Over 40 years ago as a college sophomore, I read with pleasure some of Robert Dahl’s works on the functioning of American democracy. The books themselves have left my possession long ago, but I have warm recollections of the precision and elegance of Dahl’s arguments. They were an antidote to the SDS/Marxist theory of a corporate oligarchy which controlled America, a notion of American society then still influential on elite campuses, but one which, as the revolutionary ’60s burned out and gave way to the ’70s, had begun to seem jejune if not actually apologetic for communist brutality.
Essentially—and I am relying on Wikipedia and not memory—Dahl contended that the United States was a polyarchy, a plural society where discrete formal and informal power structures competed and compromised over political outcomes. It wasn’t perfect democracy, but it was more than decent by historical and comparative standards. Today left-wing analyses are better remembered, C. Wright Mill’s interlocking Power Elite, and William Domhoff’s series of works, depicting American society in the iron grip of a mostly malevolent and self-serving WASP ruling establishment. I’m sure those works have been superseded, and am not certain that anyone even talks about Robert Dahl anymore, though he was president of the American Political Science Association and a highly regarded figure at Yale.
To what extent has academic political science has caught up with contemporary power in America? Certainly neither Dahl, nor Mills nor Domhoff had room in their conceptualizations for phenomena like this, in which billionaire George Soros invested $33 million to turn Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson from a small police blotter item to a national cause-célèbre. Of course the story is slightly more complex than that (Snopes gives it a mixed partially true rating); what it means is that the Soros-funded Open Society Foundation streamed $33 million to “grass-roots” activist groups from all over the country which then engaged efforts to take the Ferguson protests national and keep them at the center of national attention. The Open Society Foundation had given money to such groups before, and according to its director did not directly supervise their agitation over Ferguson. But anyone curious how hundreds of professional activists could decamp from New York and Washington and elsewhere and stay for months in Ferguson (don’t they have jobs to get to? who pays for their meals?) now has an answer.
Thirty-three million dollars, even if allocated to groups which have other agenda items than Ferguson, goes a long way in paying salaries, producing media content, organizing bodies to show up at demonstrations, etc. One blogger suggested that it will be interesting if the people whose businesses were burned down in the social justice looting which followed the non-indictment of officer Darren Wilson were to depose the people whose funds kept the Michael Brown affair at boiling point for months. So, too, the family of the Bosnian man beaten to death with hammers on a St. Louis street because he was white.
Relatively small amounts of money can go a long way in organizing a protest and keeping it going. Most politically competent people have jobs and family responsibilities, and can’t devote much time to serious activism, certainly not in Ferguson, Missouri. So the ability to pay full time activists can entirely shift national perception of an issue, or even turn the direction of an entire country. The so-called Maidan revolution in the Ukraine was the culmination of years of funding by the U.S. government, government sponsored NGO’s, and private groups, including a major one, the International Renaissance Foundation, founded and controlled by George Soros. Victoria Nuland, the administration’s point person in organizing the Ukrainian revolution, boasted in a speech two years ago that the United States had spent $5 billion since 1990 trying to bring “European democracy” to the Ukraine. This is a high figure, and probably includes some crony capitalist deals which didn’t work out. But in a poor country relatively small amounts of money can go a long way—paying journalists, training people to set up internet TV stations, and equipping and staffing them. The Maidan Revolution certainly would not have occurred without hundreds of salaried and trained “pro-democracy” cadres. Vladimir Putin’s reaction, and the war which ensued have cost many lives and many billions more than the initial Western investments.
If one examines very rich people wielding enormous power, it isn’t fair to concentrate only on Soros, funder of left-liberal causes in the U.S. and more ambiguous ones abroad. Sheldon Adelson is the major funder of United Against Nuclear Iran and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, two “think tanks” which generate an impressive amount of agitation inside the Beltway against the administration’s Iran diplomacy and in favor or an American military strike on Iran. (Adelson has urged an American nuclear strike on Iran as a “demonstration” that we mean business.) Together Adelson’s groups help contribute to an inside the Beltway near-consensus that American military action against Iran is a perfectly plausible, sensible option, which could be carried out with little cost to the United States. Since Adelson is a major Republican donor as well as think tank sponsor, he stands a fair chance of getting his hawkish policies translated into action.
Now is perhaps not the place to argue in favor a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear aspirations, though one seems to be in reach: nor to stipulate that if Michael Brown had simply raised his hands up, or not tried to assault a police officer, he would be alive today. But I do wonder what contemporary political science has to say about the truly mammouth influence of rich individuals on the American political system. Their businesses are, so far as I can see, immune from popular pressure: most of Adelson’s money comes from casinos in Macau, where China has granted him a kind of monopoly; Soros made his billions on currency bets. Americans of great wealth have sought political influence before, of course, but what is now going on is on an altogether different scale. Henry Ford in his business prime published an anti-Semitic newspaper, but pressure from Jewish groups and the threats of boycott against his car business compelled him to desist and apologize. Warmonger Adelson; social justice agitator Soros have few or no American customers, and operate well beyond such social and economic constraints. (For what it’s worth, I find Soros far the more congenial; I’ve met him and found him wry and charming, which I doubt is true about Adelson.)
But America really is in a new era. The much-vaunted separation of the 1 percent, or 1 percent of the 1 percent, from the rest of society doesn’t mean simply that some people have many more homes and cars and planes than the rest of us; nor does it mean they can simply finance an insurgent candidate who might not otherwise be viable (as was the case with some antiwar Democrats in the late ’60s). It means they possess a truly enormous power to shape perceptions in our society, to bend democracy more than was possible before. What can we call such a system? Clearly Robert Dahl’s “polyarchy” concept needs serious revision. Who might undertake it?
Scott McConnell is a TAC founding editor.
Obama is taking heat for not rushing to Paris to preen besides other heads of state in the Je Suis Charlie march. The president was correct not to go. The jihadist murders were vile, horrific, and inexcusable, as the deliberate murder of civilians always is. France’s task of dampening (it will never extinguish) the terror threats it faces will be long and arduous, and hopefully will entail a shrewd combination of wisdom and tough measures, and the United States should and will behave as a steadfast friend and ally of France.
However the Je Suis Charlie march was too freighted with blatant hypocrisies. Sending an ambassador, visiting the embassy, (as Obama did) were appropriate gestures; so too is tighter coordination with France on monitoring jihadists. But as Christopher Caldwell pointed out in a smart column, the attack on Charlie Hebdo was not an attack on French values, it was an attack on the French state.
Terrorists could—and have—committed murder in Moscow or in China, and those attacks are not viewed as an attack on Russian or Chinese values. Neither country has any qualms about defending itself. France was attacked last week, in its capital. Because it counts among its inhabitants at least hundreds possibly inclined to commit similar murders, its domestic security agents will be busy for a long time. (It was reported that a twitter message expressing enthusiasm for the attacks received 18,000 retweets.)
But the French seem determined to interpret last week’s attacks as an assault on their values, foremost among them freedom of expression. This is a value today’s France honors quite selectively. Muslim inhabitants of the Paris suburbs have ample reason to believe that France is far more committed to the defense of free speech which insults them than it is to free speech in the abstract. Charlie Hebdo was free to plaster on newsstands all over Paris vivid cartoon depictions of Mohammed as an eager homosexual bottom, but five years ago when one of its cartoonists wrote an item suggesting that a son of the president was making a good career move by converting to Judaism he was summarily fired and put on trial for “inciting racial hatred.” Literally, put on trial. The country of Voltaire, yup.
Last summer, as Israeli tanks and planes were smashing the defenseless population in Gaza, France became the only country in Europe to ban demonstrations against the assault. Those who marched in, or even advertised anti-Israel demonstration on social media faced a year in prison and hefty fines—which virtually guaranteed that those who insisted on demonstrating nonetheless would be ready to engage in criminal acts. It is well known that the popular French-African comedian Dieudonne is forbidden to perform in France because many of his jokes are anti-Semitic. In a more elevated vein, last December the distinguished University of Tel Aviv post-Zionist Shlomo Sand was barred from speaking at the University of Nice, after he was invited to lecture there. Sand is part of a considerable list of academic anti-Zionists who have been barred from speaking at conferences in the French university system.
It is unlikely in the extreme that the killers of January knew or cared that Shlomo Sand was barred from speaking at a French university, but they could hardly have failed to absorb that the storied liberties of France are differently allocated according to what group one belongs to.
Adam Shatz noted that the Je Suis Charlie slogan expresses a “peculiar nostalgia” for 9/11, a time of Western innocence and “moral clarity” before the destruction of Iraqi state under false pretenses, the torturing at Abu Ghraib, the renditions, and all the rest which has tarnished the American self-image of utter righteousness. Le Monde actually ran a headline proclaiming that the Paris attacks were “France’s 9/11″—and one can only hope that that doesn’t mean France is going to go berserk as America did and invade countries that had nothing whatsoever to do with the attacks. Shatz observes that prominent liberal hawks have been quick to warn Americans against asking any questions about what might have radicalized the young men on their path to murder last week. (One of the Kouachi brothers was apparently set on his path to jihadism by outrage at Abu Ghraib, and initially tried to go to Iraq to fight Americans there.) Nope, they say, forget all that, it’s just radical Islam, the evil ideology.
Benjamin Netanyahu and his entourage are reinforcing this message. The task is complicated for the Israelis, and their American neoconservative friends—their primary wish is for a Western war against Shi’ite Iran, and Sunni radicalism is definitely a distraction. So Netanyahu (the Israeli left is having fun with images of him elbowing his way to the front of the Je Suis Charlie march, his bodyguards pushing aside French culture minister Fleur Pellerin so Netanyahu could get on the dignitary bus before her) is making a strenuous effort to conflate them, Shia, Sunni, groups which celebrated the attacks, groups which instantly condemned them. In his Paris speeches, Netanyahu stated that the Israel and the West’s common enemy consists of terrorists driven by an implacable hatred of our freedoms, and a desire to return the world to medieval darkness. (Surely it must be Iran’s hatred of modernity which requires Israel to assassinate Iranian scientists). In any case, this argument worked well enough in the aftermath of 9/11: Americans became convinced that secular Iraq should be destroyed to punish Al Qaeda radicals. Under the Je Suis Charlie banner we are supposed to go off to war again, against the Sunni extremists of ISIS and all radical Islam, and also the Sh’ites (Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Assad regime in Syria, and Iran) who collectively are ISIS’s primary enemy.
One can be critical of the Je Suis Charlie ideology and hope that it doesn’t become a 9/11-level galvanizing force for a new wave of futile invasions, and still recognize that France has an Islam problem. France’s freedoms were not attacked, but France was, and Parisians cannot feel comfortable knowing that quite possibly one in a hundred French Muslims—more than 50,000 people that is—harbor some degree of sympathy for the January killers. One can dispense with the talk about France’s glorious freedoms, and still realize that there is a France, a blood and soil country of shared history and culture—which is threatened by mass immigration, especially by immigrants who lack the means or will to fully blend into that culture.
The one party in France which seems fully to recognize that—the Front National, was not invited to participate in last Sunday’s Paris march, despite the fact the Front National’s leader, Marine Le Pen, leads or close to it in virtually all opinion polls for the next presidential election. This was a curious exclusion for a so-called national unity march. Still, Le Pen’s party—despite the many racist or unsavory remarks made in past years by her father—seems to be on to something important: there is a France which people don’t want to vanish (I fully share that sentiment), and that France is threatened by transnational commitments—such as the EU’s commitment to open borders—quite as much as it is threatened by jihadist murderers.
The way out of the French dilemma almost certainly involves some disconnection—far less Western military engagement in Muslim lands, far less Muslim immigration to what we can no longer call Christian lands. This recommendation unfortunately is the exact opposite of the liberal internationalist agenda, which if it can be boiled down, seems to be more immigration and more war. Early on in the crisis the blogger Steve Sailer wrote something which strikes me as quite true: an arrangement of 200 separate countries is not the worst way of organizing the world, in a world where different people have different cultures and needs. It is preferable to grand transnational and multicultural enterprises which have the almost impossible task of formulating cultural rules which make sense for everyone.
Despite serious efforts, France has been failing in that endeavor—though the failure is far from absolute. There are, it should be noted, millions of quite French, quite assimilated, and relatively secular French Muslims. The prospect of a French total war against “radical Islam” coupled with continued high levels of immigration cannot possibly make their lives any easier.
Scott McConnell is a TAC founding editor.
Last Friday, Israeli settlers attacked the vehicles of American diplomats on the West Bank with stones, clubs, and axes. American security personnel accompanying the two cars reportedly drew their weapons but did not use them. The American consular officials were trying to investigate the the destruction by Israeli settlers of Palestinian olive trees—on land owned by a Palestinian-American. (In an amusing sidebar to this not especially funny incident, the Israeli Defense Forces apparently took down from its website a video link describing rock-throwing at cars as “terrorism”—it had been put up to justify harsh Israeli military response to Palestinian boys who throw rocks at Israeli settler cars.)
The Obama administration’s response to the incident thus far has been timid, almost apologetic in tone; it released a statement by a minor State Department spokesman saying it was “deeply concerned” by the attack and was “working with Israeli authorities” in their investigation of the incident. One might think that a non-lethal assault on American diplomats in the Mideast would attract some American media attention, especially one carried out citizens of “America’s greatest ally.” But there has been little coverage: a short paragraph in the Times, some minor additional mentions, that’s all.
The incident serves as sort of coda for the holiday season: over the break, American diplomats worked feverishly to beat back a Palestinian-sponsored UN resolution calling for immediate negotiations to establish a Palestinian state within a one-year deadline, and for Israel to end its occupation. Their efforts succeeded: Nigeria unexpectedly abstained at the last moment, depriving the measure of the nine votes it would have needed to pass the UN security council. The U.S. might then have vetoed it anyway, but a veto would have embarrassed an administration that claims to favor a two-state solution.
Meanwhile as Congress recessed, AIPAC bragged how it had shepherded through Capitol Hill three resolutions increasing, if such a thing was possible, American support for Israel. One designated Israel as a “major strategic partner”—a designation, AIPAC reminded everyone, not given to any other country on the planet.
Israel’s relationship to the American Congress is truly something to behold. Visiting Israel over the break, Sen. Lindsey Graham came up with an interesting formulation to describe it. In an interview with Sheldon Adelson’s Israeli paper, Graham assured Israelis that the much-described chilliness of President Obama’s relationship with prime minister Netanyahu was actually of little consequence: “Presidents come and go. Bush 41’s administration had problems with Israel’s policies. In business terms, the anchor tenant is the Congress.” It’s a revealing metaphor, suggesting Israeli ownership of the American-Israeli relationship. Americans pay rent, which Congress is always willing to do.
At a joint press conference with Israeli prime minister Netanyahu, Graham assured Netanyahu that Congress will “follow your lead” regarding American negotiations with Iran. What a remarkable statement from a critical American legislator—essentially conferring leadership on a vital national security issue to a foreign country! This too was barely noted by the American media, which is a bit of a surprise as it is widely understood that Netanyahu wants American negotiations with Iran to fail, so better as to draw the United States into a war with the Persian state.
The ability of Netanyahu to supervise American Congress is all the more remarkable in view of how generally ambivalent the American public has become about Israel. This is not to say of course that most Americans are hostile to Israel; most are supportive. But recent polls indicate that most Americans generally want Washington to be even-handed between Israel and the Palestinians; one surprising recent finding was the surging number of Americans who favor a “one-state solution” in which both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs have civil and voting rights in historic Palestine. It’s less shocking than it seems: Americans are making a go of multiculturalism at home, though its a route few of them would have chosen 50 years ago. According to a one recent poll, recently presented at the Brookings Institution by the University of Maryland’s Shibley Telhami, 73 percent of Americans favor either a two-state solution or one-state solution with equal rights for both peoples—a figure roughly three time times the combined number of those who favor either Israeli annexation of the West Bank or a perpetuation of the status quo of Israeli occupation, occasionally punctuated by bouts of let’s pretend peace talks.
