The American Conservative

If one drills deeper, the results are even worse for the CDU and Ms Merkel. In many of the states in which the SPD had lost elections in recent years because of Mr Schröder’s economic reforms, the party has again pulled ahead of the CDU, notably in North Rhine-Westphalia (with 40% compared with 34.4% for the CDU). It was the SPD’s crushing defeat there in May that led Mr Schröder to seek early national elections.

What went wrong for Ms Merkel? For a start, she ran a lacklustre campaign and made many unforced errors. Her biggest by far was recruiting Paul Kirchhof, a judge-turned-professor who favours radical tax reform, as her prospective finance minister, because it gave Mr Schröder an easy target. In the last two weeks of the campaign he and his party launched withering attacks on the “professor from Heidelberg” and the CDU’s “radically unsocial” reforms. Such language appears to have resonated with many Germans, who still love social consensus and dread too much change.

But the disappointing result also suggests that Ms Merkel may not have been the right candidate for the CDU, because she is so atypical of a party with deep Catholic, social and western elements. The remarried, Protestant woman from eastern Germany favouring radical economic reform seems to have frightened away many who would otherwise have voted for her party. She may also have scared voters away from the CSU, which fields candidates only in the predominantly Catholic state of Bavaria. The party dropped below 50% there—a decline of nearly ten percentage points from the last elections in 2002. ~The Economist

As I have been saying since May, Frau Merkel was a very poor choice for as the Union’s candidate. The cultural divide shaping up ever more starkly in Germany (with the SPD overwhelmingly leading other contenders in the north and east, the CDU in the south and west) and the Bavarian results in particular, however, are most telling as to why this is so. Under Edmund Stoiber, premier of Bavaria and leading force in the CSU, the Union naturally received strong support in one of its core regions, and evidently having one of their own in the running for Chancellor solidified the Union’s hold on Bavaria. The Union ran far more competitively across much of the country under Stoiber, and that before the implosion of the SPD nationwide.

In spite of the largely well-fought campaign he led three years ago, and the largely accidental reasons for Schroeder’s last miraculous escape, the Union chose to drop him and alienate its core voters for no good reason when it chose Merkel. Enthusiast for good American relations that she is, Frau Merkel might have discreetly chatted with Karl Rove, cynic and scoundrel that he is, on how to win the support of core voters with whom one has next to nothing in common.

It was not simply that Frau Merkel was a bad candidate and terrible party leader who ran a dreadful campaign, which everyone acknowledges, but that, as the article suggested, she had no connection with the people whom she claimed to represent and could not even pretend to share in the culture of Catholic Germany to which she had no personal religious or professional connections. Elections are contests over symbolic meaning–they have very little to do with government or policy, as we should all know from experience–and the Union chose to set up as its symbol something completely unrecognisable to its constituents. Even if the CDU is now entirely secular and makes little pretense to advancing a specifically Christian social program, American politics ought to have taught the Union that patterns of cultural and religious allegiance often are more important for determining electoral outcomes than the ‘rational’ appeal of a platform.

In light of this, the schizophrenic campaign of the tax-slashing Mr. Kirchhof and the actual platform of raising taxes to resolve Germany’s fiscal woes only added to the damage that had already been done when the Union chose symbolically to endorse someone in whom the Union voters could not recognise themselves or their values. The CDU choosing her to represent its interests has been rather like Illinois Republicans choosing Alan Keyes as their Senate candidate, and it has been just about as successful.

Support for the war is at an all-time low. Forty-four percent now say the United States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq, the lowest reading since the question was first asked more than two years ago.

A majority, nearly 60 percent, now disapprove of the way President George W. Bush is handling the situation in Iraq, while 36 percent approve. Almost half of those surveyed said that they were not proud of what the United States is doing in Iraq.

When asked how long U.S. troops should remain in Iraq, a majority said they should leave as soon as possible, even if Iraq is not yet a stable democracy. Fifty-two percent called for an immediate departure and 42 percent said troops should remain for as long as it takes to make sure Iraq is a stable democracy.

