It has been said that retired American spies frequently end up in some rural location that cannot be found on any map, where they can grow orchids or breed Labrador retrievers in peace. Their British counterparts often settle down to write thrillers with plots so involved and characters so conflicted that only a completely masochistic reader can enjoy the twists and turns.
But what of the flotsam and jetsam of spying, the agents who are used and discarded or, in exceptional circumstances, eventually sent out to pasture and resettled in something akin to law enforcement’s witness protection program?
Most intelligence agents, when they are no longer useful, are simply terminated with a hearty slap on the back: “Nice knowing you. Good luck.” But when an agent is so compromised that he can’t go home again, resettlement under the Agency’s Public Law 110 program is sometimes authorized. If the agent is indisputably on the side of the angels, the process is simple: new identity, job, or a business of some sort, and a house in the suburbs.
The Vietnamese general Nguyen Ngoc Loan, head of South Vietnam’s National Police and a CIA informant—who was famously photographed blowing the brains out of a Viet Cong prisoner in 1968—wound up owning a pizzeria in Burke, Virginia. Down the street a number of Saigon’s former top intelligence officers had townhouses, and everyone would get together at the Vietnam Inn in the Clarendon neighborhood of Arlington, Virginia once a week to reminisce over old times, frequently to be joined by friends from the nearby Pentagon and CIA headquarters.
But it all gets trickier when the current good guy was once a really bad guy who participated in targeting and killing Americans. A recent book by Kai Bird on former CIA officer Robert Ames has created quite a stir both in the media and in Congress over the suggestion that Ali Reza Asgari, who reportedly planned the bombing of the United States Embassy in Beirut in 1983 that killed Ames plus the six-strong CIA station as well as ten other Americans, was subsequently picked up as an agency source and now appears to be living in the U.S. with a false identity and a full repatriation package.
Like many good stories, this tale is not completely true. Asgari, a general in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, was indeed a key player in the Beirut bombing but later fell under Tehran’s suspicion and feared that he would be summarily executed. So he planned a defection during a trip to Istanbul, as Turkey was then one of the few countries that Iranians could visit without a visa. Turkish intelligence (MIT) and the CIA were tipped off by Asgari, who brought with him hundreds of documents to establish his bona fides. He was whisked away to an interrogation center near Ankara and later to CIA offsites in the United States.
Asgari, who had good access to the Iranian missile and nuclear programs when he defected, was the most valuable source ever to come out of post-revolutionary Iran. He has since been resettled in a comfortable retirement in the United Arab Emirates—which was one of the demands he negotiated with Washington before he defected—so concerned congressmen can go back to arguing about Obamacare.
Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest.
Two new spy stories surfaced during the past week. One involved the United States’ apparent recruitment of a German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) foreign intelligence officer and an ongoing investigation of a Bundeswehr official who might also have been turned, together resulting in the CIA Chief of Station in Berlin being declared persona non grata and expelled from the country. The second concerned an investigation launched by Sen. Robert Menendez of New Jersey relating to a possible Cuban sourced news story that was apparently intended to discredit him.
The German intelligence officer was reportedly recruited as a penetration of his own service to inform the National Security Agency (NSA) about what Berlin might be contemplating doing relating to Edward Snowden and the NSA spying scandal. His arrest drew a predictable angry response from senior German politicians, including Chancellor Angela Merkel. Merkel, herself a target of the NSA program, has demanded to know why Washington would continue to spy on a friend in such an unseemly fashion. Her wrath might be more feigned than real, and might be in response to public demands to “do something,” but the expulsion of the CIA Chief is unprecedented and sends an extremely strong signal. I am nevertheless sure that at least some of her advisers with actual intelligence agency experience have reminded her that governments fund spy agencies to collect information from friends and enemies alike. That is their job, and it also might be noted that the top priority for any intelligence organization is to prevent other intelligence organizations from penetrating its security and obtaining its secrets. You can only do that by getting an agent inside the other guy’s agency before he gets to you.
And as for spying on friends, even the closest of relationships in the intelligence world have limits. The liaison relationship between Germany and the United States is indeed very close, but there are undoubtedly many things that Berlin knows that it might choose not to share for any number of reasons. Having your own man or woman inside is the only way to find out what is being withheld. Is the risk of getting caught worth the possible gain? That is impossible to know until you actually are inside looking around.
Traditionally, every large intelligence organization spent a lot of its time and effort on targeting friends. In the old days of the Warsaw Pact, the KGB had agents inside the Czech, Polish, Hungarian, and East German spy agencies just to make sure that everyone was toeing the line. The U.S. behaved likewise with its friends in NATO, excluding only the British and Canadians with whom there was and still is a bilateral agreement forbidding such activity. There is no reason to assume that the end of the Cold War in any way changed that dynamic.
The Menendez case is equally slippery. Sen. Robert Menendez, a Cuban American, is one of the most outspoken critics of the communist Castro government. He is now claiming that a deliberately fabricated news story surfaced when he was running for reelection in 2012 and was anticipating becoming Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a position he currently holds. The story alleged that he had paid for sex with two underage girls while on a visit to the Dominican Republic. Per Menendez, the story was clearly planted to damage his campaign and to force him to relinquish the committee chair. He further claims that the Central Intelligence Agency has now collected evidence that identifies the internet IP addresses that were used to float the story to the media and that the links have been traced back to known Cuban intelligence officers.
The Menendez case is particularly interesting in that it was a somewhat successful attempt by the Cuban spy agency to influence political developments inside the United States even though the Senator won his election. Menendez expressed his outrage, “…I think it is incredibly troublesome that a foreign government would try to interfere either with a federal election or the seating of a senator on a specific committee in order to pursue its foreign policy goals.”
From a technical viewpoint, the planted story itself was carefully prepared, linking the date of the alleged incident to an actual Menendez visit to the Dominican Republic, where he was flown in on a private jet as the guest of a local millionaire eye doctor named Salomon Melgen. Two women backstopped the newspaper account by swearing that they had been with Menendez and had been paid for their services, though they subsequently recanted.
Since the appearance of the fabricated news report some of the mud has certainly stuck to Menendez, as can be readily observed by Googling his name and Dominican Republic, but the story behind the story is that the attempt to smear Menendez is perhaps describable as a bit of intelligence agency blowback.
Menendez’s anger is understandable, but for many years the United States has been routinely engaged worldwide in “covert action,” which includes employing fictitious stories to support specific policies and actions as well as to discredit foreign leaders who are not fully on board politically. This was particularly true in Latin America where it was easy and relatively cheap to acquire local journalists as intelligence assets. Many of the stories produced through that mechanism targeted Cuba and its government, which was then and is now viewed in Washington as the Western Hemisphere’s political bad boy, so it is possible that the Cubans felt that they had a score to settle.
The recruitment of foreign journalists frequently involves providing them with information that in turn enables them to prepare what are referred to as “press placements.” Most large CIA Stations control one or more local journalists and an occasional editor. While US law prohibits intelligence agencies from feeding false information to American journalists, foreign media representatives are fair game. Many local journalists welcome the arrangement as it gives them additional tax free income while also occasionally providing them with information that can be used to further their own careers.
The curious thing about the Menendez case is that the Cuban Directorate of Intelligence appears to have picked the wrong story, believing that a sex case would prove most damaging to the Senator’s career. According to the Washington Post, Menendez might soon be charged regarding an ongoing Justice Department public integrity division investigation over his allegedly doing favors for Salomon Melgen, whom he stayed with in the Dominican Republic. Menendez reportedly twice intervened with federal health-care officials over a finding that Melgen had overbilled Medicare by $8.9 million for eye treatments at his clinics. The senator also pressured the State and Commerce departments to use their influence over the Dominican Republic to confirm a port security contract for a company partly owned by Melgen. Menendez might learn to his regret that the truth is sometimes more damaging that fiction.
The indignation of Merkel over the American spies and of Menendez over the audacity of the Cubans is understandable, but it is all part and parcel of things that spy agencies do regularly. Did Washington learn anything important by monitoring the BND reporting on NSA? Probably not, but intelligence collection is a bit of a crap shoot, looking for something that you don’t necessarily know is there, much like the Donald Rumsfeld observation that “the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, or vice versa.” Likewise, did the cleverly executed Cuban press placement succeed in bringing down Robert Menendez? No, but if it had been developed a bit earlier and been picked up in more of the mainstream media, it just might have.
Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest.
Americans have become so accustomed to going to war based on lies that they hardly flinch when the latest round of bellicose innuendo surfaces. The public knows that Iraq was a foreign policy disaster, that Syria is more of the same, and that the current transnational crisis encouraged by Washington’s missteps and engulfing both countries is likely to turn out even worse. All of which makes it more difficult for the usual inside the beltway players to come up with a compelling argument in favor of direct intervention in Iraq or providing still more aid to the “vetted” insurgents in Syria.
The latest selling point for the need to take firm action against the radical Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is that it is a threat against the United States and Western Europe. Indeed, it is probably the only argument that has any traction. British Prime Minister David Cameron has warned that his country will be targeted and that assistance to Baghdad is necessary, a refrain similar to that being voiced by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who has assured the American public that the Obama administration is taking steps to make sure that such an attack never materializes. Sen. Lindsey Graham claims that the “seeds of 9/11 are being planted all over Iraq and Syria,” while House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers warns that “this is a problem that we will have to face and we’re either going to face it in New York City or we’re going to face it here [in Iraq].”
Former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker’s recent featured op-ed in the Washington Post is equally lacking in subtlety in making the argument for an American return to an active role in Baghdad: “We would be foolish to think that ISIS will not plan attacks against the West now that it has the space and security to do so.” The subliminal message being delivered is “act now before a guy with a beard, carrying a Kalashnikov, moves in next door.” Perhaps not so oddly, we have heard variations on that theme before, something about a mushroom cloud rising over Washington.
And just as in the case of the mushroom cloud claim, one has to ask “Where is the evidence?” The intelligence community has been largely silent about the impending threat, apart from admitting that it has limited capabilities to collect information in Iraq and Syria largely because the CIA no longer knows how to spy in places that are challenging. That admission has been coupled with generic assurances that Washington’s spooks have been monitoring the situation and are concerned over developments.
Given the apparent general lack of reliable information regarding the metastasizing Syrian insurgency, one is compelled to ask where the intelligence is to back up the claim that ISIS is intending to expand its activity to the so-called Christian world, which would seem to be at odds with their much more obvious regional agenda in the Middle East. Does it really make sense for ISIS to take steps that would unite a gaggle of Western nations against it at this time, when success at creating a quasi-independent state in the heart of the Arab world is within its grasp?
I suspect that a paucity of reliable intelligence is being shoehorned into an acceptable narrative for policymakers to regurgitate. The promotion of the alleged threat includes a conflation of several quite separate issues. It is based on the indisputable fact that a number of young Muslims ostensibly citizens of European countries and the United States, some of whom are indigenous converts to Islam, have gone to perform jihad in the Middle East and South Asia. As the punditry would have it, they must be planning to return home some day and raise hell, a line of reasoning that has spawned several Congressional hearings hosted by the Rep. Peter King of New York on the so-called home-grown terrorism threat.
It would probably surprise Peter King to learn that political Islam and its terrorist offshoots really do not care much about the United States. Islamic terrorism is overwhelmingly targeted against ostensibly Muslim governments, suggesting that the leap across the Atlantic Ocean is not inevitable except insofar as Washington is seen as the principal supporter of regimes that the insurgents are seeking to topple. But the persistence of the argument that the U.S. and Western Europe are in the crosshairs of a vast international terrorist conspiracy invites some further inquiry.
There are three separate issues that should be addressed. First, and most important, is there any actual evidence that groups like ISIS either intend or have the capability to expand out of the Arab heartland and attack European nations or the United States? I think the answer is clearly “no,” because if such intelligence existed policymakers would be citing it directly to support their desire for a free hand to intervene in Iraq and Syria.
Second, conceding that Western raised and nurtured jihadis do exist, how many individuals are we talking about? Was Yemeni-American Anwar al-Awlaki a one-off, or are there dozens or even hundreds of home-grown terrorists? The New York Times has reported intelligence sources suggesting that there might be 70 American jihadis, a round number that is quite likely a guesstimate. If the intelligence community, FBI, and Congress have no reliable information regarding the possible scale of the problem, derivative assumptions being made regarding the nature of the threat should be greeted with considerable skepticism.
Third, if it can somehow be demonstrated that the Western jihadis are real and pose a definable threat, someone should be asking how these people came to the United States in the first place and why their disaffection, if that’s what it is, has resulted in turning to terrorism as a response. I would suggest two possible lines of inquiry. First, it is necessary to examine immigration policy to learn how groups and individuals have been able to enter the United States through government-funded resettlement programs without any ability on the part of Embassies overseas or the Department of Homeland Security to vet the immigrant candidates on security grounds.
Some of the alleged American jihadis are reported to be disaffected Somalis from Minnesota. One has to wonder just how an apparent concentration of Somalis wound up in Minneapolis in the first place, as it would be impossible to do serious background checks on them given the longstanding lack of state structures and reliable information in their homeland. There is no U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu to do the work, and there are no public records accessible to determine if one is a criminal or has been associated with terrorist groups. It is difficult to understand who decided that available evidence suggested that the Somalis in question might somehow be transformed into good American citizens.
The other line of inquiry would have to be an assessment of whether the Somalis and others were turned rogue by their experience while in the United States, particularly whether the war on terror and its associated invasions of Muslim states had a particular impact on their views of Washington’s role in the world and its willingness to deal fairly with their co-religionists. There is undoubtedly some evidence that that is the case, but I am not suggesting for a moment that external issues should in any way exonerate or attempt to explain away someone’s decision to become a terrorist. Nevertheless, it certainly would be helpful from a law enforcement perspective to try to understand what drives the individuals who are attracted to politically motivated violence.
Given the lack of good intelligence, it perhaps should not be surprising that there has been little serious discussion of the alleged terrorist threat. If there are ISIS terrorists actively preparing for and capable of staging terrorist attacks in the United States, it would be a serious matter indeed, though one might in any case question the hyperbole of a second 9/11 being advanced by some of the advocates of immediate military action. But if the danger is real, the government has failed to make the case in any reasonable fashion, nor has it taken preventive action to address the policies that might have created the homegrown jihadi threat in the first place.
And if the alleged plot is in fact being orchestrated using former residents of the United States, substantially increasing its plausibility, that too should be something that the White House ought to be examining in a serious way. Yet apart from generic fear mongering, vague numbers, and allegations about Americans traveling to the Middle East to engage in jihad, there has been little discussion of what the current terrorist threat actually is, and no consideration at all of reasonable steps that might be taken to contain it.
Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest.
In a recent discussion I had with Scott Horton on his radio show, we speculated as to why the White House, which surely includes very many smart, hard-working, and responsible people, just cannot seem to recognize the cognitive dissonance inherent in supporting contradictory policies in places like Syria. Supporting the “rebels” in an effort that will likely fail to bring down the government in Damascus only prolongs the suffering of the Syrian people, while, if by some chance the insurgents actually did win, it would mean the death of the once-vibrant Syrian Christian community and the likely installation of a fundamentalist terrorism-supporting regime in the heart of the Arab world that would make its counterparts in Saudi Arabia and Iran look positively libertarian. And that support comes at the immediate price of the bloody disintegration of neighboring Iraq.
