The Swiss Option
In his discussion of military strength, foreign policy and the Swiss option, Conor has some interesting remarks, but he has missed one of the biggest flaws in the Hanson statement he is critiquing. First, Hanson:
It is generally known that Americans want it both ways — green giddiness and plenty of oil and gas for their cars and homes; lots of government services and low taxes; a big military but spasms of isolationism.
Now it’s true that Americans want to have things both ways in many respects, and I have made similar observations over the years, but the last of the three on this list is simply not the case. In the last century, there has never been a desire for a “big military” combined with “spasms of isolationism.” Arguably, the former displaced and eliminated the latter, and even that is not quite right. One of the problems with this remark is that there haven’t even been all that many “isolationists” (i.e., neutralists) after 1945, much less large enough numbers to send the entire nation into such “spasms.”
The so-called isolationists, who advocated neutrality in foreign wars that had nothing to do with us, did not on the whole favor a large military, either. Advocates of military build-ups, advocates of an active, internationalist position and advocates of entering, escalating or starting wars have been and are today largely the same people. Those who believe that America has the right and responsibility to project power all over the world also want to have the means to do so. (That doesn’t rule out miscalculation about how many forces are needed for any particular war, but in general those who call for a larger military are also among the most inclined to use it, and not just for strictly defensive operations.) Those who are very skeptical of the wisdom and justice of all this see no reason for perpetuating hegemony, and so tend to see no reason why we would need a military as large as the one we have. The trouble here is that most Americans are not all that skeptical, and for various reasons tend to have the most trust and pride in the military as a national institution, which makes opposition to “defense” spending a political loser for all but the safest members of Congress. Typically, if skeptics can just hold the line and prevent dramatic new increases in spending they are doing better than usual.
There is, of course, no real “isolationist” political force in the United States, and we have yet to see any meaningful “spasms of isolationism” in the post-war era. Even McGovern and most of his voters, much as I might respect the sentiment of “Come Home, America” and their opposition to Vietnam, did not really represent this. Except at the margins, the disagreements about Vietnam, like disagreements about Iraq today, were not between “isolationists” and their opponents, but between two different camps of internationalists who were disputing about how best to make policy for the superpower.
While there is no absolute contradiction between favoring a relatively large military and a neutral foreign policy–Switzerland shows this to be true–in the American context we have rarely seen the two combined. In his railing against FDR’s preparations for entry into war, Garet Garrett did make calls for building up defenses against any possible invasion or attack as part of his argument for continued neutrality, but on the whole it has been true that those who want to avoid foreign entanglements do not want to create a military force that would enable us to become entangled in foreign conflicts. One of the reasons why we have such a large military is that there are not all that many Americans who oppose foreign entanglements as such, and even fewer who have influence oppose them, much less do they see a problem with America’s superpower status.
So in this case, Americans are fairly consistent: most like and trust the military, they would regard the early republican hostility to standing armies quaint and perhaps even ridiculous, they tend to think highly of the military even when it is deployed on missions with which some of them disagree, and there is no sustained, organized political force resisting the pressure to give the military most of what it wants in terms of funding. There is no schizophrenia or confusion here, no case of wanting to have it both ways: we do not have “isolationist” policies, which is to say we do not remain neutral in conflicts that have nothing to do with us, because the public is accustomed to the government’s having the means and the inclination to become involved all over the world, and there is currently no significant force working to change the public’s mind about this. It need not stay that way, but that is the way it is.
Conor said something else that I found odd:
Though I cannot countenance neutrality in the Second World War [bold mine-DL], it is nevertheless demonstrable that the strategy redounded to the benefit of the Swiss, and the fact that they’ve prospered for 500 years, despite being adjacent to great powers that warred incessantly, suggests that isolationism can work far better than its critics imagine.
But if neutrality saved Switzerland from the ruin of war, occupation (most likely) and the physical and economic devastation that accompanies these things, how could Conor not countenance that? Might it be because it leads us to draw uncomfortable conclusions about what France and Britain and the United States ought to have done? Where was it written that the Swiss had to plunge their country into hell in 1939 when they had refused to do so in every war before it? There may have been people in Sweden or Austria in the early 1700s who would have said the same thing about the Thirty Years’ War, but I think we would look back on them today and think that they were rather odd. In another century or two, I suspect that WWII will be remembered more as the horrific denouement of the 20th century’s interrupted Thirty Years’ War, and people in the future will probably marvel that so much destruction was unleashed for what will seem to them to be fairly trivial disputes, much as most people today do regard most of the wars in which Switzerland refused to join over the centuries.
I am one of those who believes we should have a strong military, especially a navy, but not one designed for intervention in every foreign kerfuffle.
Protecting our natural geographic asset–our shores–and our ability to trade abroad is important.
Such a strategy would, of course, require a fairly drastic revision of our strategy and the makeup of our forces. It could, however, be done.