The political divisions that have been present all along, remain.

Seventy-one percent of Democrats said the United States should leave as soon as possible, while 31 percent of Republicans and 52 percent of independents took that position.

The poll found that the casualties had been particularly wearing on the public. Forty-five percent said there had been more American military casualties in Iraq than they had expected. ~The International Herald-Tribune

Already we can expect to hear the predictable counterblasts from the War Party: we are hurting morale, we are too sensitive to a “few” casualties, we are spineless weaklings, etc. But note the last figure: 45% said that casualties have been higher than expected. That probably has an enormous amount to do with collapsing support for the war. It is understandable that the public, accepting the administration’s either inept or deceitful predictions of easy victory, expected few casualties. These were, after all, just Iraqis we were fighting, and “we” had trounced them before with minimal losses (nevermind that the two wars are completely incomparable) and “we” had just ousted the Taliban (with helpful brigades of Northern Alliance cannon fodder)–the popular imagination might have seen it in just this way.

I imagine that if Mr. Bush had been even the slightest bit informed, prepared and honest, he would have told the public that casualties could easily be several thousands of men and that reconstruction might take many years. But his handlers, assuming they had any earthly idea what they were getting into (a big assumption), probably knew no one would go for it. However, if a majority did accept his pathetic justifications for this war, in spite of the greater expected costs, I suspect that more people would be supporting his policy today and would be far less scandalised by the loss of life. As I have said before, it is not that the public is necessarily so hypersensitive to combat losses, but that the costs and purpose of the war are not what they believed they would be. That gap between expectations and reality has been filled, naturally enough, by resentment at the man who started the war.

Ecumenism certainly has declined in recent times. The key goal was ably expressed back in 1961 at a WCC New Delhi gathering. It noted that unity “is being made visible as all in each place who are baptized into Jesus Christ and confess him as Lord and Savior are brought by the Holy Spirit into one fully-committed fellowship, holding the one apostolic faith, preaching the one Gospel, breaking the one bread, joining in common prayer, and having a corporate life reaching out in witness and service to all and who at the same time are united with the whole Christian fellowship in all places and all ages, in such wise that ministry and members are accepted by all, and that all can act and speak together as occasion requires for the tasks to which God calls his people.”

The Princeton Proposal amounts to an effort to revitalize this declaration. That’s a mighty task, to say the least, when considering the varieties and disputes within Christianity around the world today. Many Christians ask, why bother?

The ecumenists respond that Christianity demands it. Most notably, they refer to Jesus Christ’s specific prayer for unity in John 17, including “that they may all be one, just as you, Father, are in me, and I in you, that they also may be in us, so that the world may believe that you have sent me.” The implications for the church’s mission to spread the Good News are unmistakable.

Jenson declared that church division perverts the process of unifying humanity, and is “sin.” Yeago warned that abandoning church unity represented a “catastrophic and continuing failure of love,” which denies the redeeming and transforming power of Jesus Christ.

Conference speakers recognized the enormous problems, including distrust and indifference. Jenson looked at the effort as “bread upon the waters,” with developments “clearly and drastically dependent” upon the Holy Spirit.

Even in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles, if Christians take Holy Scripture seriously, then it’s difficult to see how they can stop striving for the unity prayed for by Jesus Christ. ~Raymond Keating, Church and Society (courtesy of Orthodoxy Today)

The last sentence sums up very simply why “many Christians” are indifferent, if not hostile, to the ecumenist project: it identifies the largely political project of reconciling different confessions under some minimalist, reductionist definition of Christian truth with the Lord’s most profound prayer for the Church. The implications of the prayer are not “unmistakable,” as a great many Christians of more understanding than I possess have regarded the implications Mr. Keating and the ecumenists draw from Christ’s prayer for unity as a gross error.