We eventually came to the conclusion that the staffs in large bureaucracies are not necessarily selected for their independence of mind. Quite the contrary, they rise to the top because they learned in grade school to get along well with others, which in practice means that groupthink will always prevail even if it is highly illogical and in the long run damaging to genuine interests. Combine that with an essentially reactive foreign policy, and you have a formula for coming to the wrong conclusion nearly every time.
But the old garbage in-garbage out rule should also be considered. Having been in U.S. intelligence myself, I can confirm that officials tend to regard classified information as reliable and comprehensive, which frequently leads them to ignore everything else. It might be comforting to peruse a glossy report stamped “Top Secret” in the National Security Council conference room, but from my role as an intelligence collector overseas I can assert without any fear of contradiction that clandestine source reporting can be as bad as what one reads on just about any site on the Internet, and is often considerably worse than what appears in the newspapers. This bias in favor of reporting produced by the “community” induces a tunnel vision on the part of intelligence analysts that has belatedly led to a debate about the value of open sources versus the tightly controlled version of reality that prevails in security clearance land.
Unfortunately, government bureaucrats don’t really see the quality of finished intelligence as an information issue. They tend to take steps to shut out unwelcome reports rather than including them and weighing their validity. This is because their prime objective is to control the story being fed to the public and the media. As most of the world currently obtains its information from news services and Internet sources that are beyond the control of any one government, various mechanisms have therefore been exploited to limit the ability of the public as well as government employees themselves to circumvent established narratives being promoted to support specific policies. Recently in Turkey, the government took steps to shut down Twitter accounts that enabled protesters to report independently on police activity. Similar limitations on access to Internet-based social media have been put in place in Egypt, Syria, Iran, and China. The United States has even proposed legislation to turn off all Internet communications in the event of an as yet largely undefined state of emergency.
As a better informed analyst will presumably write better reports, some recent steps taken by the U.S. defense and intelligence communities to treat clearly true leaked information as lies are particularly hard to comprehend. As long ago as late 2010, the Pentagon forbade any employee from visiting the WikiLeaks website. The White House and the Air Force subsequently broadened the prohibition, issuing both an executive order and command guidelines blocking the use of either office or home computers to view sites that contained WikiLeaks-derived information. The ban, which in its Air Force version initially even included family members, ironically confirmed that the information revealed by WikiLeaks was accurate. It also prevented many government employees from reading the New York Times, among other publications, which had unanticipated consequences. While the entire reading public was able to know, for example, that in 2009 the United States had initiated a spying campaign targeting the leadership of the UN in violation of the 1946 United Nations convention, Pentagon intelligence analysts were presumably officially ignorant of that fact.
The unconvincing excuse provided by an Air Force spokesman to justify its draconian measures was that the classified information in the news articles would contaminate the unclassified computers being used to access the news sites, requiring that the computers be sanitized before they could be reused. In other words, information that has once been classified and is now in the public domain is still considered secret if pulled up on a U.S. government computer and read by a government employee. Employees were also advised that they would receive a security violation if they were detected using home or personal computers to view classified material available on public sites, because they had no “need to know” the information.
While most Americans would agree that there are legitimate secrets, the flood of information revealed by WikiLeaks, Bradley Manning, and Edward Snowden suggests that, in some cases at least, classification has been used to conceal either illegal activity or actions that might widely be condemned as inappropriate if revealed to the public. As a result, the belief that the U.S. government mostly acts in the national interest has been replaced by a growing conviction that the government’s own bureaucratic interests and those of the public it purportedly serves have largely diverged.
The latest attempt to clamp down on leaks of information was briefly reported in the New York Times on May 8th. In April, the Office of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper issued an updated directive as part of its so-called “pre-publication review policy,” which requires employees as well as many ex-employees to clear in advance speeches, articles, books, and any other unofficial writing, including letters to newspaper editors. Clapper, who is perhaps best known for lying to Congress about the extent of the National Security Agency surveillance program, has now banned current and former employees from including any references to news or media reports based on leaks of classified information. The reasoning? “The use of such information in a publication can confirm the validity of an unauthorized disclosure and cause further harm to national security.”
The new policy, which does not even permit the mention of an article, is widely seen as an attempt to discourage whistleblowers. It is an expansion of the authority granted in a Clapper policy statement issued in March that forbade any substantive contact with journalists, even if the information being discussed were unclassified, which would appear to be a clear violation of First Amendment rights. Ironically, the sweeping ban also makes it impossible for former employees to debunk information in the public sector that is manifestly untrue, as they cannot even mention an article in order to deny its credibility. As one critic noted, government employees “can’t talk about what everyone in the country is talking about.”
The government claims that pre-publication review is not a closed door, and that articles are frequently cleared after it is determined that there is no classified or “sensitive” content, but the reality is that writing critical of the intelligence community has historically suffered trying ordeals in the clearance process, while works that praise the government are ushered through. George Tenet, former Director of Central Intelligence, researched his book At the Center of the Storm using classified documents in a secure room provided by contractor SAIC with the full cooperation of government agencies, while Jose Rodriguez, who headed the CIA torture program, also was able to have his book Hard Measures, which justified his questionable decisions, approved without any major redactions. Other authors who have been more critical, including Ishmael Jones, have been hounded both by CIA and the Justice Department.
The information being protected is not even necessarily classified. The new guideline replaces the old standard of “protection of classified information” with preventing “the unauthorized disclosure of information.” The new rules would also cover how the intelligence agencies conduct their business, including revelations of criminal fraud and waste. The government deliberately writes its rules ambiguously to give itself a free hand to interpret what is or is not considered a violation.
Even well-informed Americans are unlikely to know much about the level of corruption prevalent within the member states of the European Union (EU). A fascinating article in the London Review of Books by UCLA professor Perry Anderson opens with a tour de force run-through of the high crimes and misdemeanors featuring recent heads of state and heads of government across Europe.
Helmut Kohl of Germany and Jacques Chirac of France, the two most powerful European politicians of their era, were guilty of amassing slush funds and embezzlement, yet neither was ever punished. Germany’s Gerhard Schroeder cut a billion Euro deal with Russia’s Gazprom shortly before leaving politics and joining Gazprom’s board at a salary higher than he was receiving as Germany’s chancellor. Two German presidents, Horst Kohler and Christian Wulff, have recently been forced to resign, one for corruption, while two cabinet ministers have stepped down for falsifying their educational credentials.
Former french president Nicolas Sarkozy reportedly took a €50 million “loan” from Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi to help finance his election bid, and his party has more recently admitted to “anomalies” in the funding of its 2012 campaign. His finance minister Christine Lagarde, currently head of the International Monetary Fund, has been investigated for granting €420 million (€1 = $1.36) to a convicted felon friend of Sarkozy. Current French president Francois Hollande also had some unsavory connections. He reportedly would tryst with his actress mistress in the apartment owned by the girlfriend of a Corsican criminal who was killed during a gun battle last year.
In Britain Tony Blair cozied up to Rebekah Brooks of News of the World, advising her how to beat the five charges of criminal conspiracy against her, advice modeled on his own government’s questionable handling of an investigation into the death of an Iraq war whistleblower. Blair, who in Clintonesque fashion has become a very rich man indeed since leaving office, regularly panders to anyone who has money, including president Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, whose “achievements are wonderful.”
Ireland’s Bernie Ahern made €400,000 disappear before taking office and voting himself the highest salary of any world leader. He left office a year later, under attack for his fiscal mismanagement. Mariano Rajoy of Spain meanwhile took kickbacks totaling a quarter of a million Euros, and his party treasurer Luis Barcenas is currently under arrest while an investigation continues to determine the source of €22 million sitting in undeclared Swiss bank accounts. Rajoy has encouraged Barcenas to “Stay strong” but 85 percent of the Spanish public believes the Prime Minister is lying when he denies any knowledge of the money.
Accountability for corruption and fraud is rare, permitting elites to operate in a virtual no-rules environment. As Anderson notes, “Like bankers, leading politicians do not go to prison.” Only one Eurozone political leader has actually been imprisoned, Greek government minister Akis Tsochatzopoulos, who has been sentenced to 20 years for assorted shakedowns and money laundering. Across the Aegean, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is still in power even after discussing with his son how to hide some tens of millions of dollars obtained from kickbacks. Erdogan fired the policemen and prosecutors who were looking into the matter. A little farther to the south, in Israel, the ex-president Moshe Katsav was recently sentenced to seven years in prison for rape, while former prime minister Ehud Olmert received six years for bribery. Nearly every other Israeli head of state and head of government in the past 20 years has been investigated for corruption or fraud, including current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
A European Commission report on corruption in the Union estimated that it amounts to €120 billion annually, a sum the report described as “breathtaking” while also expressing the view that the true figure is “probably much higher.” The report only covered the member states, conveniently ignoring the massive corruption and fraud in the EU bureaucracy itself, demonstrating once again that accountability only applies to someone else.
After making his slam dunk, Anderson goes on to analyze in detail Italian politics from the 1970s until the present to demonstrate just how corruption takes hold of a political system and delegitimizes it, producing voter apathy, domination of legislatures, and strengthening of executive rule by often unelected elites. Pervasive corruption breeds public indifference and acquiescence to forms of behavior that would otherwise be considered abhorrent, note particularly the extracurricular antics of recently convicted tax evader and three-time Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi used his office and existing legislative machinery to block prosecution of himself while also exploiting his media empire to shape an essentially false narrative of his successes as head of government. He is now doing community service.
As I knew many of the Italian politicians Anderson cites, some on a personal basis, from my own time in the Eternal City in the 1970s and 1980s, I found the analysis fascinating while the dissection of Italy’s current leaders’ inability to lead offers significant new insights into the persistence of the Italian malaise. Is genuine reform of a system that is completely broken possible? Probably not.
And Anderson concludes that the Italian experience is far from unique, that the country’s style of governance is becoming the norm in Europe: “Italy is not an anomaly within Europe. It is much closer to a concentrate of it.” While he does not explore the rise of right-wing parties in recent elections, one might well speculate that the renascent nationalism that they offer is both a rebuke to the suffocating bureaucracy of the EU and a warning about the public’s growing intolerance of the corrupt politicians from the political parties that have both dominated and alternated in power in nearly every European country since the Second World War.
But is the problem only European? Most Americans probably think of corruption as a cop in a third-world country demanding a bribe in lieu of issuing a parking ticket. Real corruption is actually much more damaging in the U.S. than elsewhere because it involves far larger sums and is frequently hidden behind a smokescreen of law. The United States in fact exhibits some of the worst features of Euro corruption with a few unique wrinkles of its own. While Italy might well be a paradigm for blatant political corruption in all its forms, and the EU more generally speaking might well be the heir apparent to that distinction, it is nevertheless interesting to note that politicians in a number of countries cited by Anderson have actually been investigated and even convicted of crimes, something that occurs rarely in the U.S., where prison is seemingly limited to Illinois governors whose flamboyant misdemeanors would even make Boss Tweed blush. Which is not to say that prosecution for malfeasance does not take place among U.S. government officials, but it is generally limited to the small fry.
More than in Europe if only because it has been going on longer, money has corrupted every aspect of government at every level in the United States, creating a system in which laws are passed to make various forms of corruption legal. What is “legal” becomes a substitute for what is “responsible or accountable” even though they are not the same, meaning that the interaction of government with its citizenry is frequently framed purely in terms of what people are and are not allowed to do. The revolving door of former government officials that feeds into the perfectly legal lobbying system that prevails in the U.S. and nowhere else in the world is all part of a huge industry. Many would regard lobbying as the worst possible case of institutionalized corruption, as it operates largely behind closed doors to serve special interests that in turn profit from the process, and it does little or nothing for the broader public interest.
The rot starts with the bipartisan dominance of what passes for political process in the United States. The vetting procedure managed by the two parties and their batteries of lawyers coupled with large cash flows from special interests means that challenging the status quo is well-nigh impossible. So if you want to know why Washington pursues policies that do not serve any conceivable national interests, you only have to look at the bottom level where the voter has, in reality, no choice because he is only offered a cookie cutter politician.
The failure of the Tea Party movement perfectly illustrates the problem. Voters eventually became so upset with the status quo that they lashed out and organized to change things. In the case of the Tea Party, they initially demanded smaller, more responsible government, constitutionalism, and an end to America’s perpetual wars, surely all positive objectives. So what happened? The Tea Party was hijacked as its leadership came to be defined by folks like Sarah Palin, Ted Cruz, Michelle Bachmann, and Marco Rubio. Ron Paul’s noninterventionist legacy was conveniently forgotten and replaced by traditional GOP across-the-board bellicosity, while small and constitutional government became focused largely on two issues, Obamacare and guns. When the Tea Party weakened because it no longer stood for anything, the GOP establishment quickly moved to eliminate it.
It is depressing to have to acknowledge that corruption in government is so accepted even in politically advanced nations that those who engage in it are rarely held accountable in any serious way. It is as if it is the agreed on price of doing business, but in reality it distorts critical decision making, creates inequality, and weakens the social cohesion that enables most nations to function. A largely alienated citizenry will find it difficult to rally round the flag, so to speak, when a genuine national emergency develops. Professor Anderson describes the trend as “The Italian Disaster,” but in reality it is a disaster for all of us.
Long-time readers of The American Conservative are certainly aware of persistent Israeli spying directed against the United States, but it is a subject seldom explored by the mainstream media. That taboo has apparently been lifted with the recent appearance of three feature pieces by Jeff Stein in Newsweek, “Israel Won’t Stop Spying on the U.S.”, “Israel’s Aggressive Spying in the U.S. Mostly Hushed Up” and “The Latest Document from the Snowden Trove Highlights Israeli Spying”, which together provide details relating to Tel Aviv’s persistent efforts to obtain American secrets. The espionage occurs both inside the United States and in Israel itself, directed against naive U.S. citizens, including government officials, who are subjected to aggressive recruitment attempts while attending meetings and conferences. It has even been reported that “CIA considers Israel its No. 1 counterintelligence threat in the agency’s Near East Division, the group that oversees spying across the Middle East.”
Stein, a Vietnam-era military intelligence officer, formerly a regular columnist on espionage issues for the Washington Post, now writes “Spy Talk” for Newsweek. He is highly respected in the intelligence and law enforcement communities and has excellent contacts within the government.
The recent exposure of the depth and breadth of persistent Israeli espionage against the U.S., which Stein refers to as both “unrivaled and unseemly” and “crossing red lines,” came about in a curious fashion. For some time, the Israeli government has been pressing for inclusion in the visa waiver program. The program permits citizens of 38 countries with low fraud levels, mostly in Europe, to travel to the U.S. without first obtaining a visa. It also mandates reciprocity, so that those countries do nor not require American visitors to get visas in return. Israel’s inclusion in the program has met resistance because it has high fraud levels, largely consisting of young Israeli visitors who overstay their visas and illegally work selling art and so-called Dead Sea products at U.S. malls. Israel has also balked at the reciprocity aspect of the waiver program, frequently exercising its prerogative to refuse entry to American citizens who are of Palestinian or other Arab origin.
Congress would dearly love to accommodate the Israelis, leading Sen. Barbara Boxer to introduce legislation allowing Israel, uniquely, to have the waiver despite its high fraud levels, while also permitting Israel to retain the ability to turn away Americans based on “security concerns.” Allowing Israel to have its cake and eat it too did not, however, go down well with critics, who noted that frequent discrimination against Arab-Americans was not acceptable. The Department of State resisted, and the White House has tacitly supported John Kerry on the issue.
