Turkey is the closest thing the Middle East has to a “model,” one of only two countries in the world led by a democratically elected Islamist party. According to a 2009 survey, 64 percent of Arab respondents in seven countries believe “Turkey’s EU membership prospects make Turkey an attractive partner for reform in the Arab world.” Considering its growing regional importance, the U.S. cannot afford for Turkey to turn inward and become embroiled in conflict between its secularist military and Islamist-leaning government. For a time, Turkey’s desire to join the EU provided incentives to implement wide-ranging legal and political reforms. However, as the EU drags its feet on accession talks, and Turks lose hope in EU membership, the reform process looks less encouraging than ever. Turkey must, however, remain enmeshed in Western institutions and partnerships. The Obama administration should use its leverage with European allies to ensure the accession process moves forward. ~Shadi Hamid (original article here)

There are a few points to be made in response here, and one of them relates back to the earlier discussion on democratization we have been having. The first is that the previous administration made a very concerted, very public effort to push Turkish accession all the way back in 2002, and it backfired spectacularly. There was already opposition to Turkish membership before that, but the use of U.S. pressure to try to force the EU to accept Turkey intensified European opposition as Europeans naturally resented being told by Americans how to conduct their own affairs. Even if this pressure were applied privately, the response would likely be much the same.

In the wake of the Greek debt crisis and the financial woes of many new EU members in central and eastern Europe, it is doubtful that the major EU member states would want to have anything to do with expanding to include Turkey. To the extent that European federalism is gaining strength politically, expansion will seem less desirable. It has been the goal of opponents of EU consolidation to dilute the Union through expansion, but there is not much Euroskeptic support for Turkish membership, either. This is because there is enough nationalist and anti-immigration sentiment across much of Europe to make Turkish accession unpopular for reasons that have nothing to do with the functioning of the EU. Even if it were prudent to apply pressure on behalf of Turkey, what leverage does Washington have that could overcome all of this?

To hear Western critics of the AKP tell it, the problem with Turkey outside the EU is not that it will turn “inward,” but that it will turn east by improving relations with Iran and Russia. This does not necessarily have to be a problem at all, and should instead be viewed in Washington as a welcome development. My guess is that Turkish credibility as an “honest broker” in the region is enhanced by remaining outside the EU, and it is better able to pursue an increasingly independent and influential foreign policy apart from Europe.

This brings me back to one of Hamid’s earlier posts:

But I think Larison overstates the U.S. fear of states pursuing what he calls “independent foreign policies,” especially since there are already two Middle Eastern countries that actively and unapologetically do just that – Turkey and Qatar. They also happen to be close American allies. I’d be comfortable making the argument that, despite their hobnobbing with Iran and sympathy toward Hamas, both countries are more effective American allies than, say, Egypt and Jordan, precisely because their foreign policy conduct is perceived to be more independent and in line with popular Arab sentiment.

I would be comfortable making the same argument, but over the last seven or eight years many in the U.S. have come to view Turkey as a bad ally because of this independence. Washington has become unaccustomed to having close allies that are not also reflexively supportive allies, and Washington tends to sour on allies that attempt to show some independence. Most recently, the administration does not seem to know what to do with Hatoyama’s government in Japan. While Hamid and I regard the pursuit of independent foreign policies by allies as not only inevitable but also potentially helpful, I doubt that this is a view widely shared in the government. I would be very pleased to be wrong on this point, but right now I’m not seeing Washington adapt very well to the rise of increasingly independent democratic allies, to say nothing of future democratic Arab states that might decide to align themselves with other powers.