Certainly from the traditional Catholic and Orthodox perspectives with which I am more familiar, the Church is now already united, holy, catholic and apostolic and cannot be anything else. I assume that theologically rigorous Protestants would affirm nothing else. She is not, and cannot be, divided or partial–that is one implication of Christ’s prayer. Bad ecclesiology among Catholics and Orthodox notwithstanding, there can be no permanent divisions within the Body of Christ–there can be either a falling away from the Truth, or an adherence. That sort of stark opposition tends to embarrass modern Christians, and modern theologians most of all, but then we are all likely embarrassed by many other rather stark or ‘harsh’ things required of us by the Lord. Still, it is no excuse for sloppy thinking or confusion.

I cannot speak for the Catholics as to how their authorities understand different degrees of communion (according which, Catholics and Orthodox are apparently supposed to be in some kind of communion), as I do not pretend to understand communion that is independent of Eucharistic and doctrinal unity myself. In what would it consist? At any rate, what little I do understand as an Orthodox Christian tells me that past divisions in the Church were scandalous, but that any division is a product of some Christians departing from the common mind of the Church and persisting in dividing themselves from the Church.

There is an imperative for the Church and all Her members to call all people to salvation in Christ and to receive them according to the Tradition and teachings of the Church. For the Orthodox, there is obviously no question of concessions on fundamental points of doctrinal divergence–it is not given to us to concede things entrusted to us, as we will be held to account for each of them. Yet what seems “unmistakable” is that a genuine reunion of all confessing Christians in the one and same Church would require such concessions of certain long-held claims.

So there is no such imperative for all Christians, or all those who call Christ Lord, to unite for the sake of uniting or to pretend that they are already united. No “ecumenical” effort that presupposes a pre-existing unity of Christians can ever overcome its own theological and ecclesiological incoherence. Our unity in Christ is not some metaphorical image or nominal identity–it is a spiritual reality, accomplished by the Holy Spirit, and made visible in the world. I do not believe that such unity could be obscured and hidden such that it is no longer visible to all: if we see many different confessions around us, then it is because there is a plethora of false confessions and one true one. Full communion among all Christians is desirable, as indeed the communion of all men in Christ would be desirable, but it is difficult to see how this would happen given the current theology and attitudes of most self-styled ecumenists.

Merkel’s sense of grim purpose may suit the moment. After spending four months with a seemingly unassailable lead in the polls, she suddenly finds herself in a dogfight with Schröder.

The likelihood is still that Merkel, 51, will become chancellor after the vote Sunday. But she may have to settle for leading a “grand coalition” of her Christian Democratic Union and Schröder’s Social Democratic Party. Her preferred coalition, with the Free Democratic Party, is falling just short of a majority in the most recent polls.

Given the aura of political invincibility that has enveloped Merkel since a weakened Schröder called for early elections last May, that result would be seen as almost a defeat. ~The International Herald-Tribune

Should he [Scott Richert] choose to continue the discussion, I would be very interested to hear what he might have to say to two of the points that I raised:

1. If the just price concept is to play a moral restraining function and not be identified from or solely from the free market price of a good and not be identified through a series of price controls then what criteria does Mr. Richert think that a merchant should look to that do not substantially involve considerations of the item’s supply or the needs of those who purchase it?

2. Does Mr. Richert acknowledge that by asking for a just price to be determined that is not substantially affected by “scarcity or the special needs of the buyer” that he is asking for a price to be determined in a way not substantially affected by considerations of supply and demand? ~Jimmy Akin

Before I begin, I would like to thank Mr. Richert for his link to my original post on this debate and the very kind words he has written in his latest post.

In looking for a mechanism other than state price controls for enforcement, it seems that we have excellent mechanisms in the form of social pressure, the disapproval of the community and the conscience of the seller. The seller might measure whether or not he is charging unduly high prices by what his customers are telling him about his unduly high prices–admirers of the market are frequently enthusing about its capacity to transmit information very effectively, so why should consumer resentment at high prices not be a significant part of the exchange of information? He could then keep his prices at a level as low as he could without suffering a loss. It might also occur to a seller in a time of rising prices that his efforts to keep prices moderate will be rewarded by consumers both in the short and longer terms.
Read More…

Finally, Mr. Richert takes exception to my characterization of the Middle Ages as impoverished compared to modern times. His response is that modern times are spiritually impoverished compared to the Middle Ages.

