Andrew Peek makes a predictable and unwise demand:
President Obama must speak out publicly in support of the demonstrators in Hong Kong, and the sooner the better.
There’s not really any reason why Obama must do this. Peek would like him to do it, but if Obama doesn’t it isn’t going to matter. On the other hand, if Obama did “speak out” about the protests in Hong Kong, there are several undesirable things that could happen. It would feed into the Chinese government’s paranoia about outside interference in its internal affairs. It would probably undermine the protesters by associating them with interference from outside governments, which Chinese nationalists would probably be more than happy to exploit to the detriment of the protesters. Doing this could also potentially make it harder for Beijing to make concessions to the protesters by inserting the U.S. into an internal dispute. Finally, it would inevitably harm U.S.-Chinese relations at least for the short term, and it could fuel a backlash against all things American in China. There is no likely scenario in which having the president “speak out” about these protests would benefit the protesters or make it more likely that their demands would be granted. At best, it would be a vain gesture on the part of our government, and at worst it could do real harm to the protesters and their cause.
Bizarrely, Peek believes that the U.S. must “manage the tricky question of Chinese nationalism,” and the way he thinks that the U.S. should do that is by siding with protesters that many Chinese nationalists are likely to view with suspicion and distrust. This would not “manage” Chinese nationalism so much as inflame it. Peek imagines that by supporting and encouraging civil society that Chinese nationalism might somehow be moderated, but that gets everything backwards. Democratizing countries with strong nationalist traditions will tend to become even more enthusiastically and brazenly nationalist and majoritarian in the near term, so the remedy that Peek proposes will very likely make the problem he wants to fix worse than it already is.
Overall, it’s close, with 50 percent picking the doves and 45 percent picking the hawks.
Among Republicans, though, it is decidedly not close. About seven in 10 (69 percent) say they are hawks, while just one-quarter (25 percent) side with the doves.
The definition offered for being a hawk is someone “who believes that military force should be used frequently to promote U.S. policy.” Doves are those that “the U.S. should rarely or never use military force.” It isn’t exactly news that the GOP is the disproportionately hawkish party. Even without the definition that the poll offers, I assume a huge majority of Republicans would identify as hawks because this is ingrained in Republicans’ view of what distinguishes their party from Democrats, and because it has been the default position for most people in the GOP for a very long time.
Blake concludes from this that most of the GOP isn’t going to respond favorably to a Paul candidacy, and he could be right, but then that takes for granted that Paul really is a dove and is perceived that way. As we saw in a different survey, the hawkishness or dovishness of a possible candidate is not always clear to voters, and the preferences of hawkish and dovish voters seem to match up closely with their partisan leanings. That is why most doves end up supporting the reliably hawkish Clinton in a match-up against Paul. That’s not because Clinton is a dove (she certainly isn’t), and she isn’t widely perceived as a dove, but most doves prefer her anyway for other reasons, which is one more reason why they won’t get the foreign policy that they say they want.
The CNN poll itself shows how confused people can be about these categories. 65% label Obama as a dove, and that is simply wrong according to the definition that the poll offers. The U.S. has been at war every day that Obama has been president, and Obama has initiated two wars on his own authority and very nearly started another one last summer. Obama may be relatively less hawkish than some other politicians in Washington, but that doesn’t make him a dove or anything close to it. This is a case of too many people believing what Obama’s fans and opponents say about him instead of paying attention to what Obama has done while in office. This is why there has been a flurry of articles recently claiming that Obama is a “reluctant hawk.” Looking back on the multiple wars that Obama has escalated or started in the last five years, one can only wonder and shudder in horror at what a truly eager hawk would have done.
The most interesting result is that the hawks are in the minority overall and have been consistently for most of the last decade. Previous polls asking this same question found that those identifying as hawks always account for 44 or 45% of the respondents. I imagine that some hawks will complain that the definition of their position paints them unfairly as people that constantly want to use force around the world, but then that is the position that most hawks take. That is what hawkishness means in practice, and most Americans don’t identify with that.
There was another result from the poll that deserves a brief comment. The respondents were asked if they thought “the United States should or should not take the leading role among all other countries in the world in trying to solve international problems,” and 58% said that the U.S. shouldn’t do this. Just 39% said that the U.S. should. Most Americans don’t identify with a hawkish view, and even more of them don’t buy into the global “leadership” role that their leaders, including Obama, keep trying to foist on them. That suggests that most Americans are inclined to favor a less active, less militarized U.S. role in the world and would probably be supportive of a more dovish candidate if one were available.
Seth Cropsey notes that the public doesn’t believe Obama’s claim that American forces won’t be involved in combat in Iraq and Syria:
Yet many Americans are skeptical, judging by the new NBC/Wall Street Journal/Annenberg poll showing that 72% of registered voters believe that U.S. troops will eventually be deployed. Perhaps Americans have been listening to some of the president’s senior military advisers and several retired senior officers and have decided that their expert opinions sound more realistic.
