Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest.
Once upon a time the big threat to civilization was al-Qaeda. But today it is ISIS, alternatively known as the Islamic State, ISIL, or Daesh. Transcending their existence as actual physical entities, the names or acronyms have become metaphors for terrorist attacks, striking fear in the hearts of the people and enabling the political class in Europe and the United States to grow government in response. At the Republican National Convention, presidential candidate Donald Trump vowed to destroy ISIS—and the Democrats led by Hillary Clinton will probably follow suit. But can it be done? Or, more to the point, how does one go about doing it? How will Trump and Clinton keep their promises to keep Americans safe from Islamic radicals?
What we call terrorism is a tactic used by groups that are essentially political. You can find it in Tacitus, read about it in the accounts of 19th-century anarchists, and consider how it evolved in modern times, starting with the European leftist groups in the 1970s and then migrating to the Middle East. Today terrorism and Islamic radicalism are closely linked, but it is important to remember that it was not always so. What we refer to as terror enables a weaker party to demoralize and even threaten the stability of a nominally much stronger ruling authority.
The United States distinguishes terrorism from mass murder. In the U.S. code, it describes terrorism as “acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law” that “appear intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.”
So terrorism narrowly construed is an action intended to destabilize the political status quo so as to influence or pervert government decision making. But the definition is somewhat anachronistic. If one moves beyond the legal language, several categories of mass murder might plausibly be regarded as “terroristic” because they inevitably create fear when they include the indiscriminate taking of human life, particularly in situations where people going about their daily lives should normally feel secure. In so doing, whether their prime objective is political or not, they produce a reaction from the government, generally in the form of new laws that enhance the power of the state—which in turn can make the citizenry increasingly suspicious of the authorities.
Three common perpetrators of mass murder are the mentally ill, revenge seekers, and those motivated by an ideology to kill those they define as enemies. The three categories can sometimes overlap, of course. And the weapons they choose are most often guns, sometimes bombs, and more rarely instruments that are not usually associated with intentional killing, to include moving vehicles.
Consider as examples the profiles of eight of the most widely reported recent multiple killings in Europe and the United States, all of which have been described by the media as terrorist acts. The most recent took place in Munich last week, where ten people died. The perpetrator was a mentally deranged German born gunman of Iranian descent who was obsessed with mass killing itself. That was preceded by another attack in Bavaria by an ax- and knife-wielding Afghan refugee on a train, while a Bastille Day attack in Nice by a French citizen of Tunisian descent used a truck to kill 84 during the same week. Both of the latter attacks were reportedly inspired by ISIS.
A March attack on a Brussels airport and a metro station by five Belgian-born citizens of Arab extraction killed 32 using guns and bombs. In November of last year seven Belgian and French citizens of Arab extraction used guns and bombs to kill 130 at restaurants, a theater, and sports facilities in Paris. One additional attacker was a refugee and still another was unidentified. Both attacks were reportedly inspired by ISIS. In January of the same year, the famous attack on Charlie Hebdo took place, also in Paris, with two French citizens of Algerian extraction shooting 13 people and claiming to be inspired by al-Qaeda.
Here in the United States there have recently been two attacks. In June, 50 Americans were killed in a nightclub in Orlando in a shooting carried out by an American citizen born to Afghan refugees; he claimed allegiance to ISIS but has been regarded as having mental problems. In December 2015, 14 died in San Bernardino at the hands of a Chicago-born gunman of Pakistani descent and his Pakistan-born wife, both of whom pledged allegiance to ISIS.
If Donald and Hillary really want to make us safe and actually intend to take steps to do so, what can or should be done to address each category of mass killer and each type of weapon? The convenient response by Hillary Clinton, which she is already offering, is gun control. But any analysis of the recent incidents suggests that it will always be easy to obtain weapons, even in the tightly-controlled Western European environment. In Europe, suppliers are frequently able to connect with those interested in acquiring handguns or rifles. Many of the weapons originate in the Balkans (particularly Kosovo, where they are relatively available) and make their way to the west. Likewise in the United States new laws would not eliminate the hundreds of millions of weapons already in private hands. So gun control, which seems to some to be a simple and affordable solution, would most likely accomplish little or nothing.
Another promising approach, favored by Donald Trump, connects terror to Islam. He has proposed banning the entry of all Muslims or at least those residents from a handful of countries where metastasizing violence promoted by Islamic radicals is prevalent. He has also suggested that there might be “extreme vetting” of citizens from European countries subject to repeated terrorist attacks. The president has considerable authority to initiate such limitations on visa exemption or issuance, though any filtering based purely on religion rather than nationality would no doubt run into legal problems.
Some might plausibly argue that if Pakistanis and Afghans had been forbidden entry into the U.S., Orlando and San Bernardino would not have occurred. But it is difficult to imagine ruling out certain nationalities as potential immigrants as a sustainable policy. It would be far better to develop investigative procedures to weed out potential problems before they are granted visas, but no one is proposing that.
Likewise if North African Arabs had been blocked from residency in Europe, most of the six incidents cited above quite plausibly would not have occurred. Still nearly all of the perpetrators were actually born in Europe or were naturalized citizens; only two were refugees. This suggests that Europe already has large Muslim minorities that are infected by the radicalism bug, which in the U.S. is referred to as “homegrown extremism,” so closing the immigration door now might have little effect. It is neither practical nor politically imaginable that existing Muslim populations should be expelled, leaving one with no better options than increased police surveillance.
Clinton, unlike Trump, appears to favor the current lax visa entry procedures, possibly because she was recently involved in their implementation. But there is a reasonable approach that falls somewhere in between exclusion and an open door: restrict visas for applicants who cannot be thoroughly vetted through existing procedures. Whether either candidate would embrace such fine tuning of the obviously broken system is unclear. There also might be considerable interference from a Congress that would seek to punish some countries when passing enabling legislation and providing funding.
So you can’t stop the guns and it is difficult to create a rational basis for blocking new immigrants or visitors, but the real problem is identifying the mentally disturbed and those influenced by groups like ISIS, who together have carried out nearly all the multiple victim, terrorist-style attacks in the past five years. The United States could destroy ISIS’s caliphate physically from the air, at a cost of possibly tens of thousands of civilian casualties, but it cannot eliminate the group’s effective internet-based propaganda machine. And when ISIS relies on “lone wolf” proxies or independent cells to stage attacks, the nation’s security services are increasingly unable to identify affiliates actually organized and directed by ISIS that would be discoverable and susceptible to being dismantled (if they exist).
