The argument for Middle East democracy that Hamid sketches above sees political participation as a release-valve for Arab grievances. But what are those grievances? As they relate to the United States they are: the basing of U.S. combat forces in the region and support for Israel.

So the idea that democratic participation would actually give aggrieved citizens some relief seems to imply that a democratic government would actually have to address and ameliorate those grievances.

In such a context, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to conclude that the advance of democracy in the Middle East could mean empowering governments that take a decidedly colder attitude toward America (and Israel). They might not go so far as to sever ties, but if you consider that a long-standing and democratic ally like Japan wants to reconfigure America’s basing agreements, it wouldn’t be a stretch to see newly empowered democratic states in the Middle East start pushing back against American military power in the region. ~Greg Scoblete

Greg refers to this column by Shadi Hamid, who mentions the phenomenon of “Bush nostalgia” among Arab reformers. This is sad for a couple reasons. No one in the region (or anywhere else) should ever feel nostalgia for the Bush years. However underwhelmed or disappointed one is with Obama for any number of reasons, Bush nostalgia is a horrible refuge. U.S. and allied policies during the Bush administration caused more harm and upheaval in the region than anything at least since the invasion of Kuwait. To the extent that the “freedom agenda” was welcomed by Arab reformers, the promises made in its name were never going to be applied consistently and regularly to Arab states.

So the more important point is that Arab reformers have little or nothing about which they can feel nostalgic. The “freedom agenda” was applied half-heartedly when it was applied at all in Arab countries, and the administration quickly abandoned its efforts in Egypt at the first sign of resistance from Mubarak. I don’t fault the administration for backing away from some of its more fantastical ideas, but I would stress that Arab reformers cannot point to much of anything substantive that they received as a result of the “freedom agenda.” Hamid mentions that Obama’s Cairo speech raised expectations that have since been dashed, which is true enough, but the “freedom agenda” was just the same: long on idealistic rhetoric and hints of changes in policy that never really materialized.

Were allied Arab states to become much more democratic, their governments would be obliged to pay more attention to the grievances Greg mentions, and that would make the divergence of perceived interests between our governments difficult to paper over. An important factor in determining how “cool” relations with the U.S. became would be the American response to the more forceful and frequent expression of long-held objections to U.S. policy and military presence in the region. So far, our official and popular reactions to Japanese objections to the Futenma basing deal does not give much reason to think that the response would be particularly constructive. Washington is not very used to having many allies that pursue independent foreign policies, and it does not respond well to allies that resist or criticize U.S. policies. Americans tend to expect deference and gratitude from our allies, and much of our political class tends to categorize anything other than this as evidence of growing “anti-Americanism.”

At some point, allied states might begin to question whether it is their security interests, rather than Washington’s geopolitical ambitions, that are being served by the alliance. Like Hatoyama’s rhetoric of solidarity and fraternity (yuai) and his tentative proposal for an East Asian union, these allied states might begin discussing the possibility of regional economic and political cooperation with the neighboring states against which the U.S. is supposed to defend them. It might be possible for Washington to adjust to a world with many democratized Arab states that distance themselves from the United States in some ways, but more likely we would have to endure years of acrimonious domestic debate and recriminations over “who lost Oman.” Our politicians would try to outdo one another with promises to restore American “credibility” in the region, and the government would probably back the occasional coup against Islamist or populist Arab leaders. If American reactions to political change in Latin America are any indication, we would start hearing grave warnings about this or that anti-American Arab demagogue representing the next great threat to global peace.