Generally younger people and Democrats are more favorable to the Palestinians than the Republican and the elderly. And pro-Israel voices are more passionate (and donate far more campaign money) than other Americans.
The point however is not that the American public is divided—though it is, or that public sentiment is shifting inexorably away from strong support for Israel to a more neutral stance, though that is true as well. It is that the actual sentiments of Americans are almost completely unrepresented in the American Congress, which has recently vowed—by almost unanimous votes—to back Israel’s right-wing government whatever it does. Perhaps it is too much to now expect a Congressional resolution apologizing to the Israeli settlers for the efforts of American diplomats to investigate their destruction of Palestinian olive groves, but would such a resolution really be surprising?
Twenty-four years ago, Pat Buchanan, in an off-the-cuff quip on TV’s “McLaughlin Group,” described Capitol Hill as “Israeli occupied territory.” He once told me the words “just came out.” But TAC‘s co-founder was never more on target, and more important words were never uttered on that entertaining program.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
One reason for the continued vital role for TAC is that the left makes itself so difficult to identify with. Here is a personal example: white male, late middle age, Christian background, Obama supporter (volunteered in both campaigns) believes that major problems facing this country and the world are global warming, accelerating inequality, the outsourcing and general drying up of middle class jobs. Opposed the Iraq war from the moment the neocons began to push for it (September 12, 2001?); opposes the militarized war-as-first-or-second-resort mindset so dominant within the Beltway; supports Obama’s effort to explore detente with Iran. Supports a reduction in defense expenditures–the savings could be spent on infrastructure, debt reduction, education, health care subsidies. Pretty much a portrait of a 100 percent liberal Democrat, no?
Yet a person like this encounters at every step prominent purveyors of the dominant liberal narratives who spare no effort to repel him. If our would-be liberal is, as mentioned, white, Christian by background, male, he may know that he, or his male children are intended as the indirect targets of public shaming by Lena Dunham, the newly anointed “voice of her [millennial] generation.” Dunham writes in her highly praised best-selling memoir that she was sexually assaulted by a conservative Republican named “Barry” at her private college.
The account of the assault isn’t, I don’t believe, central to the book; it seems to be thrown in like a ketchup pack with the burger takeout. Of course she was sexually assaulted. Aren’t most coeds? Isn’t that what conservative Republicans do? As it happened, there was a guy at her college named Barry who fit Dunham’s description, and he and his lawyer have gotten together, to, I hope, sue the author and her publisher for libel. But the very casualness of Dunham’s lie is telling—the rape accusation is put forth unthinkingly, as if it is simply expected by her intended readership. She couldn’t bother to take the time to invent some details to avoid a potential lawsuit. One begins to get the idea that for the liberal cultural elite it is natural to lie about campus Republican rapists. Haven’t Obama and Biden both said that 20 percent of women on campus are raped by white Republicans? Or by white somebodies? Well, there is an actual statistic of one-half of 1 percent of women raped or sexually assaulted annually, or roughly one-tenth the rate claimed by Biden and the president. Far too many of course. But why bother with accuracy when the point is to defame an entire group, and no one will challenge the defamation?
Dunham’s book was only an amuse-bouche for the season’s hammer blow against white male “rape culture,” Sabrina Rubin Erdely’s eviscerating (but as it turns out, largely fanciful) indictment of the University of Virginia, centered on the brutal gang rape of a coed named Jackie. Rolling Stone which published the mis-reported piece, has acknowledged its error, though there is underway a widespread effort to turn the fiasco into a journalism school how-to tale about how many voicemails a prudent reporter must leave in an effort to contact the accused. If you read the piece, you may not have noticed the details which didn’t make sense or hang together, but cannot fail to recognize who the bad people are. Erdely had earlier considered basing her “rape culture” narrative on events at other colleges, but chose instead to do her “reporting” at a place where the perpetrators could unambiguously presented as white Christian males—a group which would likely be underrepresented at any other prestige college. So amidst the misreporting, there were many hate-signifiers—“the toned, tanned, overwhelmingly blonde” members of the UVA student body, the “genteel” aura of the college, which reeks of “old money” and “privilege,” a place where “social status is paramount.” The students, Erdely claims, all admire Thomas Jefferson, even to the degree of calling him by the familiar “TJ”: where else but in the epicenter of gang-rape culture would an American Founding Father be so revered?
The centerpiece of the piece was, it turns out, a lie—there was a Jackie, but she never was raped. But there is a truth which can be extracted: Sarah Rubin Erdely, who took the trouble to misreport the piece, really really despises the type of people whom she feels predominate at the University of Virginia, and Rolling Stone was very happy to give her its not-unimportant platform. And squadrons of Democratic bloggers—I’m waiting for someone to compile a list—were eager to publicize and amplify the group libel.
Of course the enemy is not only white male “rape culture.” It’s also the police, with their unrelenting murderous targeting of innocent black men. It seemed as if an unconscious wave swept through the major media in August, reporting on the major international event going on at the time was no longer enjoyable. There was a minor police blotter item, a young black man committed a robbery, got in a fight with a cop, and got shot. But Jake Tapper and co. arrive on the scene with camera crews, and all the world is presented with Ferguson, Missouri as Selma, Alabama. The story eventually becomes twinned with another, in New York, when an ostensibly amiable black man with asthma is told by the cops to stop selling loose cigarettes, refuses to do so and is taken down, stops breathing and dies. Nobody who saw that Eric Garner video thinks this guy should be dead, including most emphatically the cops who tried to arrest him. There are two main prisms through which to view the tragedy: a) the difficulty of making arrests of suspects who are noncompliant and have serious health problems, or b) racist white cops intent on murdering innocent black men. Which version comes closest to the truth? Which version is the one embraced by the Democratic media, and hammered at us 24 hours a day?
And make no mistake, the target is white police officers. In the ’60s, the looney left called them pigs, and advocated their murder. I once believed those days would never return, but in the day of outrage which took place over the weekend, one could see photos of demonstrators recreating the pig meme with masks and other accessories. The left’s dehumanization of the white police officer has a broader cultural significance; the police of course are men and women with jobs to do, but more broadly represent law and order: when they are repeatedly vilified by dishonest claims that they are waging “war” on black males, it means something far more serious than a desire for precisely calibrated policing is intended.
In recent days two important essays have been published analyzing the disconnect between the Democrats and the white working class—a disconnect which may have fatal consequences for the Democrats in the coming years. In the Times, Thomas Edsall systematically goes through the sources of the erosion of white working-class life in America: the collapse of the industrial job market is the main thing, but was surely exacerbated by the simultaneous Democratic party effort to aid and empower other previously disenfranchised and impoverished groups—except white working-class males. The fact remains that no group in America is on a steeper downward trajectory economically—not blacks, not Hispanics, not women. Edsall cites a slew of comparative polls of whites and blacks demonstrating both greater improvement of black income from generation to generation and greater optimism about the future. There is, literally, no program put forth by any major party to do anything about the collapse in white working-class incomes.
A more pointed statement comes from the international affairs blogger John Schindler, a former Naval War College professor whose views about Russia I mostly disagree with. But Schindler describes powerfully his sense of political homelessness, with which I can very much identify. About the Democrats, he writes
I worry deeply about rising inequality in America, which has been growing my whole life and shows no signs of abating, rather the contrary. It is making the country something very different from what it was for several happy generations. Accepting that mass prosperity, which peaked in the middle of the last century, making us the envy of the world, is gone for good will change American politics in ways that we can only yet see in outline. We cannot stop globalization and technological changes that promise to up-end the economy, nor should we try to, but wise and compassionate politicians will seek to soften their impacts on fellow citizens.
The obvious home for socio-economic reform, the Democrats, once the proud party of working people like many of my forebears, has lost its way. Its emphasis on identity politics at the expense of basic socio-economic fairness has driven away countless average people who are struggling and want justice, yet don’t like being lectured endlessly about how racist, sexist and cisnormative they are.
Schindler gives good TACish reasons for skepticism about the Republicans: free-market absolutism and the neoconservative foreign policy adventurism are now deeply embedded in the GOP. But the essay closes with a pointed warning about complacency—we tend to think the continued, unrelenting immiseration of the working class, combined with exploitation of every identity politics issue to shame and humiliate a selected target group can’t possibly have bad consequences. He continues:
Moreover, having spent quite a bit of time in the Balkans, I have an acute sense of how fragile civilization really is. Beneath the pleasant surface there lurk monsters, and those monsters are us. In a few short years, Yugoslavia went from being a success story, a benign socialist regime with a high standard of living and apparent amity among its photogenically diverse peoples, to a charnel house of terror. Economic decline and ethnic resentments, combined in evil fashion, led to war and genocide. It’s nice to pretend this can’t happen, but history shows plainly that it can. After all, American optimists in the 1850s, the TV talking heads of the day, considered the Civil War that was looming ominously to be impossible — right until cannons roared at Fort Sumter.
Schindler is on to something here, something which few have acknowledged. The current trends in America, Wall Street getting richer, everyone else getting poorer, politicians of both parties feeding brazenly at Wall Street’s trough, the party of the Left in full blown attack gear not on inequality, which it has done nothing to address, but picking at and rubbing raw the scabs of identity politics—this can’t keep going on indefinitely without something really bad happening.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
Jacob Heilbrunn’s “The Myth of the Liberal New Republic” is a welcome corrective to the thundering herd of independent progressives lamenting new owner Chris Hughes’s stewardship of the magazine. It is hardly surprising that present and former editors would disdain Hughes’s plans to digitize the magazine, reduce its frequency of issues, and try to transform TNR into a vertical digital platform (whatever that is, adds Heilbrunn). The retreat of the masters of old media—the long-form essay, the important little magazine—is, if perhaps not on the par with the demise of the yeoman small farmer, something genuinely to be regretted. The gutting of major daily newspapers, the loss of hundreds of capable journalists is probably a more serious loss to the the country’s public discourse than the end of the weekly magazine as an essay platform—but still. Everyone who grew up reading magazines has a spot in their heart for their favorite one; nothing on the web will ever be quite the same.
Still, there is widespread misreading of what made the The New Republic important, and this letter signed by many of its former editors and writers exemplifies it. They write:
From its founding in 1914, The New Republic has been the flagship and forum of American liberalism… . It is a sad irony that at this perilous moment, with a reactionary variant of conservatism in the ascendancy, liberalism’s central journal should be scuttled with flagrant and frivolous abandon.
First the letter implies a kind of continuity in The New Republic‘s ideological mission which simply didn’t exist. TNR in the thirties was Stalin apologetic; in the fifties it was edited by Michael Straight, later found to have been a Soviet agent. It had become more respectably liberal before Peretz bought it in 1974, after which he subsequently purged the editor and his top staffers.
Once I began to read The New Republic regularly, in the early 1980s, it became my favorite magazine. This was a time when I was a more or less a card-carrying neoconservative, writing regularly for Commentary, eventually joining the New York Post editorial page. TNR represented a unique blend: it had the outer sheen of a liberal magazine, critical of Reagan and Republicans generally, supportive of Democrats. But its core, the core I was most interested in, concerned foreign policy, and here TNR was generally neoconservative. It hemmed and hawed but ultimately supported the contras, the Reagan sponsored anti-communist guerillas in Nicaragua. It backed, like I did, the invasion of Grenada. (Charles Krauthammer memorably quipped that we were in danger of losing “MOHGROland” that is, moral high ground land.) It opposed the nuclear-freeze movement and the general campaign to end the upgrading of American nuclear forces. TNR was, as has been widely remarked, very pro-Israel, but in the ’80s this was hardly exceptional. Experts in the area recognized by then that the PLO had embraced the idea of a two-state solution, but this guerilla/national movement’s politics were still murky, and it was possible—reasonably—to believe that the PLO was simply waiting for the chance to destroy Israel.
TNR thus positioned itself as a kind of ideological cop within the Democratic Party. It was thoroughly liberal and Democratic, especially on social issues like abortion, but promoted core parts of Reagan’s agenda. Liberals who went too far—either wanting to live and let live with the Sandinistas or find an accommodation with the Russians—would be red-baited. Supporters of American pressure on Israel to accommodate legitimate Palestinian aspirations could be marginalized as anti-Semites. All this would done by a self-proclaimed “liberal” magazine, dutifully policing the boundaries of responsible liberalism. They were boundaries that I, and other neoconservatives, very much approved.
My close friend and eventual New York Post colleague Eric Breindel was also a big New Republic fan. He was personally close to Peretz (whose tri-city life seemed to provide endless fodder for delicious gossip). On many of the issues of the day—Russia, communism, the Cold War—Peretz was as right-wing as we (Breindel, myself, Commentary) were. So one major test of whether a conservative argument could fly in the mainstream was whether it could be packaged for TNR. Of course, liberals edited the magazine, and they usually didn’t reach out to neocons like us. But Marty did. There would always be a kind of back channel—you didn’t send your piece over to Hendrik Hertzberg, but instead faxed it to Marty’s private fax number. (Josh Muravchik, who wrote a few such pieces, once joked that our pieces had to be delivered to the TNR offices in a “plain brown wrapper,” at a certain time of day, with no identifying marks from the sender, presumably so that liberal TNR staffers wouldn’t mislay them.)
I wrote one such piece—countering a dominant narrative about a racial incident at Columbia University, where after much delay I was finally putting my dissertation to bed. Breindel wrote a lengthy piece examining the sudden proliferation of accusations of police brutality in New York City—we were then at the early part of the wave which would make Al Sharpton famous. Later Breindel and I collaborated on another one, critiquing multiculturalist changes in the New York State school curriculum. (TNR‘s liberal editors engaged in what I assumed to be a gesture of disdainful protest by not bothering to write a headline for it. “Head to Come” read the title as printed in the magazine.) And in a way, TNR‘s standards were higher than elsewhere: as I recall, these were well-reported pieces bringing fresh information to bear on a broader national issue. To be published in Commentary was good, but this was better.
As Heilbrunn points out, the usefulness of this role (liberal mostly but not always on domestic policy, essentially neoconservative on foreign policy but never calling yourself that) began to wear thin after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Heilbrunn notes that the magazine became increasingly right-wing on foreign policy. I’ve noted previously the disdain TNR showered on TAC when we first started: the idea of opposing the Iraq War was considered too stupid even to argue with for the bien pensants who ran TNR. But of course, one might ask—of the many signers of the anti-Hughes letter—wasn’t raising questions about the wisdom of invading Iraq something that “liberalism’s central journal” should have been doing, instead of trying to present war skepticism as beneath contempt?
Peter Beinart, who edited the magazine at the time, has performed upon himself a sincere and searching self-criticism. But Franklin Foer, who penned the dismissal, certainly has not. So, no, don’t count me among those who mourn TNR‘s demise as a neocon journal in liberal disguise. It was terribly effective in that role: Peretz was a great judge of talent and for a while at least had the magazine thumping away on all cylinders. But America’s foreign-policy debate will be improved without “even the liberal New Republic” holding Democrats’ feet to the fire to support hawkish or neoconservative foreign policies.