Even if ISIS has no physical Caliphate, it will persist online and be accessible to those who seek it out. And it will undoubtedly someday be succeeded by new, even more radical groups with updated messages for the disaffected. U.S. law enforcement attempts to identify those individuals who try to interact with extremist websites and then uses informants to develop criminal cases against them, but it is a process that probably creates more radicalization than it prevents. And as for the mentally disturbed, they only surface when they are reported to authorities by a family member or health care provider, so there is little that one can do to prevent incidents besides encouraging such reporting.
So no matter what the candidates pledge to do, the options available to our next president to deal with ISIS and other terrorism are not very promising. Getting rid of guns is a non-starter and deporting birthright citizens would be both illegal and present practical difficulties. Keeping dangerous visitors out would be highly desirable but it is probably beyond the ability of government bureaucrats to develop and manage such a program successfully. Meanwhile the FBI and NSA read emails, listen in on phones, and react. I would imagine that a post-election review of national security will have all parties throwing up their hands in frustration over the paucity of reasonable options. The new president will likely pretty much come down in support of the status quo.
Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest.
The military coup in Turkey last weekend started on Friday and consisted of attempts to take over government buildings and key infrastructure. The coup drew mostly on troops from the gendarmerie and the air force and was led by mid-level generals and colonels. There were some initial successes but by early Saturday morning it was clear that the government had prevailed. By Sunday nearly 6,000 arrests of alleged plotters had taken place with more certain to follow.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has vowed a crackdown on the military and also the judiciary and has blamed the coup on arch foe Fethullah Gulen, who resides in exile in Pennsylvania. Analysts believe that defeating the coup has greatly increased Erdogan’s authority and he will be able to consolidate his power by altering the country’s constitution, which, given the sense of crisis in Turkey due to the coup and the recent terrorist attack in Istanbul, is likely to succeed. And due process for the alleged coup plotters under the present circumstances is likely to be limited. They reportedly will be charged with treason. Erdogan will be able to clean house and consolidate his power.
There is inevitably a counter narrative which I and a number of Turkey-watchers who have networked to discuss recent developments are inclined to believe. As full disclosure, I will admit that all of us are established critics of the autocratic and Islamist direction being pursued by Erdogan’s government over the past three years.
First of all, though it is not a major issue, none of us believes that Gulen was behind the coup. It is convenient for Erdogan to blame his principal opponent because it will facilitate the arrests of any and all opponents not linked to the actual coup by claiming that they are Gulenists. Erdogan has become adept at jailing opponents, often journalists, on trumped up charges to include treason and this time around will be no different. The process has already begun with the detention of a number of military officers and judges and will no doubt be expanded as more enemies are identified.
Second, nearly all of us believe that the coup was basically a set-up. Erdogan and his government have been warning for months about the possibility of a coup, so the event itself should surprise no one. It is now certain that there was a coup in fact being plotted, apparently supported mostly by Kemalists in the military who advocate a secular state and are alarmed by aspects of Erdogan’s foreign policy, including his collaboration with terrorist groups and hostility towards Russia and Syria. There was also likely an element of concern over the deteriorating Turkish economy with European fear of terrorism wrecking the tourism industry, an issue linked to Ankara’s meddling in Syria and Erdogan’s personal vendetta against the leading Kurdish political party the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Many observers and even government officials when speaking off the record have also criticized the Erdogan-driven breakdown in the truce that up until recently prevailed with the domestic Kurdish minority and its armed wing the PKK.
The coup plotters probably erred in their assumption that there was wide support at senior levels in the Turkish military for a coup. The generals, who once would have been natural opponents of Erdogan’s ambitions, had been severely punished in their first encounter with the then prime minister in 2010-11. A series of show trials claiming that the senior officers were involved in plotting against the government based on very flimsy evidence removed many upper ranks, replacing them gradually with Erdogan loyalists. Many of the officers so convicted have only recently been released from prison but, having been out of power for years, they have not retained any ability to take action against the government.
The coup plotters may have approached one or more of the new Erdogan-appointed generals, without whose support a coup could not succeed, expecting a sympathetic hearing. In all likelihood, they were received cordially but the senior officer immediately reported their overture to the president, setting the stage for a trap.
The rest followed course somewhat as planned. The plotters heard from sympathizers in the judiciary or police that they would soon be arrested so they started the coup before their plans were complete and almost caught the government by surprise. They were few in number so they must have hoped that they would be joined by others. They were not successful and loyal army and police units quickly organized to resist them. Erdogan also was able to call on his civilian supporters to take to the streets and gather at the airport in Istanbul. The results were predictable and the coup was crushed. Erdogan will now reap the political benefits. He is also demanding the extradition of Gulen from the United States and the Obama Administration is reported to be considering the request.
One other aspect of the coup has caused some confusion. Early on it was alleged without any evidence that the plotters were dismayed by recent Erdogan government overtures to Russia and Syria to restore normal relations. That is a complete misreading of developments, as the Turkish military has long been reluctant to support any operations in Syria and, in general, is opposed to any initiatives outside Turkey’s borders. During a brief takeover of Turkish television the coup leaders referred to their movement as a “peace council.” The generals have their hands full with the internal Kurdish and refugee problems and are most definitely not encouraging taking on anything new.
One might also add to changes vis-à-vis Russia and Syria the recent rapprochement with Israel. Turkey’s economy is in bad shape and its international standing has been gravely damaged by Erdogan’s foreign and domestic policies. Opinion polls have been suggesting that the Turkish public is blaming Erdogan directly for the decline in employment and income as well as for the terrorism problem. The shift in policy to mend fences with a number of countries has been a response to that concern and is unrelated to the discontent within the Turkish military.
So the aborted military coup has become a great victory for President Erdogan. It remains to be seen how exactly he will exploit it, but it is certain that he will use it as a pretext for expanding his own powers. To those who object to the notion that the Turkish president would kill his own soldiers to advance his political agenda, one might note that he was considering doing so in 2014 to create a pretext for war with Syria. Consequently the question whether Erdogan might actually have helped set up the coup in a version of a false flag operation is certainly intriguing and must be considered. It should be taken into account by the White House before contemplating bending to any demands from Ankara to extradite Gulen or any of his associates.
Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest.
Whenever the subject of American foreign-policy catastrophes comes up, the word “Iraq” immediately comes to mind. But George W. Bush’s ill-fated invasion of that hapless land in reality did not do irreparable damage to the United States. That is not to trivialize the costs, including trillions of dollars and the deaths of thousands of Americans plus hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, but the reality is that the U.S. homeland was not attacked and the economy has not collapsed, making Iraq a war that should never have been fought but not a defeat in historic terms.
One thinks of Russia less frequently when U.S. policy failures are examined. In 1991, Russia was a superpower. Today it is a convenience, a straw man fortuitously produced whenever someone in power wants to justify weapons expenditures or the initiation of new military interventions in faraway places. Much of the negative interaction between Washington and Moscow is driven by the consensus among policymakers, the Western media, and the inside-the-beltway crowd that Russia is again—or perhaps is still and always will be—the enemy du jour. But frequently forgotten or ignored is the fact that Moscow, even in its much-reduced state, continues to control the only military resource on the planet that can destroy the United States, suggesting caution should be in order when one goes about goading the bear.
Truly, the unwillingness to takes steps after 1991 to assist Russia in its post-communism transformation into a stable, prosperous, and secure state modeled on the West is the most significant foreign-policy failure by both Democratic and Republican administrations over the past 30 years. The spoliation of Russia’s natural resources carried out by Western carpetbaggers working with local grifters-turned-oligarchs under Boris Yeltsin, the expansion of NATO to Russia’s doorstep initiated by Bill Clinton, and the interference in Russia’s internal affairs by the U.S. government (including the Magnitsky Act) have exploited Russian vulnerability and have produced a series of governments in Moscow that have become increasingly paranoid and disinclined to cooperate with what they see as a threatening Washington.
There have also been unnecessary slights and insults along the way, including sanctions on Russian officials and a refusal to attend the Sochi Olympics, to cite only two examples. The drive by Washington democracy-promoters and global hegemonists working together to push Ukraine into the Western economic and political sphere was a major miscalculation, as they failed to realize—or did not care—that what takes place in Kiev is to Moscow a vital interest. Heedless of that reality, the Obama administration, which recently endorsed the somewhat bizarre entry of Montenegro into the NATO alliance, is already treating Georgia and Ukraine as if they were de facto members. Hillary Clinton, who has likened Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler, has pledged to bring about their full membership in the alliance. It would not in any way make Americans more secure—quite the contrary, as the United States is pledging itself under the NATO Article 5 to defend both countries. Moscow for its part would be forced to react to such expansion.
Nearly everything Russia does is considered wrong or even threatening by the White House, Congress, and the U.S. media. I was reminded of that predilection when I read recent accounts of Russian “harassment” of American diplomats overseas. The story described how, in one instance, a U.S. embassy officer returning to the building late at night was challenged by a Russian guard and a scuffle ensued. In other alleged incidents the apartments of employees were searched, and it was even claimed that a pet dog had been killed. Certainly the incidents are deplorable, but they are not exactly unusual in the world where spies and spy-catchers interact.
The old KGB was—and its successor organization, the FSB, still is—adept at tricks to unnerve suspected intelligence officers and render them less effective, forcing them always to be looking out for surveillance even when it was not there. From my time in CIA training in the late 1970s, I recall descriptions of how an agency officer had parked his car on a Moscow street only to return to find it gone. It turned up in a plowed field 100 miles away a few days later with no tire tracks evident. It had been picked up and moved by helicopter. Or an officer would return to his apartment and find all his books arranged in alphabetical order, or dinner prepared and sitting on the table. The FBI would do the same sort of thing to suspected KGB or GRU officers in the United States, a warning that they were being observed and that the bureau knew what they were up to. In the intelligence world it is business as usual, but in the U.S. media, the latest round of spy vs. spy was depicted as another sign of barbaric behavior on the part of the Russians.
The point here is that the Russians are not exactly failing to notice what is going on and are drawing their own conclusions about what they must do to defend themselves. None but Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and the Kagan family actually want a war, but Moscow is being backed into a corner, with more and more influential Russian voices raised against détente with a Washington that seems to be intent on humiliating Moscow at every turn as part of a new project for regime change. Many Russian military leaders have come to believe that the continuous NATO expansion means that the United States wants war, and both the generals and Vladimir Putin are warning that a resort to arms could easily go nuclear, as Moscow will use all weapons available to defend itself. Putin is, incidentally, the voice for moderation, as he still aspires to a positive relationship with the West, a position he reiterated in his July 4 message to President Obama.
Russia’s generals are not optimistic about what is coming their way. They are insecure because they are aware of their own military inferiority and see nothing but hostility from the West, including evidence that American generals have collaborated to fabricate Russian threats in Europe to force a U.S. reaction. The Russians understand that the buildup of forces on both sides of the border that has resulted from the clashing interests is unstable and dangerously unpredictable. The Russian military justifies its responses based on what it has clearly and unambiguously observed and what it is hearing. But when the Western powers probe Russian borders with their warships and surveillance aircraft, they claim that it is aggression when Moscow scrambles a plane to monitor the activity.
NATO has now decided to base four multinational battalions of combat soldiers in Eastern Europe, along the Russian border, the first troop deployment aimed at Moscow since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Washington in its own prepackaged view describes itself as behaving defensively, from the purest of motives, while Moscow is always in the wrong, but Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov notes that it is not his country that is moving soldiers up to a border to confront the West. Picture for a moment a reverse scenario, with a Russian missile cruiser lounging just outside the territorial limits off Boston or New York or a marine infantry brigade based in Cuba, and imagine what the U.S. reaction might be.
Washington’s misguided policy toward Russia under both Republican and Democratic presidents has the potential to become the greatest international catastrophe of all time, with the risk of ending human life on this planet as we know it. NATO expansionism and the regular promotion of a false narrative that Russia is seeking to recreate the Soviet Union together suggest to that country’s leaders that Washington is an implacable foe. The bellicose posturing inadvertently strengthens the hands of hardline nationalists in Russia, while weakening those who seek a formula for accommodation with the West.
