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	<title>Comments on: Dashed Expectations</title>
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	<description>n. the principle of good order&#60;br /&#62;&#60;br /&#62; "Observe the strange inversion of all order and sense! Dignity debased; how vilely is the function of a consul prostituted!" ~The Craftsman</description>
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		<title>By: antrastan</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13206</link>
		<dc:creator>antrastan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 16:01:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13206</guid>
		<description>Mr Larison, what would you say to Leon Wieseltier&#039;s post over at TNR? http://blogs.tnr.com/tnr/blogs/the_plank/archive/2008/08/11/the-analogists-ball.aspx</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mr Larison, what would you say to Leon Wieseltier&#8217;s post over at TNR? <a href="http://blogs.tnr.com/tnr/blogs/the_plank/archive/2008/08/11/the-analogists-ball.aspx" rel="nofollow">http://blogs.tnr.com/tnr/blogs/the_plank/archive/2008/08/11/the-analogists-ball.aspx</a></p>
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		<title>By: WRW</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13205</link>
		<dc:creator>WRW</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 13:50:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13205</guid>
		<description>VA_Paleocon, it is always 1938, didn&#039;t you know that?  George Will is the latest pundit to lose sense of reason and conjure up WWII.  Smith doesn&#039;t understand what Chamberlin was doing any more than he understands this confrontation.  Conflict between UK and Germany was inevitable, but there is no evidence to support the idea that Chamberlin&#039;s compromise in any way either provoked war or undermined Britain&#039;s position. (Indeed, it likely enhanced by giving her time to prepare for war.)

Back to the current, a foolish and destructive gambit by Saakashvili, perhaps encouraged by irresponsible rhetoric from US politicians. Civilians in South Ossetia suffered the initial consequences of this reckless act, and then Georgians suffered the consequences of Russiaâ€™s disproportionate response. An Americans (after foolishly and irresponsibly inflating Georgian expectations and nationalistic impulses) clucks on the sidelines recognizing that intervention would only escalate matters to a more destructive level. (A bout of realism of which I didnâ€™t think they were capable.)

It appears Russia has restrained itself after capturing Gori and will take her â€œwinningsâ€ and withdraw. Meanwhile, Mr. Saakashvili deserves to join our President in retirement as both have mastered provoking an unjustified, unnecessary and destructive war.

Let me conclude by saying I&#039;m happy Mr. Larison was right and I was wrong about US/NATO intervention.  I&#039;d hoped he was and glad he was.  Our governing elites for once restrained themselves from war, seeing that (regardless of the capability to do so) it would only have made matters much worse; escalating into a much broader conflict with severe consequences for all parties.  And I also apologize from my ill-tempered remark which were the product of frustration with an article on Putin from John Laughland in TAC some time ago. (Mr. Larison being the innocent brunt of that frustration.)

Of course, given that the conflict seems to have resolved by diplomacy and Western restraint on armed response, I am curious by Will&#039;s denunciation today of Obama&#039;s diplomatic approach.  Perhaps I&#039;m missing something.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>VA_Paleocon, it is always 1938, didn&#8217;t you know that?  George Will is the latest pundit to lose sense of reason and conjure up WWII.  Smith doesn&#8217;t understand what Chamberlin was doing any more than he understands this confrontation.  Conflict between UK and Germany was inevitable, but there is no evidence to support the idea that Chamberlin&#8217;s compromise in any way either provoked war or undermined Britain&#8217;s position. (Indeed, it likely enhanced by giving her time to prepare for war.)</p>
<p>Back to the current, a foolish and destructive gambit by Saakashvili, perhaps encouraged by irresponsible rhetoric from US politicians. Civilians in South Ossetia suffered the initial consequences of this reckless act, and then Georgians suffered the consequences of Russiaâ€™s disproportionate response. An Americans (after foolishly and irresponsibly inflating Georgian expectations and nationalistic impulses) clucks on the sidelines recognizing that intervention would only escalate matters to a more destructive level. (A bout of realism of which I didnâ€™t think they were capable.)</p>
<p>It appears Russia has restrained itself after capturing Gori and will take her â€œwinningsâ€ and withdraw. Meanwhile, Mr. Saakashvili deserves to join our President in retirement as both have mastered provoking an unjustified, unnecessary and destructive war.</p>
<p>Let me conclude by saying I&#8217;m happy Mr. Larison was right and I was wrong about US/NATO intervention.  I&#8217;d hoped he was and glad he was.  Our governing elites for once restrained themselves from war, seeing that (regardless of the capability to do so) it would only have made matters much worse; escalating into a much broader conflict with severe consequences for all parties.  And I also apologize from my ill-tempered remark which were the product of frustration with an article on Putin from John Laughland in TAC some time ago. (Mr. Larison being the innocent brunt of that frustration.)</p>
<p>Of course, given that the conflict seems to have resolved by diplomacy and Western restraint on armed response, I am curious by Will&#8217;s denunciation today of Obama&#8217;s diplomatic approach.  Perhaps I&#8217;m missing something.</p>
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		<title>By: VA_Paleocon</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13198</link>
		<dc:creator>VA_Paleocon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 02:14:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13198</guid>
		<description>BTW, if you say &quot;history shows it doesn&#039;t work&quot; then you&#039;re historically illiterate. Read a book. Save the appeaser-baiting for moronic talk radio.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>BTW, if you say &#8220;history shows it doesn&#8217;t work&#8221; then you&#8217;re historically illiterate. Read a book. Save the appeaser-baiting for moronic talk radio.</p>
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		<title>By: VA_Paleocon</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13197</link>
		<dc:creator>VA_Paleocon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 02:14:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13197</guid>
		<description>Nathan Smith-