The bureaucratic pushback Congressional persistence on the issue encountered led to closed door hearings before the House Foreign Affairs and Judiciary committees in 2013 and early 2014. To everyone’s surprise, representatives of the intelligence and law enforcement communities showed up in force and harshly denounced aggressive Israeli spying against the United States, citing “dozens” of sharp though fruitless exchanges with Israeli diplomats in the decade after 9/11. After providing chapter and verse on the level of espionage and its intensity, a tale that reportedly shocked the normally pro-Israel congressmen and staffers present, the officials also noted that granting waivers to Israelis without any prescreening process, such that normally carried out at embassy consular sections, would pose a major security threat, and would enhance Mossad’s ability to steal still more secrets.
What exactly were the intelligence and law enforcement spokesmen referring to? They were recalling the massive Israeli espionage operation that predated 9/11 and fearing a return to the U.S. being overrun with young Israeli spies that would be impossible to monitor or control. Many of the stringers for the pre-9/11 Mossad operations were so-called “art students” who traveled the country freely with their wares and provided surveillance teams and other forms of support for the more experienced intelligence officers to whom they reported. They constituted a considerable force multiplier for the trained spies, and the students themselves were mostly ex-soldiers who were used to operating in a disciplined environment. They were essential to the creation of a massive program to spy on Arabs residing in the U.S. that could be constructed ad hoc without any commensurate ability on the part of the U.S. authorities to discover exactly what was taking place.
A second concern relates to U.S. inadvertent complicity in the ability of the Israelis to operate clandestinely. All intelligence agencies issue passports in false names for the use of their operatives, but as information gets collected into vast interconnected databases, and biometric features increasingly appear embedded into documents, the ability to travel freely using various identities becomes constrained.
Israel has two additional problems that result in greater scrutiny of its travel documents. First, it does not regularly report to Interpol on passports that it eventually claims were lost or stolen, many of which wind up being used illegally. And second, the well-known extralegal activities of Mossad subject the bearers of the country’s passports to additional screening, which is why Israel’s intelligence agencies have tended to use genuine but altered European, Canadian, or Antipodean passports “borrowed” from expats residing in Israel when they carry out an operation.
Nevertheless, problems aside, spies need identities, and the more the better. Though Tel Aviv has recently begun issuing passports with biometric features due to pressure from Europe, the issuance is still voluntary and may not be implemented for all documents when the pilot program expires in 2015. That lack of biometrics means that Israeli passports are particularly susceptible to cloning by the government so that one bearer can easily have multiple passports in different names, a boon to the country’s spies.
But possessing multiple identities creates its own problem. It means that the passports themselves as well as their bearers have to be validated, which is where free travel to the United States comes in. Entry and exit stamps from the United States imply that the passport holder is respectable and are therefore as good as gold, enabling travel to many other countries that would instead deny entry. Using a false passport also creates a “legend” for the passport holder with immigration stamps that make him or her appear to be a legitimate traveler.
The visa waiver program for Israel would therefore mean more spies, more stolen technology, and more illegal entries and exits to and from the U.S., courtesy of Mossad. That the issue is even being debated at all is a result of a Congress and Justice Department that have been ever willing to look the other way and forgive Tel Aviv’s transgressions. Former FBI counter-intelligence chief John Cole has provided a “conservative estimate” of 125 potential cases against Israeli spies that were not allowed to develop for political reasons. As Jeff Stein observes drily “…they don’t get arrested very often.” But the genuine pushback over Israeli spying that might derail the visa waiver bid is telling, suggesting that Tel Aviv has finally gone too far and is now confronting major government bureaucracies engaged in national security that will not be as pliable when subjected to pressure from the Israel Lobby as congressmen and the White House. It could produce a direct confrontation pitting the friends of Israel against the law enforcement and intelligence community of the United States. This would inevitably include the Pentagon, which has both been burned by Israeli espionage and become wary of Israel’s insistence that Washington lead a military assault to disarm Iran. If it does indeed shape up that way, it is a conflict that Israel will lose because, for once, vital interests will trump the maneuverings of a foreign country and its lobby that up until now have been able to operate in the shadows.
There is some horse-trading going on between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Senate Intelligence Committee over the packaging of the committee’s now notorious 6,300-page report on the CIA interrogation program.
It is generally agreed that only the 500-page summary of the report will actually see the light of day—and even that will be heavily redacted—but the discussions that are taking place relate to the accompanying statement that will be issued by the committee when the CIA finishes its review and agrees to the partial release of the document to the public.
The agency wants the committee to concede that even though there were admittedly lapses, the CIA was generally acting legally and in accordance with established guidelines when the interrogation program was running and there were successes derived from it.
While it may seem that such a statement would be some kind of “fog of war” guarantee that no legal action will be taken against the CIA officers who carried out the torture, as well as those who approved it, that is not the case. Neither the committee nor the Obama administration has any interest in prosecuting CIA personnel, even if it can be clearly demonstrated that they committed war crimes.
The statement is instead intended to avoid the labeling of the agency as a rogue organization, either directly or by implication, as that would have serious consequences relating to organizational morale and public support for the intelligence community.
At CIA, where attempts to shift towards conventional spying and away from drones are proceeding very poorly, morale is reported to be very low and sinking. Few within the agency are assuaged by clear indications that Republicans on the committee will attempt to minimize any possible consequences deriving from the report’s conclusions.
The problem for the committee is that any statement excusing or trying to mitigate the agency’s procedures is not supported by the report itself. Depending on what is finally released and how it is packaged, the public could well learn that torture was far more widespread and brutal in agency black sites than has been conceded until now, that particular cases of physical abuse were deliberately carried out illegally and “off the record” to avoid oversight and accountability, that information obtained was deliberately misrepresented and that there were a number of deaths from torture that were processed as “John Does” and secretly disposed of to conceal what had been done. Widespread instances of collusion in torture as part of the rendition program might also be revealed.
The reality is that the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” regime far exceeded the permissive John Yoo Justice Department guideline that defined torture as any procedure that brought about organ failure or worse, the assumption being that physical abuse as part of the interrogation process would be unlikely to go beyond that point. Either Yoo guessed wrong regarding how far an interrogator might actually go if given legal cover or he did not appreciate that the widely publicized White House pledge to “take the gloves off” against the terrorists might actually have real-life repercussions.
Some years back I would have described myself as a conservative Republican. My understanding of what that meant was shaped by two leading conservatives of that era, during my college years William F. Buckley, and somewhat later, Pat Buchanan. Both were Catholics who embraced essentially traditional social values, as did I, were suspicious of big government, and were willing to endorse strong national defense in confronting the Soviet Union but reluctant to engage overseas unnecessarily.
Back then there was a certain suspicion of someone who was seen as too assertive vis-à-vis foreigners. Barry Goldwater lost to Lyndon Johnson in part because Johnson was able to portray him as being reckless due to his “conservative” anti-communism. Indeed, for most pre-Vietnam 1960s Republicans, foreign policy was worn lightly with little beyond the usual flag waving, but this has all changed. Now nearly every Republican calls himself a conservative and the label implies a general belligerence in dealing with all foreigners except Israel, coupled with general tolerance for a police-state mentality at home. And, of course, it is all backed up by the Bible.
Even Republican mavericks have to toe the line over the institutionalized craziness. An e-mail last week announced that the Rand Paul-leaning Campaign for Liberty was organizing a drawing for supporters because “…each and every one of us has a God-given right – and duty – to defend freedom. That’s why C4L is giving away a brand new Daniel Defense DDM4 AR-15. The AR-15 will come with Magpul MBU.S. front and rear sights and two Magpul mags.” An AR-15 is the semi-automatic version of the M-16 assault rifle, while a Magpul mag is a combat magazine that holds 30 rounds, what we Vietnam-era vets used to refer to as a banana clip.
The irrepressible Sarah Palin, much beloved by faux conservatives and the Tea Parties, as well as anyone else willing to cough up her reported $100,000 speaking fee, meanwhile told a National Rifle Association convention audience that those jihadis who are out to get us have to learn that if she were president “waterboarding is how we baptize terrorists.” The audience roared. I am an experienced gun owner myself and consider it a fundamental constitutional right, but I would also note that the freedom of all Americans has been under unrelenting attack for the past thirteen years with little or no resistance from the heavily-armed populace, which compels one to ask: “What are they waiting for?” And, more seriously, when handing out assault rifles and chattering about torturing people to produce a laugh come center stage, it is time to stop and consider whether or not we have finally entered the twilight zone.
So I no longer believe the Republicans to be saying anything credible and no longer consider myself one of them, even marginally, since Ron Paul retired. Well, what about the libertarians? They want small government or even no government, want people to leave them alone, and aren’t interested in getting involved in overseas wars. But hang around with a few of them for a while and you will discover that their distaste for government sometimes veers into the unsympathetic and the uncaring. What their heroine Ayn Rand referred to as “ethical egoism,” but sometimes without the ethical. They generally believe in the “non-coercion” principle which essentially means that the individual should not be forced to do anything by the state, a viewpoint that sometimes fuels a deplorable tendency to unfairly demonize those they see as agents of the government. Cops, in their view, become homicidal monsters and soldiers are baby killers.
It is hard to imagine what a libertarian foreign policy would look like as it would be a contradiction in terms. Many libertarians want to make the armed forces and intelligence agencies go away to be replaced by heavily armed citizens who have a duty to resist an invader, as long as nobody is pressured into joining in the fight, which would violate individual liberty. Open borders and free trade are also on the agenda with no concern for who gets to come into the country and how many Americans wind up getting harmed in the process, because many libertarians really don’t believe in nationalism.
I will largely pass over progressives (as liberals currently refer to themselves since the “L” word has fallen out of favor) because they are now sadly in power in Washington and are demonstrating their utter cluelessness. There has been considerable jesting about a recent op-ed by one Anne-Marie Slaughter explaining how “Stopping Russia Starts in Syria.” Slaughter, a former Hillary Clinton appointed State Department Director of Policy Planning, is a relative heavyweight within the foreign policy establishment. She is currently at Princeton and wants the U.S. to bomb Syria “until the game has changed” to send a message to Russia’s Vladimir Putin. And if one is not convinced by Slaughter’s solution or her highly dubious linkage of two quite separate crises I would point to the empty utterances and perverse “humanitarian”-driven bellicosity of folks named Obama, Rice, Clinton, and Power that have together brought us Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. Progressive interventionists are particularly dangerous as they are sitting in the White House and believe they have a mission.
Finally there are the realists. Put simply, for realists foreign policy and the use of force overseas is to serve national interests, a basically nineteenth-century notion. That would make sense, but only if one assumes that the United States has an extraterritorial and extrajudicial right to arrange things overseas to suit its own needs, as the enforcer of some kind of latter day Pax Britannica. That certainly can be challenged and the realist agenda itself can be considered to be somewhat light on ethics. Whether it is right to entertain regime change if one has an interest to do so, as the case was made with Mohamed Mosaddegh in Iran in 1953, certainly can be questioned, and even a “realistic” analysis of the results of that particular intervention would suggest that the ensuing blowback made the entire venture counterproductive.
The point of all of the above is that for too many of the political class, ideological packaging conditions and ultimately trumps sensible policies, meaning that reasonable discussion across party lines becomes impossible. Former CIA Officer Paul Pillar calls it a “Tyranny of Labels.” Ironically there is quite a lot that most Americans would probably agree about if one could get past the ideological divisions and return to the initial organization of the federal government by the Founders. What did they expect from the newly minted War Department and the Department of State? According to the Preamble to the Constitution, the federal government exists “for promotion of the general welfare” of all citizens. Both war and relations with foreigners were seen as instruments that, when needed, were intended to benefit the American people. The tendency to introduce other extraneous agendas and interests through the conflation of defense and foreign policy into a “national security” package is a relatively recent development.
The Founders’ reluctance to embrace a standing army reflected the view that war making should be limited to the ability to defend the nation’s borders. It would not include fighting a war in Ukraine as a form of forward deterrence. Likewise, an ambassador, as the personal representative of the president, was not intended to function as an offensive weapon. He was delegated to serve as a channel for extending the protection and assistance of the United States government to its traveling citizens and to serve as the conduit for negotiating treaties that would facilitate that function. It was never expected that the U.S. ambassador should serve as an instrument to interfere with or critique the sovereignty of the Turkish Sultan or the Russian Tsar.
If there is any confusion about the objectives of U.S. diplomacy, they should be dispelled by George Washington’s Farewell Address, in which he stressed the need to “Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all.” In spite of his own revolutionary experience, Washington would not have approved of sending ambassadors overseas to openly meet with opponents of the local government, and cultivating “regime change” would shock him. He would agree that while it is accepted practice for an ambassador to report on developments in the country to which he is assigned, involvement or interference in local politics should never be on the agenda.
A return to constitutional concepts of diplomacy and war making might not be as difficult as it seems. It would largely be a change of tone requiring a ratcheting back from the past decade’s policies made on steroids and the restoring of a respectful interaction with the world, what George W. Bush once referred to as a “modest and humble foreign policy.”
Nearly all Americans understand that the primary role for U.S. armed forces is to defend the United States. Most would also accept that the State Department should protect and assist U.S. citizens overseas and facilitate functional interactions with all foreign nations. We Americans can agree to disagree over what foreign crises constitute genuine threats, but most would likely admit that the use of force as a first resort over the past 13 years has been an expensive failure. Getting rid of the blinders that mandate what a conservative, libertarian, progressive, or realist is “supposed to do” or think and getting back to basics would be an enormous step forward, freeing the government to return to what should have always been its primary mission: reducing its footprint overseas and acting in a minimalist fashion to secure the “general welfare” of all Americans.
If you had been a reader of The American Conservative magazine back in December 2011, you might have learned from an article written by me that “Unmarked NATO warplanes are arriving at Turkish military bases close to Iskenderum on the Syrian border, delivering weapons [to the Free Syrian Army] derived from Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s arsenals…” Well, it seems that the rest of the media is beginning to catch up with the old news, supplemented with significant details by Sy Hersh in the latest issue of the London Review of Books in an article entitled “The Red Line and the Rat Line.”
The reality is that numerous former intelligence officials, like myself, have long known most of the story surrounding the on-again off-again intervention by the United States and others in Syria, but what was needed was a Sy Hersh, with his unmatched range of contacts deep in both the Pentagon as well as at CIA and State Department, to stitch it all together with corroboration from multiple sources. In a sense it was a secret that wasn’t really very well hidden but which the mainstream media wouldn’t touch with a barge pole because it revealed that the Obama Administration, just like the Bushies who preceded it, has been actively though clandestinely conspiring to overthrow yet another government in the Middle East. One might well conclude that the White House is like the Bourbon Kings of France in that it never forgets anything but never learns anything either.
The few media outlets that are willing to pick up the Syria story even now are gingerly treating it as something new, jumping in based on their own editorial biases, sometimes emphasizing the CIA and MI6 role in cooperating with the Turks to undermine Bashar al-Assad. But Hersh’s tale is only surprising if one had not been reading between the lines over the past three years, where the clandestine role of the British and American governments was evident and frequently reported on over the internet and, most particularly, in the local media in the Middle East. Far from being either rogue or deliberately deceptive, operations by the U.S. and UK intelligence services, the so-called “ratlines” feeding weapons into Syria, were fully vetted and approved by both the White House and Number 10 Downing Street. The more recent exposure of the Benghazi CIA base’s possible involvement in obtaining Libyan arms as part of the process of equipping the Syrian insurgents almost blew the lid off of the arrangement but somehow the media attention was diverted by a partisan attack on the Obama Administration over who said what and when to explain the security breakdown and the real story sank out of sight.