One more thing, on another subject. I wouldn’t write anything about the Eric Garner case if I hadn’t written previously about Michael Brown. But I want put on the record how different they seem. I don’t think a reasonable person can look at the Garner “I can’t breathe video” and not conclude the cops committed a horrific transgression, indeed probably some kind of crime. Garner was clearly non-threatening and not particularly belligerent—anyone who has spent any time in New York can recognize that. If he needed to be arrested, then another way had to be found to do it. I’m not a lawyer or legal expert, but there surely is a sort of “general will” in which regular people who generally appreciate the police can look at an event and somehow judge whether cops are maintaining order in a reasonable fashion.
This doesn’t come close.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
In the morning e-mail came something from the activist group CODEPINK, headlined “From Ferguson to Palestine, Come Out to Join Us.” Listed were various events: a vigil for Michael Brown at the Justice Department, a meeting of “fighters for social justice” at a popular Washington cafe the following evening, similar events in that vein. Also on the list was a talk by professor Richard Falk, formerly UN special rapporteur on Palestine, to discuss Israel’s latest land grab around Jerusalem.
CODEPINK is not alone in seeking to connect Ferguson to Palestine: pro-footballer Reggie Bush tweeted something about it over the weekend, and Annie Robbins of the important Mondoweiss website publicized the Bush tweet. Then there’s this: a post by a board member of the right-wing Zionist group StandWithUs, connecting anti-Palestinian Israelis with the Ferguson police, both holding the line of civilization against peoples full of rage and an unjustified sense of their own victimhood. There was some Twitter pushback against the StandWithUs post, and the Times of Israel eventually removed it. The pro-Palestinian website Electronic Intifada portrayed this as some sort a victory, rather as if the Palestinians had won the right to possess Ferguson as “their” symbol. Rania Khalek writes that “Zionist organizations are rattled by the growing displays of solidarity between people in Ferguson, Missouri, and Palestine.” While it’s true that such such displays are growing, I doubt seriously that any Zionist organizations are rattled by them. If they have any political savvy, and they surely do, they would instead welcome it—as did the StandWithUs board member.
Why? Well, for starters, Palestine really is occupied, and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have no political and civil rights, and those who reside in Israel proper are now being told that Israel can take away their citizenship at any time.
Ferguson, by contrast, is a complicated situation. The one simple thing about it is the fact that if Michael Brown hadn’t leaned into a police cruiser in order to assault a police officer and to try to seize his gun, he would be alive today. As always there is a broader social and historical context: a considerable amount of police brutality directed at blacks, exemplified by episodes like this, on top of many layers of American history in which blacks were enslaved, and after emancipation, subject to fierce legal and customary discrimination. I largely agree with John McWhorter, who asserts that throughout America there are large segments of the black community who consider the police morally bankrupt, and that this is a huge national problem. It is certainly a problem with no easy answer. There wasn’t one in the 1960s when finding a decent, family-sustaining job was achievable for most people willing to work regular hours, and it is no easier now in an economy far far more geared to rewarding the very rich, highly skilled, or very talented, while the working class has lost ground steadily for 40 years.
The thing about Palestine, however, is that it is actually not that complicated. Resolving the issue in a fair and practical way is of course difficult. But it has long been an article of faith among pro-Palestinian activists that if Americans could see the land-grabbing, see the checkpoints Palestinians are subjected to, see the difficulty of trying as a student to commute through roadblocks and checkpoints to Bethlehem University from Ramallah, they would understand that Palestinians are subject to a blatantly unjust and racist regime, facing conditions no American would put up with for a moment without resisting. And they would see that this Israeli regime—heavily subsidized by American tax dollars—is animated by ideologies sharply at odds with American values, at least with how those values have evolved over the past 50 to 100 years. Perhaps Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians resembles South Africa under apartheid, perhaps it resembles the American South of the pre-civil rights era; perhaps it is worse than both. It does not, in any way, shape, or form, resemble Ferguson, Missouri, where all American-born blacks possess the same constitutional and civil rights as white Americans.
To the extent that the American left succeeds in creating an impression of some sort of rhetorical and moral equivalence between Ferguson and Palestine, describing both venues as places where a virtuous, oppressed people confronts brutal and murderous white racism, they will harm the prospects of Palestinian struggles ever being considered sympathetically by a critical majority of Americans. For the fact is, the more Americans learn about Ferguson, the less sympathy Michael Brown and his cause receives. The young man surely should not have been shot to death—Officer Darren Wilson probably blundered in a dangerous and chaotic situation. But to hold Brown blameless is something that most Americans won’t do.
Before the grand jury decision was announced, a Huffington Post YouGov poll indicated that only 22 percent of whites thought that Officer Wilson was culpable, versus 64 percent of blacks. After the release of the the grand jury report, after Ferguson residents showed their displeasure by widespread looting and burning, after mainstream news shows showed the Brown family lawyer getting decimated in on-air debates about the facts in the case, after Michael Brown’s stepfather mounted a podium to tell Ferguson residents to “burn the bitch down,” the poll numbers are not going to shift more in favor of the racist whites versus innocent blacks narrative. That the United States is so divided racially, on this issue and others, is, of course a national problem. But it is surely not one which Palestinian activists should seek to exploit by linking their cause to the losing side.
In all of this, of course, are echoes of the American 1960s. The activism of that decade began with a movement of civil rights activists, white and black, risking their lives to secure for blacks in the South their fundamental constitutional rights. It expanded with opposition to the Vietnam war. It reached a crisis point when liberalism, the dominant ideology of the age, had to confront the reality of black rioting in northern cities, demonstrating how complex the racial issue was, how difficult it would be resolve it. Part of the Left soon embraced the idea that any black demand, any black behavior, was justified. Some New Left theorists advanced the notion that ghetto blacks were a revolutionary vanguard in the mother country. “Off the Pigs, Power to the People” did, really, become a New Left slogan. (“Pigs” was the common epithet for police officers. “Off” meant kill.) Black Panther chic advanced to the salons of the Upper East Side. It wasn’t especially obvious to everyone at the time, but these were sign posts that the movement had imploded, had driven itself mad, and was so committed to hating “whitey” that it was on the road to becoming essentially irrelevant to any serious politics in America.
There are more than a few whiffs of that era in the current Michael Brown madness. Most Palestinian activists realize that if they could win for their people in historic Palestine the rights possessed by each and every black citizen of Ferguson they would have gained a victory of world-historic proportions. Nevertheless one can understand the temptation of connecting to a movement in America that does at this moment seem energetic and hip, which seems to be treated with enormous deference and respect in the dominant media, and which must seem for all the world like an unstoppable emergent groundswell. Added to this is the important if seldom-noted fact that black members of Congress have, on average, been far more ready than their white colleagues to see the need for justice in Palestine, and have been more willing to question and challenge the self-righteousness behind America’s blind and often murderous policies in the Mideast. The connections emerging from those sentiments should, of course, be welcomed and nurtured.
Ferguson however is a bridge too far. Nothing could please the Likud coalition more than to see the Palestinian cause linked, in the minds of the average, mainstream American, to that of the Ferguson rioters. For the pro-Palestinian left to work to reinforce exactly that linkage will be seen as dreadful mistake, for which Palestinians will surely pay a higher price than American leftists will.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
How bad is the political news?
First one tried to rationalize, and discount, the Republican victories in the midterms: of course they did not signal a return of the neocons, no way. Indeed none of the new senators campaigned on foreign policy. But that conclusion requires overlooking the fact that Tom Cotton is an unadulterated hawk, one who can’t be derided as a chicken hawk, and he made his foreign policy views clear. And then one has to acknowledge that no Democrats, defeated or victorious, mentioned foreign policy either. If Obama deserved credit for at least seeking a fair settlement in Israel and Palestine and a detente with Iran, Democrats running for office surely didn’t want to campaign on it. Mark Udall, aka Mark Uterus, seems to have run a Senate campaign focused entirely on the fanciful notion that abortion might be once again made illegal.
Was hyping the Michael Brown matter also a Democratic strategy, to boost black turnout? If so, it was a bust—and someone may have noticed that immigrant shopkeepers, and their friends and families, also vote. Perhaps not unrelated to the Michael Brown as victim of racism strategy was the Republicans’ success in recouping roughly a 50 percent share of the Asian vote, which they used to get before the George W. Bush era.
President Obama, I reassured myself, could still ignore the election results and maneuver towards a detente with Iran. Franklin D. Roosevelt after his 1938 midterm election rebuke could serve as a role model. The president has more sway over foreign policy than any domestic matter, and could probably carry the country with him. Instead Obama decided first to pick a fight with Congress over immigration, inviting the mockery of even liberals at Saturday Night Live. If he needs to confront Congress, why choose a matter in which public opinion is well informed, fairly passionate, and not terribly malleable? Whether they favor some sort of amnesty or not, Americans tend to know what they think about immigration. Indeed, talking about the adverse wage consequences for American workers of a mass influx of unskilled immigrants has become a Republican talking point. (As someone who was involved in the immigration restriction movement in the 1990s, then grew somewhat bored with it, I had despaired that the GOP would ever grasp this simple concept of supply and demand.)
By choosing immigration as a battleground, did Obama narrow his maneuvering room in the Iran negotiations? I await publication of further details, but I had assumed—as had most people trying to follow the talks closely—that an agreement on the essentials, such as roughly how many centrifuges Iran might keep and what the schedule of sanctions relief would be, was pretty much in hand. Now from most accounts it appears that the gaps remained wide and that each side was assuming the other would make a significant concession in the final week. I don’t think the details of the agreement are that important, and they would soon have been overshadowed by the transformations which followed Iran’s re-entry into the world economy. But a weakened Obama had perhaps less room to put some distance between the United States and the expressed desires of Israel and Saudi Arabia. (Basically the two countries want Iran to be permanently isolated, if not broken up and destroyed.)
Iran’s negotiators were on a comparatively short leash; there are powerful constituencies there that want no concessions on the nuclear issue whatsoever, and their psychology is not hard to understand if you try to imagine how Americans, or Chinese, or French, or Israelis would feel about international inspectors combing through their top scientific programs. The failure of the negotiations, (and I don’t see any factor which would make them more likely to succeed in the ensuing seven months) will bring other elements into play: military threats from Israel (which were started up again before the negotiators even reached their deadline) and the erosion of the international sanctions regime, already foreshadowed by the barter agreements Iran has signed with China and Russia.
The prospect of war seems distant now, but it did not seem so three or four years ago, and the optimism which has surrounded American-Iranian relations for the last year may soon seem evanescent. Israel and Saudi Arabia, America’s two “allies” in the Mideast, will do everything they can to increase antagonism and possibly incite a war between the U.S. and Iran, and the termination of negotiations gives them more room for mischief making than they’ve recently had. The combination of eroding international sanctions, a weakened president, war-mongering allies, and who-knows-what political instability in Iran promises an uncertain and perhaps chaotic diplomatic environment, in which very bad things could happen inadvertently.
Compared to this prospect, the end of Chuck Hagel’s tenure as Secretary of Defense seems a small event. Given the heated battle over his confirmation, few would have predicted that. But in the end, confirmation was the main event: after it Hagel was submissive, seemingly cowed by the ordeal. On the particular policy difference which provoked his ouster, I would side with Obama and his White House staff: Hagel wanted a clear strategy to oust Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, the White House seem to realize that Assad is far from the most dangerous element in the Mideast, and very much someone with whom it is possible to negotiate and coexist. But on most issues, Hagel was a non-factor: no one would have anticipated the most salient moment of the entire affair might have been the Saturday Night Live skit (rehearsed but never aired) that mocked the Senate’s subservience to the Israel lobby, but it was.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
Surely a few foreign policy realists have flipped through George W. Bush’s portrait of his father for hint at what a third Bush presidency would be like. It’s a move born largely of desperation: Hillary for the moment seems unstoppable, and as Glenn Greenwald and others have documented, all signs are that she would usher in a new neocon presidency, albeit under the guise of “historicfirstwoman, etc.” Rand Paul might beat her, but the odds don’t favor him having the opportunity. Pro-Hillary quotes from the likes of Max Boot and Robert Kagan speak volumes, as does Hillary’s record as secretary of state (backing the war on Libya, the elevation of Cheney aide Victoria Nuland to a critical position, violent threats against Iran, likening Vladmir Putin to “Hitler”, etc.) Those of us whose whose early public impressions of Hillary, for better and worse, were colored by images of bell-bottoms and the 1972 Democratic Convention had best get over it.
I’ve flipped through Bush 43’s new book, hopeful that his portrait of George H.W. Bush could yield a window of sorts into the current family mindset. The issue has a kind of dialectical shape. George H.W. Bush was the last Republican realist and extraordinarily successful in foreign policy; his son George W’s name is indelibly linked with Cheney, Rumsfeld, Perle, and Wolfowitz, trillions of dollars expended and thousands of lives pointlessly destroyed. Where lies Jeb on this family continuum? Might this book by his candidacy’s most prominent public supporter hold some clues?
To the critical period of 1991-1992, when President Bush went from stunningly favorable approval ratings after the Iraq war (70 percent in September 1991, six months after its end) to losing the presidency, Bush the son devotes a coy chapter with one very revealing gap. He writes that in the “early fall of 1991″ he told his father that he was worried about the re-election effort. He urged a shakeup of the White House staff. He then goes on to portray the difficult political landscape Bush 41 faced that fall: resentment from the GOP base over the breaking of the “no new taxes pledge”; the economy in recession; a somewhat dysfunctional White House political operation; the “unexpected” defeat of Dick Thornburgh in Pennsylvania’s special Senate election. And then, as the election year commenced, Pat Buchanan’s primary challenge, the relative success of which encouraged Ross Perot to undertake his own independent candidacy.
Buchanan never posed an electoral threat, though it is plausible that his run prevented Bush from “consolidating the base” before the convention. Perot was another matter; he ended up taking 19 percent of the vote in November—probably 2/3 of them Republican voters. Bush the author quotes his Dad: “I think he cost me the election.”
But Bush’s account skips over one major additional controversy. In the spring of 1991, the administration got into a major conflict with Israel and its American lobby over loan guarantees and expanding West Bank settlements. Israel asked for, and fully expected, the United States to guarantee $10 billion in loans to help Israel with absorbing new immigrants from the Soviet Union. Under the right-wing Likud government of Yitzhak Shamir, Israel had commenced building West Bank settlements at breakneck speed: Shamir was a fierce partisan of “Greater Israel” and hoped, he later acknowledged, not only to claim the occupied territories for Israel but to foreclose permanently the emergence of any self-governing Palestinian entity. President Bush and his secretary of state James Baker were optimistic about an eventual final peace agreement between Israel and all Arabs, including the Palestinians, and certainly did not want the United States to be seen as subsidizing Israel’s West Bank annexation project.
In May 1991, both Bush and Baker publicly called the settlements an obstacle to peace. In response, under AIPAC’s prodding, Congress began pushing Bush to release the loan guarantees on Israel’s terms, meaning Israel could use the money to build wherever it wished. On September 6th, Bush asked Congress for a 120-day delay before considering the Israeli loan request. AIPAC pushed back, flooding Capitol Hill with lobbyists. On September 12th, Bush called a press conference and denounced both Israeli West Bank settlements and the Israel lobby. He told reporters he was “up against some powerful political forces” designed to thwart him., adding that “a thousand lobbyists” were working the Hill, while he was “one lonely guy” on the opposite side. This pushback was initially very effective: rapid polls showed a large national majority in favor of the President and against the Israeli request, and Congress agreed to a delay.
