But how much power does the president of Iran have to effect “real change”? I hope this will be addressed as well.

Also, while I recognize Moussavi is not the seceond coming of Jefferson, and anyone cleared to run for President by the Guardian Couuncil surely has some blood on their hands, the actual positions and policies that he stood for in the election were clearly intended to challenge the Khamenei doctrine of increasing political control. Given that Moussavi’s patron is Rafsanjani, with all that implies, there’s a real power struggle going on. Lumping Moussavi in with Ahmadinejad strikes me as akin to the “Gore = Bush” thinking from the pious Naderites. Consider that it took a consumate insider like Gorbachev to bring real change – and nails for the coffin – to the USSR.

At any rate I had been drafting a post on these issues anyway and am delighted to engage you in dialogue. I hope to have my post up soon.

Well, and the really odd thing is that many of the people expressing solidarity via green type on their blogs are themselves nationalists of this sort. Which again goes to how this emotional attachment to the Iraq election clouds out rationality.

-Does anyone in Russia actually expect a fair election? Cynicism about their methods are irrelevant with regards to whether or not we’re cynical about it in Iran as well- the people there expected one, and they have every right to whip bottles at the establishment windows if they didn’t get it, especially if they believe a different person would have won.

-People who are claiming the Iranian government is nuts, without fear of repercussion, etc., are saying that about the current government, with Ahmadinejad in power. You may be right that such rhetoric helps wingnut hawks, but only if Ahmadinejad remains in power with the same level of strength he had before the election (which is questionable, since the Assembly of Experts is going to meet, which really could have no purpose other than to question whether or not Khameini should retain his role as Supreme Leader, and anything that hits him will rain down on to Ahmadinejad as well). If he’s seriously weakened or ousted, the equation changes and what’s been said about him now is basically meaningless. And if he stays in full power, the wingnuts would get a major boost from that regardless of what anyone says about this event.

-The only way that a nationalist can use foreign commentary against his actions as a boost to his power is if the people by and large agree with him and get angry at the foreigners talking about, and presumably trying to influence, their country. They have to focus on us; thus, they need something to focus on, even if it’s just one or two strong comments from important people.

But right now, we’re completely peripheral to the whole thing. It’s not even like the active demonstrators are agreeing with us; we’re agreeing with them. The power in this is coming from those inside Iran, and no army of bloggers from the outside world is likely to make it seem any differently. What is Ahmadinejad going to say? “All the Americans with their keyboards are damning our country! I say damn them instead! And I will take away the Internet until they stop saying bad things about us!” Unless you think The Pirate Bay is going to start holding sway in world politics- it’s possible, the Swedish Pirate Party won a seat in the EU parliament!- the effects of the internet’s denizens on this will be about as noteworthy as the light of a candle in a hurricane.

Now, if major politicians or a huge swath of TV or print media were to actively campaign on behalf of the demonstrators, there might be a problem. But given that Obama is keeping mostly mum on the issue, and most rational beings are in agreement that everyone needs to let Iranians figure this out themselves, that’s probably not going to happen. Ahmadinejad might try to use outside forces as a scapegoat, but I’ll expect to see it at about the same time his fate to be cast down as President is sealed.