Yes, I’m aware of those factors, but wanted to simplify for the sake of argument. The point is that the French were unprepared for the German’s blitzkrieg tactics, which overwhelmed them before they had any chance of effectively fighting back, and this had nothing to do with any lack of will power or bravery as Sowell is suggesting. The notion that the French are somehow cowards when it comes to fighting is one of the silliest military myths of our age. It’s an attempt to reinforce the theme of “moral decline” in Europe, as if the French lost their fighting spirit after WWI. It’s sheer nonsense.

It’s a tangent, I freely admit, but your 12:57 post certainly gives [me] the impression that you think the French expected the the Germans to bash themselves senseless on the Maginot line, rather than the reality that the French expected the major clash to be on the Belgian plain (note of course that the Maginot line was built before Belgium’s turn to neutrality in 1936, which changed the French strategic environment rather substantially). Note that some of the early German plans (i.e. Halder’s OKW plans) would have given the French what they expected (in terms of the meeting engagement somewhere aroundthe Dyle or Escaut).

I certainly hope and assume that you know better.

You’re quite correct about the French surrendering in 1940 because they had been beaten beyond any hope of recovery (just like they were beaten beyond hope of recovery in 1870, but after Sedan there was at least some basis for hope of a balance of power intervention from Austria or the UK, so one can understand the national govt fighting on for a few months).

“The worship of “sacrifice” becomes a desire to see our own countrymen die in greater and greater numbers just to acheive some sense of “significane”.

One wonders if such witless supporters envision military sacrifice as some type of Olympic contest, where the US must always win the gold…