Not every year is 1938. Not every foreign leader is Hitler.

BTW, Chamberlain didn&#039;t get anything from Hitler except a vague promise. I&#039;m talking about a real trade backed up by force. Its more similar to what Kennedy did with trading missiles in Turkey for missiles in Cuba. If a moron like you had been in charge in October 1962 I would have never been born, or had I been, it would have been in a Mad Max radioactive wasteland.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nathan Smith-</p>
<p>Not every year is 1938. Not every foreign leader is Hitler.</p>
<p>BTW, Chamberlain didn&#8217;t get anything from Hitler except a vague promise. I&#8217;m talking about a real trade backed up by force. Its more similar to what Kennedy did with trading missiles in Turkey for missiles in Cuba. If a moron like you had been in charge in October 1962 I would have never been born, or had I been, it would have been in a Mad Max radioactive wasteland.</p>
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		<title>By: TGGP</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13196</link>
		<dc:creator>TGGP</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 01:42:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13196</guid>
		<description>I would like to know what Daniel thinks of the discussion going on at Volokh Conspiracy. An example is &lt;a href=&quot;http://volokh.com/posts/1218431110.shtml&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;this post&lt;/a&gt;, which compares and contrasts the secession of Kosovo and South Ossetia.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I would like to know what Daniel thinks of the discussion going on at Volokh Conspiracy. An example is <a href="http://volokh.com/posts/1218431110.shtml" rel="nofollow">this post</a>, which compares and contrasts the secession of Kosovo and South Ossetia.</p>
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		<title>By: James Rogers</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13195</link>
		<dc:creator>James Rogers</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 00:29:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13195</guid>
		<description>Check this site out. It&#039;s by an American lady in 
Tblisi right now. 
http://georgia2georgia.wordpress.com/</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Check this site out. It&#8217;s by an American lady in<br />
Tblisi right now.<br />
<a href="http://georgia2georgia.wordpress.com/" rel="nofollow">http://georgia2georgia.wordpress.com/</a></p>
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		<title>By: nathansmith</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13194</link>
		<dc:creator>nathansmith</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 00:26:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13194</guid>
		<description>VA_Paleocon&#039;s suggestion is highly reminiscent of Chamberlain&#039;s approach to Hitler, no?  Make deals over the dead bodies of small countries?

That&#039;s immoral, of course.  History shows that it also doesn&#039;t work.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>VA_Paleocon&#8217;s suggestion is highly reminiscent of Chamberlain&#8217;s approach to Hitler, no?  Make deals over the dead bodies of small countries?</p>
<p>That&#8217;s immoral, of course.  History shows that it also doesn&#8217;t work.</p>
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		<title>By: nathansmith</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13193</link>
		<dc:creator>nathansmith</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 00:25:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13193</guid>
		<description>Re: spheres of influence.  The point is that spheres of influence are neither a normal nor a legitimate justification for intervention.  And Russia has intervened outside its borders since 1991-- it was occupying two regions of Georgia, for example, and it has troops in Armenia, Tajikistan, and elsewhere, and it has taken sides in elections in Georgia and Ukraine, has cut off gas supplies in deliberate attempts to manipulate the internal politics of neighbors, and has probably committed or attempted assassinations in Georgia and Ukraine.