So this is what happened, roughly speaking: the United States had been seeking the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria since at least 2003, joining with Saudi Arabia, which had been funding efforts to destabilize his regime even earlier. Why? Because from the Saudi viewpoint Syria was an ally of Iran and was also a heretical state led by a secular government dominated by Alawite Muslims, viewed as being uncomfortably close to Shi’ites in their apostasy. From the U.S. viewpoint, the ties to Iran and reports of Syrian interference in Lebanon were a sufficient casus belli coupled with a geostrategic assessment shared with the Saudis that Syria served as the essential land bridge connecting Hezbollah in Lebanon to Iran. The subsequent Congressional Syria Accountability Acts of 2004 and 2010, like similar legislation directed against Iran, have resulted in little accountability and have instead stifled diplomacy. They punished Syria with sanctions for supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon and for its links to Tehran, making any possible improvement in relations problematical. The 2010 Act even calls for steps to bring about regime change in Damascus.
The United States also engaged in a program eerily reminiscent of its recent moves to destabilize the government in Ukraine, i.e., sending in ambassadors and charges who deliberately provoked the Syrian government by meeting with opposition leaders and openly making demands for greater democracy. The last U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford spoke openly in support of the protesters while serving in Damascus in 2010. On one occasion he was pelted with tomatoes and was eventually removed over safety concerns.
Lost in translation is the fact that Washington’s growing support for radical insurgency in Syria would also inevitably destabilize all its neighbors, most notably including Iraq, which has indeed been the case, making a shambles of U.S. claims that it was seeking to introduce stable democracies into the region. Some also saw irony in the fact that a few years before Washington decided al-Assad was an enemy it had been sending victims of the CIA’s rendition program to Syria, suggesting that at least some short-term and long-term strategies were on a collision course from the start, if indeed the advocates of the two policies were actually communicating with each other at all.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, whose country shared a long border with Syria and who had legitimate security concerns relating to Kurdish separatists operating out of the border region, became the proxy in the secret war for Washington and its principal European allies, the British and French. When the U.S.-Saudi supported insurgency began to heat up and turn violent, Turkey became the key front line state in pushing for aggressive action against Damascus. Erdogan miscalculated, thinking that al-Assad was on his last legs, needing only a push to force him out, and Ankara saw itself as ultimately benefiting from a weak Syria with a Turkish-controlled buffer zone along the border to keep the Kurds in check.
Hersh reports how President Barack Obama had to back down from attacking Syria when the Anglo-American intelligence community informed him flatly and unambiguously that Damascus was not responsible for the poison gas attack that took place in Damascus on August 21, 2013 that was being exploited as a casus belli. The information supporting that assertion was known to many like myself who move around the fringes of the intelligence community, but the real revelation from Hersh is the depth of Turkish involvement in the incident in order to have the atrocity be exploitable as a pretext for American armed intervention, which, at that point, Erdogan strongly desired. As the use of weapons of mass destruction against civilians was one of the red lines that Obama had foolishly promoted regarding Syria Erdogan was eager to deliver just that to force the U.S.’s hand. Relying on unidentified senior U.S. intelligence sources, Hersh demonstrates how Turkey’s own preferred militant group Jabhat al-Nusra, which is generally regarded as an al-Qaeda affiliate, apparently used Turkish-provided chemicals and instructions to stage the attack.
Is it all true? Unless one has access to the same raw information as Sy Hersh it is difficult to say with any certainty, but I believe I know who some of the sources are and they both have good access to intelligence and are reliable. Plus, the whole narrative has an undeniable plausibility, particularly if one also considers other evidence of Erdogan’s willingness to take large risks coupled with a more general Turkish underhandedness relating to Syria. On March 23rd, one week before local elections in Turkey that Erdogan feared would go badly for him, a Turkish air force F-16 shot down a Syrian Mig-23, claiming that it had strayed half a mile into Turkish airspace. The pilot who bailed out, claimed that he was attacking insurgent targets at least four miles inside the border when he was shot down, an assertion borne out by physical evidence as the plane’s remains landed inside Syria. Was Erdogan demonstrating how tough he could be just before elections? Possibly.
And then there are the YouTube recordings. Three days before the election, a discussion not unlike the Victoria Nuland leak in Ukraine surfaced. A conversation between Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Hakan Fidan, the chief of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT), included Davutoglu saying that the “Prime Minister said that in the current conjuncture of time, this attack [on the Tomb of Suleiman Shah] must be seen as an opportunity for us.” Davutoglu was clearly referring to an attack on the tomb serving as a pretext for a Turkish incursion into Syria. Fidan then declared that “I will send four men from inside Syria, if that is what it will take. I will make up a reason for war by ordering a missile attack on Turkey. We can also prepare a direct attack on the Tomb of Suleiman Shah if necessary.” The recording reveals that Ankara was considering staging a false flag attack on the tomb of Suleiman Shah, the grandfather of Osman I, the founder of the Ottoman dynasty. The tomb is in Syria but because of its historical importance has been regarded as sovereign Turkish territory, much like an Embassy, and is guarded by Turkish soldiers. So the suggestion is that Ankara was prepared to kill its own soldiers to create an incident that would have led to a broader war.
Critics of Hersh claim that the Turks would be incapable of carrying out such a grand subterfuge, but I would argue that putting together some technicians, chemicals, and a couple of trucks to carry the load are well within the capability of MIT, an organization that I have worked with and whose abilities I respect. And one must regard with dismay the “tangled webs we weave,” with due credit to Bobby Burns, for what has subsequently evolved in Syria. Allies like Turkey that are willing to cook the books to bring about military action are exploiting the uncertainty of a White House that continues to search for foreign policy successes while simultaneously being unable to define any genuine American interests. Syria is far from an innocent in the ensuing mayhem, but it has become the fall guy for a whole series of failed policies. Turkey meanwhile has exploited the confusion to clamp down on dissent and to institutionalize Erdogan’s authoritarian inclinations. Ten years of American-licensed meddling combined with obliviousness to possible consequences has led to in excess of 100,000 dead Syrians and the introduction of large terrorist infrastructures into the Arab heartland, yet another foreign policy disaster in the making with no clear way out.
Washington’s unwillingness to use diplomacy to resolve international conflicts has proven remarkably consistent over the past 13 years. Even chalking it up to ineptitude would let the Bush and Obama administrations off the hook for what are apparently more systemic failures. I am referring to an inability to think outside the box, coupled with a kind of policymaking cronyism that automatically limits any ability to craft a careful and proportionate response to developing situations. Ukraine is the latest example of American failure to see what is plainly visible, but one can go through an entire catalog of misconceived policies starting with Bosnia and continuing through Georgia and the interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, all of which have turned out poorly. If the current pattern is repeated, catastrophe awaits as involvement in Ukraine deepens and the drive to somehow confront Iran gains momentum in Congress and the media.
Part of the problem is psychological. The United States has not experienced war on its own soil in any serious way since 1865, nor have many congressmen or journalists actually served in the military. For them war is an abstraction, something that is inflicted on other people but not on the United States. Unfortunately, that assessment of American invulnerability is increasingly fragile. Russia is one of the few world powers that can actually hit back at the U.S. with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, a threat that should not be considered outside the realm of possibility should Moscow be pushed into a corner.
Meanwhile the likely failure to reach an agreement with Iran over its nuclear program will only encourage Tehran to build a weapon, which will in turn likely lead to a profusion of nuclear states in response, including unstable regimes like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. As the number of nuclear weapons in the hands of governments with internal security problems increases, so too does the risk that a stray weapon or weapons will wind up in the hands of genuine terrorists, whose own numbers are also increasing as U.S. policy creates blowback in a number of countries through its poorly thought-out interventions. It is not unthinkable that the devil’s brew of more weapons and more enemies could eventually lead to Condoleezza Rice’s fantasy vision of a mushroom cloud over Washington.
President Barack Obama’s foreign policy has been characterized by stops and starts, perhaps not surprising coming from an intelligent man who nevertheless lacked any real understanding of what goes on in the world outside of academia and the Chicago wards. He has been forced to rely on reliably Democratic cronies and frequently self-styled experts to guide him, an understandable if not particularly successful approach that creates little in the way of healthy internal debate. A recent New York Times op-ed by Michael A. McFaul, until recently Obama’s Ambassador to the Russian Federation, very clearly illustrates the problem.
It is undeniable that McFaul knows a lot about Russia. He is a former professor of political science at Stanford and a fellow at the Hoover Institute. He was a Rhodes Scholar and holds degrees from both Stanford and Oxford in Russian and Slavic studies. He speaks the language and has lived there. After serving on the National Security Council as Special Adviser to the President, he was named Ambassador to the Russian Federation, serving in that post from January 2012 until February of this year.
Appointment to Moscow generally goes to a career diplomat given the complexities of the relationship and the possibility that the wrong choice could have serious consequences. Obama opted to go with someone he was comfortable with instead of State Department professional John Beyrle, who was generally regarded at Foggy Bottom as the best choice for the post, having already served as both Deputy Chief of Mission, the number two position in the embassy, and as acting ambassador. McFaul, unlike Beyrle, is an unrepentant democracy activist. He even wrote a book called Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can. When he was appointed ambassador he noted that “the United States can speak out on democracy and Georgia while still seeking cooperation with Moscow in other areas,” setting the stage for confrontation with the Russian government.
McFaul believes that the Cold War never ended satisfactorily because Russia did not become an institutional clone of the United States, a thesis elaborated in his book Russia’s Unfinished Revolution. In his writing McFaul is particularly hard on Vladimir Putin, whom he describes as a reactionary figure seeking to recreate the Soviet Empire, ignoring the fact that the Russian president is very popular among his countrymen if not among some American academics. McFaul describes other scholars who see the Russian leader more favorably than he as “Putin apologists,” while indicting Putin’s government as “Russia’s new autocratic regime.” McFaul’s writings make clear that he believes that U.S.-style democracy, capitalism, and press freedom are universal rights, and that the United States should impose those standards on Russia as a condition of it joining what McFaul refers to as the “international order.”
From the start of his tenure in Moscow, McFaul was sending the Russian government a message. During his first week he met with opposition politicians and groups, even before presenting his credentials at the Foreign Ministry. He was ambassador in October 2012 when the Russian government began to clamp down on foreign government agencies and nongovernment organizations that were active in “democracy promotion” in Russia, noting that many of the groups were little more than pressure groups directed against the freely elected regime in power. In his op-ed McFaul protests against Russian attempts “To continue to spook Russians about American encirclement and internal meddling…” when that is what precisely has been taking place since 1991.
McFaul is a kindred spirit with Obama’s other favorite foreign policy advisers, Susan Rice and Samantha Power. All of them believe that the United States has some civilizing mission to bestow on the rest of the world, and it is all tied up with convincing countries to become democratic. In reality it is little more than a lazy formulation asserting a unique right for America to remake the world in an image of itself, while blatantly ignoring international law and the world opinion.
McFaul’s op-ed is illuminating in that it rests on a number of assumptions derived from the democracy promotion imperative that are at a minimum questionable. He accepts that the United States has license to involve itself in the internal politics of other countries even when their governments object. He also assumes that spreading democracy by whatever means necessary must be a major priority for any American government.
McFaul does not even argue that democracies are less inclined to go to war, which has sometimes been falsely asserted, but instead appears to believe that democracy is a good thing intrinsically. His assumption is, of course, very much dependent on what he means by democracy. Since he is promoting the American brand, it is quite easy to note how U.S.’s democracy is essentially dysfunctional on many major issues like providing accessible health care and balancing the budget. It is also riven by corruption of various kinds from top to bottom. It is hardly a model for the rest of the world and McFaul even admits that its current incarnation does not “inspire,” but he nevertheless argues that it must be imposed on the willing and unwilling alike.
Being an ideologue like McFaul, Rice, Power, and, presumably, Obama makes one choose not to see or recognize certain realities. McFaul writes that “We did not seek this confrontation [with Russia over Ukraine].” He then elaborates, “A revisionist autocratic leader instigated this new confrontation. We did not.” Really? Then the actions undertaken by successive U.S. presidents to deliberately advance NATO into Eastern Europe in spite of pledges not to do so did not occur? Or the $5 billion worth of “investing” or meddling by Ms. Nuland and company in Ukraine, most recently to remove an elected government and replace it with something more to Washington’s taste did not take place? Or the introduction of new missile systems into Eastern Europe was not a provocation? Or the encouragement of the rape of the Russian economy by American and European “entrepreneurs” aided by domestic oligarchs after the fall of the Soviet Union in a rush to create a capitalist economy is a fantasy? I could go on, but it think the point is made that Russia had and has very good reasons to fear an aggressive and frequently out of control United States.
McFaul writes about “Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008…,” undoubtedly a bit of a stretch unless one has been spending too much time with John McCain, and he decries Moscow’s propaganda deriding “American imperialism, immoral practices and alleged plans to overthrow the Putin government.” Surely the suggestion of overthrow is too strong as Washington has no such capability, but the United States has made clear its intention to reform Russia by maneuvering “around the Kremlin.” Most governments would demur at being subverted by paid minions of a foreign state, and is attributing imperialism and immorality to Washington really inaccurate?
McFaul indicts Putin because he wishes “…confrontation with the West, no longer feels constrained by international laws and norms, and is unafraid to wield Russian power to revise the international order.” But surely if one plays with the context a bit, those charges are much better applied to Washington than to Moscow. After calling for considerable international pressure on Russia to punish it, McFaul concludes that democracy will triumph in Russia because “democracies have consolidated at a remarkable pace, while autocracies continue to fall.”
If that is true, and there is inevitability to the transition, it is likely something we all can welcome. And if it will happen anyway, it is certainly not worth restarting the Cold War to hasten the process.
Government bureaucracies, like many private sector businesses, are initially created in response to a perceived need either to do something or provide a service. The Department of Defense in its current incarnation rose out of the developing Cold War in the post-Second World War environment, while the CIA was created to prevent a second Pearl Harbor. But as bureaucracies mature they become less and less connected to their founding principles as circumstances change and they fail to adapt. They then go into a self-defense mode that makes maintaining jobs, budgets, and political turf in Washington their top priority. This compulsion to protect equities is the reason we are currently hearing of alleged CIA spying on a largely disengaged Senate committee in an attempt to forestall any accountability for torture and rendition policies that many believe to be war crimes.
Mostly lost in translation is the fact that the Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence, like CIA, is also a stale bureaucracy, one largely inhabited by senators who have been in place for many years. Committee staffers reflect their sense of entitlement, believing themselves untouchable as they bask in their celebrity since 9/11. In short, they too are prone to go into self-defense mode about what they have and have not done, making Sen. Dianne Feinstein no hero for opportunistically attacking the CIA for spying on her committee. Her attempts to shift the blame for now-discredited and abhorrent activities in which her committee was almost certainly complicit are obvious, though this in no way exonerates the Agency.