But the fact of the public pushback stirred up what would be a very effective reaction. J.J. Goldberg introduces his book Jewish Power, a down the middle portrait of the Jewish political establishment, with a chapter on the September 12th press conference and its aftermath. He depicts Jewish leaders as shocked at the President’s words. By the next evening the Presidents Conference, a umbrella body representing major Jewish organizations, had agreed upon and drafted a public reply to the president. The letter called Bush’s remarks “disturbing and subject to misinterpretation”—a euphemistic phrasing. Privately, some Jewish leaders were claiming that Bush had attacked Jews and threatened their political rights. It’s seldom clear in such cases to what degree the outrage was felt genuinely versus feigned as a political tactic; surely there was some of each. But a battle with organized Jewry was the last thing Bush wanted and the White House was alarmed by some phone line support which whiffed of anti-Semitism. Displays of contrition quickly followed. Within less than a week, Bush had written a “Dear Shoshana” note (to Shoshana Cardin, the President’s Conference Director) stating that he was “concerned that some of my comments … caused apprehension within the Jewish community” and claiming further that his references to lobbying and powerful political forces “were never meant to be pejorative in any sense.”
But the damage was done. AIPAC leader Tom Dine called September 12th a “day of infamy.” A major American Jewish Congress figure said “September 12 will go down in Jewish history as the day of the great betrayal. [Bush’s] statement was a disgusting display of, if not anti-Semitism, then something very close to it.” One activist said, “it set off a lightbulb. People everywhere began to mobilize.” The administration sought to make amends, but to no avail. Bush traveled to New York to meet with the Conference of Presidents. But he stuck to his guns on the loan guarantees.
As Goldberg notes, the important off-year election was the Pennsylvania Senate contest, where moderate Republican and close Bush ally Richard Thornburgh held a 44 point lead over Harris Wofford in mid-September. Within 10 days, money began pouring into Wofford’s inert campaign and the Democrat began to rise in the polls. In the final weeks Wofford was raising money at twice Thornburgh’s pace. After he lost by 10 points, Thornburgh told Bush he was the “canary in the coal mine.”
How much did this have to do with Bush’s defeat the next year? The president performed poorly in heavily Jewish precincts, but not enough to be decisive in any state. It would be too speculative to connect the settlement controversy to the transformation of Bush’s public image from the masterful diplomat who had put together an anti-Saddam coalition in 1991 to the out out of touch preppy of a year later. But clearly this face-off counted for something. George W. Bush may have signaled this without really acknowledging it when he states that he began to be worried about his father’s campaign in “early fall”—i.e. well before the Buchanan and Perot challenges had materialized.
And what does the father say? We know from Michael Desch, who formerly taught at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M, that Bush 41 himself blames the Israel lobby at least partially for his defeat. Desch cites comments that Bush made to students when visiting the school in February 2005, when he decried the power of the Israel lobby. Thomas Friedman seems to agree: he recently alluded to the election when he said that after Bush’s defeat, Republicans vowed they would never get out-Israeled again.
And of course they have kept their word. George W. Bush made it clear, beginning with a 1998 helicopter tour around the West Bank with Ariel Sharon as his guide that he would shy from challenging Israel’s leaders. His first administration was stacked with prominent neoconservatives, with consequences lamentably familiar. One can see in Bush’s second term some indications that Bush eventually came to feel that he was too quick to jump into the neocon car: he reportedly began referring to Bill Kristol and Charles Krauthammer as “the bomber boys”; privately I have heard that the younger Bush asked his dad, in the summer of 2004, to explain what a neoconservative was. Dynasties are complicated, with dynamics difficult for an outsider to plumb. Where Jeb fits in, we don’t know—though his apparent readiness to jump through Sheldon Adelson’s hoops is hardly encouraging. If Bush 43 senses the answer, he doesn’t let on in this book.
The issue of this quarrel, the settlements, is now largely moot, resolved in favor of “Greater Israel.” James Baker and George H.W. Bush genuinely believed a peace agreement between Israel and the Arabs was possible, and in both Israel’s interest and America’s. With roughly six times as many settlers on the West Bank now as then, the prospect of two state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict has probably vanished forever. In the near term it is not clear how Israel will be anything but an apartheid state. A President Jeb Bush would face a different set of questions about “the special relationship”. Would he respond like his father or like his brother? From his recent book we learn mostly that George W. Bush doesn’t want to talk about the issue.
Scott McConnell is a TAC founding editor.
No one was surprised to see Republican hawk Lindsey Graham, or even Mitt Romney, line up to kiss Sheldon Adelson’s ring at the Israel-American Council conference in Washington last weekend. Adelson has urged that the United States drop nuclear weapons on Iran as a “negotiating” tactic; he dreams that his son will be a sniper in the Israeli army; he is basically the kind of hawk with maximal loyalties to Israel and minimal ones to the United States that one might wish held no position of honor in the Republican Party. But alas he does. In a better world a Sheldon Adelson event might receive no more attention from prominent Republicans than a David Duke conference, but we’re long past that point. The Romney and Graham speeches blasting Obama’s diplomacy towards Iran received headlines of the dog bites man nature.
But the Twittersphere was set aflame at the Sunday plenary session, where Adelson held court with fellow billionaire and Israel supporter Haim Saban. Saban does not have the public persona of Adelson. The Power Ranger mogul is a major Democratic Party donor, perhaps the largest of all. He sponsors something called the Saban Center at Brookings, which provides a think tank gloss to pro-Israeli perspectives, but also funds some genuine scholarship. He is on first-name terms with the liberal hawk or liberal internationalist elite, “Tony” and “Shimon” and of course “Hillary.” You can get a sense of Saban’s world from the fulsome video made to introduce Hillary when she spoke two years ago at the Saban Center—where she received a parade of warm endorsements from Israeli politicians well known in the U.S. It was the first concrete sign, many noted, that Hillary was really interested in running for the presidency in 2016.
But last weekend here was Saban, Democratic mogul, on stage alongside Sheldon Adelson, the two performing sort of duet: One could title it “Pity the Zionist Billionaires Who Can’t Always Get What They Want.” Adelson claimed the Palestinian were an “invented people” Saban came back with the retort that in the event of a “bad” Iran nuclear deal, Bibi “should bomb the living daylights of the sons of bitches [the Iranians].” When Saban mentioned that there were actually a lot of Palestinians between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, Adelson retorted with “So Israel won’t be a democratic state, so what.” (One might at least credit him with candor not usually evident among Israel’s most vociferous right wing supporters, fond of touting Israel as a democracy which shares American values.) The two talked of measures to squelch the rapidly expanding BDS movement, movement to boycott Israel either in full or part to pressure it to end the occupation. (The First Amendment might pose a problem here.)
The two naturally agreed that the American media was terribly biased against Israel, except for maybe Fox News, and that they discussed whether they could buy the Washington Post or New York Times to correct the problem. This aspect of the performance was comic, the lament, commonplace enough among neoconservatives, that the American press is biased against Israel. Consider that the Washington Post runs (the Wall Street Journal aside), the most neoconservative major editorial page in the country, and it’s been a long time since someone that one can even conceive of being slightly sympathetic to those subjected to Israeli occupation (perhaps the late Mary McGrory?) has written there. The Times is more diverse and makes occasionally sincere efforts at both balance and objective journalism, but if one looks at the roster of Times-men who regularly cover Israel, one could conclude that having a child serving in the IDF is a job requirement.
Sheldon and Haim then amused themselves and their audience by talking about taking over the Times and Washington Post.
The whole affair might have been comical but for the serious issues it raises for presumed Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton. Haim Saban is her close friend and major financial backer: one could go so far as to say that he and his donor circle constitute her “base” or at least a significant part of it. One question any inquisitive journalist might ask of Hillary is: What does she think of Haim Saban’s wish that Israel “bomb the daylights” out of Iran if Bibi doesn’t approve of a nuclear deal reached with Tehran by the United States and the other P5+1 countries? Since Bibi’s disapproval is virtually guaranteed (Israel insists that it be the only nuclear-capable country in the region), would she have that the United States support and even assist Israel bombing the daylights out of Iran, right after the United States signs a deal with the Iranian government? Or does she reject the counsel of her major backer? Saban’s partner on stage has urged that the United States drop nuclear bombs on Iran as a negotiating tactic. What does Hillary think of this?
Hillary has never paid a political price for her ties to right-wing Israel supporters, though she has reaped the usual benefits. Might the American political culture be ready to turn on this, at least to the extent that she will no longer get a free pass? The Twittersphere agog at the Sheldon and Haim show was largely a liberal Jewish one, journalists and writers who are hardly hostile to Israel, but are increasingly dismayed as the Israeli right wing entrenches itself in power while becoming ever more extreme. Its numbers are small, but it speaks for an influential slice of Democratic Party elite opinion—supportive of the two state solution, of negotiating with Iran. A recent J Street-sponsored poll found that 84 percent of American Jews backed an Iran deal which restricts Iranian nuclear enrichment and subjected Iran’s nuclear sites to inspection. But Adelson and Saban do not.
Where does Hillary stand, with her financial backers or the more mainstream opinion of the Democratic Party? It’s a question worth watching in the presidential year to come.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
If President Obama wants to find solace from American history, he might look to the 1938 midterm elections. The Republicans, benefitting from disgust with Franklin Roosevelt’s court-packing scheme and another economic downturn, picked up eight Senate seats, 81 House seats and 13 governorships. The Democrats maintained a formal congressional majority, but a not real one, as many conservative southern Democrats opposed Roosevelt and the New Deal.
But the political coalition he lost for his domestic agenda, Roosevelt eventually recouped through his foreign policy—eventually dying in office and becoming renowned in history as his nation’s leader in “The Good War.” That option—emerging as a widely beloved “total war” leader is not open to Obama. But making a big mark in foreign policy is—and remains the only route redeem his presidency.
On Election Day, the Washington Post published a useful effort to explain the decline in Obama’s popularity from his re-election in 2012 to the midterms. To those who aren’t political junkies, the collapse is a bit of a mystery, as the president is pretty much the same man as the one who defeated a quite capable Mitt Romney two years ago. By then he had long been stripped any magical “hope and change” properties voters might have ascribed to him in 2008. Instead he campaigned with his limitations known: a good orator, not especially deft at managing the power levers of the presidency, reluctant to pick fights, insular in his choice of advisors, moderate, and prone to compromise. A liberal Republican perhaps, in a multicultural, third-worldist packaging?
In the Post’s telling, small events piled up to undermine Obama’s authority in the last two years: an ultimately futile effort to get a gun control bill passed after a horrific school shooting; the botched website on the Obamacare rollout; the crisis of the border crossing children; Ukraine; Ebola. Of these, I would argue that only Ukraine was truly bad presidential policy, a result of leaving neocons in charge of the State Department’s European desk, who then proceeded to foment a coup d’etat in Kiev without considering Moscow’s reaction. But the lesser missteps created the impression of an unsteady hand on the tiller.
Yet the Washington Post story skips over the most important initiative in Obama’s second term. Obama has pursued, carefully and methodically, an Iran detente, a course impossible while Ahmadinejad was president and Iran was imprisoning Green Movement leaders. But once it became possible, Obama and his diplomats advanced forcefully, forging at least in outline an arrangement that would limit Iranian enrichment and open the country to international inspections in exchange for a loosening of the sanctions imposed on Iran for nearly a decade.
The negotiation is technical and complex, and the deadline—extended once for six months, looms in less then three weeks. Both the P5+1 powers (the U.S., France, Britain, China, Russia, and Germany) and Iran are maneuvering hard for an advantage—either concerning the provisions of the final deal, or possibly for the high ground in placing blame if the negotiations fail. It is not known whether Iran has now or ever did have a policy of seeking nuclear weapons: the Iranians deny it, claiming that weapons of mass destruction are contrary to Islam, and they did not develop chemical weapons even while they were being assaulted heavily with Iraqi chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq war. American intelligence agencies don’t think that Iran seeks a bomb. It has been noted that the countries most loudly accusatory about the Iranian nuclear program (Israel and the United States) are themselves nuclear-armed states with a record of attacking Muslim countries. Presumably their strategists assume that, given the threats it faces, it would make sense for Iran to develop a nuclear weapons deterrent.
Complicating the negotiation is Congress, which contains a powerful claque which views all international developments through the prism of what it perceives as good for Israel. Israel has made clear its opposition to any arrangement that permits Iran an active nuclear industry, whether or not it develops weapons. The administration has made clear that if it reaches a deal with Iran, it will not seek Congressional approval, which would probably not be forthcoming. The American sanctions on Iran are backed by legislation passed by Congress, but they include a provision allowing the President to waive them. The Iranians naturally worry that if sanctions are “waived” rather than terminated, a more hawkish or Israel-centric president would simply re-impose them.
If a deal that constrains but does not terminate Iran’s nuclear industry is arrived at, the battle between Obama and Congress, or more precisely, between Obama and the Israel lobby and its backers in Congress, will likely emerge as the centerpiece of the final two years of his presidency. It is likely to loom larger in significance than any foreign policy battle between president and Congress in the postwar era; to find a parallel, one might have to return to FDR’s effort to outmaneuver a hostile and generally isolationist Congress in order to support Britain and eventually enter World War II. In that battle, as this one, Congress held many of the cards: the neutrality acts passed in the 1930s genuinely constrained Roosevelt, and public opinion was initially heavily on the side of Congress’s isolationists.
A major distinction of course is that FDR was trying to maneuver the country into war with Germany, while Obama seeks a peaceful detente, and possibly even a de facto alliance with Iran. But the significant parallel that Obama can take solace from is that in both cases the international climate shifted rapidly to provide a tailwind for the President. Roosevelt had to combat the perception (reasonable enough) that the oceans provided America ample security from Europe’s wars, and Asia’s as well. But that perception grew weaker once Hitler broke the bounds of Munich, and then in 1940 invaded France and the low countries. American public opinion in early 1941 was far more open to intervention than it had been two years earlier.
In the case of Iran, much has changed since Congress imposed sanctions. First of all Iran has changed, or partially changed, its leadership. President Rouhani—elected in a vote that was free and competitive by Mideastern standards, is not, like his predecessor, a belligerent who plays footsie with Holocaust deniers. He clearly rode the vast wave of young educated Iranian opinion that wants an end to the country’s isolation, and seeks a rapprochement with America. That doesn’t mean submission to American demands—and Rouhani’s political leash from a conservative Iranian parliament and the country’s Supreme Leader Khamenei may be shorter than Obama’s. But he certainly represents an Iran that wants to turn the page.
Secondly, even the initial agreement signed last November has opened up Iran to some Western journalists, who are bringing reports of a young, urban Iran, which seems attractive, interesting, and latently quite friendly to the United States. This was communicated clearly in Steve Kroft’s visit for CBS’s “60 Minutes” last spring, and perhaps even more so in Anthony Bourdain’s recent visit. Bourdain is a roving food and travel writer, his Parts Unknown show seen by more than half a million viewers: it would be difficult for anyone who viewed the hour-long program on Iran to think of the country as an enemy.
Thirdly, the rise of the Sunni extremist group ISIS has demonstrated how thin and unreliable America’s existing alliance structure is in the Mideast. While ISIS is a small, underarmed force, its success in seizing territory rapidly revealed how few Sunni states really oppose Islamic extremism. Saudi pilots have refused orders to bomb ISIS forces—which speaks volumes about the hearts and minds inside the kingdom. Turkey opposes its own Kurdish population more than it does Sunni extremists. One expects, or at least must hope, that Sunni opinion will evolve and become more resistant to ISIS fanaticism. But until and probably after then, Iran looks awfully good by comparison.