Swiss neutrality is non-sense, and believing they’re “neutral” requires a very odd definition of the word. To quote Bob Black on the issue:
As it does, as surely as exist the Swiss banks whose numbered accounts safeguard much of the loot of the world’s dictators and gangsters. Is there possibly a connection? Might Switzerland’s rakeoff from loan-sharking and money-laundering underwrite its direct democracy (such as it is) just as slavery and imperialism underwrote the direct democracy of Athens? A Swiss parliamentarian once referred to his country as a nation of receivers of stolen goods.
Switzerland, much like its Middle East equivalent Dubai, amongst other sundry states, avoids being targeted for the reasons listed above; it’s a part of the fleecing operation, and it acts as an essential conduit to protecting and laundering ill-gotten gains. Would the pirates really attack their metaphorical Barbary Coast? No, of course not, and they have enough credibility abroad to stave off investigations from other developed countries (though that might be ending with the recent take-down of UBS by the IRS).
Certainly America can, and does play, a similar role for countries we choose to be allies with. But there is no doubt that the “neutrality” of Switzerland is not only a quirk of history, but that there is no realistic way to fashion that as a policy, without of course becoming the Grand Cayman’s writ large.
“for what will seem to them to be fairly trivial disputes”
I do not think that Hitler’s goal of rendering every other European state a protectorate at best, a slave plantation at worst, was a “trivial dispute.”
May I suggest spending the weekend with Mark Mazower’s Hitler’s Empire?
I’ve already read Mozawer on the German occupation of Greece, thanks, so I understand perfectly well what his empire involved. As so many people here seem to be doing this week, you miss the point entirely. The point is that staying out of wars that one’s country does not need to be involved in is a wise course of action. Partisans of a major belligerent power in such a war are bound to look down on those who refrained from joining in or express disapproval at those who remained neutral, because to them the struggle was epic, necessary and righteous, but those who steered clear of the devastation were wiser. Is Sweden, for example, better off today because it remained neutral in the wars of the 20th century? Obviously yes. Would Sweden have been better off had it not frittered away its wealth and manpower on religious warfare in northern Europe in the 17th century? Very likely. With the passage of time, what seemed in the decades following it to have been a necessary and important struggle will seem to be much less so. With WWI the disillusionment came more quickly, but it comes sooner or later for almost every conflict.
“The point is that staying out of wars that one’s country does not need to be involved in is a wise course of action.”
Of course, if it were blindingly easy to determine which those were. Which is not to make an excuse for every interventionist cause ever espoused, or current American policy in the Middle East. But that to make the argument against interventionism by referring to quirks in European history is ridiculous. Which is what the “neutral” states of Switzerland and Sweden represent. The “success” of their non-intervention is only demonstrable because of luck and the fortunes of others in their own military strategy.
One can only speculate, but it is not hard to imagine how much more successful Gustavus Adolphus’ Sweden would have been had he not entered the war in Germany and managed to get himself killed. The history of early modern Europe is littered with examples of military interventions by major powers that ended up ruining the state. The Swedes may have learned something and stopped chasing after past glories, which is why they emerged on the other side of the worst conflagration in the history of the world more or less unscathed. It is a lot easier to determine what wars to avoid that most people seem to think. Other than self-defense or coming to aid of a formal ally under some treaty obligation, most states do not need to become involved in a bilateral or regional conflict. Indeed, it tends to be the involvement of outside powers that escalates and worsens the effects of the war.
Of course, if all the neutral states in a given period can be dismissed as “quirks,” there isn’t going to be any evidence for the results of a neutralist policy. One might say that the success of our non-intervention during most of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was a “quirk” in American history, but then that would be to ignore how well non-intervention worked for us and how disastrous embarking on conflict with Britain in 1812 was.
It’s eerie – I just read that very neutrality argument in a history book at lunchtime, except the imperialist aggressor on the march was Sean’s Imperial Athens, the aggressee was Syracuse, and the neutral was one of Syracuse’ neighboring cities. Of course, Switzerland isn’t a direct democracy, as your quote shows, as direct democracies have assemblies rather than parliaments, and only cover one city; but that doesn’t mean there’s no moral question.
Also equally, each of the biggest Allies had gotten their ability to face the Nazis down and beat them by going on the march themselves long before…. There’s quite the difference in ‘tude on imperialism since WW2. Athens and the UK, especially, did amazingly similar things. The UK still gets bennies from its old Empire – from being at the head of the Commonwealth, having marketing and financial industry edges from that time, even London’s Tube, mostly built in Imperial times by killing lots of coolies; if there’s ever a serious fallin, that segment’s probably history forever.
Today’s best example of direct democracy is probably California, since direct votes can override everything else. Good thing California’s imperialism is limited to business, or we might see enemy cities being looted by vote…. But we have seen its ability to do sane business gutted over the years. All good political systems need eumonia in the form of checks and balances.