It is more likely that Americans expect that U.S. forces will end up fighting a ground war in these countries because recent experience has taught them that this is often what happens with wars of choice. For that matter, Obama’s assurances that this won’t happen can’t be very meaningful at this point. Just a few months ago, he was assuring us that the U.S. wouldn’t be drawn back into a war in Iraq, and when the bombing began in Iraq the administration claimed that it would not be the start of a “sustained campaign.” Before that, Obama had made U.S. withdrawal from its ongoing foreign wars the leitmotif of his foreign policy rhetoric. Now that he has committed the U.S. to a new war in the same region, and he and his officials are now boasting that the campaign will be a sustained one that will take years, so it is little wonder that few people believe him when he says there will be no “boots on the ground.”
Meanwhile, it doesn’t taken much in the way of expertise to guess that a war ostensibly dedicated to “destroying” ISIS in two countries isn’t going to be successful on its own terms by relying on a few “moderate” Syrian rebels, Kurdish militias, and an Iraqi army whose failures made ISIS’ expansion in Iraq possible. The fact that the public expects this to happen doesn’t mean that most Americans want it to happen. Opposition to having Americans fighting this war on the ground is as strong as ever, but the gap between the administration’s rhetoric about the war’s goals and the means that they are using to achieve them is so large and obvious that it would be very hard not to see it.
The administration could close this gap by redefining its war aims, and it could acknowledge that expanding the war into Syria was an error, but neither of these is likely to happen. Each time he had a choice about how to proceed in Iraq and Syria this year, Obama has chosen to expand this intervention’s goals after claiming the action would be “limited” and to escalate U.S. involvement after he had said that there wouldn’t be any. The public can see that Obama has yielded to pressure for escalation in the past, and they reasonably assume that he will do so again.
Perhaps the most worrisome thing about Ted Cruz is that he now bizarrely thinks foreign policy is his strong suit:
Indeed, ever since he played an instrumental role in last year’s government shutdown, Cruz has narrowed his agenda to focus on international affairs, both as an avenue to raise his profile among GOP donors and to pivot away from his reputation as a conservative kamikaze bent on wreaking havoc inside the halls of Congress [bold mine-DL].
That’s good thinking on Cruz’s part. It’s much better to be known as a hard-line kamikaze bent on wreaking havoc all over the world instead. The interesting thing about this report is that Cruz has largely confirmed the description of his foreign policy that I offered last week: “shoot first and don’t ask any questions.” This is his position in his own words:
“If and when military action is called for, it should be A) with a clearly defined military objective, B) executed with overwhelming force, and C) when we’re done we should get the heck out,” he said.
By his own admission, Cruz is quite open to using force, he wants that force to be “overwhelming,” and he doesn’t want to give the slightest thought to the aftermath. As I said, it is an approach best described as “killing lots of people and then going home.” Apart from being overly reliant on military solutions and oblivious to the consequences of war, the problem with this is that he offers no good definition of what it means to say “when we’re done.” Cruz presents his position as if it were a repudiation of costly, prolonged military intervention, but that is not the case. His preferred approach would create the conditions that would virtually guarantee a long-term U.S. commitment in the countries that he wants to attack. The fact that he can’t or won’t acknowledge this just makes his position that much worse. If Cruz thinks this is the “sweet spot” on foreign policy, he will be sorely disappointed. Conservatives that are interested in a sane, restrained, and responsible foreign policy shouldn’t be taken in by what he has to say.
Anna Nemtsova follows up on an earlier report about a Georgian offer to host a training facility for members of the Syrian opposition as part of the war against ISIS. As soon as the proposal was reported, Georgian officials were quick to disavow it for obvious reasons:
By helping out American forces in the war against both ISIS and Assad, former deputy defense minister Nodar Kharshiladze told The Daily Beast on Thursday, Georgia “automatically becomes a target for Islamist organizations” and raises the dangerous ire of the pro-Assad Kremlin.
When I first read about this proposal, I couldn’t see what Georgia could hope to gain from it. As I said at the time, it seemed like a lose-lose proposition. Georgia takes an unnecessary risk by aligning itself openly with anti-regime forces in a civil war that has nothing to do with Georgian security, thus exposing itself to possible reprisals from jihadists and interference from Russia, and it stands to receive nothing in return. Georgia has already contributed disproportionately to U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the vain hope of currying favor with Washington, but this was never going to produce the results that the Georgian government wanted. It makes no sense for Georgia to repeat that mistake by joining in the latest U.S. war effort when this will just make the country more of a target.
