Leading The Jacksonians
Ross:
But the conservative coalition ought to naturally produce realists from its ranks, for their sake and its own, because realism’s cold-eyed pursuit of the national interest is the most logical and productive elite-level expression of the Jacksonian, don’t-tread-on-me nationalism that holds sway among a large swathe of the conservative base. Neoconservatism can and should speak for part of the American Right, but it can’t speak for the whole of it; it’s [sic] Wilsonian impulses will always be a bridge too far for many conservatives whose instincts run instead toward “to hell with them” hawkery. This “more rubble, less trouble” tendency within the Right’s coalition needs to be channeled in a constructive direction by the right-wing elite, or else it runs toward jingoism and folly of various sorts.
Reading Ross’ earlier post in light of his more recent comments, I am a bit puzzled. Proposing that a “coalition of the introverts” (i.e., an America First coalition on the right) would be unsuitable to govern, Ross nonetheless seemed to concede in his later post that the most logical, if perhaps not the most productive, expression of don’t-tread-on-me nationalism would have been Ron Paul-style “Jeffersonianism.” Leaving aside certain direct symbolic appeals to libertarian populist, don’t-tread-on-me sentiment (e.g., the frequent appearance of Gadsden flags at Ron Paul events and the flag’s popularity among Ron Paul supporters), it is not clear why realists/”Hamiltonians” offer the better elite expression of the “Jacksonian” nationalist view.
If Jacksonians tend to support wars when they are declared/launched far longer than any other group because of strong cultural habits and traditions of military service, but are themselves unconcerned and usually uninformed about international affairs, the typical elite complaint about them is that they are not zealous enough for this or that grand mission that Wilsonian and Hamiltonian elites have planned for them. This is what had Fukuyama (who must now be also be classed among the “Hamiltonians”?) agitated several years ago. To be blunt, jingoism and folly are the provinces of the Wilsonians and Hamiltonian elites who by and large pushed for or acquiesced in the Iraq war. These elites have not channeled Jacksonian nationalism in a constructive direction, but on the whole exploited it in a crisis and pushed the Jacksonians in rather destructive directions, and I do not see what will change in this dynamic in the future. “More rubble, less trouble” and “to hell with them” hawks are expressing the frustration of Jacksonians who have been conned or misled into foreign adventures on what were supposed to have been national security grounds that later gave way to woolly-minded nation-building projects. Had they not been incited by elites to support the adventure based on exaggerated threats abroad, they might not have been hawks in the first place. Before they said “to hell with them,” Jacksonians said, “Why bother?”
It is also taken for granted here that Jacksonian nationalists are not to have elites from their own ranks, because they are otherwise ruled unfit for government, and so they must be led, channeled, and directed by others. Even though the Wilsonians erred very badly, as Wilsonians will, and, as Ross said, “many of [Hamiltonianism's] practitioners, starting with the buffoonish Chuck Hagel, did not exactly distinguish themselves during the debates over the Iraq War,” these groups are still going to be permitted a leadership role in formulating center-right foreign policy thinking? On what grounds? If realists/Hamiltonians failed to lead and failed to distinguish themselves during one of the most important foreign policy debates of the last 20 years, why should Jacksonians or anyone else want to be “channeled” anywhere by them in the future? If up and coming realists were chastened by Iraq, what exactly have they learned that would distinguish them from the older realists who failed?
You aren’t entirely fair to Ross, and maybe too fair to the Jacksonians.
What Ross said was “Nor do I think that a Jeffersonian-Jacksonian “coalition of the introverts” could govern the nation responsibly unless the United States actually withdrew from its current quasi-imperial role, which almost certainly isn’t going to happen.” Stated that way, with the qualifier, he is probably right. Of course, many of us would say that the U.S. and the world would be better off if we did withdraw from our quasi-imperial role, but that’s where the dispute lies.
As for the Jacksonians … historically they have been perfectly happy to support the most disastrous interventions abroad. While no worse in that regard than the Wilsonians and the Hamiltonians, they have been no better either.