Only the much-maligned Donald Trump sees the situation with some clarity. Speaking in Moscow last week, his foreign-policy adviser Carter Page stated (in the words of ABC News) that “the U.S. had been overly hostile toward Russia and … the blame for the current tensions lay largely with the American government.” He “echoed Trump’s own attacks on Washington’s foreign policy consensus, suggesting that U.S. experts and officials’ assessment of Russia was skewed by an anti-Russian bias and that they often ‘unnecessarily perpetuated Cold War tendencies.’”
To be sure, Russia is no innocent in the international one-upmanship game. But the nearly constant animosity directed against Russia by the Obama administration and likely to continue under President Clinton should be seen as madness, as the stakes in the game, a possible nuclear war, are unthinkable.
The FBI has decided not to recommend criminal charges for Hillary Clinton over her use of a private email server, but Director James Comey’s explanation of the decision provides some additional information on what occurred and how. Among the 30,000 emails turned over by Hillary’s lawyers were eight chains classified at the highest level—“Top Secret”—plus 36 chains that were “Secret” and eight more that were “Confidential.” Comey went on to describe Hillary Clinton and her aides as “extremely careless in their handling of very sensitive, highly classified information.” Clinton’s behavior was “especially concerning” because her email system was not protected by a full-time government security team—or even by a sophisticated private service such as are employed by companies like Yahoo! and Gmail.
The FBI could find no sign of an intrusion into Clinton’s emails, but Comey noted that the nature of her system, which ultimately employed a number of servers, made it unlikely that the bureau could find such evidence even if an intrusion had occurred. One particular concern was that Clinton’s use of the private server while overseas—within the reach of “sophisticated adversaries”—rendered it “possible” that hackers had gained access. And Comey was careful to note that under normal circumstances, despite an FBI recommendation against criminal charges, behavior like Clinton’s might result in “security or administrative sanctions.”
What Comey did not say, though he suggested it, was that based on precedent, the possibility of obtaining a conviction in court would be minimal given the apparent lack of “intent” to defeat the security system in place with a clear understanding that the activity was illegal. The FBI clearly believed that Hillary Clinton had set up the private server for her own personal convenience—and to maintain control over her emails given her political ambitions, rather than letting them go into the government archive, where they might someday become accessible to the public and media.
As a former government employee who has had Top Secret, Codeword, and Special Access Clearances from the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and State Department, I find the Clinton defense that she and her team considered the private server to be acceptable practice untenable. Anyone who has handled classified information knows very well that you do not copy it, you do not send it somewhere else or share it with someone who has no need to know, and you do not edit it down to make it unclassified in your opinion. It is not a matter for discussion, debate, or interpretation. For me and the former government employees in my circle, the entire Clinton charade that has been playing out for so many months is unfathomable. Apart from Clinton’s ignoring the guidelines for proper handling of classified information, outlined in Executive Order 13526 and 18 U.S.C Sec. 793(f) of the federal code, there is also some evidence of a cover-up regarding what was compromised, as many emails were erased. This itself would be a violation of the 2009 Federal Records Act and the Freedom of Information Act.
And then there is the political aspect of the investigation. In retrospect, it is interesting to note President Obama’s two statements regarding the inquiry. His first comment was that he would do nothing to impede the investigation and possible charges, elaborating that “That is institutionally how we have always operated: I do not talk to the attorney general about pending investigations. I do not talk to FBI directors about pending investigations. We have a strict line.” But he followed up by stating that “There’s carelessness in terms of managing emails, that she has owned, and she recognizes. I continue to believe that she has not jeopardized America’s national security.”
This suggests to me that Obama knew in advance where the investigation was going in spite of his disclaimers, and his signal that Hillary would in no way be punished for her actions is particularly telling. He recently endorsed Clinton and is participating actively in her campaign, which he would not have committed to if he’d had any concerns about her being indicted. He had to have known what was going to happen; secure in that knowledge, he has been able to do what he can to make Hillary Clinton the next president of the United States.
But even given all of that, I have to believe that the cautious James Comey did Hillary no favors. Comey has challenged her decisionmaking and as much as conceded that if she were currently a government employee she would be fired. Surely some voters, at least, will pay attention to that. As Robert Gates, who was CIA director under George H.W. Bush and defense secretary under George W. Bush and Obama, recently commented, the “whole email thing … is really a concern in terms of her judgment.” He added, “I don’t know what originally prompted her to think that was a good idea.”
Obama’s denial that national security has been compromised is also suspect. Comey carefully left the door open on that issue, and there have been reports that a Romanian hacker who goes by the name Guccifer repeatedly hacked Clinton’s server. He described the server as “like an open orchid on the Internet” and said “it was easy … easy for me, for everybody.” There have also been claims that Russian intelligence and other foreign services were able to hack the secretary’s server. Anyone with the proper equipment, knowledge, and motivation might have been able to obtain access. That is what hackers are able to do, with considerable success, against government servers that are far better protected than a private email setup located in an official’s New York State home.
The national media is awash with stories suggesting that Hillary Clinton has been vindicated by the Comey report, but I think not. The reality is much more complex than that, as the Clintons’ contempt for what many might consider “the rules” is again manifest. If Hillary Clinton had been an employee of State Department rather than the politically appointed head of the organization, I have no doubt that she would have been fired at a minimum or, more likely, sentenced to some jail time or subject to punitive fines. I say this because her setting up of a private server to handle government work is so outside the realm of acceptability that there should have been all kinds of warning bells and whistles going off when she decided to do it.
That no one within her entourage objected demonstrates how loyalty to powerful individuals who can advance one’s career, rather than to a government institution and the Constitution, plays out in Washington. It should serve as a warning for what might be coming in January 2017.
I am surely not the only one noticing the extent to which the corporate media worldwide are damning Donald Trump. In the wake of Brexit, his supporters were repeatedly likened to the Brits who voted Leave, both groups being characterized as “white and less well educated.” And over the past week, the Washington Post has been examining and damning nearly everything The Donald has said and done, hammering the presumptive GOP nominee with an average of six heavily editorialized news articles daily, plus op-eds.
