over the last decade. It’s sad to see a once-respectable mind taken over by a great idea.