Bob Corker wins some sort of prize for chutzpah with this op-ed:

As Syria slips further into chaos, America is acting hesitantly at a pivotal moment for our national interests and for those of our allies in the region [bold mine-DL].

Unlike many of his Republican Senate colleagues, Corker is on record as a vocal skeptic of aiding the Syrian opposition. Just one year ago, Corker was very leery of greater U.S. involvement in the conflict. He certainly didn’t think this was a “pivotal moment for our national interests” twelve months ago, and nothing has happened in Syria in the last year that would have changed that. Josh Rogin reported at the time:

“I don’t think we know enough about the opposition groups that have become involved or what might happen should Bashar be gone,” said Corker. He said that the information the administration has given him in secret doesn’t match the rhetoric administration officials use when talking about the Syrian opposition in public.

“In the classified briefings I’ve had, I don’t get the sense at all that this is about democracy, OK? This is not some sort of George Washington thing we’re watching,” he said, drawing a distinction between the Syrian uprising and the American revolution.

Fast forward a year. Corker has since replaced Dick Lugar as the ranking Republican member on the Foreign Relations Committee, and now he is suddenly so concerned about administration “dithering” on Syria that he wants to arm the “moderate” opposition. Corker writes:

We must use American resources and ingenuity to help change that — beyond the “nonlethal assistance” we currently provide. This will require weapons and training for rebel units vetted by the United States as well as assistance to improve leadership skills, and cohesiveness in both military and civilian institutions. We should not be engaged in nation building, but we can certainly support Syrians committed to rebuilding their country.

But sending arms alone will not solve the problem. After all, small arms are already flowing to combatants from other sources in the region at an alarming rate. By more fully engaging vetted units and training them to respect the law of armed conflict, protect critical infrastructure and secure dangerous weapons sites, America can make a down payment on Syria’s future by building relationships with future partners.

It goes without saying that Corker never explains why the U.S. “must” do any of the things he recommends. He goes on to say that the U.S. “must be more aggressive in stopping Iranian support for Mr. Assad,” but does not explain what he means by this or how the U.S. would be able to do this. His proposal that the U.S. create “common cause” between Sunnis and Alawites seems utterly unrealistic under the present circumstances.

Corker’s proposal for policing the support provided to anti-Assad forces seems unworkable. Corker writes:

Likewise, public and private sources of support for anti-Assad extremists in Syria should be publicized and targeted with sanctions. Other countries opposed to Mr. Assad, including American allies, must also be much more selective about who they arm and support in the war in Syria.

I have no idea why the Saudis and Qataris would agree to be “much more selective” about which proxies they support in Syria. They are trying to buy influence, and they aren’t likely to be very interested in which groups Washington finds acceptable. Corker’s policy is so filled with qualifications and caveats that it’s clear he doesn’t think that greater U.S. involvement makes much sense. As the ranking Republican member on the FRC, he feels the need to argue for a policy that he thought was unwise just a few months ago. The result is a muddle that makes no sense and is sure to please absolutely no one.

The differences between the administration’s policy and Corker’s position are not that great, and Corker admits as much:

Like the president, I am reluctant to commit the United States as an active participant in a complex and distant war and do not support the deployment of American forces to topple Mr. Assad. But the time for “leading from behind” is over.

In fact, Corker favors doing exactly this, but doesn’t want it to be perceived that way. Fortunately, he isn’t calling for direct intervention in the Syrian conflict. Unfortunately, feels compelled to demand that the U.S. “do more” than it is doing now, so he offers up a half-baked proposal for a limited escalation in U.S. involvement. That makes Corker’s proposal a prime example of demanding that the U.S. “do more” in the conflict simply for the sake of doing it.