“Social conservatives may come to see one of the leading candidates as solid enough on their values issues, while keeping the national focus on the major issue of the day — defeating Communism for Reagan, and fixing Iraq and winning the war on terror for a McCain or a Romney,” Mr. Dallek said.

Yet this outcome seems an unlikely prospect to some political analysts.

In a survey of voters in the 2006 elections, the Pew Forum found that so-called values issues like opposition to same-sex marriage and abortion rights mattered the most to white evangelical Protestant voters. Forty-five percent of them ranked values issues highest; 17 percent chose the war in Iraq; and 12 percent cited illegal immigration.

“White evangelical Protestants are not only still a real component of the Republican Party, but they are also concentrated in key primary states like South Carolina, Florida and Virginia,” said John Green, a senior fellow in religion and American politics at the Pew Forum. “They are not going away, and it’s too soon to say how fractured they will be.” ~Patrick Healy

But there is a road, and in a weird year with a weak field, I wouldn’t be shocked to see him [Giuliani] pull it off. ~Ross Douthat

I appreciate Ross’ comments on my recent Giuliani post, and I agree that Giuliani’s likely slippage of support because of social issues is not overwhelming when we are looking at the national electorate as a whole as the Gallup poll was doing.  I also agree that there is a road to the nomination for Giuliani.  It is a muddy, hole-filled road frequently beset by banditos and highwaymen, and it has many treacherous switchbacks high in the mountain passes where there are often avalanches and attacks from wild animals, but there is a road.  I would be shocked to see Giuliani make it on such a road, but then I’m fairly surprised that he’s embarking on the journey at all.    

I am surprised because of the figures from that Pew report and because of that list of primary states where evangelicals wield significant influence.  If approximately three times as many evangelicals placed “values” ahead of Iraq in 2006 (when, by almost everyone else’s standards, Iraq was far and away the most important single issue), that suggests that Giuliani’s potential for making inroads among these evangelical voters on the basis of some vague “leadership” or “security” appeal has a fairly low ceiling.  These “values voters” won’t ever vote for guys who have gone in drag–you can quote me on that one.  Some have told us that 2006 was the eclipse of the “values voter” and that the old red-meat appeals on “values” issues did not succeed as they once did, but this is to mistake GOP defeat at the hands of alienated independents for a lack of zeal among religious conservatives on these traditional issues.  Come the primaries, these people will be out in force to try to weed out the candidates that do not see things their way. 

If Republicans voted in a national primary, Giuliani’s chances would be greatly improved, not least because the traditional kingmaking early primary and caucus states where Giuliani is going to have a very hard time would be overwhelmed by the numbers from the more urbanised and homogenised parts of the country.  In a national primary, instead of being forced to win over social conservatives in the early states, such as South Carolina (and even Iowa) where they pack a strong political punch, he would be able to draw on a variety of secular and moderate Republicans and would not feel obliged to assuage the doubts of social conservatives to the same degree; his fate would be much less in their hands.  This is just one more reason why a national primary would be very bad (for many of the same reasons why eliminating the Electoral College would be disastrous): it would privilege urban, secular candidates and significantly weaken the campaigns of religious conservatives.  Today something like a Brownback or Huckabee candidacy is a long shot; in a national primary, it would simply be an absolute no-hope absurdity.  The profoundly “unrepresentative” quality of the early primary and caucus states is one sure way to make sure that the rest of the country–normally left more or less for dead by Washington, New York and L.A.–receives at least some modicum of representation in our political process, which is otherwise overwhelmingly geared to the policy agenda and interests of major urban centers.

Consequently, Giuliani will have to explain to libertarians and conservatives in New Hampshire why they should want an anti-gun candidate as their man in ’08, and he probably will not be able to satisfy them.  He will have to face significant evangelical blocs in Iowa, South Carolina, Florida, Virginia and across the South and, to a lesser extent, in the West.  He will have to go to state after state where they have voted down gay marriage and explain why he marched in gay pride parades and supports “civil unions.”  When he tries to change the subject to other topics where he is stronger, his critics will grow emboldened and start hitting him with all manner of negative ads saying, “Stop trying to change the subject, Giuliani!” 

If his strength right now vis-a-vis McCain is the counterintuitive appeal that he has for conservatives (even though by every measure McCain is vastly more conservative than Giuliani–reflect on that horrifying thought for a moment), the effect of a competitive social conservative on his levels of support would be devastating.  If he had a chance of succeeding, Giuliani would have to be able to sell himself, as Bush improbably did, as the “real conservative” alternative to McCain.  McCain, after all, inspires distrust and loathing among conservatives unlike almost any other figure, so the only way to beat McCain in a head-to-head contest is by coming at him from the right.  But Giuliani has so much more distance to make up and so much more baggage than Bush ever did that he will never be able to pull it off.  Romney has positioned himself to attack McCain in this way, but as I have detailed in many other posts he has some problems of credibility and identity politics that are in some ways even more damaging than Giuliani’s liabilities. 

Because of the distrust and uncertainty they also inspire, McCain and Romney, despite their fairly impressive organisational achievements, fundraising and strings of endorsements, will similarly have great difficulty in South Carolina.  I suspect the Palmetto State will give us surprises in both contests next year.  (Biden and Brownback victories, perhaps?)  The momentum the S.C. primary gives or takes away may well be what decides things for both parties.  

If Giuliani hopes to get the nomination, he has to hope that South Carolina, where he will probably fare very poorly, is entirely overshadowed by the other states that have been pushing their elections to early February.  After weak third place finishes or worse in Iowa and New Hampshire, Giuliani will be in the sorry situation of Lieberman, whom he resembles quite a lot as a would-be nominee for his party, as he will find himself boasting of his three-way split decision for third place.  As has been noted in more than a few places, Lieberman was the anointed frontrunner and obvious favourite in all of the polls at this same time in 2003.  Then came Howard Dean virtually out of nowhere.  He obviously failed to win the nomination, but he and Edwards did manage to effectively knock out Gephardt and Lieberman, who had been treated as leading candidates until that point.  Something similar could very easily happen to any of the anointed frontrunners on the GOP side next year, and Giuliani will be just about the easiest of the three to knock down.   

Speaking of Dean, Vilsack is attempting to position himself as the Dean of this cycle (the small-state governor who attacks the war to win over progressive activists), but Richardson really has the makings of the successful centrist-but-antiwar Democratic candidate.  (I don’t say this with any great satisfaction, since I think he would be a terrible President.)  He can campaign against the war as Dean did, but by using a much more polished campaigning style and invoking his foreign policy resume (which is not to say that his resume is worth anything).  I don’t say this out of home state favouritism, since I wish it weren’t the case, but Richardson begins to look like an increasingly credible challenger on the Democratic side.  

Update: I forgot to mention Giuliani’s greatest liability with all decent-minded voters: he is a Yankees fan.  There are some things that will simply not allow for any compromise, and resistance to the Yankees, their fans and all their works is one of them. Besides, what respectable man from Brooklyn of his generation could be a Yankee fan? To millions of old Brooklyn Dodgers fans and their children (such as yours truly), there could be no greater betrayal.