To be sure, Trump has earned much of the opprobrium, with his often contradictory and scattershot presentations of the policies he intends to pursue, as well as the provocative language that has left him legitimately open to charges of racism and sexism. Trump’s racially flavored warnings about homegrown terrorists certainly have considerable popular appeal in the wake of San Bernardino and Orlando, but the reality is that Muslim Americans as a group exhibit low crime rates, achieve higher-than-average levels of education, and are financially successful. Police sources reveal that they frequently cooperate with law enforcement regarding members of their community who are flirting with militancy.
Trump is also presumed guilty of several other Democratic Party-defined capital crimes, including failing to enthusiastically embrace diversity and multiculturalism. But at the core of his appeal to voters is the one issue that he largely gets right, and that is immigration, both as a cultural phenomenon and as a law-and-order issue.
His up-front condemnation of illegal immigration can be seen as the launching pad for his successful campaign for the GOP nomination. From a rule-of-law and national-security perspective, many Americans have long been dismayed by the federal government’s unwillingness to control the nation’s borders, and many blue-collar workers have a more personal stake in the issue, being appalled by the impact of mass illegal immigration on their communities.
While Trump’s proposed blanket ban on Muslim travelers is both constitutionally and ethically wrongheaded and, in my opinion, potentially damaging to broader U.S. interests, his related demand to temporarily stop travel or immigration from some core countries that have serious problems with militancy is actually quite sensible. This is because the United States has only a limited ability to vet people from those countries. The Obama administration claims it is rigorously screening travelers and immigrants—but it has provided little to no evidence that its procedures are effective.
The first step in travel limitation is to define the problem. While it is popular in Congress and the media to focus on countries like Iran, nationals of such countries do not constitute a serious threat. Shi’a Muslims, the majority of Iranians, have characteristically not staged suicide attacks, nor do they as a group directly threaten American or Western interests. The Salafist organizations with international appeal and global reach are all Sunni Muslim. In fact, al-Qaeda, ISIS, the Taliban, and al-Nusra all self-define as Sunni Muslim and regard Shi’as as heretics. Most of the foot soldiers who do the fighting and dying for the terrorist groups and their affiliates are Sunnis who come from Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, and Somalia, and even the homegrown Europeans and Americans who join their ranks are Sunni.
It is no coincidence that the handful of Muslim countries that harbor active insurgencies have also been on the receiving end of U.S. military interventions, which generate demands for revenge against the West and the U.S. in particular. They would be the countries to monitor most closely for militants seeking to travel. All of them represent launching pads for potential attacks, and it should be assumed that groups like ISIS would be delighted to infiltrate refugee and immigrant groups.
U.S. embassies and consulates overseas are the choke points for those potential terrorists. Having myself worked the visa lines in consulates overseas, I understand just how difficult it is to be fair to honest travelers while weeding out those whose intentions are less honorable. At the consulate, an initial screening based on name and birth date determines whether an applicant is on any no-fly or terrorism-associate lists. Anyone coming up is automatically denied, but the lists include a great deal of inaccurate information, so they probably “catch” more innocent people than they do actual would-be terrorists. Individuals who have traveled to Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria since 2011, or who are citizens of those countries, are also selected out for additional review.
For visitors who pass the initial screening and who do not come from one of the 38 “visa waiver” countries, mostly in Europe, the next step is the visitor’s visa, called a B-2. At that point, the consulate’s objective is to determine whether the potential traveler has a good reason to visit the U.S., has the resources to pay for the trip, and is likely to return home before the visa expires. The process seeks to establish that the applicant has sufficient equity in his or her home country to guarantee returning to it, a recognition of the fact that most visa fraud relates to overstaying one’s visit to disappear into the unregistered labor market in the U.S. The process is document-driven, with the applicants presenting evidence of bank accounts, employment, family ties, and equity like homeownership. Sometimes letters of recommendation from local business leaders or politicians might also become elements in the decision.
In some countries, documentary evidence can be supplemented by police reports if the local government is cooperative. Some consulates employ investigators, generally ex-policemen, who are able to examine public records if there is any doubt about an applicant’s profile or intentions, but most governments do not permit access to official documents. Recently, background investigations have sometimes been supplemented by an examination of the applicant’s presence on the internet to determine whether he or she is frequenting militant sites or discussing political issues online. If the visa applicant is seeking to become a U.S. resident, the process is, of course, much more rigorous.
Both travel and immigrant visas are nevertheless a somewhat subjective process. I knew a visa officer in Turkey who delighted in turning down Iranian applicants “on principle.” It was a seemingly arbitrary act—but this was shortly after the U.S. embassy hostage crisis in Tehran, and it was plausibly based on the fact that there was no embassy any longer in Iran and documents presented in Turkey would be impossible to verify.
Most of those convicted in terrorism-related cases in the U.S. are foreign-born. The real issue that Trump should be addressing is the federal government’s inability to vet visa applicants to a level that could be considered sufficient from a national-security perspective, a failure that has led some conservatives to complain that White House policy is to “invade the world, invite the world.”
In many places, official documents are easy to forge or can even be obtained in genuine form from corrupt bureaucrats. If one is unable to go the source of the document for verification, papers submitted in support of a visa application are frequently impossible to authenticate. So what does one do when applicants from countries in the throes of civil war—like Iraq, Syria, or Yemen—show up at a visa window, some of them with no documents at all? Or when such applicants constitute not a trickle but a flood? It gets complicated, and Trump has a point in saying we should deny visas to all of them until procedures can be established for making those judgments in a more coherent fashion.
Another steady stream of immigrants into the U.S. comes from the refugee-resettlement process; Washington is a signatory to the United Nations-administered agreements to resettle refugees. Much of the background vetting is carried out by the UN in a not-completely-transparent fashion, and the resettlement of the refugees in various places is done by quota—with the U.S. being the largest recipient country, expected to receive 100,000 refugees in 2017. But does the Obama administration have a clue regarding the reliability of the information it gets on the new would-be Americans? If it does, it is not letting on.