Larison got this wrong and McCain got it right.  By now it should be obvious to everyone that this is no more and no less than Russian aggression.  And why is Russia behaving aggressively?  Because it&#039;s an authoritarian state that has destroyed independent media, fomented nationalism at home, crushed constitutional legality, crippled civil society, and attacked private property.  Such nations cannot be trusted to pursue moral or rational courses of action.  This is what history teaches.  It&#039;s the real realism.

No doubt McCain learned something about communist thugs while he was their prisoner in Hanoi.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Re: spheres of influence.  The point is that spheres of influence are neither a normal nor a legitimate justification for intervention.  And Russia has intervened outside its borders since 1991&#8211; it was occupying two regions of Georgia, for example, and it has troops in Armenia, Tajikistan, and elsewhere, and it has taken sides in elections in Georgia and Ukraine, has cut off gas supplies in deliberate attempts to manipulate the internal politics of neighbors, and has probably committed or attempted assassinations in Georgia and Ukraine.</p>
<p>Larison got this wrong and McCain got it right.  By now it should be obvious to everyone that this is no more and no less than Russian aggression.  And why is Russia behaving aggressively?  Because it&#8217;s an authoritarian state that has destroyed independent media, fomented nationalism at home, crushed constitutional legality, crippled civil society, and attacked private property.  Such nations cannot be trusted to pursue moral or rational courses of action.  This is what history teaches.  It&#8217;s the real realism.</p>
<p>No doubt McCain learned something about communist thugs while he was their prisoner in Hanoi.</p>
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		<title>By: Roach</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13186</link>
		<dc:creator>Roach</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2008 22:22:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13186</guid>
		<description>I don&#039;t think Operation Just Cause was that long ago.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I don&#8217;t think Operation Just Cause was that long ago.</p>
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		<title>By: VA_Paleocon</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13184</link>
		<dc:creator>VA_Paleocon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2008 21:58:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13184</guid>
		<description>Theres a way out of this mess, I think.

Tell Putin he has two options--he can do whatever he wants with Georgia, even annex it, but Ukraine will join NATO in exchange if he does that. Or, he can withdraw from Georgia and get a promise of a neutral, slightly Russian friendly Ukraine (similar to the arrangement with Finland) and a freeze on NATO expansion.

Sound reasonable? Ukraine is more important anyway since its on the road to western Europe and Georgia isn&#039;t.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Theres a way out of this mess, I think.</p>
<p>Tell Putin he has two options&#8211;he can do whatever he wants with Georgia, even annex it, but Ukraine will join NATO in exchange if he does that. Or, he can withdraw from Georgia and get a promise of a neutral, slightly Russian friendly Ukraine (similar to the arrangement with Finland) and a freeze on NATO expansion.</p>
<p>Sound reasonable? Ukraine is more important anyway since its on the road to western Europe and Georgia isn&#8217;t.</p>
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		<title>By: James Rogers</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13177</link>
		<dc:creator>James Rogers</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2008 17:40:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13177</guid>
		<description>With all due respect to Mr. Smith, I don&#039;t think that &quot;paleocon pseudo-realism&quot; adequately describes this left-of-center Obama democrat. I prefer to think of it as a becoming humility.

    I am likewise unsure why you hark back to the Suez incidents to  demonstrate a sphere of influence situation. Perhaps we could explain that to Tibet, to Lebanon, or to Ireland, to say nothing of Chechnya.  The bottom line is that a &quot;sphere of influence&quot; exists when a given country has the power and proximity to exert it&#039;s will cheaply, quickly, and with comparative impunity. Though I think WRW disagrees with Mr. Larison and myself respecting the impunity part, it is all too clear to all of us that Russia has eliminated Georgia&#039;s army fast and on the cheap. Frankly, I&#039;m thrilled that Georgia performed as well as it did.