This is quite true. The faith among the Christian population was stronger then and suffused their culture in a way it does not today. This aspect of the Middle Ages is much to be admired and, if possible, duplicated at some point in the future (though B16 doesn’t see that happening any time soon).

Mr. Richert points out that there are values that transcend economics and that must be pursued, and this is also quite true. He tells a poignant story involving Mother Theresa, which is spiritually compelling and a powerful testimony to the value of compassion over money.

These points do not mean, however, that the economics of the Middle Ages were correct, that they should be applied today, or that the Church requires us to believe in them. ~Jimmy Akin

This was one of the few points worth commenting on from Mr. Akin’s riposte to one of Mr. Richert’s last posts on the just price debate. Rather than spending much time detouring down the side alley of Mr. Akin’s justifying his backhanded attack on the views of Father Eugene Cahill, S.J., which dominates most of Mr. Akin’s last post, I wanted to tackle Mr. Akin’s argument advanced against medieval economic practices.

Yes, Mr. Akin grants, medieval Christian man was generally more pious and lived in a far more consciously Christian and Christianised society than we do, and he also grants that, as I would put it, we are bereft of that spiritual illumination in our preoccupation with having effective strategies of capital management and working to maximise return, which conventional opinion regards more or less as essentially a good in itself. But medieval economics was just plain incorrect. By what measure are medieval economic practices (it seems somehow odd to refer to ‘the economics of the Middle Ages’) deemed incorrect? Again, by the measures of efficiency, maximising gain and “growth.”

Of course, when modern, capitalist economic standards are applied to past ‘economies’, all ages before early modernity will be found lacking, their economic “systems” deemed deeply flawed and retarded by cultural values that conceive of entirely different purposes for wealth and human life. But isn’t Mr. Akin’s acknowledgment of medieval Christian man’s superior spiritual and cultural life a tacit concession that, as far as the highest goods in life are concerned (the goods with which Christians should be most concerned), a meaningful and good life was realised far better in many ways under that economic regime than under our own?
Read More…

So much attention has been paid to these false determinants of administration policy that a different political dynamic has been underappreciated. Within the Republican Party, the Bush administration got support for the Iraq war from the neoconservatives (who lack a political base of their own but who provide considerable intellectual firepower) and from what Walter Russell Mead calls “Jacksonian America” – American nationalists whose instincts lead them toward a pugnacious isolationism.

Happenstance then magnified this unlikely alliance. Failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the inability to prove relevant connections between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda left the president, by the time of his second inaugural address, justifying the war exclusively in neoconservative terms: that is, as part of an idealistic policy of political transformation of the broader Middle East. The president’s Jacksonian base, which provides the bulk of the troops serving and dying in Iraq, has no natural affinity for such a policy but would not abandon the commander in chief in the middle of a war, particularly if there is clear hope of success.

This war coalition is fragile, however, and vulnerable to mishap. If Jacksonians begin to perceive the war as unwinnable or a failure, there will be little future support for an expansive foreign policy that focuses on promoting democracy. That in turn could drive the 2008 Republican presidential primaries in ways likely to affect the future of American foreign policy as a whole. ~Francis Fukuyama, The New York Times (registration required)

As a category of political thought or foreign policy alignment, Jacksonian is perhaps one of the few less meaningful and intelligible than “isolationist.” Even more useless is the attribution of “isolationism” to Jacksonians by someone who obviously has no sympathies for either. What needs to be understood straightaway is that whoever the Jacksonians are supposed to be (here they apparently refer to ‘pro-military’, Midwestern and Southern Republicans), I cannot see how they have much, if anything, in common with the politics or foreign policy attitudes of Andrew Jackson.

