The apparent victory of Viktor Yanukovych in yesterday’s Ukrainian presidential election is yet another setback to the idea that the world is rapidly becoming a more democratic place. ~Walter Russell Mead

Via Scoblete

I don’t assume that the world is rapidly becoming a more democratic place, but the Ukrainian election is a very strange example to cite as a “setback” to this idea. According to national and international observers, the election was free and fair, and there were no significant irregularities to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the result. Free and fair elections are not the end-all and be-all of democracy, but they are a start. At worst, Yanukovych’s tenure will continue the same cronyism and corruption that flourished under Yushchenko, but it does appear for the moment that Kuchma-era quasi-authoritarianism has been weakened significantly. As we have seen over the last five years, democratic election does not mean that the government produced by the election will be competent or effective, and Ukraine may endure another five years of ineffective government, but it will pretty clearly be a democratic one. That doesn’t rule out that it might become a more illiberal state, but we do not yet know whether that will happen or not.

What we do see in the Ukrainian result is that democratic elections do not automatically lead to the most “pro-Western” or Washington-favored outcomes, and it suggests that as democratization progresses the divergence of interests between the West and Westernized or developing countries will become sharper and more pronounced. As Western and Westernized countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America have become more fully democratic and matured as democratic states, they have usually become more assertive and less likely to fall into the predictable behavior of satellites. Turkey, Japan and Brazil are the most obvious examples of states that have begun charting more independent courses abroad consistent with national interests as their political systems have become more fully democratic. In Ukraine’s case, the Orange coalition was trying to chart a more independent foreign policy course that directly conflicted with its economic relationship with Russia, and this election suggests that Ukraine will be rebalancing its interest in European integration with the reality that it remains very closely tied to Russia.

Russia is a populist authoritarian state, but it does not necessarily follow that its neighbors must mimic its political model in order to cultivate good relations with Moscow. Ukraine might gradually become a more democratic state, and that could in turn lead to a continuation of a close relationship with Russia because this proves to be what most of the electorate prefers. We should not make the mistake of confusing democratic states for reliably pro-U.S. or pro-European ones, just as it does not follow that authoritarian governments will automatically want to align with Moscow or Beijing.

If Yanukovych’s election is a setback for U.S. and EU influence in post-Soviet space, it is not therefore a setback for democratization in that space. It should make Western policymakers consider whether democracy promotion actually complements or hinders the promotion of our interests. On the other hand, as allied and developing nations become more confident in pursuing their own national interests, the U.S. might begin to see what interests of ours are really vital and necessary and what interests are not very important.