Like Greg Scoblete, I am, well, skeptical that Cameron’s Euroskepticism will have much of an effect on the “special” relationship between the U.S. and Britain. All of this assumes that Cameron can actually win enough seats to form a government, which is far less likely today than it was six months ago, but if he were to become Prime Minister I doubt Euroskepticism would figure very prominently in how he governed. Even so, one of the common themes in a lot of Tory Euroskeptic rhetoric is that Britain should align itself more and more closely with the United States and keep its distance from Europe. This view has an intelligent, learned exponent in John Redwood and a ridiculous, ideological one in Daniel Hannan. Regardless, the most reliably “pro-American” Tories are typically the biggest Euroskeptics, and Europhile Tories tend to be more critical of U.S. policy. The question is not whether a Euroskeptic-led Britain will be “relevant” or valuable to the United States (there is far more to the relationship that London’s ability to act as go-between with other Europeans), but whether the British electorate will be satisfied with a foreign policy that tilts more towards Washington than towards Brussels in ways that most British voters don’t like and which seems to get Britain nothing in exchange.

Some years back, Cameron hinted at being more independent of the United States’ line on foreign policy. This may have been partly just political posturing to identify then-PM Blair as a reflexive supporter of Washington’s positions no matter what it cost Britain. The presence of Hague as shadow foreign secretary suggests that the so-called “Love, Actually moments” inner circle Cameroons once hoped for will not materialize. Nonetheless, I think Cameron’s Euroskepticism is exaggerated. Typically, it has been the Tory modernizers who have been the most reliable Europhiles, and my guess is that Cameron will gradually drift in this direction over time. That could lead to a greater willingness to criticize and even oppose the United States on certain issues, but those tensions might be mitigated as long as the administration in Washington is as interested in green issues and climate change regulations as Cameron most likely will be.

Come to think of it, from the British perspective there is not much of a “special” relationship to endanger. Antiwar Labourites already saw this when adamant British support for every Bush administration folly was repaid with nothing. After the Falklands quarrel, Britons across the spectrum have discovered that British solidarity and loyalty win Britain no American consideration or aid in supporting its rights and claims elsewhere in the world. Were the bogus “special” relationship brought to an end and a healthy bilateral relationship based on shared interests and reciprocity allowed to take its place, Cameron might be able to stake out a position that affirms ties with Washington without identifying himself completely with the administration. If a British government could pursue a foreign policy that served British interests first and foremost, rather than subordinating those interests to whatever Washington requires, that might permit a more balanced pursuit of those same interests in its dealings with Europe.