“Of course, if all the neutral states in a given period can be dismissed as “quirks,†there isn’t going to be any evidence for the results of a neutralist policy.”
I didn’t say all were; simply that Sweden and Switzerland are. Certainly you don’t have to be some dyed in the wool Greatest Generation partisan to realize that Sweden and Switzerland’s situation vis a vis WWII were far from stable. And that despite much talk of their own ability to defend themselves, they were never tested, and its not exceptionally clear how they would have fared without external support.
“Indeed, it tends to be the involvement of outside powers that escalates and worsens the effects of the war. ”
Only if you consider loss as the ultimate form of de-escalation. I imagine, if there were no American intervention into WWII, that the loss of Britain and other countries would have no doubt happened with fewer lives loss due to military action and obviously no American one’s. But its not hard to estimate what the eventual cost in live’s would have been, even granting the German occupiers being far more lenient than their historical example shows. It’s also not hard to imagine what would have become of most of Asia if Japan had maintained its occupation. Sins do not come merely in the form of commission, as the bombing of Dresden or Hiroshima/Nagasaki, but also in the form of omission, and looking the other way.
“In another century or two, I suspect that WWII will be remembered more as the horrific denouement of the 20th century’s interrupted Thirty Years’ War, and people in the future will probably marvel that so much destruction was unleashed for what will seem to them to be fairly trivial disputes, much as most people today do regard most of the wars in which Switzerland refused to join over the centuries.”
Whether it ought to be so or not, this is almost certainly false (at least in one century; it is hard to predict for two centuries away).
There is also something to be said for just capitulating in a timely manner. The Czechs suffered under German occupation but were spared the worst of the bombing and ground fighting.
While the Swiss were truly neutral, the Swedes tended to lean toward whoever was ahead in the war. Ireland was also neutral, while many forget this now. I think most military historians assume that had either German or the Soviet Union prevailed totally, all the neutrals would have been invaded. During the war Germany got what it wanted from Sweden (raw materials) and really had no reason to take on Switzerland.
Daniel,
I think you’re stretching a bit with relevant examples when you’re counting American actions during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic War era as “neutrality” particularly with regards to the War of 1812. Given the rather blatant intervention by the United States against France during the Quasi-War era, the fact that the rearmament of the United States Navy during that time period helped spur part of its ability to expand the merchant marine and its trading power in the immediate aftermath, that was hardly a case of neutrality paying off, but rather actually actively intervening to scare off an enemy which by most accounts was incapable of actually threatening your substantive interests.
Whether or not the War of 1812 can be considered disastrous also depends on your definition of such. Sure it achieved none of the aims that it was launched under (except perhaps stopping impressment simply by making sure no American ships sailed at all) but it also did help lead for causus belli against certain Indian tribes, and perhaps as important emphasized the need for the US to restore a strong navy, and create the basis for expanding the role of the US trade in the world.
In addition, the case of Denmark is probably a good counterpoint to the concept of neutrality, given its geographic proximity to the actual theater of the war (Europe) and the fact that it was basically attacked without provocation precisely because it WAS neutral. The second Battle of Copenhagen in particular had disastrous consequences for the Denmark, which lost Norway as a result of siding against the British as a result, and pretty much destroyed what had been a very effective and modern naval force.
Norway also in WWII is probably just as instructive in how useful “neutrality” can be. In general, the only way to actually remain neutral is to be in a position that’s strategically untenable to drag into involvement.
The Swiss Option, really?
The Helvetic Republic anyone? The only reason the Swiss actually have that option is because it’s an internationally recognized neutrality that was imposed in the Congress of Vienna. It has nothing to do with them optionally staying out of every important war in the past 400 years. Hell they were a puppet state for nearly 20 years during the French Revolutionary/Napoleonic period.
Or how about comparing it to Denmark-Norway, which because of staying in 1807 effectively wound up being forced into the war and becoming just Denmark after Napoleon’s capitulation?
The only reason the US could actually afford to be “neutral” in the Napoleonic War was because it had no significant threat from French interests, while the British were too occupied with financing their coalition wars against the French to actually bother with the US.
Somebody (Jim Henley?) once said that if your argument leans heavily and solely on WWII, you don’t have a good argument; you’re leaning on one incident only.
Mr. Larison is baiting and switching. He wrote:
In another century or two, I suspect that WWII will be remembered more as the horrific denouement of the 20th century’s interrupted Thirty Years’ War, and people in the future will probably marvel that so much destruction was unleashed for what will seem to them to be fairly trivial disputes, much as most people today do regard most of the wars in which Switzerland refused to join over the centuries.
Called on this, he responded:
As so many people here seem to be doing this week, you miss the point entirely. The point is that staying out of wars that one’s country does not need to be involved in is a wise course of action.
