A Bizarre Change
But by the late 1990s, during America’s post-cold-war triumphalist moment, Senator McCain gradually but decisively moved away from his realist roots and became an enthusiastic champion of an ideological interventionist agenda. To be fair, many in the political center, including key Republican realists, came to believe that, as the only superpower, the United States was both able and entitled to reshape the world without paying a prohibitive price. ~The National Interest
McCain’s move from hawkish realism, which prompted him to criticize deployments to Lebanon and Somalia, to super-hawkish interventionism can be overstated, but it is clear that during the Balkan Wars McCain abandoned any hint of realism. Complicating matters, McCain was correct in his arguments against intervening in Lebanon and Somalia, which sounded eerily similar to many conservative arguments against invading Iraq. At one time, he was wary of intervention because of the intractability of local conflicts, our lack of understanding of the divisions in a very different foreign society, and the lack of clear objectives and direct connection to the national interest, but cast all of that aside to support intervention in the Balkans of all places. Since then, there has never been a major deployment or use of force that he has opposed. No one denies that there has been a shift in his views, but as far as I know what no one seems to be able to account for is why, aside from opportunism or perceived political advantage, he came to side with the very kinds of people who would not only have wanted to go into Lebanon and Somalia but who also regularly decry the subsequent withdrawals from those places as invitations to attack.
No one denies that there has been a shift in his views, but as far as I know what no one seems to be able to account for is why, aside from opportunism or perceived political advantage, he came to side with the very kinds of people who would not only have wanted to go into Lebanon and Somalia but who also regularly decry the subsequent withdrawals from those places as invitations to attack.
It seems possible to explain this as a product of McCain’s militarism and his generally confrontational personality. Earlier in his career his militarism found an outlet in anti-Communism, which may have made him reluctant to get the military bogged down in missions that had little to do with confronting the Soviets. But in the absence of a clear threat his militarism and self-righteousness eventually sought an outlet in any place where the US could claim to be defending a noble cause, demonstrating its strength and determination, etc.
McCain’s like a drunk guy who started off the evening mixing it up with another confrontational drunk, but who finishes the night looking for any pretext to sucker-punch the closest convenient target.
I’d second that – McCain swallowed the ‘hyperpower’ or ‘sole power’ theory, and figured that whipping the Ruskies cleared the field to take on everybody else as we pleased.