Fourth, Israel has been losing influence as an ally, if not decisively in Washington, then certainly among America’s partners in imposing Iran sanctions. Americans may have shrugged off Israel’s assault on civilian targets in Gaza, but Europe, where Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians are viewed increasingly with repugnance, has not. The continent is moving inexorably towards recognizing Palestinian statehood, ignoring Washington’s constant admonishments not to. Britain’s Parliamentary vote to recognize Palestine was a landmark in evolving opinion, and will inevitably be followed by comparable moves in France and even guilt-ridden Germany. Israel’s ability to hector, persuade, or guilt-trip Europeans into supporting its policies, whether anti-Palestinian or anti-Iran, is approaching its sell-by date.
Finally, America’s technical ability to impose sanctions and have them followed by the P5+1 is slowly disappearing. The sanctions regime depends on Washington’s ability to monitor and punish dollar-denominated transactions with Iran. But Russia and China have already initiated barter agreements with Tehran, and European businesses are chafing to enter Tehran’s markets. If Washington tries to keep the sanctions on, or ratchet them up, as the Congress’s Israel faction demands, it may one day find itself brandishing a very wet noodle.
There is little doubt that if Obama reaches a deal, Israel and its advocates will be able to generate a seemingly massive Congressional uproar to undermine the President’s diplomacy. But larger forces, both inside and beyond the Beltway, line up on Obama’s side. The Pentagon, it was reported recently, has been seeking to make deals with Iranian companies in order to stabilize Afghanistan. Will the U.S. military brass, having expended large amounts of blood and treasure to wrest Afghanistan from the Taliban, wish to see it revert to Islamic extremism because Israel doesn’t want Iran involved in stabilizing the country?
Maneuvering for an Iran deal will take all the political acumen Obama can muster, and more than he has demonstrated in previous dealings with Congress. And in terms of political skill and appeal, Obama is no Franklin D. Roosevelt. But the president has powerful cards to play, and will have the support of much of the world if he plays them well. One day peace with Iran may seem as inevitable as did war with Germany. Even though he was drubbed in the midterms, Obama’s chance to forge an historic and positive legacy still lies very much before him.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
Much is written about Israel/Palestine, but fresh insights are rare. Whether the subject is the endless and barren “peace process” or the fact that Israel responds brutally to Palestinian street protests, there are few surprises. It is somewhat unusual when the 14-year-old shot by an Israeli sniper at a West Bank demonstration turns out to be an American citizen, but the fact is America officially doesn’t care very much when Israel kills its citizens, requests for a “speedy and transparent” investigation of the incident notwithstanding. When Israel pummels Gaza on flimsy pretexts, this too we’ve seen before–mowing the lawn, as the Israelis say.
So there was something genuinely unique about this short piece by economist Robert Wade in the London Review of Books. Written with an economist’s eye but in non-specialist language, it gives an informed sense of how the occupation burdens the daily lives of Palestinians on the West Bank, beyond the sporadic flashpoints and confrontations. And it is shocking.
Israel seems to be the only country in the world which makes a systematic effort to keep impoverished part of the population it governs. The average Israeli income is $4ok a year, 11 times the average for a West Bank Palestinian. The Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman recently said that no independent Palestinian state would be possible until average Palestinian income rises to $10K a year, a figure which presumably would give Palestinians vested material interest in making sure the provisions of a settlement would be maintained. But the catch is that Israel’s occupation policies are designed to thwart Palestinian economic development and ensure that level can never be reached.
Wade gives numerous examples. He begins in Hebron, the important West Bank town where a handful of Israeli settlers control the apartments overlooking the once thriving central market, regularly emptying their garbage on the Palestinians below. Palestinian access to the market is controlled through certain checkpoints (so the settlers never have to cross paths with Palestinians). He describes one scene where market-bound canned goods are transported by cart to one side of an Israeli barrier, raised by a pulley over the barrier, then loaded onto a a cart on the other side. The transaction costs are obviously passed on to Palestinian consumer. Later he describes a farmer, who has to cross the security barrier–through a gate Israel opens only three times a day,–to reach his crops and fields. To pass, he needs an Israeli permit, which has to be renewed every two months. Last year when he applied, during the harvest period for his crop of green tomatoes, Israel delayed granting of the permit for 40 days. The tomatoes rotted.
In Area C of the West Bank, controlled by Israel, goat herders are not allowed to build toilets without an Israeli permit. Nor repair a water cistern. Nor use solar energy panels. The permit system goes all the way up the economy. After the Oslo agreement of 1992, the Palestinians supposedly gained the right to construct their own telecommunications system. But the small print said that Israel would allocate the frequencies. Unsurprisingly, Israel has not done this generously. Palestinians have difficulty accessing the internet or email on their phones because Israel has not allocated the frequencies need for 3G, for “security reasons”. Of course Israel’s West Bank settlers have access to 3G networks. Telecommunications equipment the Palestinian Authority purchased from Ericsson languished for two years in Israeli customs, while Israelis performed “security checks” on it. West Bank trade with Jordan has actually diminished, because Israel controls the only bridges which cross the Jordan River. The occupied West Bank may be the only place in the world with a smaller amount of foreign trade as a proportion of GDP than 20 years ago.
Wade’s conclusion about the overall economic impact of the Israeli occupation is devastating. While the separation wall, and the land seizures which went along with its building are relatively well known in the West, Wade adds:
[T]he restrictions also cover the movement of people, the import and export of goods and services, investments, and access to basic infrastructure (electricity, water, sanitation). They are so pervasive and systematic that it almost seems as if the Israeli state has mapped the entire Palestinian economy in terms of input-output relations, right down to the capillary level of the individual, the household, the small firm, the large firm, the school, the university, so as to find all possible choke points, which Israeli officials can tighten or loosen at will.
Robert Wade is a prominent, widely traveled, developmental economist of vast experience, a winner of the prestigious Leontieff prize, a top award in the field. He concludes that the restrictions Israel has imposed on Palestinian economic life are unlike anything he has ever seen anywhere else in the world.
The ideology of the free market is as popular as ever in the Republican Party, and few would be so foolish as to deny its usefulness and explanatory power. So here is a wishful fantasy: that some of the “young guns” of the House Republican caucus, acolytes of Milton Friedman to a man (or woman), might read and contemplate Wade’s analysis—a prime example of the anti-market impediments in action, in a far-from-insignificant part of the world, where the United States spends a great deal of blood and treasure. Of course this is highly unlikely; it would it raise for them questions which are too politically uncomfortable. They, like most of their Democratic colleagues, prefer to cover their eyes and ears while pledging more American taxpayer dollars to Israel, the so-called “start up nation.”
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
Obama might have been able to find a prominent public health expert with gravitas and television skills to tap as the administration’s new Ebola tsar. He was probably wise to choose a political operative instead. For a political operative is more likely to convey to the White House that Ebola is not only a potentially very serious health problem, but a watershed for his administration—one with the potential to end the Obama presidency.
Should we assume that the chances of another Thomas Eric Duncan, the Liberian whose arrival here resulted in the infection of two nurses, are fairly small? Perhaps such a traveler would be screened under the new procedures and quarantined after arrival at an American airport, but why would he have been? Duncan’s temperature was supposedly normal when he boarded the flight from Liberia and was likely normal a day later, when, via Brussels, he arrived at Washington’s Dulles International Airport. He apparently flew during the latency period between infection with Ebola and the advent of discernable symptoms. What are the chances of that happening again? Well, negligible perhaps. But there are, according to the Center of Immigration Studies, more than 13,000 people from the three largest Ebola countries with visas to travel to the United States. How many of those might profile like Duncan? By continuing to allow flights from the Ebola countries, the Obama administration is placing a very steep wager that the number is zero.
One can notice that the broader political atmosphere has changed already. Granted, the Republicans were long favored to make off-year election gains; the president’s party almost always loses ground after six years. But the GOP had few serious issues to campaign about. Benghazi and the Affordable Care Act were, literally, the major GOP talking points for most of the past two years. The ACA is at worst a decent effort to mitigate a major problem that Republicans did nothing to address when they held the presidency and both houses of Congress, and Benghazi is a nothing burger if there ever was one. The GOP has no more persuasive answers to the emergence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria than Obama.
But now Republicans can talk about Ebola. Already there is a sea change in the political atmosphere; In The Weekly Standard, Jonathan Last has published an excellent article about the Ebola crisis; highly readable Wall Street Journal columnist Peggy Noonan effectively deconstructs the patronizing rhetoric coming from the Washington Ebola establishment. Many who are not fans of either publication will find the pieces compelling. When, in a widely watched, highly competitive swing state senate race, a Democratic incumbent feels the need to break openly with Obama’s “let the Liberians fly in” stance, it should signal to the White House that its position is politically untenable. That is, assuming the White House is sufficiently open to unpleasant political information to read the tea leaves.
Obama would upset virtually no one if he said, until things are under better control, no travelers from the most infected countries will enter legally through American airports. There really is no serious constituency opposing a temporary flight ban. Because the severely affected countries need help, the administration can and should arrange charter flights to fly health care workers in and out. A flight ban would not be the kind of “error on the side of prudence” (like, for instance, interning Japanese Americans during World War II) that violates the rights of American citizens. The fact is, West Africans have no “right” to fly here. The science about the disease’s transmission (as Jonathan Last points out) is more murky and less reassuring than the administration claims. But even under best-case assumptions, if someone like Thomas Duncan, a symptomless Ebola carrier arrived here tomorrow, there is no way he would be stopped or quarantined. To regular Americans, including most Obama supporters, this seems like dogmatic adherence to abstract principle (America’s borders should be open to the world) over simple common sense. If more Africans from the three infected countries fly here and make more nurses sick, there is a fair likelihood that Obama would be successfully impeached.
I write, it could be noted, as an Obama supporter, as someone who volunteered in both presidential campaigns. His nearly six years in office have been somewhat of a disappointment, but my expectations were always modest. Obama steered the country fairly successfully through the mortgage crisis, following Wall Street friendly policies—to the monumental chagrin of some of his most eloquent backers. He tried to push Israel and the Palestinians towards a two-state solution, eventually realizing that his leverage to bend Israel towards justice was not up to the task. He has been unable to stand up to the defense establishment on the issues of torture or domestic surveillance. But more often than not he has tried to resist hawkish policies; we haven’t started a war against Syria, we haven’t started one against Iran, we haven’t started one against Russia. There is a powerful permanent government in Washington whose default position on all international crises is always hawkish, and Obama—if he hasn’t defeated it, has managed with some success to rope-a-dope it. Before the hawks, Obama has bent but not broken.
Moreover, I believe there is at least a 50 percent chance Obama will be able to do something truly historic—forge a new relationship with Iran, that will be a strategic boon to the United States and may even change—for the better—the trajectory of the Islamic world. This is no easy matter; it will require, for instance, effectively circumventing the wishes of the Israel lobby in ways no president has even thought about in more than 20 years. But there are grounds for optimism, and a detente with Iran will be as game changing—and necessary—as Nixon’s opening to China. Hillary Clinton would not have done this, nor John McCain. Obama may, and it will give a permanent luster to his legacy.
So I’m hoping that even if Ron Klain knows nothing much about Ebola, his counsel about American politics will be persuasive. I would now wager that the United States will suffer well less than a thousand deaths from Ebola before it’s over, that the disease never blossoms into the feared pandemic. Of course it might turn out worse, through no fault of the administration. About the politics, I’m far more certain. If Americans die because West Africans are allowed to continue flying here legally during the heat of the crisis, Obama’s presidency will be toast.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
The ISIS rampage through Iraq and much of Syria, roiling Washington and other world capitals, gives rise to an interesting question: Who would win a contest to be named America’s most worthless Mideast ally? Competition is fierce, but three countries are clear frontrunners.
There is Saudi Arabia, whose princely emissaries to Washington have been confidants of presidents and fixtures on the Georgetown party circuit, a country whose rulers and princes possess seemingly unlimited amounts of discretionary income. They have used this wealth to subsidize worldwide the teaching of the most extremist and intolerant variants of Islam, but also to prop up the US defense industry by buying at every opportunity the most elaborate weapons systems we would sell them. It isn’t yet known whether Saudi pilots can actually effectively fly these advanced fighter aircraft under combat conditions. (There is sufficient evidence however that even relatively untrained Saudis can learn to steer a fully loaded 747 into a fixed ground target.)
What do the Saudis do with their shiny F-16’s and spanking new tanks? One might have hoped to see Saudi forces in action against ISIS—which really hasn’t had any success against a military formation that has been systematically trained and adequately armed. But this isn’t happening, probably because Saudi leaders realize that a great many Saudis (a majority?) actually agree with the ISIS ideology, and there is no guarantee they wouldn’t defect to ISIS if called upon to battle it. Among the best few sentences written since the onset of the crisis comes from veteran observer William Pfaff, who pointed to the stakes:
Moreover, is it fully appreciated in Washington that the “New Caliphate” has every intention of taking over the existing role in Islamic society of Saudi Arabia? It wants to conquer and occupy Mecca. If it succeeds, the Saudis themselves will be submitted to the ferocious discipline the ISIS practices. The Saudi ladies who now complain that they are not allowed to drive cars will find themselves in a new world indeed!
Then there is Turkey, an actual NATO member, a Muslim majority country which bridges Asia and Europe, a country with a considerable middle class and millions of educated and highly trained citizens. There are smart people in Washington and beyond who have held great hopes for Turkey: that it might solve the seemingly intractable riddle of how to combine Islam with modern democracy; that it might provide meaningful diplomatic support to the Palestinians; that it could both restrain America from disastrous blunders (as it tried to do in Iraq) and exert its growing influence on behalf of social and scientific progress in the region as a whole.
I shared those hopes, but have to admit they now seem pretty naive. Faced with an aggressive extremist Sunni movement beheading people on its borders, Turkey’s leaders choose to focus on the alleged dangers posed by its own long-restive Kurdish minority, while remaining obsessed with the Alawite (i.e. not Sunni Muslim) regime in neighboring Syria. Turkey has allowed ISIS to be replenished by allowing its own territory to be used as a transit zone for jihadist volunteers. If, as seems plausible at this writing, the Syrian-Kurdish town of Kobani falls while Turkey’s powerful NATO-armed military observes placidly from just over the border, it will be a long time before anyone in Washington will be able to say “our ally Turkey” with a straight face again.
Then there is Israel, usually touted as the best of American friends in the Mideast, if not the best ally any nation has been blessed to have, ever. Recipient of nearly as much American foreign and military aid as the rest of the world combined, Israel, with its crack air force and large stockpile of nuclear weapons, stands unchallenged as the region’s dominant military power. Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu shows up on American news talk shows more than leaders of the rest of the world combined; were it not for John McCain, he would surely log more “Face the Nation” time than any American politician.
Once again, events illustrate what utility Israel has as a regional ally when the crunch comes. Faced with a unforeseen, rapidly moving, and dramatic crisis, Americans watch as Israel does absolutely nothing except antagonize the Muslim world further by announcing new land seizures so more illegal settlements can be built in Jerusalem. Of course this isn’t without precedent; Israel was of no help in the first Iraq crisis, and of course no help in the second—beyond providing a parade of prime-time cheerleaders to encourage George W. Bush in his lurch into war. Indeed, almost by definition Israel is no help in any regional crisis. The Israeli military may well remain formidable, though it is hard to be sure, as its most recent campaigns have been conducted against essentially undefended civilian populations.
What distinguishes Israel from Turkey and Saudi Arabia, is that no one is particularly surprised that it gives no help; it is not expected to do so. Congress will respond anyway with new resolutions demonstrating to major campaign donors its absolute submissiveness to Tel Aviv; perhaps Israelis will be permitted to travel to the U.S. without visas while Israel doesn’t reciprocate the favor, or the Pentagon’s replenishment of Israeli military stocks, exhausted by Gaza bombardment, will be prioritized.