The mostly Saudi attackers on 9/11 used temporary or tourist visas to enter the country, so the threat from that source should be clear to everyone involved in the entry process, and consulates are acutely aware of the danger. But beyond that, the Obama administration has been complacent. It would no doubt point to the fact that no refugee to the United States has carried out an act of terror once admitted to the country, which would be true but somewhat misleading: The estimated 77,000 Somali refugees who have somehow wound up in Minnesota have included a substantial number of younger men and women who have returned home to join the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab. And it would in any event be prudent to be cautious when relying on past behavior models, as groups like ISIS have indicated their desire to hit the United States and have proven to be highly adaptable in their tactics.
Trump’s demands to block many visitors and would-be residents might seem an overreaction, but until a broken immigration system is fixed, he is more right than wrong.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution establishes the right of free speech. Though there may be instances when speech cannot be truly uninhibited because of possible consequences, e.g. yelling “fire” in a crowded theater, the right to speak freely has been enshrined in American law and custom. Lately, however, free speech has come under attack even in the U.S. by groups claiming that certain words and expressions can be an incitement to violence or can induce discomfort or fear. This interpretation of free speech as a privilege, rather than a right, is more common worldwide than not.
Many countries with constitutions, and several without, have adopted the principle of freedom of speech, but just how free one actually is varies from place to place. In practice, even many nations where speech is notionally protected nevertheless have laws that define lines that should not be crossed. For example, Turkey’s constitution promises free speech, but there is also a law that makes criticizing the head of state a criminal act, an exception that is currently being strictly enforced under President Erdogan. In Western Europe a number of countries have legislation defining “hate crimes,” laws intended to establish a level of civility among the various constituencies that make up the citizenry. Generally, they define as illegal any attempt to criticize or ridicule someone based on race or religion. In France and Germany it is, for example, illegal to deny that the Holocaust occurred.
Most jurisdictions in Europe consider speech that is either “blasphemy” or “racist” in nature to be illegal, and a court ruling in Brussels suggests that supranational institutions like the European Union are likewise sensitive to what some might regard as free speech that is a bit too free. The European Court of Justice, the EU’s top tribunal, ruled that the European Union was justified in firing a British economist back in 1995 for writing a book that condemned European currency integration. According to the court, the book did damage to the EU’s “image and reputation” and was “aggressive, derogatory and insulting.” It was conceded that the economist, Bernard Connolly, otherwise performed his work satisfactorily and that the book was written and published on his own time and at his own expense. The court nonetheless upheld his dismissal.
That ruling was issued in 2001, but it came back into play in the British media this year as part of the Brexit campaign, as an example demonstrating that under current rules the EU cannot even be criticized without consequences. Connolly, who argued in his book that currency union was a threat to democracy, certainly might be credited with being more correct now than he appeared to be in 1995, given recent events in Greece and the EU’s other underperforming economies. After the 2001 judgment, Connolly referred to the operation of the European Court of Justice as having affirmed the concept of “seditious libel,” a long-discredited principle of jurisprudence maintaining that any attempt to criticize in writing the sovereign authority should be considered equivalent to seeking to overthrow the government itself.
The State Department’s 2015 Country Reports on Terrorism came out earlier this month. It will no doubt be overshadowed by events, as it deals with overseas rather than domestic terror and appeared ten days before the worst mass shooting in U.S. history. But it helps to explain the roots of America’s terrorism problem.
The document purports to be an objective review of the year’s terrorist incidents as well as an overview of some of the players, and it includes a discussion of “violent extremism” issues region by region and country by country. It is a valuable resource that provides considerable information on the various militant groups and the crimes attributed to them. But it is nevertheless a government document.
The Obama Administration definitely has a point of view on what constitutes terrorism and how to deal with it. The report’s section on Afghanistan, for example, implicitly makes a case for a more robust American role in the conflict engulfing that country, and the discussion of ISIS tends to view the group in regional terms, with less emphasis on its ability to operate transnationally.
I often find that how something is described or even ignored is just as important as what is revealed. There is, for example, a section of the report identifying “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” a status that brings with it various sanctions. It would be difficult to find a section that is more hypocritical, as many would consider Washington the leading practitioner of state-sponsored terror, given its claimed authority to go after militant targets anywhere at any time.
This year’s report names only Iran, Syria, and Sudan as state sponsors. Iran and Syria undeniably have relationships with groups like Hezbollah, which is a party of government in Lebanon. Hezbollah is currently heavily engaged in fighting ISIS, which the U.S. government in its own reporting clearly identifies as international enemy No. 1. Meanwhile, Iran is criticized for having a close relationship with Syria, while Syria is condemned for having a close relationship with Iran, resulting in both being labeled state sponsors even though their military efforts, like those of Hezbollah, are focused against groups like ISIS and al-Nusrah that are seeking to do damage to the United States. Regarding Sudan, the report states that it is no longer in the supporting-radicalism business, while earlier annual reports actually commended it for helping international efforts against terrorists—yet it remains on the list, apparently because some people in the White House do not like its president very much.
And there is a bigger problem. I have long argued that “terrorism” is a largely meaningless expression, as it has been politicized to such an extent that it no longer provides any real insight into what a designated group is or is not doing. The United Nations defines terrorism as violent acts intended to coerce a civilian population and destabilize the target country’s government, which probably is as far as a reasonable observer should go with the concept.
Others inevitably entertain a somewhat broader viewpoint on what constitutes a terrorist, because the label enables one to marginalize those one does not approve of. Contemporary Turkey’s political leadership describes journalists, protesters, and even the political opposition in parliament as terrorists because it makes it possible to disregard their arguments and curtail their constitutional rights. Israel, meanwhile, calls Palestinians who are legally resisting its illegal occupation of the West Bank terrorists, while the United States uses drones to kill suspected militants based on profiles and, after the fact, rationalizes the deaths by labeling those killed as terrorists.
At any rate, how big of a problem is terrorism, however we Americans define it? The numbers tell us something. Deaths attributed to terrorists are certainly a huge global problem, with the State Department report recording nearly 12,000 terrorist attacks producing 28,000 deaths worldwide in 2015. But the mayhem is very much concentrated in countries that are gripped by what might reasonably be termed civil war, including Syria, Iraq, and Somalia. Several other countries with high levels of “terror” deaths, including Nigeria and Pakistan, are engaged in bloody regional conflicts over economic issues fueled by anti-central-government sentiment: not exactly civil war, but something close to it.