It is conventional to depict Jackson as a ‘nationalist’, but the genuine nationalists of his time and the proponents of the associated American System were his political enemies among the Whigs. Three things above all characterise Jacksonian politics: vigorous exercise of executive power, privileging federal legislative power vis-a-vis the states with respect to nullification and hostility to urban, mercantile and Northeastern interests represented by the Bank, the latter being informed by a lifelong hostility to England and those whom he deemed friendly to her interests. As disagreeable as we find his attitudes towards the Cherokee, his foreign policy towards other states was largely irenic or, put another way, diffident.

His sympathy for his fellow Tennesseans making their stand in Texas is hardly surprising, but in practical terms nothing in his record as President would suggest anything other than an endorsement of the studied, pragmatic neutrality of his predecessors and his successor in Martin Van Buren. If he was personally pugnacious, as he undoubtedly was, this did not actually translate into a proclivity for armed conflict as a matter of policy. Young Hickory, that is James Polk, might provide a better template for the so-called ‘Jacksonians’ in his readiness to go to war against Mexico, but generally he represents an attitude toward the desirability of continental expansion that is scarcely any different than that of Jefferson. Properly speaking, however, the nationalists of his time remained on the other side of the political divide and would continue to do so.

As I understood Fukuyama’s use of the term, he takes Jacksonian in the sense that it implies what the British called a ‘forward’ policy in relation to other states, a preference for military solutions to international conflicts but a general disinterest in foreign affairs except for how they more or less directly affect America. His Jacksonians are the sort of people who somehow imagine that the existence of small, hostile states on the other side of the globe constitute imminent danger to their neighbourhoods. They are the last to acknowledge that a war is unwinnable or pointless, because they cannot conceive of a war that America is ultimately unable and unwilling to fight to the finish (however the finish may be defined), as this would imply national weakness.

They would probably be happy to endorse this silly idea: “Slavery anywhere is a threat to freedom everywhere.” In this way ideological causes overseas appear to be legitimate issues of national defense. They are therefore probably much more appropriately called Lincolnians (which is not very euphonious)–they are responsive to Lincoln’s sort of pseudo-religious language, messianic fervour and nationalist-cum-egalitarian claptrap. Perhaps even more accurately they are fans of Teddy Roosevelt’s style of presidential leadership, TR’s activism and vitalistic doctrines of conflict mixed with his generic Americanism.

Because of this, I think Fukuyama underestimates their capacity to remain loyal to ludicrous ideological causes and grossly overestimates their tendency towards “isolationism.” It a sort of nationalism that prizes independent action that can often be mistaken, especially by ‘experts’ such as Fukuyama, for something called “isolationism,” which is to say armed neutrality. TR devotees might welcome Joseph Chamberlain’s sort of “splendid isolation,” in which America does whatever it pleases to advance its interests in the most mercenary and amoral fashion and gives no thought to international consequences. These are the sorts of people who would laugh off allegations of torture by the government just as they might make callous justifications of the British concentration camps in South Africa. Imperialism overseas would not embarrass a TR lover the way it might a real Jacksonian. If the war in Iraq is perceived by them as an exercise in dominance, rather than “liberation,” it would simply redouble their commitment to supporting it.

Viewed in that way the “TR crowd” might be more liable to remain supportive of the war if it continued to be framed, however implausibly, in terms of national defense, American virtue and hegemony rather than falling back to the no more plausible humanitarian and democratising excuses of the administration. The war might be completely pointless, but so long as it was prosecuted with a sort of vigour and full-throated affirmation of American supremacy it would be acceptable to these sorts of people. Nonetheless, I suspect that no matter what happens with the war the “TR crowd” will continue to support Mr. Bush long after the foreign policy elites have jumped ship (since that is what such elites are best at doing), if only to express for their own sake their understanding of what it means to be patriotic.

