Scoblete refers us to a November report from WorldPublicOpinion.org on Iranian public opinion. Obviously, no one poll is definitive, and there are reasons to skeptical of the extent of support the poll shows for the Iranian government, but it seems to confirm the more recent analysis of the Leveretts and Stratfor regarding Iranian public support for the current government. Kull looks specifically at admitted Mousavi supporters:

What we find is that those who openly support Mousavi are different from others. Unlike the others a majority of Mousavi supporters that the press should be completely free from government controls (59%) and that Iran’s relations with the west have worsened under Ahmadinejad (57%).

As compared to others, Mousavi supporters are far more likely to say that the election was not free and fair, that they do not have confidence in the election results and that the Ahmadinejad is not the legitimate president of Iran.

However a modest majority of Mousavi supporters says the opposite. [bold mine-DL]

More important, they express support for the Iranian system. Fifty-three percent say that a body of religious scholars should have the right to overturn laws they believe are contrary to the Koran. Two thirds say they trust the government in Tehran to do the right thing at least some of the time. Majorities say they have some confidence in the Guardian Council (55%) and the President (62%).

Furthermore, even if these people were to have a powerful influence over Iranian foreign policy it would not signal a transformation of US-Iranian relations. Only 35 percent say they trust Obama, and majorities have pernicious assumptions about US goals such as the belief that the US is hostile to Islam (68%). Like the rest of the sample, less than half say they oppose attacks on US troops in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf.

Perhaps most significant, only 43 percent say they would be ready to give up enriching uranium in exchange for removing sanctions.

The detail that even a majority of admitted Mousavi supporters does not endorse the key claims of the Green movement is remarkable, and so it will probably be dismissed out of hand by pro-Green enthusiasts. If that figure is correct, however, it makes the breadth and depth of the Green movement’s support even more questionable. It would mean that most of the people who are willing to identify themselves as supporters of the leading opposition figure do not accept even the most basic critiques of the election and Ahmadinejad that were at the heart of the movement that claims to represent them. It would also mean that most Western sympathizers and even skeptical Western observers are more likely to accept the core grievances of the Green movement than are most of those who voted for Mousavi. Half of those backing Mousavi may not share the protesters’ complaints about the election even if they do share more broadly in the critiques of the policies of the current government. Assuming that Mousavi won less than half the vote, that would mean that the Green movement is a minority of a minority.