Edward Snowden, addressing the controversy from Moscow, noted correctly that the Senate committee is hypocritical in that it and Feinstein have never objected to mass spying and other indignities inflicted on ordinary American citizens as byproducts of the “global war on terror.” Feinstein’s concern only becomes acute when she and her colleagues are themselves being scrutinized. As Ron Paul explained, Feinstein “doesn’t care about our privacy, but, lo and behold, she does care about her own.”
The long-serving senator from California indeed has a solid record of doing absolutely nothing about torture, secret prisons, rendition, clandestine as well as open wars, domestic spying, and targeted killing drone attacks carried out by the United States government’s intelligence community, which she claims to oversee on behalf of the senior branch of the legislature. Her committee has perhaps attempted to redeem itself with its exhaustive 6,300 page report on torture, which the CIA is blocking as part of the saga on who was spying on whom, but the horse has long since escaped from the stable. The torture took place ten years ago, and no one has been punished for it. The claim that the Agency lied to Congress about the program is almost irrelevant, as Congress probably preferred it that way and would not have done anything about it in any event.
So this is the story insofar as it is possible to piece it together up to this point: to prepare its report on CIA torture the Senate committee staff insisted on having full access to every document at Langley relating to the practice without any monitoring or redaction by the Agency. It would have been both impractical and insecure to send all that material over to the Hill, so the Agency set up in northern Virginia a privately controlled secure facility with its own computers that could access the relevant documents prescreened by Agency contractors by using a special search tool, a process that theoretically limited what documents could be viewed to only those relevant to the inquiry.
After that it becomes murky. CIA, which was preparing its own rebuttal demonstrating that the “enhanced interrogation” was both effective and legal, claimed that the Senate staffers were able to somehow obtain access to a withheld CIA Inspector General’s “draft” report that had actually been critical of the program. This discovery led to an investigation into what was being viewed. The recent preemptive filing of a complaint to the Justice Department by the CIA General Counsel possibly sought to dispel any allegations that the Agency had been monitoring the staffers while also suggesting that the aides had in fact been spying on CIA by borrowing the draft report and taking it back to Capitol Hill with them.
The Senate committee reacted angrily, claiming that all documents it accessed were found using the CIA-provided search mechanism, and that it was the Agency which was, in fact, spying on the staffers when they were doing the research for the report. CIA had agreed not to monitor the activity of the aides when it set up the secure facility, but it may have violated that understanding either by actually accessing what was being done on the computers, or, quite possibly, noting and analyzing the types of documents that were being viewed and the length of time they were being used, relatively easy to do through the security forensic system now in place when highly classified information is pulled up. That would reveal what the staffers were focusing on. The CIA contractors who were running the show apparently also unilaterally pulled a number of documents that they had previously made available to the staffers.
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid has now also joined the fray, lining up to defend Feinstein and ordering an investigation. Other side issues that have surfaced include allegations that President Barack Obama was aware of and authorized both the redaction of documents from the Agency computers as well as the CIA spying on the committee (bear in mind that the Agency works for the president, not for Congress); that CIA Director John Brennan approved the operation and therefore should be fired; and that Republicans appear to be backing the CIA to beat the Obama administration over the head with yet another White House mishandling of a crisis relating to the intelligence community. There is also the perhaps more important issue of constitutional separation of powers, cited by Reid, with Congressional oversight of the intelligence community being challenged by one of the agencies being overseen. One must bear in mind that there were no apparent disagreements on policy; the torture issue is old news and bipartisan.
In reality, what we are seeing is two powerful vested interests in the United States government going at each other in an attempt to establish credibility and score points. They are both seeking to control the narrative that will emerge from the CIA detention and interrogation program. The Agency would like to claim that it cleared everything with the oversight committees and that the program was both legal and effective. The Senate committee prefers to demonstrate that the now-embarrassing program was ineffective and plausibly illegal because the Agency did not fully brief the committee. One suspects that the senators are conveniently suffering from amnesia when they currently claim that they were not fully informed. As often happens, back in 2003 they might have collectively decided that it was best not to know all the messy details. They are almost certainly correct in claiming that the program was completely ineffective, however, so there is considerable mud to be flung on both sides.
Curiously, neither side in the argument is even suggesting that the Justice Department lawyers, CIA senior managers, and White House officials that authorized the torture should be held accountable in any way. Also lost in the shuffle are the interests of the American people. I am sure most Americans agree that the proper role for an intelligence agency is to identify and respond to genuine threats in a measured fashion that is both appropriate to the level of the danger and, within reasonable limits, ethical. Secret prisons and torture chambers are the hallmarks of a police state, not a constitutional republic. Most Americans would probably also agree that intelligence activities should be overseen by elected officials who believe in the same thing—and that magnifying threats to make an argument for reducing constitutional liberties and committing crimes against humanity is not appropriate for any government agency.
Unfortunately, both the CIA and the Congress have failed in their primary missions and are together the source of the morass that the rest of the nation is currently struggling through. That a finger-pointing debate over the effectiveness and legality of a torture regime that prevailed many years ago is only now taking place is indicative of the ineptitude and callousness of every part of the government that was involved in the whisking away of suspects to “black sites” where they could be subject to “enhanced interrogation.”
For me one of the most horrifying revelations about the torture carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at its black sites, and the military at its prisons, was that medical doctors not only stood by to monitor the process but were also involved in providing advice to make the torture both mentally and physically more effective. Let’s face it, you can always find a thug who is willing to torture someone, particularly if he is sold a bill of goods that he is doing his patriotic duty and paid handsomely while being assured that he will never be punished. But a physician is supposed to answer to a higher calling. There is something called the Hippocratic Oath, a guideline for ethical behavior by doctors, which includes the mandate “first do no harm.”
The system, described subsequently as having “anemic ethical standards,” worked as follows: a doctor or team of doctors would stand by while someone was being tortured to attempt to prevent the suspect’s actual death, not as a resource to mitigate suffering but rather in recognition of the fact that the prisoner is a source of intelligence that has to preserved until he surrenders all the information that he possesses. The physicians were also there to observe the process for effectiveness. Afterwards, the doctor would write up a report to explore how the experience might be enhanced in terms of the ultimate objective, which was to obtain a complete confession. Both medical doctors and psychologists were part of the process as both pain and fear were to be exploited to obtain the desired results. CIA psychologists also participated in the “Penny Lane” conditioning program at Guantanamo that sought to turn prisoners into double agents.
Did they know they were doing wrong? Absolutely. The Department of Defense even described its attending physicians as “safety workers” in reports because it did not want to reveal that they were actual medical doctors. And if this all sounds like something that might have been contrived by Dr. Josef Mengele and his colleagues at Auschwitz, it should. Even though opponents of torture have demonstrated that prisoners who are subjected to it will say anything to stop the pain, and even though in practical terms permitting the practice invites enemies to do the same when they capture Americans, the belief persists that torture somehow works. Recent CIA efforts to demonstrate that torture produced information vital to the eventual killing of Osama bin Laden have proven to be somewhat fanciful, as an exhaustive 6,300 page investigative report by the Senate Intelligence Committee has demonstrated that that the procedure never produced anything that could not have been obtained by other means.
Characteristically, no one in the government has ever been punished for carrying out torture. Neither the CIA employees who actually engaged in “enhanced interrogation” after 9/11 nor the officials who condoned or ordered the procedure have ever been prosecuted, while the government attorneys who wrote memos justifying the practice are now law professors and federal judges. Similarly, the Agency senior officers who against legal advice destroyed the videotapes that provided clear evidence of torture have never been held accountable. Ironically, the only one who has ever been imprisoned in connection with the CIA program is John Kiriakou, who blew the whistle after he left the Agency. The Justice Department carried out an exhaustive investigation of Kiriakou before convicting him of violating the Espionage Act of 1917. He is currently serving a 30-month term in a Federal prison in Pennsylvania.
In one of its first official acts in January 2009, the Obama administration declared that it had stopped torture, which might or might not be true as there has been no accountability and precious little transparency since that time to enable one to examine the claim. As the president also promised to close Guantanamo Bay prison, White House pledges to take certain actions might well be viewed as less than rock solid.
As a result of the reported abuses in prisons at Abu Ghraib and Bagram, the military now has strict rules defining and limiting torture detailed in its current interrogation field manual 2 22.3, and the CIA appears to be bound by the same architecture based on the White House declaration, though whether that is true in practice is difficult to determine as the Agency continues to assert that the rendition/torture regime was effective. The Agency and White House both claim that CIA no longer has any prisoners under its control.
But even if torture as a U.S. government prerogative in its global war on terror appears to be on the wane, it appears that some physicians are still drawing their wagons in a circle to protect themselves from any possible repercussions deriving from their cooperation with the practice. On February 21st, some American Psychological Association (APA) members sought unsuccessfully to attempt to formally ban psychologist-assisted interrogations by the military or intelligence agencies. The issue has been discussed at APA biannual conventions over the past ten years but has regularly failed to gain the two-thirds support necessary for it to become an agenda item. This time around, however, 53 percent of delegates voted “yes,” the first time that a majority has been obtained.
If the ban had passed, it would have meant the immediate withdrawal of government psychologists from Guantanamo Bay prison. The APA has in the past refused to censure a notorious Guantanamo U.S. Army psychologist John Leso, who led a Behavioral Science Consulting Team (sic) that drafted a policy memo incorporating “illegal” techniques once used by North Korean and Chinese interrogators to break American prisoners. Leso has also been accused of being a party to the torture of al-Qaeda suspect Mohammed al-Qahtani. The former top military psychologist at Guantanamo as well as at Abu Ghraib prison, Larry James, attended the convention and is a member in good standing of the APA.
The American Medical Association (AMA) explicitly condemned torture in 1999, stating that “Physicians must oppose and must not participate in torture for any reason. Participation in torture includes, but is not limited to, providing or withholding any services, substances, or knowledge to facilitate the practice of torture. Physicians must not be present when torture is used or threatened. Physicians may treat prisoners or detainees if doing so is in their best interest, but physicians should not treat individuals to verify their health so that torture can begin or continue.”
This prohibition was violated by the doctors working for the CIA’s Office of Medical Services who participated in the “enhanced interrogation” program, but no one has ever been expelled by the AMA or lost his license to practice as a result, suggesting that the guideline is actually toothless. More recently both the AMA and the American Psychiatric Association have again addressed the issue publicly and restated their intentions to ban members who participate in torture, but the APA continues to hold out, reportedly because members have developed fatigue over the debate and now believe that it will result in bad publicity for their profession no matter what they do.
The APA is not unique in its unwillingness to confront the evil practices that have been unleashed by both Republican and Democratic administrations over the past thirteen years. If it is indeed true that 60 percent of Americans who describe themselves as “evangelicals” approve of torturing terrorist suspects to obtain information it might be reasonable to suggest that there is a large body of opinion in the United States that accepts that the gloves are off in the post-9/11 world without any regard for possible consequences. But consequences there are, with the world looking on in dismay at a still-open Guantanamo Bay prison where many detainees continue to be held even though they are completely innocent, unable to return home only because no country wants to take them. If they were not terrorists when they were rounded up and sent off to Guantanamo they are almost certainly terrorists now, a process that benefited from the services of some of America’s medical professionals.
The Obama administration is facing complete collapse of its counterterrorism strategy in South Asia as it fails to ratify a new status of forces agreement with Afghanistan. Yet many intelligence insiders consider the failure to be a good thing.
The administration erred in constructing its capability to counter the terrorist threat largely around the use of drones, which are politically appealing in that they do not require placing soldiers in harm’s way and are relatively cheap. In order to be effective, however, drones have to be close enough to target areas to enable them to spend considerable time hovering, and they are dependent on their bases, a fact that produces its own logistical and political complications. The maintenance of the bases depends on the connivance of host countries in the region, and the security of the facilities has to be guaranteed by the presence of thousands of American soldiers, numbers that might not be available by the end of the year. There is also strong Pentagon opposition to stationing thousands of combat troops in a country largely to protect other U.S. government facilities.
The U.S. is leaving nearby Kyrgyzstan in July and closed its drone base at Shamsi Air Base in Pakistan in late 2011, though it continues to have limited access to Pakistani military facilities, including a former drone site near Jacobabad. But the political winds in Islamabad have also shifted against Washington, and it is unlikely that the U.S. will be allowed to retain any operational presence inside Pakistan after it leaves neighboring Afghanistan. This means that the closest friendly base to launch a drone from would be in the United Arab Emirates, and a drone would have to traverse considerable hostile airspace to arrive on target, where it would only be able to remain briefly.
Inside Afghanistan there are currently six military-operated drone bases that primarily deploy surveillance aircraft and one CIA base at Khost that flies the lethal Predators. CIA also occasionally launches drones from the military air fields at Jalalabad and Bagram. Drones are increasingly a political liability, as they have been responsible for numerous civilian casualties—one reason why Islamabad has reduced its cooperation with Washington and even Afghanistan has proven unwilling to continue to give the U.S. carte blanche for their use.
The drone strategy was based on an overly robust assessment of the al-Qaeda presence in South Asia, in the belief that the group continued to pose a serious threat in the region and might be able to reestablish itself.
Intelligence assessments now regard that conclusion as based on an erroneous conflation of local insurgencies with transnational ones. Analysts regard the danger of a resurgent al-Qaeda in Afghanistan as minimal and are focusing on more serious metastasizing threats in places like Iraq and Syria.
There have, in fact, been no new attacks in Pakistan since Christmas. As it is increasingly difficult to identify genuine terrorist targets in the Pakistani tribal areas, a growing percentage of Predator attacks have been signature lifestyle strikes against loosely profiled targets, which produce high levels of civilian casualties. Analysts are suggesting that an end to the use of lethal drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan would actually be desirable.
During my time in government many of us would refer to the United States as “Uncle Sugar.” We were implying that the sweet government largesse extended far and wide for those who knew how to exploit the system. It was something we saw nearly every day as highly paid government appointees, with no discernible qualifications or aptitude, flooded the corridors of power after each change of party at the presidential level. It was also much in evidence whenever one had to interact with massive government departments like Agriculture or HEW or the Pentagon, where every potential decision was analyzed based on the likely support of key Congressmen who were in turn responding to lobbyists. One dollar spent lobbying produced a thousand-fold return. Uncle Sugar indeed.
The increasing prevalence of political appointees at the Defense Department and even in the intelligence agencies should raise serious questions about the overall integrity of the system even when they are only allowed limited ability to shape policy. And sometimes they have a great deal of influence. One recalls the emergence of the ideologically driven Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, and Paul Wolfowitz at the Pentagon, all political appointees.
And bad decisions in rewarding friends go back much further. When Ronald Reagan was elected president he appointed William Casey as his Director of Central Intelligence and Casey in turn brought in businessman Max Hugel as his Deputy Director for Operations, a line of work for which he was completely unqualified. Fortunately, the actual spies rebelled and were instrumental is exposing Hugel’s somewhat shady business dealings, forcing him to resign after only six months. The Hugel appointment has never been repeated at CIA even though Director John Deutch made a valiant effort to pack the senior ranks with his cronies.
One additional area where one would expect the government to proceed with some deliberation would be the management of foreign diplomacy, where a false step could have unforeseen consequences for American businessmen and travelers. A bad Ambassador not only produces a poor impression of the United States, he can do serious damage to the bilateral relationship even when he is being carefully guided by a professional diplomat on his staff attempting to avoid embarrassment all around.
