The Squeeze That Wasn’t
I challenge the increasingly marginal number of pundits, pols and bloggers who are blaming this incident on the Obama administration to explain to me exactly where and how Obama has changed U.S. policy on Israel in any material or substantive fashion. ~Kevin Sullivan
Of course, he has not, which is what I argue was the mistake that makes this quarrel over this particular settlement expansion ultimately so unimportant. Obama has been facing something of a no-win situation on Israel policy (is there any other kind?). He cannot make material or substantive changes to U.S. policy without calling down ten times the condemnation from Congress and assorted pundits he already has, and if he effectively tolerates the status quo, as he has been doing for the last year, he is declared a foreign policy failure and a weak leader. Because there was no “or else” to the call for a settlement freeze, Netanyahu called Obama’s bluff, and even now that there is a deterioration in relations there is no “or else.” It isn’t hard to guess what will follow. Netanyahu will press ahead, Obama will be made to look foolish, and the hawks who absolutely do not want him to pressure Israel in any way will nonetheless seize on the incident to declare him weak and ineffectual.
One of the most irritating memes in conservative commentary these days is the idea that Obama subverts allies and aids rivals. They have been pushing this one right from the beginning. This is a pretty blatant accusation of treachery and/or naivete, and it isn’t true. Naturally, this latest quarrel with Israel has become another entry on the indictment against Obama for the supposed “squeeze” he puts on allies. The only trouble with this argument is that there is no real squeeze. There is a lot of talk that I assume everyone involved knows will lead to nothing. It’s as if all of the parties know that the entire quarrel is a charade, but now that it has started it has to be played out.
Incredibly, despite the absence of any meaningful consequences for Netanyahu’s government from Washington, the administration is supposedly being very “hard” on Israel while it is being equally “soft” on Iran. There is an Iran gasoline embargo bill pending in Congress, where it has overwhelming support, and it seems unlikely that Obama would veto it if the bill came to his desk. On the other hand, the administration is throwing a public fit over the treatment of the Vice President during his visit to Israel and not doing much more than that. No honest person could conclude from this that it is Israel that has been getting the squeeze.
One thing that I have been noticing over the last few days is how readily foreign policy hawks have been adopting arguments that are normally made by opponents of Iran sanctions but have been applying them to the U.S.-Israel relationship instead. All of a sudden, the hawks have realized that public condemnation and political pressure might backfire and cause the population of another country to rally around the government Washington is trying to pressure. At last they have discovered that hectoring rhetoric and attempts to push a government into doing something it believes it has every right to do are counterproductive! Of course, this insight disappears the minute it might actually be useful in improving our Iran policy.
There are also a few crucial things that the hawks are missing that make these arguments a poor fit for Israel policy. Israeli settlement policy really does violate international law, Israel really is “flouting the will of the world” (to the extent that such a thing exists), and Israel really is more isolated today than it has been in decades. All of the things that the administration has falsely claimed about Iran’s nuclear program and its diplomatic and economic position in the world are far more true of Israel’s international position in the wake of Lebanon, Gaza, Dubai, the latest settlement announcement, and the serial incompetence of Lieberman’s Foreign Ministry. Unlike in Iran, the U.S. actually has leverage and influence in Israel, but while Washington strives mightily to conjure up some way to punish Iran it refuses to use the means available to it to try to make Israel stop doing what Washington has called on it to stop doing for decades.
It’s quite possible that the “pressure track” wouldn’t work on Israel any better than it would work on any other state, but it isn’t even part of the discussion. One reason for this is because the U.S.-Israel relationship is similar to the relationship between Russia and Iran or China and Iran. The major power patron doesn’t really believe that there is anything wrong with the client’s controversial policy, and will never bring itself to pressure the client to change the policy. Some elements within the major power’s political class may even seen the client’s policy as a desirable or useful thing. The client relies on support from the major power to shield it from the opprobrium and opposition of hostile and unsympathetic states, and the major power is invested enough in supporting the client that it isn’t really ever going to jeopardize the relationship over an issue that ultimately makes no real difference to the major power’s interests.