Western governments have consistently misled Georgia to expect that their real contributions and sacrifices in Iraq and Afghanistan would help to advance its aspirations to join NATO, and that has encouraged the Georgian government to make commitments that make no sense for their country. Georgia keeps being led on with the false promise that someday these contributions will be rewarded with meaningful commitments from the U.S. and NATO, but that isn’t going to happen. It is long past time that Western governments started telling Georgia the truth that no matter how much it contributes to these war efforts it is not going to acquire the support that it seeks.
Many groups belonging to the “moderate” Syrian opposition have denounced U.S. strikes in Syria, especially those that have targeted members of Jabhat al-Nusra, the organization affiliated with Al Qaeda that is on the State Department’s official terrorist list:
On Tuesday, nearly a dozen of the FSA’s most powerful groups signed a declaration denouncing the strikes, demanding they target the Syrian regime, too [bold mine-DL]. In a heated meeting with the Syrian opposition in Istanbul Thursday, U.S. officials demanded an explanation for the statement condemning the American-led coalition, an opposition official said.
“They said ‘friends don’t speak against friends,’ ” said an opposition official with knowledge of the meeting. “We told them, ‘true friendship means coordination.’” The meeting was confirmed by a second opposition official.
It’s not surprising that opposition groups are unhappy with the way that the U.S. is fighting this war so far. After all, their primary adversary is the Syrian government, and so far the U.S. isn’t attacking regime forces. They see the U.S. intervening directly in the civil war after years of not doing so, and they are predictably displeased that the U.S. is targeting other anti-regime groups along with ISIS.
The opposition complaints are revealing. The “moderate” opposition that the U.S. is foolishly arming and training doesn’t have the same priorities as the U.S. in this conflict (and there was never any reason to think that it would). Many groups in the FSA are opposed to and offended by military action against a jihadist group that the U.S. correctly views as a terrorist organization. That ought to be the latest in a series of flashing warning signs that the U.S. has absolutely nothing to gain in backing such “moderates.” Friends might not “speak against” friends, but it’s long past time that we realized that the U.S. doesn’t have friends–or even useful proxies–in the Syrian conflict. It is yet another reason to doubt the wisdom of expanding the ISIS war into Syria, and by extension it is another reason to doubt the wisdom of the intervention in its entirety.
Supporters of expanding the war against ISIS into Syria seem to assume that “moderate” rebels will pursue Washington’s goals, but that isn’t going to happen. Like any proxy group, the “moderate” opposition was always going to pursue its own agenda, and there was never going to be much that the U.S. could do about this, especially when it was so intent on trying to “shape” events. These opposition protests confirm what opponents of arming Syrian rebels have taken for granted from the start: providing arms to rebels isn’t going to gain the U.S. the influence or control that Syria hawks want, and the belief that the U.S. can build up a “moderate” alternative to both the regime and jihadists has always been a fantasy. As these protests remind us, many “moderate” rebels don’t consider Jabhat al-Nusra and similar groups to be their enemy, but they do predictably view the group as their ally against Assad. That underscores just how absurd the preoccupation with identifying “moderate” rebels in a brutal civil war has been from the start. It is a label created to evade the underlying problem with taking the anti-regime side in Syria’s civil war, which is that it puts the U.S. in league with jihadists or the allies of jihadists.
The editors at Bloomberg make a familiar case against bringing Ukraine into NATO:
Ukraine, a divided and almost bankrupt nation of 45 million, would first have to receive a Membership Action Plan and then meet its conditions — a process that would take many years. (Albania, which joined NATO in 2009, got its MAP in 1999.) So starting the process would merely set the clock ticking for Russia to do whatever it takes to prevent its neighbor from joining — from rekindling the war to eastern Ukraine to making a full-scale invasion.
Next, imagine that Ukraine were, miraculously, to succeed in joining NATO. It would only further destabilize the country. Even though Russia has lately done much to unite most Ukrainians against it, the east of the country still has strong cultural and historical ties to Russia. As long as the Kremlin sees and portrays NATO as a threat, a substantial share of Ukraine’s population will want no part of it. Before the annexation of Crimea, in 2010, 51 percent of Ukrainians opposed joining NATO. (In the east, 72 percent did.) Even today, polls suggest that less than half of Ukrainians want to join the alliance.
The editorial focuses on why NATO membership would be harmful to Ukraine, and I agree with all of this, but I’ll just add a few other observations. Even if the worst-case scenarios described above didn’t happen right away, Ukraine would still be a major liability for the alliance as soon as it was invited. Its future membership would be an ongoing source of tension with Russia that could erupt into another open conflict before Ukraine becomes a full member. The period between being given a MAP and accession would be extremely perilous for the country, since the alliance would not yet be obliged to defend Ukraine while Russia would have every incentive to derail Ukraine’s membership by any means available. There is now no question that Russia will do this, so it would be inexcusable to pursue further NATO expansion as if we don’t know what will happen next.
