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Domestic Obstacles to Diplomacy

Nikolas Gvosdev looks at the reaction to diplomatic efforts in the Snowden case and relates it to obstacles to diplomacy with Iran and the Taliban: In last week’s column I raised the question of whether the United States can succeed in achieving its strategic objectives with regard to stability in Afghanistan and curtailing Iran’s nuclear […]

Nikolas Gvosdev looks at the reaction to diplomatic efforts in the Snowden case and relates it to obstacles to diplomacy with Iran and the Taliban:

In last week’s column I raised the question of whether the United States can succeed in achieving its strategic objectives with regard to stability in Afghanistan and curtailing Iran’s nuclear ambitions through negotiations with the Taliban and the new government of Iranian President Hasan Rouhani. But if the reaction of U.S. pundits to the Obama administration’s efforts to get accused NSA leaker Edward Snowden extradited are any indication, then the sort of protracted diplomatic efforts needed to resolve the Iran and Afghanistan crises are likely to run into considerable domestic political resistance.

I think this is right, but I would add something else. Negotiations with Iran or the Taliban are bound to face strong resistance because there are many hawks that have opposed any serious negotiations from the start. Hawkish critics of Obama’s handling of the Snowden case nonetheless want his efforts to succeed, because they also want Snowden handed over. Of course, they would be the first to cry foul if Obama engaged in “wheeling and dealing” to give Russia a reason to send him to the U.S., because they are instinctively opposed to making such deals. These same hawks aren’t interested in pursuing negotiations with Iran and the Taliban, except in the very unlikely scenario in which both capitulate to all U.S. demands. So they will exploit any protracted negotiations to undermine them and to pronounce them as failed before they have a chance to work.

Gvosdev notes that there is very little room for maneuver in negotiations with Iran:

Sanctions on Iran, previously a matter of executive orders, are now codified in U.S. legislation, meaning the U.S. president does not have the ability to offer incentives should Rouhani begin to take incremental steps toward halting or even rolling back Iran’s nuclear program. It is easy for talks to deadlock if a negotiating partner does not have confidence that an up-front concession will be met by a reciprocal U.S. gesture or if it does not trust the slow and sometimes sclerotic U.S. policy process to work with sufficient rapidity.

One of the obstacles to successful diplomacy with Iran is that many Americans assume that negotiations are simply another instrument to compel Iran to yield to all U.S. demands without having to make any concession to Iran. The fixation on making a military option seem “credible” to Iran is informed by the mistaken idea that Iran will become more compliant only if it is under threat of an illegal attack, and the only “concession” that many are willing to offer is to refrain from launching that attack. This fails to grasp that the U.S. and Iran are at odds on this issue in part because Iran takes for granted that it will be attacked sooner or later, which is one of the reasons why there is so little trust between the two governments. It is difficult to enter into negotiations in good faith with any party that reserves the right to attack your country for doing something that you believe you have every right to do.

Gvosdev also sees very little tolerance in the U.S. for concessions in negotiations:

Linked to this is a growing sentiment that it is somehow unseemly for the U.S. to be seen offering concessions. Liberal commentators endlessly worry about whether doing so constitutes a reward for bad behavior, paying people off for doing what they ought to be doing in the first place; conservatives see concessions in the course of diplomatic negotiations as akin to appeasement or capitulation.

What both groups miss is that there have to be incentives in order to get another government to compromise, and this is especially true when it concerns an issue that the other government considers to be extremely important. Many Americans don’t like the idea of giving an oppressive regime an incentive to reach an agreement because they think this demonstrates some form of approval of that government’s conduct, but all that it does is give the other government a reason to back down and compromise without suffering humiliation. Unfortunately, many hawks in the U.S. view negotiating as something that is humiliating in itself, which is why there is so little patience with negotiations.

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