fbpx
Politics Foreign Affairs Culture Fellows Program

Conservative Internationalism and the “Freedom Agenda”

Henry Nau responds to Michael Desch’s review of Conservative Internationalism. He is trying very hard to dissociate his idea from Bush, with whom he has much in common: But conservative internationalists do not believe you can spread liberty everywhere at once, as George W. Bush did. They prioritize the spread of freedom on the borders […]

Henry Nau responds to Michael Desch’s review of Conservative Internationalism. He is trying very hard to dissociate his idea from Bush, with whom he has much in common:

But conservative internationalists do not believe you can spread liberty everywhere at once, as George W. Bush did. They prioritize the spread of freedom on the borders of existing freedom, much the way realists discipline the use of force by geopolitics. Thus, securing freedom in Ukraine and Turkey along the border of existing freedom in Europe counts for more than securing freedom in Georgia, Iraq, Afghanistan, or other countries remote from the borders of freedom; and securing freedom in South Korea and Taiwan in Asia counts for more than securing freedom in Burma or Mongolia. Bush 43 did just the opposite: he paid little attention to democracy in Turkey, Ukraine, or South Korea in his zeal to spread it to Iraq and Afghanistan.

This conveys very well how little difference there is between Nau’s conservative internationalism and Bush’s foreign policy. Both are committed to an unnecessary and sometimes reckless “freedom agenda,” and disagree only about where to focus their efforts. They both assume that the U.S. has a mission and a responsibility to spread freedom where it doesn’t exist and secure it on the “border,” which treats the domestic political developments of other countries as if they were things that the U.S. could competently manipulate in a certain direction. Both expect a “domino” effect that never comes, and they differ only on where to start. This is a meddlesome and arrogant doctrine, but more important it is one that fixates on the wrong goal for U.S. foreign policy while creating needless tension with other major powers. We already saw how poorly the “freedom agenda” went when Bush paid less attention to Ukraine than Nau prefers, so we can just imagine how explosive and dangerous a more activist U.S. approach to Ukrainian politics could be.

One inherent flaw in all of this is that democratization and the spread of freedom are not the same thing and do not necessarily go hand in hand. As the Turkish case shows, the more democratic and populist a government is, the more illiberal and authoritarian it can become. Another flaw is one shared with all forms of U.S.-led democracy promotion, which is the incorrect assumption that the people in a particular country desire American help in changing their country’s political system. Especially in countries that already have established democratic governments, there is probably no quicker way to anger local nationalists and rub people the wrong way than to have the U.S. lecturing them on how they should improve.

Finally, the main conceptual flaw is that freedom has a “border” that needs to be expanded. As mistaken as it is to see Jefferson and Polk as internationalists, it is equally mistaken to advocate for territorial expansionism on behalf of “freedom.” Not only is this not the proper role of the U.S., but it misses that many countries on one side of the “border” can become and already are becoming more illiberal for their own reasons. The division doesn’t exist only between countries or regions, but is always present in every country. The preoccupation with expansion will probably cause us to ignore these problems at home and among our allies, and it will serve as cover for the increase of illiberal measures here for the sake of “spreading freedom” abroad.

Advertisement

Comments

The American Conservative Memberships
Become a Member today for a growing stake in the conservative movement.
Join here!
Join here