Excuse me, but which “international law” does Israeli settlement policy “really violate” …? The “West Bank” is simply the region beyond the armistice line where the opposing forces were deployed when the war of 1948 stopped, and it included ancient Jewish communities that were destroyed by Jordan during and after that war.
The present status of the region is control by Israel, won in w defensive war in 1967 – disputed territory subject to negotiated settlement of the agreed final borders.
It’s Arab rejection of co-existence with Jews, or with a Jewish state in the region, which is preventing that negotiated settlement.
So leave Israel alone, and go quarrell with the rejectionists who teach hatred, glorify martyrdom and treat their “brethren” like cannon fodder.
I haven’t really been following the crisis of the week because, as you say, it’s so incredibly unimportant. It’s a charade, as you said, but the same is true of almost all these little stories, like that Dubai incident. You can’t take what anyone on any side says at face value, and it doesn’t matter anyway. This little hundred-year (and still counting) tragedy in the Levant is being played out in long, slow movements in the Middle East, America, and Europe.
Good point about the Iran sanctions parallel. I think the analysis in your last paragraph is exactly correct. It’s also good that you remind people of the incompetence of the Foreign Ministry under Lieberman (whom I once actually voted for). Just as the Foreign Ministry is incompetent and not some finely-tuned component of Netanyahu’s intricate machine as Westerners seem to assume, the Interior Ministry under Shas’s Eli Yishai is a loose cannon because, well, it’s under Shas. That’s why a lot of these pundits are being pretty stupid to ass-u-me that Netanyahu approved Yishai’s settlement announcement. It’s possible he did, but not likely.
P.S. Israeli settlement policy probably does not violate international law, despite what most jurists say now. But of course international law is no more relevant than these little charades.
I agree that the crisis is a charade, but at the same time it seems unprecedented. It was a highly visible affront to the VP of the United States…has such a thing happened before? In any case, even if there are no sanctions or pressure of any kind against Israel, I don’t think you can discount the symbolic power of an apparent rift between Israel & the US.
I also don’t think you can discount the repercussions it might have domestically. Americans instinctively accept the idea that the US should support the issue, but they just as instinctively reject the idea of sending billions of dollars in aid to a country that feels they can insult American leaders with impunity. Support for Israel just became a bit harder to justify here politically. Maybe nothing will come of it; I certainly wouldn’t recommend repeat performances.
Should read: that the US should Support Israel*
No doubt I’m dense, but once the Soviet Union collapsed and the need for a counterweight to Soviet clients in the region ended, I don’t see the “special relationship” with Israel as particularly useful to the US. It’s expensive and provocative. Militarily, Israel might be a kind of “aircraft carrier” in the event of a general war in the Middle East, but that seems unlikely and doesn’t require the degree of closeness that exists.
It seems to me the policy derives from the fact that Israel’s supporters are both fervent and influential, and her opponents are less passionate and less influential; and from a kind of inertia. If the price of the “special relationship” goes up, perhaps this will change, but I don’t see Obama’s apparent personal distaste for Zionism as enough to change much in the short run.
I don’t think the blowback against Obama’s criticism of the Netanyahu government is a problem, in that Netanyahu’s government is already getting lots of criticism from within Israel for similar reasons, and is only tentatively holding onto its coalition. As I’ve said before, I think Obama is actually playing on the internal politics of Israel to give support to the opposition, and that this actually has a decent chance of working, in that Obama is looked upon favorably by a lot of people in Israel, and his frustrations add even more credibility to the opposition.
This is quite different from the situation in Iran, because obviously Israel is both a country that is very friendly with the US, and even dependent on the US, and a democracy that is not about to punish those who side with a liberal attitude and Obama’s side of the argument. In Iran, obviously, the situation is very different, in that the US is seen as an enemy, and the liberal opposition is being soundly repressed and denied any electoral capacity to change the government.