Might there be a silver lining in all this? As we witness the emergence of a violent new force, simple realism forces upon us the fact that the friends we’ve been wooing for decades just don’t see it that way. They may not like ISIS, but for various reasons they have other fish to fry. That should tell us something about the strategic vision underlying our policies for the past two or three decades. (I would give a passing grade to the American Mideast policies pursued during the heat of the Cold War, when strategists considered keeping oil flowing and the region out of the communist orbit to be a pressing national priority, superseding all other considerations. In this they succeeded.)
What silver lining? It’s rooted in the fact that the Mideast may now actually matter much less than we think it does. We do have the option of pretty much ignoring it, if we choose. Its contribution to the world economy is negligible. Its oil will reach the market one way or another. The security and well-being of the American people is not linked to the survival of a Shi’ite regime in Baghdad, a medieval monarch in Riyadh, or, for that matter, a Jewish state in Jerusalem. Recognition of this fact is only beginning to seep into the discourse: Justin Logan argues persuasively here that virtually nothing that goes on in the Middle East can threaten us very much, that no country in the region is worth starting a war over, and that the amount of money we’ve spent combatting terrorism in the region is wildly disproportionate to the actual threat. (It goes without saying that American bombing, with its inevitable “collateral damage,” will create a growing class of Muslims who have concrete reason to want to harm Americans.) In an recent interview, Francis Fukuyama elaborates on this view. 9/11 didn’t “change everything” as many claimed, or shouldn’t have; it was essentially a lucky shot.
“These are really marginal people who survive in countries where you don’t have strong states … Their ability to take over and run a serious country that can master technology and stay at the forefront of great-power politics is almost zero,” he says. Elsewhere he notes that the crisis over ISIS is really a subset of the Sunni-Shia civil war, and America’s ability to have any lasting impact on that is also almost zero.
This perspective—that the Mideast isn’t actually all that important to American security and we should pay much less attention to it—should now become a critical part of the American conversation. The thinkers cited here—Logan and Fukuyama, and one should add the popular blogger Andrew Sullivan, also writing along these lines—are far from knee-jerk “isolationists.” Fukuyama posits particularly that we should use military offshore balancing to ensure that no single power controls the oil fields; and obviously Iran would not want or allow ISIS to shut off its ability to export oil. But beyond that, we can afford to take the region much less seriously.
Unfortunately, there are no major American politicians now ready to make this argument. Rand Paul, regrettably, seems to have folded into a “me too” ISIS hawk after the first atrocity appeared on television, and the entire debate in Washington is now between neocons who want to send American ground troops now, and Obama establishment figures who hope, against much persuasive evidence, that some combination of bombing and special forces and our “coalition partners” will halt the ISIS advance. This narrowing of our true choices is madness.
There is a third, quite realistic, option: ISIS doesn’t matter all that much, and in any case if our “allies” don’t want to fight it, there’s very little we can do about it. If it one day rules Mecca, more the pity for the Saudi women and their driving aspirations. But the impact on American life will be minimal.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
Scientist and writer Greg Cochran unearths an interesting morsel about the post World War I influenza pandemic, which killed 50-100 million people worldwide. After the war, the Pacific island of West Samoa passed from Germany to New Zealand’s control. Administrators were aware of the global flu outbreak, but powerful plantation interests opposed any quarantine of the island as bad for business. When the flu bug arrived via crewmen from the SS Talune, which visited regularly, roughly 90 percent of the population fell ill. In the end, more than a quarter of the island’s population died.
American Samoa was nearby, 60 miles away. The climate and infrastructure were more or less identical, and the islands were culturally and socially integrated through trade and intermarriage. A U.S. Navy officer was the administrator. He too was forewarned of the flu danger, but—not receiving any instruction from Washington—took matters into his own hands and responded in the completely opposite manner. He imposed a quarantine on the island, a kind of self-blockade. He even managed to persuade American Samoa’s chiefs to send out canoes to block visits of their kinsmen from their New Zealand-run neighbor. On American Samoa, there wasn’t a single case of flu.
In this case, human choices made not a difference at the margins, but all the difference. The flu was an unprecedented danger, there was no clear scientific protocol to follow. Modern medicine was still in its infancy. But in American Samoa, a cautious attitude towards a poorly understood germ made the difference between life and death.
It is a mystery why the United States allows any travelers at all to fly from the Ebola-infected countries of West Africa into American airports. If much of our politics is a fight over the proper role of government, virtually everyone agrees that shielding the population from infectious disease should be a top priority. And yet, bizarrely, every establishment instinct in Washington is to avoid overreacting, as if some terrible harm might come were it ever demonstrated that stemming the flow of West African tourists for a short period of time was not absolutely necessary.
One might think that Ebola, like almost everything else in Washington, would become a partisan issue. Hardly. The first federal officeholder to call for moratorium on flights from West Africa was a liberal democrat, Florida congressman Allan Grayson, who did so in July. After Ebola patient Thomas Duncan arrived in Dallas from Liberia, passing through Dulles airport en route, Louisiana Republican Gov. Bobby Jindal made the case for banning West African flights. But these two stand almost alone. (In the past day or two, some more Republicans, perhaps sensing a new front to oppose Obama, have urged more rigorous airport screening.) But generally speaking, the establishment open-borders coalition has held firm, trumping partisan divisions, as leaders of both parties form a united front, repeating the Obama administration talking points that closing America’s airports to travelers from West Africa would do no good, or even “make matters worse.”
To be clear, there is no scientific consensus about any of this.
In Forbes, columnist Stephen Salzburg surprised himself by endorsing Jindal’s recommendation, noting there are expected to be 1.4 million West African Ebola cases by January. Salzburg writes that even the pro-flight Center for Disease Control has acknowledged that sick people are trying to board planes to the U.S.; 77 have been stopped so far. This figure is for known infected persons who have been stopped. How many managed to get through the rudimentary screenings in Freetown and other airports we don’t know. But when there are a million Ebola infections, many of them still asymptomatic, how easy will it be to screen infected travelers off the planes, he asks. It is perhaps necessary to point out that Salzburg is not a Fox news tub thumper but a top scientist, a professor of biomedical engineering and biostatistics as Johns Hopkins, with an illustrious career of research into bacteria and viruses behind him.
Another relevant voice calling for far sterner measures is Alexander Garza, who was chief medical officer of the Department of Homeland Security during Obama’s first term. Garza notes (not very reassuringly) that airport workers in West African countries have been trained to take temperatures of passengers. Who would deem this sufficient? Is it really prudent to entrust so much of American security to West African airport screeners?
Garza calls for the hiring of additional screeners at U.S. airports to essentially duplicate the African screening, and to question travelers more aggressively. He calls for a doubling of the Global Migration and Quarantine office budget (and staffing) until the disease is checked. Unstated but implicit in this argument is that travelers from West Africa ought to be quarantined until it is established they are indeed disease free. The United States did this as a matter of course with European immigrants during the 19th and early 20th century immigration wave.
But such calls for tougher measures are met with bland assurances that everything is under control, that flight bans would only worsen matters. Why? Well, it is argued that the foreign medical and aid workers Africa needs to combat Ebola’s spread use commercial flights to travel to the region. The concern for the medical workers’ travel and access is a valid one. But as the United States is flying thousands of troops to West Africa to help contain the epidemic, it would surely be possible for aid workers to fly back and forth on military planes.
In defense of the current, not very rigorous, regime, President Obama argues that “in recent months we’ve had thousands of travelers arriving from West Africa and so far only one case of Ebola.” But this was in the early stages of the epidemic, before the breakout of Ebola in West Africa’s cities. Does Obama really want thousands more West Africans flying here once Ebola cases number more than a million? The answer appears to be yes. Mark Krikorian of the Center for Immigration Studies has pointed out that 13,000 visas for travel to America have been handed out in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea—which means that so long as such travelers don’t have a fever observed by the West African screeners when boarding and can get a ticket, they’re coming to the U.S.
Some issues are complicated, but this one seems simple. So long as the epidemic is raging, why should even a single traveler come here from the Ebola-infected countries?
The deeper answer is that much of the American establishment has bought into “post-America”—the concept that the border shouldn’t mean much of anything. There is a right-wing and hawkish component to this: those feel we have the right and duty to meddle in every region of the world. ISIS is treated as primarily an American problem, as are ethnic fissures in Ukraine. The liberal side of the same paradigm is driven by guilt that the United States is richer or more successful than much of the world and hopes–by eliminating the significance of the border—to gradually erase such differences. The Washington Post recently ran an op-ed denouncing “borderism.” The piece opened by lamenting that someone born in New Mexico has better opportunities in life than someone born in Mexico. (“Not only did we take a lot of territory from Mexico, but we took the parts with all the good roads” someone once remarked, wryly.)
Few in Congress would go this far, but the belief that everyone in the world has some kind of civil right to get on a plane and fly to Dallas or Newark is pervasive. One might think a deadly virus whose capacity to spread and mutate is not yet widely understood by scientists would be sufficient grounds to constrain quite dramatically this supposed “right,” at least for a few months. But not in post-American Washington.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
Two years ago, Andy Bacevich published an important piece, “How We Became Israel.” His argument concerned strategic doctrine more than ideology. He noted similarities between Washington’s seemingly continuous low-grade military campaigns, which commenced once the Cold War was over, and Israel’s regular attacks on its neighbors. Both countries sought through military strength a kind of absolute security; both had no problem with starting preemptive wars; both employed “targeted assassinations” against opponents as a matter of course. Both relied on air power. Both were perfectly willing to endure perpetual war in their quest for dominion over their region.
Bacevich did not dwell on the irony of this policy becoming manifest under Barack Obama, who was elected in great part to terminate the militarization of America’s policy towards the Muslim world. But he did note that American acceptance of a permanent low-level war was entirely bipartisan: it was under President Clinton that bombing someone different every year became the American norm. It was depressing that Bacevich had to look hard for a prominent mainstream Washington figure who doubted the wisdom of this permanent war footing; he quoted Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, who wrote “we don’t have enough drones to kill all the enemies we will make if we turn the world into a free-fire zone.”
Two years ago, this argument was both prescient and novel, even if others has noted that the United States had long ago abdicated having any perspective on the Mideast independent of Israel’s. But suddenly variants of the Bacevich proposition are in vogue. Charles Krauthammer and Maureen Dowd, respectively leading neocon and liberal editorial voices of the two most prominent national newspapers, have both listened to President Obama’s United Nations speech and concluded “Yes—the president is right to bomb ISIS, and yes his policies are essentially Netanyahuesque.” Just as Israel uses airpower to “mow the lawn” in Gaza, America uses it in Iraq. Dowd even cheerfully adopted that banalizing and dehumanizing Israeli phrase for the periodic killing of militants, their families, and innocent women and children by forces with overwhelming technological superiority. But we may do it over the entire region.
Or beyond. In Andrew Sullivan’s mordant exclamation, “The world will be our Gaza!”
There is perhaps an element of technological determinism in this strategy: the United States and Israel deploy bombers and drone assassinations because they can, because such actions seem, at least in the short run, relatively cost-free. If this becomes a hard case to make morally (though there is little evidence so far that Americans care about that one way or another) Israelis are happy to help out. “ISIS is Hamas, Hamas is ISIS” is the slogan brought to the United Nations by Benjamin Netanyahu, and it is being echoed by Israeli government officials worldwide, as well as by pro-Israel groups with money and media clout.
It is, to be blunt, a blatant misrepresentation of reality: one need hardly be a defender of Hamas to note the critical differences. The comparison was, as 972’s Larry Derfner put it, “a crude attempt to brainwash people, to put the most horrifying image in their mind and associate it with Gaza, thereby cleansing Israel of those images of Gaza’s agony.” A twofer in other words. Israel is exonerated of killing 500 innocent children, and America is associated with Israel, for we are doing the same thing. The ISIS/Hamas comparison is valid only so far as both organizations are Muslim and militant.
For its part, in Gaza, Hamas does not kill Christians; indeed they worship freely, are represented in the government, and share in the bitter and blockaded status of Gaza’s Muslims. Hamas doesn’t aspire to a Muslim caliphate but rather national liberation, and, if you follow the contemporary words of its spokesman, (rather than its generation old, anti-Semitic charter) liberation of a small part of historic Palestine. Hamas doesn’t execute Western journalists but welcomes them. It does execute suspected collaborators (that’s where the gruesome execution photos which Israel-friendly organizations have been using in advertisements come from) but so has every guerrilla movement, including, as Derfner notes, Zionist ones.
Hamas came to power through a free election; Israel negotiates with it; some Israeli security officials have noted its increasing moderation. Israel actually understands all this, or it would have tried to root Hamas out of Gaza. But for an American audience, the word is “Hamas = ISIS.” If Netanyahu were truly frightened of Hamas, he would have recognized that negotiating seriously with the secular Palestinian Authority would have undermined almost completely Hamas’s appeal as an effective national resistance movement.
There was another component to Netanyahu’s lie. Not only does he say that ISIS = Hamas, but he devoted more of his UN speech to the proposition that Iran = ISIS. They are, after all, Muslims. As Netanyahu put it “Some want to restore a pre-medieval caliphate … some want to trigger the apocalyptic return of an imam … but they all share a fanatic ideology.” Haaretz reports that Netanyahu will spend his days in the United States telling network television viewers to be very afraid of Iran. If the images coming out of Iran belie Netanyahu’s claim that they’re just fanatical Muslims who must be bombed into submission, Netanyahu is probably confident that the American media will present his version without much competition.
Who can say whether this “big lie” will work once again? In the fall of 2002, it seemed unlikely to many intelligent people that the United States would do something so obviously stupid as invading Iraq. You didn’t need to be great Mideast expert to recognize that al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s secular, Christian-friendly dictatorship were entirely different animals, though both were part of the Muslim and Arab worlds. Surely that obvious point would eventually penetrate the minds of Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Rice. But it didn’t, and somehow, against what I once thought were steep odds, the relentless campaign of the neoconservatives and various Israeli leaders to conflate al-Qaeda with whatever target Israel wanted taken out carried the day. Iraq was destroyed. More than a trillion dollars, the cost will come to, a million Iraqis killed, wounded or homeless. The remaining officers of the decimated Iraqi army became a foundational stone of ISIS.
This time Israel wants us to destroy Iran, using ISIS as the bogeyman for American audiences, a massive bait and switch. Andy Bacevich is surely partially right in his claim that America has become Israel. But whether we are as ignorant and easily moved as Netanyahu hopes remains to be seen.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
By bombing ISIS units in Syria, the United States has turned a new page in its long-running conflict with the Arab world. I share the pessimism of those who predict the bombing won’t work, in which case this president or the next will come under intense pressure to commit ground troops in order to avoid a humiliating defeat. American allies in the region, who might be expected to contribute ground troops to the fight, have all refused—though jet planes from “several Arab allies” did strike targets in Syria. Presumably that’s an improvement over the Iraq invasion: the regional disdain for “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was perhaps best captured in a priceless scene from Oliver Stone’s “W.”, in which the Condoleeza Rice character tells the President that Morocco has promised to contribute thousands of monkeys to aid the American war effort.
Nathan Brown’s article in Monday’s Washington Post conveys a sense of the region’s ideological and political complexity in a period of great flux and despair—and how little it is understood in Washington. But armed with our ignorance, we are embarking on a multi-billion dollar campaign that will kill thousands of people—most of them, quite innocent—for reasons we have not thought through at all. Indeed, there seems to be something like an official government policy on not asking too many questions. For instance, we all seem to understand the thread leading from 9/11 to the Iraq invasion, to the creation of ISIS from the remnants of Saddam’s army. But where does the thread actually begin?
