BarryD, I agree with all you’ve said: my point is that the _nation building_, driven by Boutros-Ghali and accepted by Clinton, was _not_ what Bush wanted the US involved in. The original plan was for the 35,000+ US soldiers to supervise and enforce the distribution of (media-driven) aid, principally food to the starving populace. The taking on of such a task in a little-known country of no vital strategic importance to the United States was certainly questionable proposition. From Halberstam’s book _War in a Time of Peace_ it was said that Powell favored a rapid in-and-out deployment to Somalia in order to forestall being sucked into the Balkan vortex. Scowcroft and Baker apparently were quite dubious about the plan from the start.

With timely help from the Somali expertise of Special Envoy Oakley, the food aid was delivered, accomodations were reached with Adid, and the US force was respected and things were moderately improving. In the original Bush plan the troops were to be out by no later than the end of January. That they were still there a half-year later, performing a far different mission, with a far different US/UN makeup, was a situation I don’t believe would have played out in the same fashion if Bush had received a second term.

Bush I may have broken the rules of NB/CG work, but such work was not, IIRC and IMO, what was actually anticipated.

Cheers.

Continued intervention in Somalia would make enemies (or rather, that continuing intervention means that US forces were not a temporary problem, but one which certain factions could no longer simply outw-wait). This would mean that the US would be involved in a civil war, and would either engage in nation building, get out after a frustrating time, or continue on, accomplishing nothing but taking casualties and tarnishing the SuperForce rep that US forces had after the first Gulf War. In terms of force size, remember that the second Gulf War swallowed up far larger forces.

When it comes to ‘nation building’, or counter guerrilla work, the US military’s technological force multiplier goes from perhaps 10X to a fewX. The only way to win at that are to use local forces on the ground, with US air, logistical and naval support, and a Green Beret force. Bush I broke that rule from the start.

I guess it comes down to my use of the term _egregiously_. IIRC, Bush 41 had sent in a large force with specific goals to be achieved within a specific time frame. The egregious part to me would be Clinton’s reduction of the force even as their mission expanded into playing _Somalian Sheriff_ and hunting Adid, as well as engaging in the UN-Boutros-Ghali desired goal of nation building. The original deployment’s wisdom can certainly be questioned, but I cannot see a more prudent Bush making the same _this is a pickle_ mistakes that Clinton did.

Additionally, I wasn’t asserting that he’d have had _success_ in Yugoslavia which, as you so rightly point out, has been the chief migraine inducer of many a government. Rather, it’s my opinion that the Bush team – allegedly realpolitikers all – would likely have handled things more adroitly.

Would have’s and could have’s – what would life be without them?

Cheers.

I also agree that the “handling” or “mishandling” of Somalia would never have come up had Bush not decided to intervene. Bush made mistakes and got plenty of things wrong. It just so happens that his speech in Kiev wasn’t one of those things.

As for managing the break-up of Yugoslavia, you’re basically asserting that he’d have had success with Balkan politics, which isn’t easy for outsiders.

It’s interesting to be reminded that this speech was just a few weeks before the failed coup that was precipitated in part by Moscow proposing to grant more power to the republics. In the context of the time, it is actually more accurate to see this speech as a tacit acceptance of this proposed grant of powers to the republics under the banner of saying that it was none of our business how the Soviets organized things. So one might even argue that it had almost the exact opposite political significance inside the USSR at that time than the one that is commonly attributed to it–an affirmation of the limited decentralization then underway, rather than a dismissal of the aspirations of inhabitants of the republics. In any case, if this speech counts as a blunder, I’d like to have a lot more foreign policy blunders like it in the future.

Pretty sound for the “new world order” guy.