The only thing that will scandalise and dishearten a TR lover is a show of weakness or dilatoriness when ‘action’ and ‘strength’ are required. Here they find common ground with the neocons and their obsession with demonstrating ‘resolve’. In that sense, Mr. Bush’s handling of Katrina may embarrass his TR-loving supporters and the neocons more than his incompetent war leadership. The TR lovers can still have solidarity with a war leader, however bad he is, provided that he is not going to give up the fight and humiliate the country too much (minor humiliations can be rationalised as inevitable ‘setbacks’), but they could never tolerate the appearance of helplessness. As Mr. Bush continues to thrash around in political confusion after Hurricane Katrina, he is revealing to his TR-loving followers that he is not the ‘tough’ and vigorous sort of president they like. That, and not anything that could happen in Iraq, is what will undo his presidency and alienate the political base supporting the war even now.

President Bush’s job approval has dipped below 40 percent for the first time in the AP-Ipsos poll, reflecting widespread doubts about his handling of gasoline prices and the response to Hurricane Katrina.

Nearly four years after Bush’s job approval soared into the 80s after the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, Bush was at 39 percent job approval in an AP-Ipsos poll taken this week. That’s the lowest since the the poll was started in December 2003.

The public’s view of the nation’s direction has grown increasingly negative as well, with nearly two-thirds now saying the country is heading down the wrong track. ~The Chicago Sun-Times

39% is a pretty pitiful figure. It is on par with Nixon in the summer of 1973 and the rating of Gerald Ford after he had pardoned Nixon. It is only five points better than Jimmy Carter in 1981. Mr. Bush’s mediocrity as President has now been matched by the popular perception of his mediocrity. The GOP should be very afraid.

Man is made in the image and likeness of God; he is not Homo economicus. Where Mr. Akin and I disagree is on whether you can interpret the Church’s social teaching in light of an economic theory that celebrates the self-interest of man and is itself predicated on a philosophy that regards men as individuals who are related to each other and society at large only by means of contracts (economic or social) without doing irreparable damage to that teaching. ~Scott P. Richert

Last week, Scott Richert of Chronicles began an interesting discussion at The Rockford Files of Mr. Jimmy Akin’s objections to the regulation of price-gouging, in this case in the wake of a hurricane, and took issue with Mr. Akin’s usage of the term ‘natural price point’ where, he held, just price was more fitting and appropriate in reconciling the setting of prices with Catholic social doctrine. The post listed above is Mr. Richert’s response to Mr. Akin’s first reply.

The exchange is well worth reading, and Mr. Richert’s arguments are commendable in the way in which they take seriously the consequences of our creation in the image and likeness of God and our ultimate natural end in returning to Him. He is quite right to stress that this concept of man, to which, incidentally, all Christians are obliged to subscribe, cannot readily admit assumptions from theories in which man’s end can be conceived really only in terms of material self-gratification rather than spiritual and natural restoration in Christ. In this way it is tangentially related to my post about Dr. Fleming’s ethics article: understanding the proper theological definition of human nature and will found in the Fathers will necessarily lead to a rejection of any ethics that privilege the self as an autonomous agent and which consider the self’s fulfilling of its desires as the basis of moral rationality. Indeed, it is well worth considering whether the Christian doctrine of person, and the patristic understanding that true personhood exists only in relationship and communion, has anything substantial in common with the modern concept of self, which is, by and large, considered to be independent and autonomous in its true form.

In a parallel way, it seems to me, economic libertarians and somewhat less doctrinaire proponents of largely unregulated markets, such as Mr. Akin (who firmly disavows any libertarian label), appeal to concepts of economic self-interest rooted in a concept of autonomous man alien to the understanding of the Fathers, and they defend those appeals by turning to definitions of rationality and value that must inevitably vindicate their economic theory. As I read Mr. Akin’s “Just Price Analysis,” I find that he is willing to entertain that there might be intrinsic value in a commodity, but that he has long since accepted that value is determined in terms of money and anything’s value is only as great as the amount someone is willing to pay for it. In Austrian economics, as I understand it, anything that interferes with the market determining that value creates inefficiency and that interference is ipso facto irrational.