I recently read The Eleventh Day, a gripping book by Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swann on the 9/11 attacks. It’s a detailed account of what happened that day, based on painstaking analysis of the known record, including hundreds of interviews carried out by the authors and others. (For what it’s worth, it’s not a “truther”-friendly book.) One point which emerges very powerfully is the many layers of interaction between our Mideast ally Saudi Arabia and bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the 9/11 hijackers. A substantial part of the Saudi ruling family is “bin Ladenist”—perhaps not surprising for a group with piles of money and no responsibility, almost invariably a recipe for bad behavior. Not only were most of the hijackers Saudis, but Bin Laden raised most of his money through Saudi charities and individuals. These observations are included in the publicly released 9/11 Commission report. Not included are some more specific points, including facts which raise the possibility that two of the hijackers were in rather more direct contact with and given substantial assistance by officials affiliated with the Saudi embassy. Many of the loose threads are gathered up and detailed in a 28-page segment of the 9/11 Commission report.
Curiously, President Bush ordered those 28 pages classified, so that no one without extremely rare security clearances could read them. Former Senator Bob Graham of Florida is one person who has read them, and who then pressed hard for deeper investigation of the Saudi role. Said Graham, pondering Bush’s role in keeping the Saudi information under wraps: “It’s as if the President’s loyalty lay more with Saudi Arabia than with America’s safety.” Obama promised to release the classified material shortly after his inauguration, but has not done so. One official who read the classified material is quoted by Summers and Swann: “If the twenty-eight pages were to be made public, I have no question that the entire relationship with Saudi Arabia would change overnight.”
There is a presently a House bill to declassify the 28 pages, introduced by Walter Jones and Stephen Lynch; it is bipartisan and now has 17 cosponsors. Perhaps the ISIS crisis will generate some curiosity about what those pages say.
The boots on the ground component of Obama’s anti-ISIS campaign involves the training of “vetted” Syrian rebels in Saudi Arabia. Clearly the Saudis are playing a complicated game—training the anti-ISIS rebels, perhaps out of fear that their own population might be attracted by ISIS. Is it possible, or likely, that Saudi princes have been helping to finance ISIS? It would be hard to see why not. But while Americans know the crux of the president’s current anti-ISIS strategy involves close cooperation with the Saudi regime, might they also ask whether this involves cooperation with Saudis whom some (those who have seen the classified report) believe were engaged in financing and assisting the 9/11 hijackers? That’s what this administration, like the last one, doesn’t want you to speculate about.
The famous Founding Fathers’ warnings against entangling alliances are often considered pertinent for America’s ties to Israel, and of course they are: one point Summers and Swann make is that all of Saudi Arabia—from the top government ministers to the 9/11 hijackers—was enraged and repulsed by Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians and America’s complicity in it. (This fact was considered but watered down in the 9/11 official report, out of fear that it might cause some to question the value of the “special relationship” with Israel.) But it seems obvious that a Saudi “special relationship” may be just as detrimental to America’s real interests. In any case, it should be up for discussion. For starters, before we bomb anyone, let’s unclassify the 28 pages of the 9/11 report, and discuss the nature of our ties to Saudi Arabia. Then we can decide how much to rely on Saudi Arabia as our principle Muslim ally in combatting ISIS.
Or perhaps we should just go ahead and bomb first, then ask questions about who or why later. The Obama administration has already made its choice.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
What is there to add to the extremely rich vein of commentary elicited by Ted Cruz’s shameless Israel lobby pandering at a Washington forum intended to call attention to the plight of Mideast Christians in the age of ISIS? The pieces by Ross Douthat, Michael Brendan Dougherty, and the several posts by Rod Dreher say a great deal of what needs to be said, making many points I would likely never have thought of.
One takeaway from the controversy, which continues to reverberate around the conservative blogosphere, is how many socially conservative/Christian/Republican-leaning thinkers have sensed, perhaps for the first time in their relatively young careers, how morally flawed is the entire Christian Zionist/McCainist/Commentary/Washington Free Beacon/Likudnik group, whose views have long driven “mainstream” conservative foreign-policy opinion in Congress and the GOP presidential primaries. I think this may grow into an important schism on the right, one that weakens neoconservatism, to the Republican Party’s long-term benefit. I don’t want to ascribe views to people who don’t necessarily have them, but when I see young conservatives reacting viscerally against the tweets from the Breitbart site and other movement conservatives, tweets putting scare quotes around the word “Christian” in order to denigrate the Mideast patriarchs and bishops and other figures who attended the gathering, attacking them because they failed some sort of “stand with Israel” litmus test, it feels like a kind of Kronstadt moment. This sentiment also comes when I see the disgust felt when Weekly Standard editor Lee Smith implies that Mideast Christians are simply a kind of ISIS lite. I witnessed personally a comparable repulsion a year or so ago, when an old friend, long a prudently neocon-friendly author and Wall Street Journal writer, reacted to the smearing of Chuck Hagel by the same group. It’s as if the Israel lobby has grown so accustomed to the deference accorded it by everyone else in the American political system, it has lost any sense of its own limits.
Still there are other points to be made. Several of Cruz’s critics responded as if the Mideast Christians who came to the gathering deserved a sort of indulgent understanding for their lack of enthusiasm for Cruz’s admonition that Israel is their greatest friend. It was sometimes noted as historical fact that most Palestinian Christians live under Israeli occupation, and that others were ethnically cleansed by Israel in 1948; that the Lebanese Christians had once been Israel’s allies, which had not worked out well for them: in other words, all these groups had understandable excuses for their chilliness towards Israel. These Christians are, according to this discourse, genuinely vulnerable—they can be forgiven for not loving Israel. But this argument—and there are elements of it in most of the conservative pieces which chastized Cruz—scants the fact that Israel’s continuing occupation of Palestine is also opposed, often quite publicly and with increasing energy, by ever growing numbers of non-Mideast Christians.
I wonder if Cruz would similarly walk out and denounce Pope Francis as an anti-Semite, considering the new Pope visited the Holy Land and expressed his wishes for dignity and freedom for both Israelis and Palestinians and said a prayer outside the Israeli wall that severs Bethlehem from neighboring Jerusalem and has largely rendered the town of Jesus’s birth a walled off ghetto. (The Israeli right went into conniptions about the Pope’s visit, with the incomparable Caroline Glick accusing the Pope of licensing “Holocaust denial” by his prayer at the Bethlehem separation wall.) If there is an argument that the Pope, with his stand in support of peace and dignity for both peoples in the Holy Land, is some kind of outlier among Catholics, I have not yet heard it.
Then there are the Presbyterians, who last summer voted to divest from several American companies profiting from the Israeli occupation, and the United Methodists, who nearly did so two summers before and are edging towards a successful divestment vote in good time. These are mainstream and mainline American Protestants, not the historic peace churches. Lutheran World Service runs a hospital in Jerusalem, designed to serve Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank, that is engaged in a constant tension with the Israeli authorities who want to isolate it from the population it is meant to serve. One could go on: consideration of the European or South American churches would hardly alter this analysis.
Simply put, the Mideast Christians who gathered in D.C. to express their fears and ask for support when threatened by an inflamed Muslim fundamentalism are—in their nuanced attitudes toward Israel—far more representative of Christian opinion as a whole than is the belligerent Christian Zionism expressed by Ted Cruz.
Finally, I see that one avenue of response to Rod Dreher in Commentary is to tar him with association with the views of other TAC writers, including yours truly, who are accused of “clear anti-Israel bias.” I probably should resist taking this as an invitation to respond, but I won’t, and my guess is that Rod, who is surely less cool towards present day Israel than I am, might welcome some clarification from his colleagues.
Generally my own view of Israel and Palestine is summed up (more pithily than I would be capable of) by Bradley Burston in a recent Haaretz piece:
If somebody tells me that Israel alone should keep the West Bank and East Jerusalem forever because God said so—or even “Just because it’s ours”—my feeling is: This is this person’s honest belief. I don’t share it, by any means. But I respect it as true faith, without an effort to whitewash, misdirect, or misrepresent.
I feel the same way about the opposite side. When someone, usually someone Jewish, says that in their view, there should be no State of Israel because it’s an illegitimate, militarized ethnocracy, I appreciate their candor in spelling out what they want to see, and I respect as an expression of true conviction their telling me what they want to see politically or otherwise euthanized. Even if it’s me.
In that spirit, I make no special claims for my desire to see—and my perhaps messianic belief in the possibility of—partition of the Holy Land into two independent states: Israel and Palestine.
Burston uses these words as a prelude to exposing the dishonesty in a recent piece by Elliot Abrams that attempts to whitewash Israeli settlement building. But his overall perspective is one I share: that is, I believe in the two-state solution as the most likely way to deliver peace and dignity to Israelis and Palestinians. I am not sure how I would have felt in 1947 and 1948, but I suppose there is good chance I would have believed as Truman did, that establishing a Jewish state in Palestine would be the source of unending religiously-based strife. He hoped for some kind of non-faith-based federation that might accommodate Jewish refugees and the Palestinian Arabs then living there. I might also have agreed with George Marshall and other members of the American diplomatic establishment who opposed American support for the creation of Israel for strategic reasons. Truman eventually threw up his hands and let domestic politics trump his ethical and strategic concerns, which he in any event had no plausible way to forge into policy.
The American diplomats who feared the consequences flowing from the establishment of Israel have been proved partly right, partly wrong. At this point, that’s water under the bridge: the question is how to seek the greatest measure of peace and justice now and in the future.
In the past 20 years, I have had to recognize that the possibility of a two-state solution has receded dramatically—from, I would estimate, probably more than 60 percent to less than 20 percent. For this I hold successive Israeli governments far more responsible than the Palestinians. The latter have revised the PLO charter to recognize Israel, and most of their leaders have told their people and behaved as if they they wanted to build a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. The major Arab countries formally put forth a peace initiative in 2002, reaffirmed five years later, offering Israel full diplomatic recognition in return for giving up the occupied territories. For their efforts, and for America’s long-term diplomatic campaign to cajole the Palestinians into accepting a small state on the 22 percent remainder of historic Palestine, Israel has responded by building settlements and more settlements on the remaining land, slicing it up in non-contiguous cantons, divided by military checkpoints, armed settlements, and Israeli-only roads. In the process Israelis have elected a right-wing government formally pledged to deny Palestinans a state on the West Bank. In other words occupation now, occupation tomorrow, occupation forever—that is Israel’s current policy. At the same time, Israel has ignored, refused even to acknowledge, the Arab peace initiative, refused even to discuss it. Have these developments over the past 20 years influenced my opinion of Israel? Of course they have. Have they changed my sense of the two-state solution? Well, it certainly seems unlikely, but I’m not sure of a better answer.
There’s another, more self-interested, part of my overall view. As someone concerned with foreign policy, I cannot help but note that Israel’s self-proclaimed friends in America, and often Israeli officials themselves, play a very large role in lobbying for American to fight wars in the Middle East. They did so in Iraq—after 9/11, Israeli officials flooded the American media talking about the necessity of destroying the government of Iraq, complementing the efforts of their friends at Commentary and The Weekly Standard. They got their wish, as they often do—and the destruction of Iraq played no small role stirring up the potentially genocidal crisis Mideast Christians face today. And now the Israelis are doing it again, trying to foment an American war with Iran. I understand that Israel feels it to be in its own national interest to have a regional monopoly on nuclear weapons. But I don’t think it’s an American national interest to fight continuous wars to maintain Israel’s monopoly. So this too makes me less warm towards Israel than I was 20 or 30 years ago.
Of course there are many kinds of Israelis. I’ve taken two trips to Israel and have met quite a few—liberal Zionists is probably the most accurate term—who are actively striving towards a just peace with the Palestinians and believe in an Israel in which the country is fully integrated, peacefully, into its region. They are, regrettably, a minority in Israel now, and perhaps they never had much influence. But for me they represent an extremely attractive side of Zionism—sophisticated, broad-minded, non-bigoted people, often possessed of extraordinary courage, energy, and talents. When I think of being supportive of Israel, they are people I would happily support, and I do and will continue to do.
Others are free to their opinions whether this view constitutes “bias” against Israel or makes me an “anti-Zionist.” It is certainly based on on far more reading, knowledge, and personal experience with the Mideast than went into the presumably “unbiased” view I held 20 or more years ago, when I was a neoconservative in good standing and a fairly regular contributor to Commentary.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
Such inconvenient things, elections. So much the better if the elites of both parties could quietly meet in a plush and smokeless private room to decide what’s best. That, anyway, is what the “immigration reform” establishment must feel after the President Obama announced he was backing off his announced intention to push amnesty by executive order prior to the November election. As the New York Times reported:
What had once looked like a clear political imperative for both parties—action to grant legal status to millions of undocumented immigrants—had morphed instead into what appeared to be a risky move that could cost Democrats their majority in the November midterm congressional elections.
The Times went on to explain how years of the highest level of elites lobbying the Republican Party to understand that amnesty was in their interest were undone by a few weeks of the southern border seeming out of control. Polls showed that voters somehow perceived what the Washington consensus refused to admit—that the prospect of an imminent amnesty made illegal border crossing more attractive, both to the coyote smugglers and to would-be illegal migrants themselves.
It’s been more than a decade since immigration was a major concern of mine. I can think of numerous reasons why diverse multicultural immigration has been or might eventually be quite okay, even on balance beneficial. Most importantly, it could raise some political roadblocks to unwise military interventions, as the war as first resort coalition is generally white and Protestant, and the diminution of that bloc’s influence is perhaps a blessing. I would wager also that immigrants from all regions are somewhat closer to the global consensus, more resistant to the “Israel right or wrong” ideology now regnant in Congress. But this is supposition, based on present voting patterns and cultural assumptions, not yet tested by events.
Still, it’s hard not to be struck by the failure of the immigration debate, on every side, to touch on the heart of the matter. The heart of it isn’t the end of white cultural and political dominance (the end of America, as some would have it) though that is surely an element behind some immigration restriction sentiment. It’s that mass immigration is a frontal assault on America as a country with a fair degree of social equality; a characteristic that nearly defined the country of the ’50s, ’60s, and ’70s, the decades of the baby-boomer’s youth. The writer and speaker who now carries forth this argument best, indeed practically the only one, is Mickey Kaus, author, one of the America’s first important bloggers, quixotic one-time California Senate candidate.
Last year, Kaus spoke at the Center for Immigration Studies, where he analysed the broader effect of mass immigration on the economy. Some excerpts:
And it’s not because I think immigration overall will be a drag on the economy as, as some argue, the third generation of immigrants sinks into single parenthood and dependence. That might happen, but I assume for the purposes of this argument that, overall, immigrations bring a drive and a work ethic that will boost overall gross national product, dynamic scoring. Unfortunately, gross national product isn’t everything. It also matters how it’s distributed, at least and certainly at the bottom of the income distribution.
And this is the beginning of the problem, the first big problem with amnesty, because it’s very hard to believe that uncontrolled unskilled immigration won’t hurt the very people who have been screwed the most over the past three decades. That is unskilled workers, especially young people, especially high school dropouts, and especially men. They are the people who have been hurt the most by the outsourcing trend as unskilled jobs have moved abroad. Now we’re saying those unskilled jobs that have to be performed here, you don’t get those either because we’re importing people from abroad to do them.
