Obama And The Russians
Barack Obama is keeping people guessing about whether he will pursue a Bush administration plan to set up a missile shield in central Europe but analysts say Russia has shot itself in the foot with threats to deploy missiles in retaliation.
Analysts see the threats as amounting to loose rhetoric and do not expect a showdown that will test Obama during his first six months in office after his inauguration as president on January 20. ~AFP
Ralph Peters will undoubtedly be disappointed that his latest alarmist warnings are being proved false on the same day that he made them. The good news is that Moscow seems perfectly willing to respond favorably to signals from the future President that he may not necessarily pursue the missile defense program in Poland and the Czech Republic. While there is an impulse among Obama’s supporters to crow about Moscow’s apparent volte-face, what we should take away from the last few days is that Moscow is willing to respond rationally when those in charge of the next administration leave an opening for flexible, constructive engagement and when they refuse to endorse needless provocation as a matter of course. If Obama would now just pull back from the absurd campaign rhetoric in which he called for “immediate” membership for Ukraine and Georgia in NATO, we might be getting somewhere.
I have heard through various liberal sources that Obama’s general plan for the defense department is critical of its emphasis on missle defense, primarily for being too costly and ineffective, and there’s plenty of reasons on that count alone being cited to delay or even cancel the deployment of a third missle defense site in Poland. My guess is that this is both a valid rationale and a good excuse for cancelling the Polish deployment, without turning it into some kind of face-down with the Russians. My guess is the Russians will also quietly cancel their own missle deployments in the western regions. This I think is part of a general under the radar warming of relations with Russia.
Ralph Peters will undoubtedly be disappointed that his latest alarmist warnings
No, Ralph Peters doesn’t care how Obama responds to the actual threat. Ralph Peters cares about how Obama reacts to Ralph Peters’ alarmist description of the threat.
Conrad I hope you’re right, both because a less provocative foreign policy toward Russia would be better for us and many of our allies (with the understandable exception of the former Warsaw pact countries eager to escape the Kremlin’s yoke), and because a missile shield would be expensive, unreliable, and totally useless against a terrorist threat, which is going to arrive in a suitcase or van, and not be launched (with a return address) from the territory of Iran, North Korea or any other oppressive government that exhibits an iota of self-preservation.
Mr. Larison, what do you make of Medvedev’s proposal to extend the presidential term of office?
I view it as another step in the consolidation of power in the Kremlin by keeping power concentrated in the same hands for longer periods of time. Whether or not it is intended primarily as a vehicle for allowing Putin to have influence through additional, lengthened Medvedev presidential terms, the goal is certainly to make the Presidency somewhat less accountable and to make political opposition to the serving President (and the security service/military forces he represents) more difficult. I am extremely skeptical that this is a maneuver designed to allow Putin to run for a third term after a brief Medvedev interregnum. If that is the goal, I’m not sure that it makes that much difference in how the government functions, but I would be surprised.
I take it you would disagree with this more optimistic assessment?
Also, were you attending the Yale ISI conference this past weekend? Any possibility of a post or two on this?
I would like to believe Umland’s interpretation, but I doubt that Medvedev is likely to follow through on much of this. Even if he wants to, he may not be able to do as much as he proposes. When he was elected, I was generally much more positive about what this might mean for domestic political reform there than, well, almost everyone. I would be happy to be proven right about that, but there are strong institutional interests that have no desire to see increased pluralism and dissent. If Medvedev does go ahead with these measures to increase prerogatives of legislatures and facilitate more participation in elections and the Duma, that would be a significant improvement.
Actually, I was speaking at the conference. I apologize for not having publicized it before I left. I will certainly have something to say about the conference and the other speakers, who were all outstanding.