The goal of just price is, well, justice, not economic efficiency or ‘rationality’, and as I understand the early Fathers it would only be to the extent that the latter are compatible with justice that they would be considered desirable or even licit. There was considerable economic inefficiency in medieval Europe, as measured by this definition of efficiency, but I suspect that had the medievals been confronted with the alternative of great efficiency most of them (or at least the authorities in the Church) would have spurned it, as the hope and desire of medieval Christian man was not riches stored up here below but those laid up in heaven.

That being said, however, it is a bit tendentious to accuse Mr. Richert of a certain inconsistency in his argument for using the concept of just price without also necessarily endorsing the practices of medieval guilds. Mr. Akin writes: “From what I gather, Mr. Richert is not in favor of price controls, but these were a prominent part of the medieval just price system. By rejecting them, Mr. Richert is advocating a significant departure from the just price system as it was understood and practiced in the Middle Ages.” At this point I might point out that just price was originally a Roman legal requirement adopted into Christian theology through the Byzantine Fathers and reformulated by Aquinas and others in the thirteenth century, so there need be no necessary connection between medieval economic practices as they obtained in western Europe in the high middle ages and an embrace of the concept of just price. More to the point, as I imagine Mr. Richert might argue in a future post, if the Catholic Magisterium does not feel obligated to endorse a temporary economic arrangement in order to endorse the concept of just price, whether understood in scholastic fashion or not, Mr. Richert is hardly under any obligation, moral or intellectual, to do the same.

Judging from the blistering analyses in Time, Newsweek, and elsewhere these past few days, it turns out that Bush is in fact fidgety, cold and snappish in private. He yells at those who dare give him bad news and is therefore not surprisingly surrounded by an echo chamber of terrified sycophants. He is slow to comprehend concepts that don’t emerge from his gut. He is uncomprehending of the speeches that he is given to read.

Maybe it’s Bush’s sinking poll numbers — he is, after all, undeniably an unpopular president now. Maybe it’s the way that the federal response to the flood has cut so deeply against Bush’s most compelling claim to greatness: His resoluteness when it comes to protecting Americans. ~Dan Froomkin, The Washington Post

For the last four years, the press regularly treats us to the idea that Mr. Bush is admired and respected for his resolve and, as we hearing lately, his determination and ability to “protect” Americans. I must confess that I don’t understand where anyone has gotten the idea that he is particularly concerned about such protection. He certainly uses that sort of rhetoric–invading Iraq was, after all, self-defense, don’t you know–but none of his actions has impressed me with any sense that he is very concerned to protect us. Neither am I convinced that he is capable of doing so. But apparently some people are only becoming aware of this now after Hurricane Katrina, and what is more they seem shocked or upset that this is the case. This is one more sign of the sycophantic attitude to which I was referring in an earlier post, as this is an attitude that breeds a mentality of dependency and servility in the expectation of protection and provision. But, of course, Mr. Bush cannot protect us.

Generally speaking, it is not his job to protect us, which is good for him considering his less-than-stellar track record. He has certain responsibilities and duties for maintaining the common defense, more than a few of which he is shirking or ignoring in surrendering our borders to virtually all comers, but as the president he is not especially obligated to protect Americans. Insofar as policies for the common defense do protect us, it is the men actually doing the guard, intelligence and field work who provide some protection. The president’s decisions can either facilitate or retard that effort, and I think we have a good idea what effect Mr. Bush’s decisions have had for the defense of the nation itself. But in the final analysis a free people should be able to protect and provide for themselves, or they quickly lose the quality of being free.

As for Mr. Bush’s staff, it is little wonder that he cultivates sycophancy around him when he seems to rely on it for his political support and success. But Mr. Bush should be worried–now it seems that even the eunuchs of his bedchamber, so to speak, are beginning to get restless.