People like us won’t be happy with any of the “respectable” foriegn policy paradigms. Despite past examples where the Hamiltonians did indeed go along with some of the most ill conceived interventions, given the real alternatives, they represent probably our best hope for a relatively restrained foriegn policy – in the short to medium term at least.
Okay, I hadn’t read your prior post, where you address this, but not in a terribly satisfying or fair way. The “unless” is the key here. I think if you take Ross’ sentence literally, it is pretty much indisputably correct. The kicker, of course, is that if you somehow could put such a coalition together, it most likely would abandon our quasi-imperial role, or at least attempt to. Which many of us would be perfectly happy with.
I don’t think I was being unfair. I’m objecting to the assumption that responsible government requires the ability to run the empire. That is where the dispute lies, and I am challenging the implicit claim that the quasi-imperial role is actually responsible. Ross is saying that the “coalition of introverts” can’t govern the *nation* unless the U.S. gets out of the empire game. That’s not so much a qualification as it is a way of setting the terms such that the “introverts” will never be considered responsible or fit for government.
You make my point about the Jacksonians–they go along with interventions that other people propose. There weren’t too many people marching in the streets demanding an invasion of Iraq, or the bombing of Yugoslavia, but they fell behind it when it happened. They contribute to the problems we have with our foreign policy, but they do not create them. Ross presents them as something like wild jingoists who need to be controlled and directed, but they are not the ones constantly demanding intervention overseas.
Why do the Hamiltonians “represent probably our best hope for a relatively restrained foriegn policy”? Scowcroft and Hagel, to name two, both supported bombing Yugoslavia (Scowcroft was seriously talking about introducing ground forces at one time!), and obviously Hagel and Lugar went along with the war in Iraq. Hagel foresaw many of the potential problems but went along anyway–doesn’t that make the Hamiltonians even less desirable than the Jacksonians? If they are so capable of restraint, why do they never show restraint when it matters?
“I’m objecting to the assumption that responsible government requires the ability to run the empire.”
I’m probably picking nits here, but that assumption, which does indeed exist, and deserves all of the scorn that you heap upon it, isn’t present in this particular post from Ross. Based upon prior posts from Ross he probably does share that assumption, but it wasn’t in that particular post.
“Why do the Hamiltonians “represent probably our best hope for a relatively restrained foriegn policyâ€? ”
Well, you left out my qualifiers. I’m assuming (as does Ross, and as do you) that in the short to medium term abandoning our quasi-imperial role is (sadly) a non-starter. With that in mind, the realists (ultimately I agree that Hamiltonians is an unfortunate term) are our best option because (1) many of them did indeed oppose our intervention in Iraq, albeit not as forcefully as one would have liked to hope, and (2) they do seem more chastened by events than the other factions in our current foriegn policy consensus.
That assumption is there. It isn’t stated explicitly, but it certainly seems to be there.
Your qualifier was “given the real alternatives.” What counts as a real alternative? If we limit our “real alternatives” to the two main failed groups, it is probably true that Hamiltonians are relatively better than Wilsonians, but that doesn’t say much at all. This isn’t like the two-party system where we have to settle for the existing options because of the structure of our electoral system.
*Many* of them opposed it? Who? I assume we’re talking about public opposition. Having reservations and staying quiet do not count as opposition in my book. I can think of Scowcroft, Mearsheimer and Walt when I think of establishment realist internationalists who spoke out publicly against the invasion. I will grant there are probably a few others who do not come to mind, but there were not many. Give me some additional examples, preferably from the right if you can.
Realist internationalists go with establishment CW more than just about any other group. Now that most people agree that Iraq was a mistake, they have come to endorse that view. Many of these realists seem to be “chastened” by events in much the same way they were persuaded to stay silent before the invasion.
“Don’t tread on me” becomes “our jackboots on their necks before they can do it to us”.
Somehow I don’t think foreign invaders would fare very well here, and the only intimidation they could accomplish would be from dependencies our own vices have created.
Shining cities on hills have no need to send forth troops or missiles.