If Russia reacted so negatively to the prospect of a mere EU association agreement, we can easily imagine how much worse the Russian reaction would be to a MAP for Ukraine. Considering how unwilling members of the alliance are to extend a security guarantee to Ukraine now, it should be obvious that members of the alliance will be similarly unwilling to back up such a guarantee should the need arise in the future. That is why the notion of bringing Ukraine into NATO should be shelved permanently. U.S. relations with Russia and relations between Ukraine and Russia are best served if Ukraine remains a neutral, non-bloc country, and officially confirming Ukraine in that status is the surest available way to reduce the threat from Russia.
The most dangerous world ever? Christopher Preble debunks alarmist claims about how dangerous the world is.
Reviving the failed logic of the “war on terror.” Ramzy Mardini criticizes the administration’s new war.
Republicans shouldn’t stoke international revolution. Justin Logan refutes some of the incoherent and absurd foreign policy statements of John McCain and Lindsey Graham.
Obama doesn’t want your approval for war. Noah Feldman dismantles the administration’s absurd legal justifications for the war against ISIS.
Nixon’s advice to Reagan. John Gans revisits a memo Nixon sent to Reagan after the 1980 election and considers its relevance to contemporary foreign policy debates.
The very modern presidential salute. Brian Adam Jones reviews the very short history of this odd presidential habit.
Klaus on Europe and Russia. Neil Clark of The Spectator interviews former Czech prime minister Vaclav Klaus.
Micah Zenko picked up on something important in recent Senate testimony from Secretary Hagel and Gen. Dempsey:
MCCAIN: How will we help them—will we repel Bashar Assad’s air assets that will be attacking them?
HAGEL: Any attack on those that we have trained and who are supporting us, we will help ‘em [bold mine-DL].
In short, because the U.S. is foolishly arming and training some of the Syrian opposition, the administration believes that it is also committed to defending them from regime attacks. Note that Hagel said that “any attack” on those opposition forces would trigger U.S. “help.” So the administration appears to have committed the U.S. to go to war against the Syrian government if the regime attacks U.S. proxies, which the regime almost certainly will continue to do. That would put our forces in the absurd and dangerous position of fighting both ISIS and the Syrian regime at the same time. The legal justifications for the ISIS war are laughably weak, but there is no legal justification in U.S. or international law for what the administration is proposing here. Just in case we might hope that this was just an off-the-cuff, meaningless answer from Hagel, his position was later confirmed by the Pentagon.
Jeffrey Lewis calls for ending the official U.S. pretense that Israel’s nuclear arsenal is some closely-guarded secret:
Since the late 1960s, the United States has treated the fact of Israel’s nuclear weapons as an important state secret. This is absurd, and it doesn’t do anyone any favors, least of all our friends in Israel. It’s time to declassify the fact of Israel’s bomb even if Jerusalem doesn’t admit it.
The reasons to do this are straightforward enough. Everyone already knows that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, and it has been a matter of public record for decades, so pretending that it is being kept a secret is pointless. Pretending to keep it a secret means that people can lose their security clearances and their jobs for admitting something that is already public knowledge. As Lewis points out, the rule isn’t enforced consistently. It was used earlier this year to punish Jim Doyle, a LANL employee who wrote an article that included a reference to Israel’s arsenal, but it hasn’t been enforced in other more high-profile cases:
One obvious downside to our absurd policy of refusing to acknowledge Israel’s bomb is that it ends up being enforced in an arbitrary and capricious manner. When Bob Gates, during his 2006 confirmation hearing to be secretary of Defense, referred to Iran being surrounded by nuclear-armed neighbors including “the Israelis to the West,” nothing happened — even though he had served as director of central intelligence and maintained his clearances. I’ve certainly heard plenty of current and former officials, in private conversation, state the obvious. It’s hard not to mention. Hell, even Ehud Olmert, when he was Israeli prime minister, slipped up once. As a result, the classification is little more than a handy excuse to prosecute someone we don’t like for some other reason — such as writing annoying articles about disarmament while working for a nuclear weapons lab or something.
As Lewis goes on to explain, the solution is very simple:
Change WPN-136 Foreign Nuclear Capabilities to declassify the “fact” that the United States intelligence community has believed that Israel has possessed nuclear weapons since the 1970s. That’s it. We don’t have to declassify the details of the stockpile. And we don’t have to hold a press conference….But U.S. officials should be free to acknowledge the obvious without fear of losing their clearances and their jobs. That’s all.
Israel is free to continue its policy of not acknowledging the existence of its nuclear weapons, but the U.S. shouldn’t be forcing people working for the government to “keep” a secret that was revealed long ago.