Discussing &quot;legitimate v illegitimate&quot; use of power sounds swell, but I can&#039;t see that it has any bearing on the &quot;pseudo-realistic&quot; interpretation of the problem on the ground.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With all due respect to Mr. Smith, I don&#8217;t think that &#8220;paleocon pseudo-realism&#8221; adequately describes this left-of-center Obama democrat. I prefer to think of it as a becoming humility.</p>
<p>    I am likewise unsure why you hark back to the Suez incidents to  demonstrate a sphere of influence situation. Perhaps we could explain that to Tibet, to Lebanon, or to Ireland, to say nothing of Chechnya.  The bottom line is that a &#8220;sphere of influence&#8221; exists when a given country has the power and proximity to exert it&#8217;s will cheaply, quickly, and with comparative impunity. Though I think WRW disagrees with Mr. Larison and myself respecting the impunity part, it is all too clear to all of us that Russia has eliminated Georgia&#8217;s army fast and on the cheap. Frankly, I&#8217;m thrilled that Georgia performed as well as it did.</p>
<p>Discussing &#8220;legitimate v illegitimate&#8221; use of power sounds swell, but I can&#8217;t see that it has any bearing on the &#8220;pseudo-realistic&#8221; interpretation of the problem on the ground.</p>
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		<title>By: WRW</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13174</link>
		<dc:creator>WRW</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2008 16:52:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13174</guid>
		<description>Mr. Smith,
  This is the first Russian intervention outside its territory since the fall of the USSR.  I simply don&#039;t see your basis for asserting Russia&#039;s experience is &quot;exceptional.&quot;  
  I also don&#039;t understand how states would be induced to abandon their interests or pursue them in some approved manner other than by compulsion (which would itself seem to be as assertion of a sphere of influence by another actor.
  If you point is that interests can be pursued in legitimate and illegitimate ways, of course.  But if you think states can be induced to abandon their interests or pursue them only in ways of which the US approves, then you aren&#039;t even dealing in pseudo-realism.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mr. Smith,<br />
  This is the first Russian intervention outside its territory since the fall of the USSR.  I simply don&#8217;t see your basis for asserting Russia&#8217;s experience is &#8220;exceptional.&#8221;<br />
  I also don&#8217;t understand how states would be induced to abandon their interests or pursue them in some approved manner other than by compulsion (which would itself seem to be as assertion of a sphere of influence by another actor.<br />
  If you point is that interests can be pursued in legitimate and illegitimate ways, of course.  But if you think states can be induced to abandon their interests or pursue them only in ways of which the US approves, then you aren&#8217;t even dealing in pseudo-realism.</p>
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		<title>By: nathansmith</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13172</link>
		<dc:creator>nathansmith</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2008 16:33:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13172</guid>
		<description>&quot;Spheres of influence, is that it is not a concept, but a reality created by geography, economic interest, security interest, culture and history.&quot;

This is a good example of paleocon pseudo-realism.  One could, I suppose, note that the US in the Caribbean and Latin America, or western European countries in their former empires, or any country in its immediate neighbors, takes a special interest that leads to a higher-than-normal degree of influence, and call this a &quot;sphere of influence.&quot;  As long as this involves the consent of the governments concerned this is compatible with sovereignty.

But since the Suez crisis of 1956, it has been atypical if not unheard-of for western European countries to use anything like a &quot;sphere-of-influence&quot; concept to justify armed intervention against the will of sovereign governments and without some kind of broader international legitimation.  Since 1991 it has also been rare for the US to do so.  Russia&#039;s strange, vague claims over its former territories are not an instance of any universal and inevitable pattern.  They are decidedly exceptional.  This is simply proven by the lived experience of the rest of the world.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;Spheres of influence, is that it is not a concept, but a reality created by geography, economic interest, security interest, culture and history.&#8221;</p>
<p>This is a good example of paleocon pseudo-realism.  One could, I suppose, note that the US in the Caribbean and Latin America, or western European countries in their former empires, or any country in its immediate neighbors, takes a special interest that leads to a higher-than-normal degree of influence, and call this a &#8220;sphere of influence.&#8221;  As long as this involves the consent of the governments concerned this is compatible with sovereignty.</p>
<p>But since the Suez crisis of 1956, it has been atypical if not unheard-of for western European countries to use anything like a &#8220;sphere-of-influence&#8221; concept to justify armed intervention against the will of sovereign governments and without some kind of broader international legitimation.  Since 1991 it has also been rare for the US to do so.  Russia&#8217;s strange, vague claims over its former territories are not an instance of any universal and inevitable pattern.  They are decidedly exceptional.  This is simply proven by the lived experience of the rest of the world.</p>
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		<title>By: WRW</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13170</link>
		<dc:creator>WRW</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2008 15:31:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13170</guid>
		<description>Mr. Smith,
  I believe Mr. Larison&#039;s point re: spheres of influence, is that it is not a concept, but a reality created by geography, economic interest, security interest, culture and history.  You can dispense with that reality unless you adopt  essentially an unlimited sphere of influence for the US (i.e., intervention in all places.)  That is not to say you cannot use diplomatic efforts, but the notion you can require a country to abandon such spheres of inluence isn&#039;t realistic.