Unfortunately the record of President Barack Obama on ambassadorial political appointments has been worse than that of any of his predecessors, for the first time ever exceeding 50 percent of all appointments. As of February 6, posts in 39 countries, mostly in Europe, have political ambassadors either in place or pending. The general rule that an ambassador designate should have some plausible connection with the country he or she is being sent to, whether as a visitor or in language or a business relationship, has been ignored by Obama. The situation is so bad that even the Washington Post has taken notice with a front page article “Gaffes prompt diplomatic debate” on February 15.
In a recent hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee Sen. John McCain could barely conceal his disdain for what he saw in front of him, commenting “I have no more questions for this incredibly highly qualified group of nominees.” Noting that candidates appeared to have no knowledge of or connection with the countries they were nominated for he called the situation “truly alarming.” Recent ambassadorial misfits have included an emissary to Sweden lying drunk in the snow, a current hotel chain owner nominee for Norway who did not know the country was a constitutional monarchy and who incorrectly called a party in the government “fringe,” and a TV soap opera producer pick for Hungary who had no idea what the relevant U.S. interests might be. Ambassadors to Iceland and Argentina had never visited either country and did not speak the local language. One Obama appointee Seattle investor Cynthia Stroum actually was forced to resign after running her embassy in Luxembourg into the ground, verbally abusing her staff and spending embassy funds on personal travel and alcohol. Obama appointees to Malta, Kenya, and the Bahamas have also been forced to step down after State Department inspectors filed scathing reports.
President Theodore Roosevelt called the spoils patronage system “partisan plunder” of public office. Former diplomatic service officer James Bruno observes that “The United States is the only industrialized country to award diplomatic posts as political spoils, often to wealthy campaign contributors in an outmoded system that rivals the patronage practices of banana republics…” He guesstimates that the cost of an ambassadorship has now reached a record $1.7 million. That is the contribution to a political campaign, either directly or through bundling of donations, that has become the norm for someone seeking to be rewarded with his or her very own embassy. Several recent donors have contributed less however, though $1 million currently appears to be the cut-off point for any consideration by the White House. Concurrently, the nouveau riche ambassador corps appears to have abandoned the venerable tradition of appointing a rich man in expectation that he would use his own personal money to embellish the post. This sense of noblesse oblige appears to have largely vanished.
If it manifestly makes no sense to appoint unqualified cronies to senior jobs in the intelligence agencies and within the military itself, why should it be acceptable to do so with overseas embassies? To be sure, some political appointments to embassies have turned out well, but they tend to be otherwise successful individuals who are named for reasons other than their fundraising. In my own experience, the best chief of mission I worked for was a highly empathetic political appointee, while the worst was a hubristic career diplomat. Former Sen. Max Baucus promises to be a good choice for China, where Jon Huntsman also was successful. Whether Caroline Kennedy will be effective in Japan remains to be seen.
And what is being overlooked completely is the cost of a sinecure appointment to Uncle Sugar. Ambassadors do not come cheap, and three years spent in a foreign capital on the American taxpayer’s dime can add up. Ambassadors are paid a base salary of $201,700, which is understandably at the top of the Foreign Service executive scale. There is also Overseas Comparability Pay on top of that, currently 16.52 percent of base salary, and in some posts like Hungary that is increased by an additional 25 percent cost of living allowance. Ambassadors also enjoy relatively free access to post entertainment allowances, government provided cars and drivers, an official residence, educational and medical allowances, and high-end travel allowances. The representational allowances in major posts like London or Berlin can be in the seven figures range. Admittedly a career diplomat would incur similar costs, but in return you get a professional, not an amateur who has to be mentored by another careerist on the staff, who must him or herself be paid.
And then there are the intangibles. Who would turn down being the U.S. Ambassador in Rome or London, with a large staff doing most of the work for you while you attend ego-inflating top level meetings and diplomatic receptions? Particularly when the types of contacts you are making can turn quite profitable down the road. Once upon a time the major embassies were a reward for Foreign Service Officers who had spent their careers learning languages, living in foreign cultures, and practicing diplomacy, but no longer. Both Rome and London currently have political appointee ambassadors.
So being rewarded with an ambassadorship can be pretty much a free ride for a donor who wants to be referred to as “The Honorable” for the rest of his or her life at the expense of the taxpayer. Appointing unqualified people to serve as United States Ambassadors as political rewards for supporters, part of what used to be referred to as the spoils system, might have made sense in 1900 when the ambassador was in a real sense the personal emissary of the president. But today it is an anachronism and just another form of political corruption. President Obama ran on a pledge to minimize the practice, so it is perhaps past time that he begins to deliver on his promise. But as is so often the case, the opportunity to use government resources to reward supporters is just too tempting.
The connection between America’s wars in the Middle East—and its wars more generally—with the more fundamentalist forms of Christianity in the United States is striking. Opinion polls suggest that the more religiously conservative one is, the more one will support overseas wars or even what many might describe as war crimes. Fully 60 percent of self-described evangelicals supported torturing suspected terrorists in 2009, for example. That is somewhat puzzling, as Christianity is, if anything, a religion of peace that only reluctantly embraced a “just war” concept that was deliberately and cautiously evolved to permit Christians—under very limited circumstances of imminent threat—to fight to defend themselves.
To be sure, some Christian conservatives who might be described as Armageddonists regard America’s Asian wars as part and parcel of the precursor events that will lead to the Second Coming of Christ, which they eagerly look forward to. Also, a non-interventionist friend of mine who comes from a religiously conservative background explained to me how the contradiction partly derives from the fact that many evangelical Christians hardly relate to the New Testament at all. While they can recite scripture and verse coming from the Old Testament, they are frequently only marginally conversant with the numerous episodes in the New Testament that attest to Jesus’s extolling the virtues of peacemaking and loving one’s neighbor. If true, that means that many evangelicals are much more imbued with the values of an eye-for-an-eye or smiting Philistines than they are with the Sermon on the Mount.
There has undeniably been pushback coming from some evangelical leaders as well as from many younger religious conservatives against America’s constant diet of God-anointed warfare, but given that those who describe themselves as evangelical Christians tend to disproportionately support America’s wars, it is perhaps no surprise to learn that fundamentalist viewpoints prevail in certain quarters in the military. There has indeed been considerable media reporting on the impact of evangelical Christians on the armed services, to include a bizarre account of US military sniper sights being inscribed with citations from the Bible, leading one critic to suggest that the soldiers were being issued “Jesus rifles.”
A prominent General, William Boykin, was until recently the best known Christian fundamentalist in the U.S. military. Boykin held prayer breakfasts when he commanded Delta Force and, when Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence under George W. Bush, was widely criticized for appearing in churches and other public gatherings in his uniform. He would describe his personal war against Islam, claiming that “My God is bigger than yours,” possibly suggesting that size really does matter, at least in theological circles. He also called the Islamic God an “idol.” At some church gatherings Boykin would produce a photo taken in Mogadishu which, he claimed, included a mysterious dark shadow that he described as a “demonic presence,” adding that “spiritual enemies will only be defeated if we come against them in the name of Jesus.” Boykin, who advocates “No Mosques in America,” is currently Executive Vice President of the Family Research Council, which lobbies the Pentagon to complain that there is a “war on Christianity” within the military.
Boykin was not unique. Several other generals and a number of additional senior officers have appeared at church sponsored events or made videos while in uniform, frequently extolling the religious nature of America’s wars in the Middle East. They were perhaps encouraged from the top, by born-again President George W. Bush’s overt religiosity and his description of Jesus Christ as his “favorite philosopher.” Be that as it may, the shock of 9/11 let the evangelical genie out of the bottle in anticipation of the conflict of civilizations that some Armageddonists were welcoming, with the Pentagon even livening up its daily Worldwide Intelligence Update by using biblical verses as captions for war images. Bush had himself initially described the global war on terror as a “crusade,” though he quickly regretted using the expression after being educated to the fact that many of Washington’s potential allies against terrorism were, in fact, Muslims.
The U.S. military, aware of the constitutional restraints on promoting any religion, generally attempts to rein in outward expressions of religiosity on the part of its officers, but the open defiance of those efforts has been increasing as fundamentalists become both more assertive and better represented at senior levels in the officer corps. Fully one-third of military chaplains are currently evangelicals and the percentage is increasing. Many fundamentalists assert that a good officer has to be “moral,” by which they mean “religious,” in the belief that it is impossible to be ethical without a relationship to God. As many of the evangelicals also believe they possess the absolute truth in terms of their own definitions of religiosity, there is little room for alternative viewpoints.
The soldiers who promote their faith dodge the military’s restrictions on their actions by claiming that they are only “evangelizing the unchurched,” not proselytizing. When they hand out bibles to Afghans they describe it as providing “gifts.” General David Petraeus, when head of the Central Command was well known for his strong commitment to “spiritual fitness” as a sine qua non for his officers, providing a top level sanction for including religion in one’s professional development. In 2007 Petraeus endorsed Christian rock concerts on military bases. A year later, senior Army chaplain William McCoy took the argument for spirituality one step further, explaining how the non-religious soldier, having no protection against sin, might cause the failure of his unit. Petraeus blurbed McCoy’s book Under Orders: A Spiritual Handbook for Military Personnel, recommending that it be in every backpack for those times when a soldier needs “spiritual energy.” A senior chaplain in Afghanistan also enthused about how leading by example produces positive results, with 85 percent of the 22 officers reporting to Petraeus engaging in “dynamic Bible study,” though one has to wonder if they might have been doing so to enhance their promotion prospects.
A notorious, long running dispute at the United States Air Force Academy over the proper role of “spirituality” has generally resulted in little or no change in the promotion of evangelical Christianity at many levels, a process aided and abetted by a series of Superintendents who were themselves fundamentalists. Even the Air Force football team was not immune, with a large banner in the locker room proclaiming “I am a Member of Team Jesus Christ.” Captain MeLinda Morton, an Air Force Lutheran chaplain who actually complained about the over the top proselytizing was initially ignored and then reassigned.
Why should all this be important, since it is surely up to the individual to decide what he or she does or does not believe? It matters for a number of reasons. Believers who do not create a firewall between their faith and their professional responsibilities, which for a soldier should include all Americans and not just the ones that think the same way he or she does, will inevitably favor coreligionists, particularly if it is being argued that religiosity is an essential ingredient for soldiering. Many Christian fundamentalists understandably believe that their first duty is to God, not necessarily to their country or to their fellow citizens, but they fail to see how such a view might be considered unacceptable in someone who chooses to work for the government.
Just how God before country works in the military context might best be illustrated by one aspect of the Air Force Academy’s struggle with proselytizing on campus. Groups of cadets had been gathering in commons rooms in dorms and libraries to have Bible study sessions. An understanding that public spaces at the academy were just that and the ad hoc use of a room by a group would discourage or prevent others from using it appeared to carry the day until the academy’s second in command, an evangelical Christian named Johnny Weida who had previously advised cadets that they were “accountable first to your God,” stated flatly that the practice would continue: “You wanna have a Bible study in a cadet TV room? No problem.”
The increase in highly visible religiosity among U.S. soldiers also has real life consequences by becoming a propaganda tool for groups like al-Qaeda and strengthening the widespread belief that Washington is actually mounting a new crusade against Muslim regimes. Efforts to have soldiers distribute Bibles in Afghanistan’s languages, encouraged by some military chaplains, have been noted by both the local and international media, a practice that runs counter to both military regulations and specific general orders for the Afghan theater of operations.
And then there is the strange tale of Pat Tillman, the National Football League player who volunteered for the Army after 9/11. Tillman, an Army ranger, was shot dead by his own comrades on a patrol in Afghanistan in April 2004, resulting in an elaborate military cover-up relating to his death. Tillman was apparently an outspoken non-believer and there is some evidence that he also had turned against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Credible speculation by both the Tillman family and also by former General Wesley Clark suggests that he was murdered, three bullet holes in his forehead indicating that he might have been shot by an M-16 at close range. His fellow soldiers also uncharacteristically burned his clothing and his body armor after he died, and Tillman’s personal diary went missing. A criminal investigation was requested but turned down by Army brass. When the family complained, the leading investigating officer Lt. Col. Ralph Kauzlarich commented that they were venting because the Tillmans were all non-believers, saying “…if you are an atheist and you don’t believe in anything, if you die, what is there to go to? Nothing. You are worm dirt.”
There is a cliché about soldiers, atheism, and fox holes which is probably as true or untrue as most clichés. That the United States military appears to be increasingly a professional force that has few links to the general population is by itself disturbing. That it also might be developing a warrior class ethos that includes a certain kind of evangelical religiosity as a key element only serves to increase the distance between soldiers and most civilians, apart from the constitutional issues that it raises.
My own exposure to holy war courtesy of the U.S. Army was somewhat different, but it was a draftee experience, long ago. In basic training back during Vietnam a chaplain who was, as I recall, both a Colonel and an unmistakable Irish Catholic came storming through our barracks spewing fire and brimstone. He delivered a pretty good impression of Pat O’Brien playing Father Francis Duffy of the Fighting 69th before he disappeared followed by a cloud of cigar smoke, growling something about “killing commies.” A couple of kids from Chicago followed in his wake crying out “Fatha, Fatha,” evidently in need of spiritual solace of some kind, but his pastoral visit was apparently over. Mission Accomplished.
The last time the Olympic Games were confronted with a serious, capable, and active terrorist movement was at the 1992 Barcelona Games, when the Euskadi ta Akatasuna (ETA) threatened to stage attacks to highlight its demands for an independent Basque homeland. Currently, the Russian Olympic sponsors of the Sochi Games, which open on February 7th, are confronted by what is quite possibly an even greater threat.
Central Asian Muslim separatists, mostly Chechens, have been fighting since 1992 to break away from the Russian Federation and obtain independence for several neighboring Muslim majority states. There have been two “wars” against Chechnya involving Russian troops, the second of which restored Moscow’s control of the region by 2009, but at a price. 15,000 Russian soldiers died as well as 300,000 Chechens. The capital city Grozny was subsequently described as the “most destroyed city on the planet.” Russia is loath to give up the region because major oil and gas pipelines transit through it, but the pacification of Chechnya has become increasingly bloody as the insurgency increasingly identifies with al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups, giving the conflict an international dimension. Chechen fighters are reported to be increasingly turning up in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria.
The U.S. State Department has issued a travel warning for the Sochi Games based on concerns that it is close to the regions in central Asia that have been subject to terrorist attacks, and thus might experience spillover from that violence. Indeed, Chechens have been repeatedly able to challenge Russian security forces even in Moscow. Notable Chechen attacks over the past 15 years have included the 2002 siege of the Dubrovska Theater in Moscow that killed more than 150, and the 2004 capture of a Beslan school in neighboring North Ossetia that resulted in the deaths of more than 300, mostly children. In the same year, Chechen separatists downed two civilian airliners using bombs. A March 2010 attack by two women suicide bombers in a Moscow metro station killed 39.
Suicide bombings, often using women, appear to have become the Chechen separatists’ weapon of choice. An ethnically Russian widow of a Caucasus separatist fighters is suspected of trying to reach Sochi to carry out such an attack. So-called white widow Ruzana Ibragimova is believed to have arrived in Sochi on January 10th or 11th and has been seen in the city. Hotels report that “wanted” posters have been circulated depicting her and three other Central Asian women suspected of preparing to engage in terrorist attacks.