American victims are a lot harder to find. The State Department report, which is only about acts of terrorism overseas, identifies 19 American citizens as victims of terror for the year 2015. Eight of the deaths were in Afghanistan, one in Syria, and one in Somalia, all of which can be regarded as war zones. Three were in Jerusalem and on the Israeli-occupied West Bank, a region also suffering from endemic violence: two American visitors, plus a settler who held dual Israeli-U.S. citizenship.
Twenty-two more Americans were injured in terrorist incidents worldwide in 2015, and there were no reported kidnappings during the year. Though I in no way wish to minimize the killing of anyone in a criminal act, which terrorism is, the death and injury toll hardly represents a major international threat to U.S. citizens, and I am sure that many more Americans are killed every year “overseas” in traffic accidents while vacationing. So based on the State Department report, one has to question a counter-terrorism strategy costing hundreds of billions of dollars a year to combat an enemy that is largely ineffective, at least in terms of being able to do direct damage to the United States, its citizens, or its other interests.
And there is, of course, the domestic side of the terrorism industry. The year 2015 was, in fact, a relatively busy year for international terrorists, particularly those who might reasonably be linked to ISIS. Insofar as can be determined, no terrorist act carried out in the U.S. in 2015 was actually ordered or directed by an overseas terrorist group, but some terror suspects were certainly inspired by what is taking place in Europe and the Middle East. The killings in Orlando suggest that the so-called “lone wolf” pattern continues in 2016, with little direction from abroad but considerable motivation generated through interaction with radicals online.
There were 25 deaths in the U.S. attributable to some form of ostensibly foreign-sourced terrorism in 2015, a number that includes six perpetrators killed during or subsequent to the attacks. The largest single attack was at San Bernardino, Calif., in December, which killed 16 including the two gunmen. Another multiple-victim attack took place in Chattanooga, Tenn., in July, killing five military personnel plus the shooter. There has been no real suggestion that any of the attacks could have been prevented, though San Bernardino has led to demands by the government for better access to social-networking accounts and to cell phones. While both capabilities would be undeniably useful for after-the-fact assessments of what has occurred, I would argue that giving the police and intelligence agencies broad authority to access what have traditionally been private communications would lead to fishing expeditions through the thousands of communications posted and calls made by terrorism fantasists. It would be hard to justify an extreme interventionist response as either appropriate or effective.
So a total of 44 Americans died in 2015 in incidents that have been categorized by the U.S. government as foreign-sourced terror. To put that in context, the number is comparable to a single month of homicides in Chicago in the same year, when 468 deaths were recorded.
A final measure of the terrorist threat directed against the United States is the number of people being charged with terrorism offenses in 2015. There were 56 arrests in that year, some involving American citizens or legal residents who intended to travel to join a group that has been designated as “terrorist” by the State Department and/or the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control.
But what do those numbers really mean in terms of the vulnerability of the United States to an actual terrorist attack? An estimated two-thirds of all terrorism cases that result in charges in the U.S. are brought about through the use of a paid FBI informant who becomes friendly with the targets and in theory monitors their activities. In many cases, however, the informant actually creates the legal case against the accused by giving the suspects weapons or bombs that do not work.
If the FBI informant actually motivates the targets to carry out the illegal act, that would be considered entrapment, but one can imagine how difficult it would be to make that case unless one were a fly on the wall during all of the meetings involving the informant. A better measure might be whether those accused were ready, willing, and able to carry out a terrorist act without any intercession from an informant. I have done a rough media survey of the identifiable cases from 2015 and could not find a single one where that was so, though in at least one instance a suspect’s online searches relating to how to turn a pressure cooker into a bomb were considered a serious threat.
I am not trying to minimize the threat posed to the United States by terrorists either overseas or domestically, and last weekend’s horrific massacre in Orlando certainly makes one reluctant to endorse anything like complacency. But I would nevertheless advise that the danger posed by radicalized groups and individuals be put into some kind of context, and that draconian steps to deal with the problem be embraced with caution. Terror is the poor man’s weapon against powerful government forces, so it will likely always be with us, but terrorists are rarely successful in their broader objectives—these are achieved only in cases where there is a political vacuum.
I have been reading the State Department annual reports for many years now, and my firm impression is that the international terrorist threat, as poorly defined as it is, has actually been receding as more and more governments actively seek to eliminate militants in their midst, and as fewer states are willing and able to provide them with assistance or a safe haven. Terrorism is a dying industry in every sense of the word, and while the U.S. government should take every reasonable step to protect American citizens, the key word must be “reasonable.” A global anti-terror Crusade led by the United States is not a reasonable response, nor is it necessary, as terrorist groups always eventually fade away due to their own internal contradictions. It is time to declare the War on Terror finished and move on.
Cities reduced to rubble, schools and hospitals leveled, prisoners tortured and executed, car bombs exploding. Long lines of refugees, their homes in ruins, stumbling along a road to nowhere with their few remaining possessions carried on their backs. Graphic photos and videos from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa continue to show the downside of the “New World Order,” the global system operating under American direction envisioned by President George H.W. Bush in 1991.
They also demonstrate the enormous perceptual gap between much of the world and the United States, which has not had a hostile force penetrate its borders since Pancho Villa rode into New Mexico in 1916. America does not know and does not understand the reality of war, which renders the bellicose pronouncements made by presidential candidates as so much background noise, little more troubling than their comments about what to do about greenhouse gases. Meanwhile, the drums of war continue to beat, with Pentagon sources revealing that the United States has been bombing so many people in so many places that its weapons stockpiles are running low.
Responding to increasing demands for some accountability, President Barack Obama has pledged to bring transparency to the drone wars Washington is waging in at least seven countries. Drone missions have received considerable criticism owing to their lack of any legal framework, but the administration argues they are justified by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, which gives a carte blanche to the armed forces to pursue and kill “al-Qaeda associated” terrorists wherever they might be. The additional drone attacks undertaken by the CIA are “covert actions” made legal by presidential “findings,” and both the intelligence services and the military are reported to be guided by the constabulary principle, which means that the U.S. has authority to strike a “threatening” terrorist target if the local government lacks either the resources or desire to do the job itself.