  As I think I made clear, my disagreement with Mr. Larison is his apparent confidence that armed conflict between Russia and the US/NATO will not happen even if Russia invade Georgia (and by that I mean more than an armed intrusion to the periphery of Georgia&#039;s undisputed territory.)  I think that simply isn&#039;t true based on prior US conduct and the opinion of Russia held by our establishment.  Conflict will only be avoided if Russia pursues steps to permit a disengagement and withdrawal to the disputed territories. (Which its posturing appears to indicate it has allowed itself to do.)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mr. Smith,<br />
  I believe Mr. Larison&#8217;s point re: spheres of influence, is that it is not a concept, but a reality created by geography, economic interest, security interest, culture and history.  You can dispense with that reality unless you adopt  essentially an unlimited sphere of influence for the US (i.e., intervention in all places.)  That is not to say you cannot use diplomatic efforts, but the notion you can require a country to abandon such spheres of inluence isn&#8217;t realistic.</p>
<p>  As I think I made clear, my disagreement with Mr. Larison is his apparent confidence that armed conflict between Russia and the US/NATO will not happen even if Russia invade Georgia (and by that I mean more than an armed intrusion to the periphery of Georgia&#8217;s undisputed territory.)  I think that simply isn&#8217;t true based on prior US conduct and the opinion of Russia held by our establishment.  Conflict will only be avoided if Russia pursues steps to permit a disengagement and withdrawal to the disputed territories. (Which its posturing appears to indicate it has allowed itself to do.)</p>
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		<title>By: nathansmith</title>
		<link>http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/comment-page-1/#comment-13167</link>
		<dc:creator>nathansmith</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2008 15:00:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2008/08/10/dashed-expectations/#comment-13167</guid>
		<description>The most likely outcome would seem to be that Russia will end up like Armenia, holding a lot of territory to which it has no legal title.  Hindsight is 20-20, and there&#039;s plenty of blame to go around in bringing things to where they are.  But ultimately the details fall away, and one fact remains: Russia has invaded a sovereign country. Historical &quot;spheres of influence&quot; are not the sort of datum the international order can afford to acknowledge.  Every country in Europe has a &quot;Greater _____&quot; to remember; peace requires putting that behinid us. Russia has already very nearly forfeited the hope of not being remembered as the aggressor, and aggressors are pretty scarce on the world stage today now that Saddam&#039;s gone. It&#039;s a very small and odious club to be in. It will be interesting to see what international pariah status in the 21st century entails. 

If Russia had the political, legal and constitutional infrastructure to behave rationally, it would have stopped already-- or, better yet, never gotten involved at all.  But Putin has smashed the free press, assaulted private property, and trampled on the Constitution by decreeing the central appointment of governors.  Without a free press, the populace&#039;s ability to form public opinion with a sensible center of gravity is crippled.  Now they&#039;re ruining Russia&#039;s reputation by playing to the worst of their image in the eyes of the world.  These are sad, sad, sad days for lovers of Russia.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The most likely outcome would seem to be that Russia will end up like Armenia, holding a lot of territory to which it has no legal title.  Hindsight is 20-20, and there&#8217;s plenty of blame to go around in bringing things to where they are.  But ultimately the details fall away, and one fact remains: Russia has invaded a sovereign country. Historical &#8220;spheres of influence&#8221; are not the sort of datum the international order can afford to acknowledge.  Every country in Europe has a &#8220;Greater _____&#8221; to remember; peace requires putting that behinid us. Russia has already very nearly forfeited the hope of not being remembered as the aggressor, and aggressors are pretty scarce on the world stage today now that Saddam&#8217;s gone. It&#8217;s a very small and odious club to be in. It will be interesting to see what international pariah status in the 21st century entails. </p>
<p>If Russia had the political, legal and constitutional infrastructure to behave rationally, it would have stopped already&#8211; or, better yet, never gotten involved at all.  But Putin has smashed the free press, assaulted private property, and trampled on the Constitution by decreeing the central appointment of governors.  Without a free press, the populace&#8217;s ability to form public opinion with a sensible center of gravity is crippled.  Now they&#8217;re ruining Russia&#8217;s reputation by playing to the worst of their image in the eyes of the world.  These are sad, sad, sad days for lovers of Russia.</p>
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