But the first quote above was not about the Swiss perspective on WW2; it was a future’s-eye perspective on the war’s having been fought over “fairly trivial disputes.” Changing “the point” to whether Switzerland should have fought in WW2 — and I am happy to concede they had no duty to do so — does not correctly represent the first quote, which perhaps Mr. Larison should good-naturedly retract rather than defend by avowing that its “point” is something other than what it quite literally says.
I think Larison actually has a very good point, and a terrific example in Gustavus Adolphus as an example of Pyrrhic warfare. I should think that Britain of the 20th century bears a rather striking comparison to the Sweden 17th century in its willingness to engage in promiscuous warfare, despite all signs pointing toward Pyrrhic ruin.
Despite the American tendency toward Churchill-worship, I rather suspect that in three centuries’ time he will be remembered as yet another Gustavus Adolphus, someone who gloriously took his country to insignificance.
It’s difficult to see what exactly American involvement accomplished: replace the Fascist threat with the Communist threat, one murderer (Hitler) with yet another, even greater murderer (Stalin)?
It doesn’t help, too, that American foreign policy in the first decade post-war essentially involved shooting its own two feet. When Britain tried to take back the Suez in ’56, Eisenhower organized a run on the pound sterling. Needless to say, the disintegration of the British and French empires, which were previously the dominant Western presence, and the anti-Communist bulwark, in those areas where Americans were ill-equipped to take over, worked to the great advantage of the Soviets and the great disadvantage of the anti-Communist West. Englanders and Frenchmen left behind vacuums; Americans were unable to replace them.
One sometimes get the sense that Acheson and Hull were not thinking clearly when they were delineating post-war policy.
Switzerland has great geography.
For that matter, so does the United States.
This is an important point, illustrating the limits of neutrality. Neutrality did not, after all, save Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium. Greece…and I could go on. All of these states tried their level best to stay out of the war, and yet they were still overrun by the Nazis. Switzerland had the benefit of formidable geography, a robust military…and no real strategic advantage in its occupation to Germany.
And come to that, when the latter condition disappeared, it was not enough to save Switzerland from Napoleon.
This answers Myles’ concern above. Germany was more aggressively ambitious, and capable, than was Stalin’s USSR. Failure to act would have resulted in a Nazi monolith astride Eurasia, and eager to devour more (and mass genocide). But in any event it was not this which brought the U.S. into the war (try as Hull and FDR might), but the attack on Pearl Harbor and Germany’s declaration of war.
None of which is a brief for unlimited imperial adventures without end of the sort we have seen. Only that pure neutrality is not always successful. And this is, alas, bound to be even more true in a world in which technology has lengthened the reach of potential aggressors.
I agree with Daniel about how isolationism has largely disappeared from American political life. Not even the end of the Cold War brought it back. Iraq may not do so either; but perhaps it has tempered public enthusiasms for further adventures abroad.
The more I think about this statement, the more I wonder about it. If World War II was trivial, was any war ever not trivial? (Or is that the point?)
To say that the war was not trivial is not the same as saying we should have gotten involved. I don’t think the Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars were trivial either, but it was right to stay out. But World War II as trivial? That just isn’t the right word.
Certainly, the Battle of Hastings wasn’t trivial. Not were the Punic wars. Nor was the Battle of Tours. Nor was Agincourt. Nor were the German religious wars. Nor was the Battle of Vienna, which saved Western civilization. Nor was the American Independence war. And nor were the Napoleonic Wars. And nor was the Great War.
But look at the Crimean War. It inspired horror as the bloodiest conflict up to that point, and was in fact the first modern war. Shall it be remembered for some Hastings-like significance, 300 years from now. I doubt it. And so it is with the Second World War. We averted a great, murdering horror, it is true; but at what cost? That we faced an even greater horror, Communism, which didn’t just kill individuals, but entire civilizations.
Of course, we are out of that tunnel now. Imagine, say, if the Cold War was Germany vs. America instead of the USSR vs. America: I daresay we would have been out of this hole a lot faster, and with a lot less damage (starting with the destruction of civilization of the entire East Europe). But the result would likely have been the same.
And the Great War was significant only insofar as it was incredibly, utterly, and unjustifiably stupid. It was a thorough Pyrrhic victory for just about everybody concerned, except for the Americans. The British economic empire went down the drain. So did the French. And Italy got Mussolini, who tore the country to pieces.
And no need to mention how one of the greatest empires of the modern world, Kaiserliche Deutschland, simply collapsed.
“We averted a great, murdering horror, it is true; but at what cost?”
But again, that is not the same as whether the war was trivial. Even if we focus only on the negative results of the war, four and a half decades of the Iron Curtain is not trivial.
“Trivial” is the opposite of “important,” not the opposite of “good” or “desirable.”