Most recently, Chechen rebel leader and Russia’s most wanted terrorist Doku Umarov has ordered his followers to sabotage the Sochi Games by whatever means necessary, including attacks on civilian targets. Umarov’s group has lately taken credit for two suicide bombings in Volgograd in early January that killed 34. As Volgograd is the hub on the main rail line from Moscow that allows one to proceed by train to Sochi, the message being sent by the attack is clear. And there is no reason to doubt that Umarov or another Chechen insurgent group was responsible. Russian President Vladimir Putin has promised to send 40,000 police and military personnel to Sochi to guarantee security for the expected hundreds of thousands of visitors and athletes, some 15,000 of whom will likely be from the United States.
I was the CIA’s principal officer in Barcelona for the 1992 Games and also worked with the Chinese National Police in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Based on those experiences, I would note that the addition of 40,000 soldiers and cops at this point, just two weeks before the Opening Ceremonies, is more cosmetic than effective. They will not know what to do and will be, in a sense, little more than additional targets. Even the estimated total of as many as 100,000 security personnel being in place do not guarantee good results. Olympic security planning, alas, should begin soon after the bid is accepted by the International Olympic Committee and there is no quick fix for it. I spent three years in place in Barcelona doing little beyond working with my Spanish counterparts to plan and eventually implement security arrangements that included physical barriers, intelligence gathering, crowd control, and training of personnel. The Spanish devoted considerable resources to the effort and one of the first permanent facilities set up to support the Games was a fusion center where intelligence could be shared and decisions could be made in real time in response to any perceived threat.
The security for a large scale public event like the Olympic Games is particularly difficult as there must be relatively free access to events combined with protection for visitors and participants. It generally is structured in concentric rings, incrementally increasing the level of scrutiny as one proceeds. The outermost level is static and consists of heavy police and military presence at the fringes of the target area to serve as a deterrent and tripwire for any terrorist attempt. Sochi benefits from being geographically isolated, but it now appears that Putin will also extend the security perimeter outward to include checks on all roads and rail lines entering the region from the mountains behind the city and along the shoreline of the Black Sea. The approaches from the water and the port will be under the control of the Russian Navy and Coast Guard.
Sochi International Airport is modern and has excellent security, with connecting flights from most major Russian cities. One can expect anyone transiting any Russian airport on the way to Sochi to encounter intense scrutiny, so it might be advisable to fly with Austrian Airlines or Turkish Airlines, both of which connect to Sochi. The Russians will also require visas from nearly all foreign visitors, which will be used as a security tool. The screening of arrivals from abroad will be intense, requiring evidence of jobs, income, and other relevant documents.
Once inside the perimeter, there will be two basic levels of security. Sports venues and the Olympic village will have physical and procedural measures in place, including fences, CCTV, and metal detectors as well as security badges linked to access controls. Other public spaces such as hotels, city parks, and squares will have highly visible security in place, but it will be less proactive. One should assume that anyone who appears to be central Asian in origin and any woman wearing Islamic garb will likely be stopped repeatedly, as the Russians are unlikely to be concerned with issues like “profiling.”
The United States government has offered to work with the Russians on Sochi but has been politely turned down because the Russians believe, correctly, that they understand their own security environment very well. One can assume that they have been doing NSA-type intensive monitoring of electronic transmissions and phone calls for at least the past year. And the Federal Security Service (FSB) no doubt has a host of informants on tap to provide information on groups operating in or potentially threatening Sochi. In spite of the Russian desire to go it alone, it is nevertheless my understanding that there will be both Russian-speaking CIA and FBI personnel in the Sochi fusion center to provide assistance upon request, together with representatives from a number of European countries. The U.S. Navy will also have ships in international waters in the Black Sea to provide support, or even an evacuation, if called upon.
The principal challenge for Sochi is the relatively new threat posed by the suicide bomber. Since the date for the Games has been known for years, it should be assumed that parts for bombs might have been smuggled into Sochi weeks or even months ago, so the threat might materialize both inside and outside the security perimeter. Suicide bombers who are able to approach a security checkpoint pose a unique threat in that they can create a major incident just by virtue of detonating their explosives even if they only kill themselves, accomplishing their goal of creating uncertainty over the Russian handling of the security of the Games. The Russian response will be to create clear zones with built-in isolation cages around each access point, though that will be difficult to manage in practice with the large crowds that will be present.
Visitors to Sochi should be particularly concerned about two things: public transportation and crowds. The two recent attacks in Volgograd took place on public transportation, one on a trolley and the other in the train station. An attack on public transportation guarantees high levels of casualties; note the attacks in London in 2005 and in Madrid in 2004. Crowds are another favorite target, both because the confusion created by a large group of people milling around makes it hard for security to monitor for any threats, and because the attack itself creates more deaths and injuries.
Do I think there will be a major security incident at the Sochi Games, and would I go to see them if I had the opportunity? The answer to both questions would be “yes.” The odds in favor of a major incident are uncomfortably high. But if one is careful and observant, avoiding crowds, public spaces, and public transportation, the personal risk can be minimized. And I would like to be able to see an Olympics without having to work. In Barcelona, I spent the Games either in a fortified bunker underneath the U.S. Consulate General or at the Spanish security fusion center, missing nearly everything. Ultimately, fear of terrorism should impel us to behave cautiously, but it is a manageable risk and should not become a reason to avoid doing the things one wants to do.
Secret parallel negotiations with Iran that led up to the recent agreement over that nation’s nuclear program included an unusual and highly interactive role for the intelligence community. Normally the analysts provide a formal report on an issue or development, a report that is frequently codified into a National Intelligence Estimate, if there is time to do so, before going to policymakers. But barring receipt of new information that dramatically alters conclusions, which would be hand-delivered in timely updates, that is where the intelligence community role ends. There is good reason for the bureaucratic firewall as policy is distinct from intelligence and should not necessarily be driven by it, particularly as clandestinely obtained information is frequently speculative. The intelligence community historically prefers not be involved in policy, and most policymakers agree that mixing the two would be a bad idea.
But this was different. Negotiations in Oman under the aegis of Sultan Qaboos were backed up by an intelligence team working under the auspices of the National Security Council. An elaborate series of tabletop “war games” using competing teams representing the Iranians and Americans were set up to test the various options that were being floated by the Iranians and the counterproposals being put forward by American negotiators. For example, scenarios were tested and projections made based on Iranian capabilities for speeding up enrichment, the viability of using existing stores of enriched uranium for weapons purposes, and the effect on potential weaponization of permitting various enrichment levels. The U.S. negotiators were able to calibrate the extent to which limitations on Iranian enrichment would retard the possible development of a nuclear weapon, concluding that the goal would be to make weaponization a distant objective at best while simultaneously creating an inspections regime that would give ample warning of any deviation from the agreement. The U.S. intelligence teams, in line with their previous estimates of Iranian capabilities, demonstrated that Iran is at least five years away from a viable nuclear weapon and even farther away from a delivery system even if such programs were fully funded, supported politically, and not subject to sabotage. Any slowdown of enrichment activity through multilateral agreements coupled with more aggressive monitoring would push that timetable even further back.
The intelligence officers also noted, somewhat wryly, that a number of red herrings were being floated by the administration to make it appear that the Geneva negotiations were encountering problems, regularly describing the talks in public utterances as “difficult” in spite of the fact that there has been general agreement on nearly all points for several weeks. This was done, they believed, to preempt domestic opposition to a deal with Iran and to pacify critics in congress. The tactic worked, and it appears that it is being used again: witness press leaks suggesting that the administration is by no means confident that a final agreement can be reached in six months’ time. The analysts are convinced that the White House fully intends to achieve a permanent and comprehensive settlement, which it believes will defuse many other tensions in the region and will ultimately be good for Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Emirates as well as for the United States.
Many Americans are puzzled by what is going in Turkey. Turkey, a founding member of NATO and a perennial aspirant for membership in the European Union, is the land bridge that connects Europe to Asia. It is a regional superpower, both economically and militarily, and has long been an island of stability in a Near East racked by conflict.
For United States policymakers, Turkey has also long been promoted as role model for the successful fusion of Islam, democracy, and capitalism. It has also been a reliable political partner as a Washington obsessed with seeing its own national security to be based on global dominance has become increasingly unable to dictate developments in the Middle East. Turkey has served as a useful and generally reliable surrogate, able to project its own power and use its considerable diplomatic and economic clout to influence—and even moderate—the behavior of its neighbors. But what is occurring now in Turkey suggests that the wheels might have come off the wagon. The prospect of “losing” Turkey would be a major strategic disaster for both the United States and Europe.
It is first of all important to understand some things about Turkey in general. Everything one may have been reading about the situation in Turkey is at least somewhat true, even when it appears to be contradictory. This is because the Turkish Republic has always been something of a hybrid democracy since its founding by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923. From the start, it has had leading institutions that have limited the options available to the political parties. The army is the most obvious culprit, priding itself as the guardian of the country’s secular constitution, referred to as Kemalism, but there are also other major state institutions, most particularly the nationalized industries and capitalist-inspired conglomerates and state banks modeled on what contemporary Mussolini was doing in Italy.
State control of large parts of the economy coupled with a faux capitalism that had little in the way of safeguards meant that the government functioned in a corrupt fashion, rewarding supporters and punishing opponents. This pattern of blatant corruption persisted through the 1990s with several major center-right and center-left parties alternating in power around the three military coups that were required to “restore order.” In Turkey one seldom witnesses the on-the-street baksheesh style of low level official corruption prevalent in much of the Middle East and Asia, but governments preceding the current one were unrestrained in awarding contracts that benefitted both supporters and family members.
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Recep Tayyip Erdogan are less corrupt than their predecessors, but they are still corrupt. Recognizing that in spite of a secular constitution most non-urban Turks are religious, Erdogan succeeded in dramatically shifting the political playing field by making personal religiosity a plus rather than a minus, creating in the process a new self-consciously Muslim entrepreneurial class which has challenged the secularist dominance in many parts of the economy. Now, for the first time, it is political acceptable to openly demonstrate one’s belief in Islam, and Erdogan has capitalized on that sentiment to build himself a seemingly unassailable political base. This displacement of the country’s former secular elite helped fuel the class and cultural conflict that was evident last summer during the riots in Istanbul.
Critics believe that Erdogan has become empowered by his own sense of political invincibility to take unwise steps to openly repress opponents. He has arrested journalists critical of his government and has not hesitated to describe protesters as “terrorists.” The Turkish parliament is also moving to curb the internet by giving the government power to block websites within forty-eight hours. In the wake of last June’s riots, Erdogan said that “This thing called social media, I think, is right now a menace to society.”
The AKP is generally referred to as a moderate Islamic party, which is probably close to the truth, though it does obscure the fact that it includes numerous religious hardliners whose support has been bought by introducing legislation friendly to political Islam. Erdogan relies on his religiosity for votes and therefore panders to those sentiments, but he is also pragmatic and a strong supporter of economic growth. He persists in wanting to join the European Union, even though many Turks have cooled to the idea after numerous rejections from Brussels. To break the power of the secularists and replace them with his own supporters, Erdogan had to take on the army, which had intervened in Turkish politics most recently in 1997, when the generals on the National Security Council intervened to remove an Islamist government over concerns that it would subvert the Kemalist constitution.
Erdogan’s agenda led to hundreds of arrests, mass trials, and the imprisonment of military officers in 2012 and 2013. Those detained were charged with plotting to overthrow the government. While there were undoubtedly army officers who wished to remove Erdogan, many of those arrested were innocent of the charge but were perceived to be opposed to the broader AKP anti-secular agenda. Evidence was fabricated and testimony was frequently contrived while those accused were given scant opportunity to challenge the prosecution. Under pressure from the army chief of staff, a newly vulnerable Erdogan is reportedly now considering retrying some of those convicted.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been subject to considerable criticism ever since last summer’s riots, his critics claiming that he has become an autocrat obsessed with grandiose development schemes and projects without any consultation. He has also suffered from the failure to manage Turkey’s two-year long Syrian intervention, creating a chaotic situation along the Turkish border that has become a major security concern as well as a political nightmare. The fallout has been such that Erdogan may shelve plans to run for Turkish President later this year.
Prime Minister Erdogan has called recent developments a “judicial coup” and also an effort to create a “state within a state,” but has so faravoided naming the likely source of his problems, his former political and religious ally Fethullah Gulen. Gulen resides in Pennsylvania and describes himself as a teacher and “imam” of a loosely organized international Islamic movement that includes more than 800 religious schools in more than 130 countries. The movement is based on the Sufi branch of Islam, and encourages interfaith dialogue, non-violence, friendship with the West, while preaching self-reliance. Its schools emphasize science teaching and, in the United States, are both accredited and largely secular.
Erdogan has been claiming that there is a conspiracy against him involving foreigners. He has called out the U.S. Ambassador personally and has cited the United States and Israel as fomenting the unrest, capitalizing on the unpopularity of both countries with the Turkish public, as well as drawing a connection to Gulen, who regards his movement as friendly to both nations. Gulen has met with Israel’s chief rabbi and was one of the few Muslim leaders to oppose Turkey’s 2010 Gaza Flotilla, which ended with the death of nine Turks. Gulen believed that the flotilla organizers made little effort to work out an accommodation with the Israeli government to allow the ships to proceed peacefully. Gulen is also, of course, a legal resident of the United States.
Gulen’s movement does not even have a proper name and no roll of members. Its between three and six million supporters instead refer to it as “Hizmet,” Turkish for service. Gulen, who owns Turkey’s largest newspaper Zaman, helped Erdogan become prime minister in 2002, calling on the support of a shadowy group of followers that he had reportedly infiltrated into the Turkish government, most notably into the police and the judiciary. He initially cooperated with the new government, particularly in the two mass trials of military officers in which his policemen and prosecutors took the lead, but he increasingly began to see Erdogan as a rival rather than a friend. Gulen supporters reportedly have videos of AKP politicians behaving indiscreetly and have even succeeded in bugging Erdogan’s office, resulting in pushback by the prime minister, who cut the funding for a number of charter schools run by Gulen.
The current crisis became public in mid-December when the police detained fifty persons who were being investigated for corruption and graft, reportedly relating to the awarding of construction and real estate projects as well as to the secret trading of gold for oil with Iran. Some of those arrested were close to Erdogan, including prominent businessmen, the head of a major state bank, and the sons of several of his cabinet ministers, three of whom chose to resign. There were also rumors that prosecutors were preparing to arrest Erdogan’s son for meeting with an al-Qaeda financier. A separate investigation was looking into corrupt contracting for the recently completed rail tunnel underneath the Bosporus. Erdogan responded by firing or reassigning 1,700 police officers as well as the prosecutors working on the graft charges and, more recently, by seeking to ban investigation of any official without permission from the government itself.
The Turkish high court rejected the attempt to limit investigations, but Erdogan has now fired back by removing more senior police officers and prosecutors, including Turkey’s second highest police official, Muammar Bucak. He is also introducing legislation to curb judicial independence by increasing the government role in the naming of judges, something that the country’s High Council of Judges is calling unconstitutional. 20,000 Turks demonstrated in Ankara last weekend in support of the judges and, for the first time, Turkish President Abdullah Gul, a former ally of Erdogan, spoke out in support of judicial independence.