Obama is seizing upon this incident to make Netanyahu look bad, not just internationally, but more importantly within Israel. His hope is that the government will collapse over the next year and that Kadima can forge a new government that will be much easier to work with, and willing to negotiate away the settlements. Whether that works or not, Obama basically feels there’s simply no hope of any progress in the peace process with the current government of Israel in place, whereas the PA is at present much, much more flexible, and he’d like to take advantage of that before Israeli intransigence makes the Palestinians think they should return to their hard line. There’s actually more of an opening on the PA side these days than in a long time, and Obama sees Netanyahu as the main obstacle to progress. Hence, he will use any opportunity to make it clear that Netanyahu is messing up relations with the US directly, not just with the peace process, and that this is bad for Israel. Voters in Israel tend to realize that when someone is bad for their country, they need to change their leadership.
Comparing the situation to Iran is just pointless idiocy.
You cannot be this dense. I am obviously comparing U.S. policies toward the two states and the similarities between apparently counterproductive efforts to force other governments to stop doing things they believe they are entitled to do. That is the extent of the comparison. As far as it goes, I think it makes a fair amount of sense, and you haven’t said anything to persuade me otherwise. In fact, you haven’t said anything in this comment that everyone doesn’t already know. Stop wasting everyone’s time with useless complaints.
Building settlements in Jerusalem commands broad public support in Israel, just as the nuclear program commands broad public support in Iran. Washington’s efforts to pressure the respective governments on these issues have not resulted in the nations turning against their governments. The opposite seems to have happened in both places.
62% of Israelis reportedly blame Obama for the deterioration in relations, and 20% blame Netanyahu. If Obama is trying to undermine Netanyahu over this, he is failing badly.
Daniel, when I said “comparing the situation to Iran is just pointless idiocy,” I was referring to those neocons who think its hypocritical for Obama to be critical of the Israeli government and trying to pressure them into acting as we wish, and not doing the same with Iran. Something you referred to obliquely in your article. I was NOT referring to you at all, but criticizing the same people you are criticizing.
But now that you mention it, the comparison you are making to Iran is also rather insipid, in that whether a policy is popular within a foreign country has no bearing on whether we should support it or not. Often people support ideas that are really bad for their own country, as you often point out about American exceptionalism and neocon aggression. Similarly, Israelis and Iranians tend to support their own forms of jingoistic stupidity that actually hurts them rather than helps. Pointing this out can create a temporary backlash against those who do the pointing, but this does help people realize that stupid policies are indeed stupid. Americans reacted to world opinion that went against them by doubling down on their stupidity, but have come to realize that launching wars in the middle east to make the place more favorable to us doesn’t work. And the result of that was electing Obama. Many Israelis are also realizing that promoting settlements in the occupied territories doesn’t help them either. They may react at first with anger at this lack of support form their friends, just as Americans reacted at the lack of support from our European allies, but because reality is on the side of the critics in both cases, it helps lead to a backlash against the policy makers themselves, and could lead to an Israeli version of Obama coming to power in the years to come. Not today or even this year, but eventually.
You point out that Israelis are blaming Obama more than Netanyahu, which is of course reflexive, but you don’t point out that Netanyahu’s poll numbers have slid, and his party’s prospects are not looking good. Obama is happy to take some heat from Israelis if in the process he can also bring down the right-wingers.
Btw, he doesn’t even have to destroy Netanyahu or Likud. His real interest is in diminishing the power of Lieberman and the religious right in Israel. He’d be just as happy if Likud switched to an alliance with Kadima, which is entirely possible.
But this is not all about short-term goals, but a long term goal of putting heat and criticism on Israeli leaders who pursue these policies, regardless of their current popularity within Israel. The strategy is based on the notion that popularity is fickle, whereas reality tends to remain a constant, and eventually popularity gives way to reality, as Bush could tell you.