I spent a lot of time—I drove up from Florida these past few days. I spent a lot of time listening to country music, both good and bad, and the theme of about half the songs, I’d say, the ones that aren’t about true love or cheating on your true love, the theme is something like this: I may not be very sophisticated, I may drive a truck, but I go to work every day and I feed my family, and it’s not easy, and there’s a dignity in that and that makes me a hero just as much as you, buddy.
That’s basically a lot of what—the sentiment that those songs appeal to, and it’s a good sentiment. The idea is that a full-time job enables a life of dignity even if it’s not an affluent life. And that assurance is what uncontrolled immigration would erode. Even if some people make the most it—even if a lot of people make the most of it—even if some waiters can make more money in tips because they have busboys filling the water glasses, they can serve more tables; even if some drywall installers open up a drywall-installing shop and employ people making $9 an hour, lots of people won’t do better.
Kaus went on to argue that mass immigration undermines the key premises of welfare reform, the important and quite conservative Clinton legislation of the 1990s. Welfare reform essentially encouraged (or compelled) recipients to get jobs, and most of them did, and did better. It was part of a moral argument that it is better in almost almost every way to hold a steady job than to hustle in the illegal economy, or commit serious crime. Welfare reform aimed to combat the pervasive notion that minimum wage jobs were “chump change” and not worth the bother. But obviously if you tilt the labor market against the poor by bringing in more and more unskilled workers, the low salaries will remain low. That is what has happened in the past two decades, which have seen almost all national income gains go to the most successful.
When I was a kid (and spending nearly half the time in a very well-off family) one could often hear grownups complaining almost continually about how hard it was to get good help—for gardening, or pool cleaning, or whatever. It must have been tough, but somehow the rich survived it. One virtually never hears such complaints now. Instead we have an economy where tens of millions of people at the bottom are continuously teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, loss of health care, etc. But upper middle class teenage girls can get their toenails tended at a spa without great expense.
I would submit that a country where the rich have to complain about their difficulty getting good help is morally superior to one where the working class is under constant threat of falling into dire poverty. This is a kind of philosophical prejudice, difficult to argue conclusively. One can of course point to ways in which the lives of upper middle class and above Americans are enriched by the existence a large class of poorer immigrants. The freedom of American women, indeed of almost all “first world” women, was surely enhanced with child care options made possible by an influx of poorer immigrant women. Nonetheless, there are probably better ways to solve child care problems than eliminating the border.
It may be a stretch to say that some inarticulated upsurge of the general will, a sentimental nostalgia for a more socially equal America, forced Obama to scale back his amnesty promise. Most analysts point to White House fears of the amnesty issue’s effect on Senate races in the Midwest and upper South, where Obama’s intention threatened to brand forever the Democrats as the amnesty party among its white voters. No matter how much sympathy the stories of individual illegal immigrants might evoke, the amnesty issue gives the indelible impression that the “immigration reform” crowd wants simply to erase the southern border. For what does having an amnesty every 20 years mean, except that you find border inconvenient as a measure of controlling the movements of peoples?
If Mickey Kaus is the most prominent figure to make the explicit linkage between growing inequality and mass immigration, it won’t be enough. And so far, there are few prominent Democrats ready to make the case. One wonders why, for if ever an issue called for a “Third Way” pro-middle and working-class Democrat to make some waves, it is this one. Immigration remains singular as the issue where there is a large discrepancy between the popular sentiment and the elites of both parties. In the parliamentary systems of Europe, slow-down-immigration sentiment can at least express itself politically. In the U.S., when John McCain is allied with “liberal” Chuck Schumer, and Bill Gates and Sheldon Adelson have spoken with one voice, what chance to do proponents of a more socially equal America really have?
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative
Consider an analogy to get a sense of how Russia might perceive America’s Ukraine policy. It is imperfect of course, because unlike Russia, America has no history of being invaded, unless you count the War of 1812. But a comparison might be instructive nonetheless:
By 2034, China’s power position has risen relative to America’s. America has evacuated its East Asian bases, under peaceful but pressured circumstances. The governments of Korea and Japan and eventually the Philippines had, by 2026, concluded it was better off with a “less provocative” more neutral arrangement. The huge naval base at Subic Bay became home to a multilateral UN contingent. China’s economy had been larger than America’s for a while, though American per capita income is still somewhat higher. American technological innovation edge has largely disappeared, America still has a lot of soft power—people over the world prefer Hollywood movies to Chinese and America’s nuclear arsenal exceeds the Chinese. But the countries are far more equal than today, and throughout much of the world it is assumed that China will be tomorrow’s dominant “hyperpower.”
A political crisis erupts in Mexico. Mexico has a freely elected but typically corrupt government, whose leading figures are linked to Wall Street and Miami Beach by ties of marriage and money. But many in Mexico—where anti-gringo nationalism remains a potent force—want to become the first “North American partner” in the China led Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Young Mexicans proclaim defiantly they are “people of color” and laud the fact non-white China is rising while America, country of aging white people, is in decline. Their sentiments, materialistic and infused with personal ambitions are so permeated with anti-American, anti-imperialist “third worldist” rhetoric that it is difficult for outsiders to sort out the true motivations. When the Mexican government, under American pressure, rejects a Chinese invitation for candidate membership in China’s East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, long prepared protests erupt in Mexico City.
The core group of protest leaders and organizers have been on the Chinese payroll for some time, as the heads of various civic action and popular democracy initiatives, many with an obvious anti-gringo flavor. Soon Chinese politicians and movie stars begin flocking to Mexico City to be photographed with the protesters. Thus encouraged, protester demands escalate, including not only the resignation of the government, Mexico’s adhesion to the Chinese economic bloc, but a military alliance with China. The NSA captures a cell phone conversation of the Chinese ambassador discussing who will hold what posts in the next Mexican cabinet. Three days later, sniper fire of undetermined origin riddles the protestors and police, and any semblance of order breaks down. Mexico’s president flees to Miami.
The above scenario parallels pretty directly the run-up to the Ukraine crisis, before Russia began to respond forcefully. One can of course see the ambiguities of right and wrong. Why should America have anything to say about whether Mexico has a revolution and joins an anti-American military alliance, some would ask. Mexico is sovereign, and should be able to join any international grouping it wants.
What is most striking about the Ukraine crisis is how much the Washington debate lacks any sense of how the issue might look to other interested parties, particularly Russia. Putin is analysed of course—is he, as Hillary Clinton suggested, following Hitler’s playbook? Or is he merely an aggressive autocrat? Or perhaps he is “in his own world” and not quite sane? But in open Washington conversation at least, and perhaps even at the more reflective levels of government, all talk begins with the premise that Russia’s leader is somewhere on the continuum between aggressive and the irrational. That he might be acting reactively and defensively, as any leader of a large power would be in response to threatening events on its doorstep, is not even part of the American conversation. Thus in the waning days of American unipolarism, America diplomacy sinks into a mode of semi-autism, able to perceive and express its own interests, perceptions, and desires, while oblivious to the concerns of others.
A rare and welcome exception to blindness was the publication in Foreign Affairs of John Mearsheimer’s cogent essay on the Ukraine crisis, which with characteristic directness argues that Western efforts to move Ukraine in the Nato/EE orbit were the “taproot” of the present crisis. Prior to Mearsheimer, one could find analyses tracing how various neoliberal and neoconservative foundations had, with their spending and sponsorship of various “pro-Western” groups, fomented a revolution in Ukraine, but they were generally sequestered in left-liberal venues habitually critical of American and Western policies. In the Beltway power loop, such voices were never heard. The policy of pushing NATO eastward, first incorporating Poland and Bulgaria and then going right up to Russia’s borders moved forward as if on mysterious autopilot. That such a policy was wise and necessary was considered a given when it was discussed at all, which was seldom. Was Obama even aware that a leading neoconservative, a figure from Dick Cheney’s staff, was in charge formulating American policy towards Ukraine—with designs on igniting revolutionary regional transformation? One has to assume not; confrontation with Russia had not been part of Obama’s presidential campaign or style, and since the crisis began his comments have always been more measured than the actions of the government he purportedly leads.
As Mearsheimer points out, there remains still a fairly obvious and quite attractive off-ramp: a negotiation with Russia which settles formally Ukraine’s non-aligned status. There are useful precedents for this: Eisenhower’s negotiation with Krushchev that brought about the withdrawal of foreign troops from Austria in 1955 is one, and so of course is Finland. No one who contemplates where the Ukraine crisis might lead otherwise—with a war that devastates the country or perhaps brings in outside powers to devastate all of Europe, or even explodes the entire northern hemisphere—could sanely consider Austria or Finland—prosperous and free countries—to be bad outcomes. Nevertheless the entire conversation in Washington revolves around measures to make Putin back down, and accept the integration of Ukraine into the EU and eventually NATO. People act baffled that he won’t.
There is a mystery to the way Washington works—how an entire political class came to see as American policy that that Russia be humiliated at its own doorstep as logical, without ever reflecting upon whether this was a good idea in the larger scheme of global politics nor whether the West had the means and will to see it through. Because to see it through likely means war with Russia over Ukraine. (The West-leaning Ukrainians of course, be they democratic or fascist, want nothing more than to have American troops fighting beside them as they become NATO partners, a tail wagging the dog). America’s policy makes sense only if it is taken for granted that Russia is an eternal enemy, an evil power which must be surrounded weakened and ultimately brought down. But very few in Washington believe that either, and virtually no one in the American corporate establishment does. So it’s a mystery—a seemingly iron-clad Washington consensus formed behind a policy, the integration of Ukraine in the West, to whose implications no one seems to have given any serious thought.
Russia’s leaders and diplomats have been telling America to butt out of Ukraine in unambiguous terms for a decade or more. Did American diplomats and CIA agents push for an anti-Russian coup d’etat in Kiev knowing that and pursue it anyway? The sheer recklessness of such an action would border on criminal—but oddly enough, no one who truly counts in Washington, Republican or Democrat, seems even to consider it even slightly misguided.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.
Though Congress and the president are out of town, the final weeks of August have seen the arrival of an unexpectedly critical moment. The brutal beheading of James Foley by ISIS (the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq) confirmed that there remains a Sunni jihadist terrorism problem in the Mideast: decimating al-Qaeda and killing Osama bin Laden didn’t end it. It shouldn’t be forgotten that America’s destruction of the Iraqi state in 2003 created the opportunity for ISIS to grow and thrive, as America’s Sunni allies, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, gave ISIS financial backing.
How to respond? The usually wise Andy Bacevich suggests that ISIS constitutes a negligible threat to America, a superpower an ocean away, that bombing it has become—like bombing elsewhere, America’s substitute for a genuine national security strategy. Bacevich suggests we ought to butt out, except perhaps to give aid to countries genuinely threatened by ISIS. There is much to this argument, as there is little inclination from the American people to send ground troops once again into Iraq. And even if we were willing to reconstitute and send an occupation force, what good would it do? In a similar vein, Paul Pillar argues that overestimating ISIS as a potential threat is perhaps more likely, and dangerous, than underestimating it.
But few are comfortable with doing little or nothing: ISIS is undoubtedly barbaric, with possible potential to spread. In important ways the situation resembles the months after 9/11, in which America were brutally confronted with the sudden emergence of Sunni extremism which had not previously been deemed a major problem.
Then as now, an influential group of neoconservatives, tightly allied with Israel, had a very specific idea of what they wanted the United States to do. The neocons then—and still do—aspired for an almost endless series of American wars and invasions across the entire Middle East. Because in 2001 we were already engaged in a sort of shadow war with Saddam Hussein—Iraq was under a semi-blockade and America was enforcing a no fly zone over the country—Iraq was the logical starting point. But for the neocons Iraq was only a beginning. “Real men want to go to Tehran” was the neoconservative semi-jokey catchword during that time, and they quite seriously expected that after Baghdad was digested as an appetizer, they could steer the United States into war with Iran—then as now a top Israeli priority. That an American war with Iran was an Israeli priority does not mean Israel opposed the Iraq war: polls at the time indicated that Israel was the only country in the world where large popular majorities were enthusiastic about George W. Bush’s Iraq invasion, and Israeli politicians were regularly invited to appear as guests American news talk shows in order to beat the Iraq invasion drums. Steve Walt’s and John Mearsheimer’s indispensable book The Israel Lobby, contains pages filled with quotations from Israeli leaders making hawkish pronouncements to American audiences; the quotes are a necessary corrective to present to present Israeli efforts to proclaim that an American invasion of Iraq was never really an Israeli objective.
If ISIS is to be contained or defeated without using American ground troops, it is necessary to examine the regional forces ready to fight it. There are of course the Kurds, a small group which can perhaps defend its own region, if that. The biggest potential player is Iran. With its majority Shia population Iran takes a dim view of Sunni jihadism; the Iranian population was pretty much the only one in the Muslim world to display open sympathy with Americans after 9/11. By the standards of the Middle East, it is a scientific powerhouse, with a large freedom aspiring middle class, and considerable artistic community. According to published reports, Iranian tanks have reportedly engaged ISIS near the Iranian border—probably with American approval. We are likely, I would guess, to hear more about Iranian tank brigades in the coming months, even root for them.
The other serious force willing to fight ISIS is Syria, led by the Alawite Bashar al-Assad. Assad is a dictator, as was his father. His regime is strongly supported by Syria’s Christians, by Iran, and by Hezbollah, the Sh’ite militia in neighboring Lebanon. Syria has been caught up in civil war of shocking brutality for the past four years. The largest faction opposing him is ISIS—and American arms distributed to the Syrian “rebels” have often ended up in ISIS hands. By opposing Assad, the United States has in effect been feeding ISIS.
It would seem logical that if ISIS really is a threat—a metastasizing terrorist entity and enemy of America and all civilization—then the United States should patch up its relations with Syria and Iran to deal with it. That’s the advocacy of some groups favoring a detente with Iran (like the National Iranian-American Council), which views Iran as the most stable state in the region. But there is a problem: Israel hates Iran, and hates Syria because of Iran. The only Arab military force to give Israel any difficulty in the past 40 years is Hezbollah, armed by and allied with Iran. No matter how much Israel pretends to dislike Sunni extremism, it hates Iran more, because Iran has scientific, cultural, and political potential to be a major rival to Israel in the Middle East.
So the neoconservatives are arguing that the United States confront ISIS by sending in its own troops (“primarily” special forces, or a contingent of 10-15,000 “for now”) but hoping of course that can be expanded upon later, rather than relying on regional allies. This is essentially a revised variant of the policies they advocated after 9/11—divert Americans away from confronting a threat from Sunni jihadists, while preparing the ground for a subsequent war with a state actor that Israel doesn’t like. So the neocons will argue against any policy which contemplates detente with Iran or a lessening of tension with Syria, because they recognize that if the United States comes to view Iran as an ally in the fight against ISIS or other Sunni extremists, their goal of an American war with Iran is gone, probably forever. Bibi Netanyahu has boasted to Israeli audiences that America is something “easily moved” by Israel’s public relations abilities, unregistered agents, and other well-wishers. But Bibi and his allies are likely to find their proposals to send American troops back into the Mideast a hard sell.
A final point: over the past two generations thousands of articles have been written proclaiming that Israel is a “vital strategic ally” of the United States, our best and only friend in the “volatile” Middle East. The claim is a commonplace among serving and aspiring Congressmen. I may have missed it, but has anyone seen a hint that our vital regional ally could be of any assistance at all in the supposedly civilizational battle against ISIS? Fact is, when you use the most powerful military in the Mideast to continuously brutalize Palestinian children, your usefulness as a regional ally becomes pretty limited.
Scott McConnell is a founding editor of The American Conservative.