The intensity of the conflict between Gulen and Erdogan, which is already having a negative impact on the Turkish economy, is largely being fueled by upcoming elections in 2014. Local elections, including in Istanbul, take place in March, and presidential polling follows in August. If Erdogan is sufficiently damaged so as to lose his grip on power, Gulen figures to be able to fill the political vacuum as kingmaker in a future political alignment, possibly by supporting the Kemalist Republican People’s Party, which currently holds the second largest number of seats in parliament. What such an alignment might mean is not very clear. Gulen on paper looks a more moderate Islamist that Erdogan, but critics believe that his long term strategy is to take power and push a much more radical agenda. If he were to do so, however, Turkey’s still powerful secularists would likely rise up in a revolt that would make last summer’s riots in Istanbul look like a walk in the park.
If a worst case scenario were to develop, the United States interest would be to restore stability as quickly as possible, which would possibly mean a repeat of the fundamental dilemma posed by Egypt over the past year. But Turkey is more complicated, as it is a vital interest for Washington, unlike Egypt. And if Egypt is indeed the model for what might happen, it suggests that the United States would eventually wind up kicking the can down the road by supporting both sides.
The 2007 disappearance of former FBI Special Agent Robert Levinson is inevitably being exploited to score political points in Washington, with some critics denouncing the alleged CIA role in the affair while others are more focused on what is being called a cover-up in the subsequent investigation. Levinson vanished while on the Iranian island of Kish, which has provided an opportunity to blame Iran even though no evidence has been produced to indicate that he is in custody in that country, and Tehran has repeatedly stated that it has no information on his whereabouts. Furthermore, it would appear logical to assume that if Iran had caught an American spy in flagrante it would want to publicize the arrest to the max, possibly with a show trial to demonstrate Washington’s aggressive intentions.
The CIA involvement appears to be clear enough from an insider’s perspective. The Agency hired thousands of contractors after 9/11. Levinson was one of them. As a former FBI agent who had specialized in Russian organized crime he was a perfect fit for the CIA’s analytical Illicit Finance Group, which was part of the Office of Transnational Issues. The contractors were in most cases hired to do specific jobs but their activities are only tightly controlled and understood by their immediate supervisors, who frequently fudge what they are reporting to enhance their own careers. At a higher level in the Agency there would only be a general understanding of what was going on, which is why CIA senior managers, after reviewing the available documentation, initially denied that Levinson had been on a government-approved mission.
Bear in mind that there are two basic components of the CIA. One is the clandestine service (formerly the Deputy Directorate for Operations), which employs the case officers who work under cover and recruit agents and run spying operations overseas. The other consists of the analysts and specialized staffs that work mostly at headquarters and near Washington in the United States. Many identify themselves publicly as CIA employees and some even carry Agency identity cards. It is against CIA rules for analysts to run clandestine operations, something that they are not trained to do.
Spying, which is obtaining access to information that is not public, is illegal everywhere in the world but much of the other work that CIA does is perfectly legal. Hiring Levinson to travel around the world to access public records and media accounts relating to possible organized crime financing would be both legal and a continuation of the kind of work that he understood how to do as an FBI agent. So what happened?
Levinson’s immediate supervisor, Anne Jablonski, and her boss, Tim Sampson, possibly frustrated by dealing with the immovable bureaucracy on the spy side of the house, decided that Levinson could do more than search courthouses and review newspapers. She sent him off on missions that eventually involved his working with sources that were themselves engaging in illegal activity, a definite no-no for Agency analysts and even a red flag for the CIA’s spies as dealing with criminals requires special approvals and controls. She knew exactly what she was doing and what the consequences might be as she required Levinson to forward the information he was obtaining to her home address and computer rather than to the one in her office, and she may have also falsified the vouchers that were being submitted to pay him and cover his expenses, something that is not so difficult to do as spy agencies are notoriously lax in their systems for accountability.
Levinson’s notes on his own home computer indicate that he concentrated on Venezuela and Iran as targets, producing more than 100 reports, some of which dealt with reported fraud by government officials. By one account he was on the island of Kish attempting to dig up financial dirt on former Iranian President Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who has been portrayed in the U.S. media as a “reformer.” That may be so in relative terms, but he is also enormously corrupt, which has been somewhat ignored, and is the favorite candidate of Iran’s business class, the so-called “bazaaris.”
To make a long story short, Levinson had come up with a contact in Iran named Dawud Salahuddin, an American convert to Islam accused of murdering a former Shah-era Iranian diplomat in Bethesda Maryland. The connection came through a former NBC journalist named Ira Silverman, who had written a New Yorker article in 2002 in which he had interviewed Salahuddin while depicting Iran in very negative terms, particularly regarding the corruption of its rulers.
While tracking possible Rafsanjani money in Canadian 2006, Levinson also met Lithuanian-born Boris Birshtein, believed by U.S. authorities to be connected with Russian and Israeli organized crime. Birshtein reportedly offered to put Levinson in contact with some Iranians in exchange for help in getting his name removed from U.S. border-control lists. Levinson later did meet with two Iranians in Istanbul who were attempting to break Western sanctions on their country, but he was unable to help Birshtein.
Whether Levinson actually met Salahuddin in Kish is not completely clear. Salahuddin claimed afterwards to Silverman that Levinson had been taken away by the police for questioning, but he later told a somewhat different tale when he met Levinson’s wife in Tehran, concluding that he thought that Levinson was being treated well. The only evidence that Levinson still might be alive consists of a video made in 2010 begging for the United States government to do what is necessary to free him followed a few months later by an emailed photo showing him wearing an orange prisoner’s suit. The video message included “…I need the help of the United States government to answer the requests of the group that has held me for three and a half years.” In the emailed photo he is holding up a sign: “I am here in Guantanamo. Do you know where it is?”
The case for someone in Iran having carried out the abduction might seem cut and dried given that Levinson disappeared in Kish, but such a conclusion might be challenged. Unless the sign held by Levinson was a deliberate red herring, the reference to a “group” and Guantanamo would seem to argue against Iran as there are no Iranian prisoners in Guantanamo and have been none there since 2004. There are, however, numerous Pakistanis, Afghans, and Russians.
Subsequent developments also suggest that Levinson may have had extensive involvement with Russian-Israeli organized crime. The Levinson family’s legal team contacted Birshtein, who in turn led them to Oleg Deripaska, a Russian oligarch who made his billions in the organized-crime-plagued Russian aluminum industry. Deripaska has been connected to Michael Cherney, a leading Russian-Israeli organized crime figure who is currently wanted on an Interpol arrest warrant. Birshtein offered to obtain Deripaska’s help in exchange for fixing the visa problems that both men had due to their connections with the Russian mafia but was unable or unwilling to come up with any hard evidence of Levinson’s whereabouts.
CIA finally decided that it might have some liability in the Levinson case and in 2008 agreed to pay his wife $2.62 million to avoid a lawsuit, though it has not stopped her complaints about how she is “struggling.” Jablonski was fired by the Agency while Sampson and another senior analyst were forced to resign. Jablonski insists that she did not know about the trip to Kish and would not have approved it if she had known. She claims she has been scapegoated, and she may be telling the truth. Sampson now works for the Department of Homeland Security, demonstrating once again that only rarely is anyone in the government actually punished for malfeasance.
If Robert Levinson is alive he might well still be in Iran, but if he came to the attention of organized crime operating out of the smugglers’ haven of Kish there would have been a number of possible candidates interested in removing him. It invites an Ockham’s razor analysis. Who benefits most by abducting Levinson and who would have had most to lose if he were believed to be working with the U.S. government? Consider it this way: he was an FBI specialist on Russian organized crime, which is pretty much the source of Israeli organized crime and is heavily engaged in highly profitable drug trafficking. Levinson was a known contact of people who allegedly moved around in those circles. If they were intent on protecting their illegal activity they would assume that Levinson was still working for the FBI and also for the CIA, so what would they do to protect their interests? Rather than kill Levinson immediately, they might well abduct him and hold him as a bargaining chip if a colleague were to be arrested by the U.S. authorities. Levinson might be confined in Pakistan or Afghanistan, where the drug trafficking starts; in Russia, which it transits; or even in Israel, where many of the Russian gangsters live to avoid extradition. Or Iraq or Lebanon or Yemen. Just about anywhere.
“Intelligence failure” is the get out of jail free card for the political class. If one can plausibly cite an inability of the intelligence community to provide accurate information in a timely fashion, it is possible to walk away from any disastrous policy with only minimal political damage. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is a prime example; the war was driven by the White House and Pentagon in spite of what the intelligence was actually revealing, leading to largely fabricated information being cherry picked and stovepiped through the system. This resulted in the pathetic spectacle of a Secretary of State and Director of Central Intelligence appearing at the United Nations and parroting assessments relating to Iraq that they knew to be untrue. In retrospect, when the situation in Iraq had deteriorated to the point where even Bush administration stalwarts began to have their doubts, it was consequently easy to claim that the intelligence had been bad as a mitigating circumstance, an argument that is still heard to this day.
When the intelligence is ignored then twisted to produce a desired result it is truly a failure but not quite in the way that Bush defenders would like. Since the invasion of Iraq, dubbed the greatest foreign policy failure in the history of the United States, the intelligence community has been more resistant to being a party to fabrication; witness the recent pushback over Syria and the revelations by Seymour Hersh, which, if true, suggest that we the people are imbibing old wine in new bottles when it comes to the veracity of the White House.
But, politicians aside, it must also nevertheless be noted that the overall record of the intelligence agencies has not been above reproach in the decade-plus since 9/11. The recent admission that a former FBI agent was sent to Iran in a rogue CIA operation where he disappeared reveals an organization that is sometimes lacking any clear sense of what it is supposed to be doing. The massive and enormously expensive effort to collect information on terrorists and enemies du jour, including Iran, through traditional spying has not produced commensurate results. It might even be conjectured that the White House is understandably protective of the intelligence abuses by the National Security Agency because illegally tapping into people’s phones and emails has been pretty much the only reliable source of information for policymakers.
CIA, where human intelligence (HUMINT) once predominated, emphasizing recruiting spies and analyzing the information they provided, has largely been transformed into a technology driven death-by-drone machine, in the process sacrificing many of its former capabilities. Current Director John Brennan is reportedly so concerned by the change that he is now engaged in re-emphasizing traditional tradecraft training for Agency new hires before the old skills are completely lost. The killing of seven CIA officers at Camp Chapman near Khost in Afghanistan in 2009, the largest single toll of CIA officers since the Beirut Embassy bombing in 1984, was a wake-up call. The after-action assessment noted that the Chief of Base Jennifer Matthews, a career analyst, may have been at least partly responsible for the security lapses that led to the deaths. She had been given the position because she aggressively lobbied for the field assignment to help advance her career and the Agency, foolishly, ignored the fact that she had not had the appropriate training and was not experienced enough to be in charge in a war zone.
The latest intelligence failure being reported in the media is the Global Deployment Initiative, a multi-billion dollar effort to move CIA officers out of embassies and into the real world that began shortly after 9/11. It was characteristically headed by an officer with only limited overseas experience and is not surprisingly now being described as a “colossal flop” by insiders and outsiders alike. The concept is not exactly new, and the CIA has long been a leader in hiring officers who are placed under business cover and sent overseas. They are referred to as NOCs, an acronym for non-official cover. The argument in favor of NOCs has been that some countries, where the security environment is very difficult, are better penetrated by businessmen than by spies in embassies, who are routinely heavily surveilled whenever they leave the building. Many of the CIA NOCs in the 1970s and 1980s also benefited from being non-American or at least being able to pass as a non-American given the proper false identification, which was a lot easier to do in those days. Some were also already successful businessmen when they were hired, meaning that they brought their cover with them.
NOCs have no diplomatic protection if they are caught, which is why they are normally only used to handle existing agents, not to recruit new sources. They are generally disliked among embassy based operations officers for a number of reasons. First, they often require an inside or diplomatic cover officer as a regular contact, which is usually regarded as an unrewarding assignment for whoever is stuck with the job of hand holding. Second, many NOCs become obsessed with developing their business cover at the expense of their Agency job, meaning that they are often seen as nearly useless from an intelligence point of view. Third, NOCs require extensive backstopping to support their cover and administrative needs, which is expensive and time consuming both for Washington and in the field.
NOCs also often come in pairs, as tandem couples consisting of a husband and wife or God knows what combination these days as the Agency has fully embraced the Obama gender agenda. Inside officers who deal with a tandem couple often refer to the combination as “one for the price of two” since the couples, isolated in a foreign environment, tend to whine a lot, feed off each other’s professional grievances, and need a great deal of stroking.
Taking into consideration all of the downside, during my nearly 20 years overseas I only knew of three NOCs that most objective observers would have described as effective. The Global Deployment Initiative only made the situation worse, inheriting the problems associated with NOCs historically before going on to add its own wrinkles. By the 1980s, the Agency had pretty much run through its supply of officers who had learned to speak a foreign language with native fluency at home, and increasingly draconian security requirements meant that few Dari, Pashto, or Farsi speakers could get in through the front door. The new breed post-9/11 therefore does not normally have the needed foreign languages, nor do they come equipped with any actual business skills. Senior management’s desire to please the White House by getting as many bodies overseas as quickly as possible has meant that NOCs frequently find themselves in a foreign environment in which they are culturally and linguistically tone deaf, with poor cover, and far from any terrorist target that might actually be of interest.
Having many new NOCs to cover also exceeded the capacity of existing mechanisms and required the creation of large cover companies that provided a home base for numerous officers. The shell companies thus established were often poorly backstopped. One such company was Brewster-Jennings, which was cited in the 2003 exposure of NOC officer Valerie Plame by the Bush White House. Many of the covers could be exposed by methods as simple as doing Dunne and Bradstreet checks, which frequently showed incorporation at a law office coupled with no actual business activity. Problems with the multiple uses of one cover soon surfaced, with a single security issue involving one officer exposing the entire group to scrutiny by a foreign intelligence service or a terrorist group. Often the covers were so transparent, “business consultant” being much favored, that foreign intelligence services immediately saw through them, requiring the US government to arrange a number of precipitous removals of NOC officers at great expense due to security concerns.
So the new NOC program is deservedly dead, yet another failure of a vast bureaucracy whose constant unimaginative striving suggests that the motto on the CIA seal should be something like “If You Need Something New Don’t Call Us.” In Latin, of course. As a postscript, it might be interesting to note how other intelligence services handle their “outside” officers. The old KGB used to specialize in so-called “illegals” who would be sent to countries with false identities and might lie dormant for a number of years before being activated. The recent Anna Chapman spy case in New York would appear to indicate that the Russians still operate in that fashion. The European intelligence services avoid having officers under business cover and instead tend to focus on hiring their own countrymen as sources after they are established in careers that give them access to needed information, so they manage them more like traditional agents rather than as colleagues. The British have a number of journalists, employees in international organizations, and academics who work as regular, career salaried stringers for MI-6. The French and Italians do the same. Operating that way is not only cheaper, it is more effective as the non-diplomatic colleagues have demonstrated access. The CIA does some of the same but its obsession with fully controlled sources and restrictions on who it can recruit somewhat limits the practice. That means that the ponderous and unworkable NOC program is unique to U.S. intelligence, the latest failure stemming from the Gatsbyesque belief that somehow, someday, someone in Washington will actually get something right before the money runs out.