Reports in the media suggest that there will soon be a White House report on the numbers of civilians killed since 2009 in drone strikes, but, as is often the case, the devil will be in the details. The government is trying to demonstrate that the civilian death toll is minimal, though it is unlikely to go as far as CIA Director John Brennan, who argued that the agency’s attacks had killed “no civilians.” It will do that by excluding from consideration “war zones” in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, and also CIA “clandestine” operations. Only Libya, Somalia, Yemen, and possibly Pakistan will be included in the findings, as they are “outside areas of active hostilities.”
The report will also manipulate its own definitions of what constitutes a terrorist or militant, and it will justify some otherwise inexplicable attacks as “self-defense” due to U.S. special forces operating in the area. Guidelines for firing drones’ Hellfire missiles have been somewhat subjective, including, for example, considering any male of military age and carrying a weapon as a likely terrorist and therefore subject to annihilation, even though being an armed male in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan is not unusual and hardly equivalent to militancy. In other cases, a tribal gathering where several alleged militants are reported to be present will be considered to be 100 percent terrorist, even though the drone operator has no idea who is on the ground apart from the one or two targets who are plausibly or sometimes not-so-plausibly identified.
The document is also likely to include questionable assumptions about the targets of the attacks and, reading between the lines, should raise some serious doubts about the accuracy of the alleged “pinpoint” strikes delivered by drone. If the past is anything to go by, it will be obfuscated by discussion of legal aspects of the use of drones and will tend to dismiss or even ignore the human tragedy playing out on the ground by granting the U.S. government the benefit of the doubt when a target does not fall into any easily discernible category.
There’s inevitably a political objective behind the report, which is to institutionalize the process of using lethal drones by presidential fiat worldwide. Obama has embraced the drone as his weapon of choice against terrorists, having authorized hundreds of attacks, a vast expansion of the deployment compared to his predecessor, George W. Bush, who approved drone strikes fewer than 50 times in his eight years in office. It is likely that Obama will formalize the procedures for selecting and killing targets by executive order before his term in office ends.
Drone warfare aside, Americans should be appalled by how many people their elected government has directly or indirectly killed since the War on Terror began nearly 15 years ago, particularly as the United States has not actually been at war with anyone during that entire period—and they probably would be appalled if they knew. Bear in mind that there are a lot of ways to die. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright famously declared killing 500,000 Iraqi children through sanctions that limited the import of food and medicines in the 1990s “worth it.” More recently, the huge dislocations of populations and refugee flows have killed tens or even hundreds of thousands more. One need not have a bullet in the head to die.
Estimates of deaths caused by the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq are at best guesstimates and depend on what factors are included or excluded. Is starvation due to disrupted food supplies, or death by an illness that would have been treated if the local hospital hadn’t been destroyed, the responsibility of the United States? Some think so, even if the death is “collateral” or occurs some time after the traumatic incident.
Tallying the actual death toll ultimately comes down to a reckoning of deaths that would not have occurred but for the military action. Governments will inevitably try to deflate the numbers and dismiss the causal linkages, while other observers will move in the opposite direction.
A March 2015 report by the Nobel Prize-winning Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) suggests that there has been considerable, deliberate understating of the true consequences of the U.S.-led response to terrorism. The report claimed that more than 1.3 million people were killed during the first ten years post-9/11 as part of the so-called “Global War on Terror” in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan alone. A year later, one might reasonably update the numbers and add Syria, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen to the carnage—and the current total might easily exceed 2 million. Some other estimates go as high as 4 million. The PSR report stresses that the estimate of the dead is “conservative” and based on the most reliable sources, suggesting that there are large numbers of deaths that have been reported but could not be confirmed.
It is difficult and probably unfair to consider George Bush and Barack Obama to be mass killers along the lines of a Pol Pot or even a Josef Stalin, as they did not seek or condone the deaths of large numbers of civilians. But the lesson to be drawn from their passages through the highest public office is that leading what is nominally a democracy is no impediment to lashing out largely indiscriminately, without regard for those on the receiving end. We as a country are now reduced to preparing reports explaining that we really didn’t kill that many civilians with drones while attacking countries we are not at war with by virtue of a plausibly unconstitutional congressional authorization.
The past 15 years have institutionalized and validated the killing process. President Clinton or Trump will be able to do more of the same, as the procedures involved are “completely legal” and likely soon to be authorized under an executive order. And the 2 million or 4 million or maybe eventually 6 million dead will become, as Stalin once put it, not a tragedy but just a statistic.
The other day, a question popped up on a Facebook thread I was commenting on: “Where is Victoria Nuland?” The short answer, of course, is that she is still holding down her position as assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs.
But a related question begs for a more expansive response: Where will Victoria Nuland be after January? Nuland is one of Hillary Clinton’s protégés at the State Department, and she is also greatly admired by hardline Republicans. This suggests she would be easily approved by Congress as secretary of state or maybe even national-security adviser—which in turn suggests that her foreign-policy views deserve a closer look.
Nuland comes from what might be called the First Family of Military Interventionists. Her husband, Robert Kagan, is a leading neoconservative who co-founded the Project for the New American Century in 1998 around a demand for “regime change” in Iraq. He is currently a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, an author, and a regular contributor to the op-ed pages of a number of national newspapers. He has already declared that he will be voting for Hillary Clinton in November, a shift away from the GOP that many have seen as a clever career-enhancing move for both him and his wife.
Robert’s brother, Fred, is with the hawkish American Enterprise Institute, and his sister-in-law, Kimberly, is the head of the Institute for the Study of War, which is largely funded by defense contractors. The Kagans work to encourage military action, both through their positions in government and by influencing the public debate through think-tank reports and op-eds. It is a family enterprise that mirrors the military-industrial complex as a whole, with think tanks coming up with reasons to increase military spending and providing “expert” support for the government officials who actually promote and implement the policies. Defense contractors, meanwhile, benefit from the largesse and kick back some money to the think tanks, which then develop new reasons to spend still more on military procurement.
The Kagans’ underlying belief is that the United States has both the power and the obligation to replace governments that are considered either uncooperative with Washington (the “Leader of the Free World”) or hostile to American interests. American interests are, of course, mutable, and they include values like democracy and the rule of law as well as practical considerations such as economic and political competition. Given the elasticity of the interests, many countries can be and are considered potential targets for Washington’s tender ministrations.
For what it’s worth, President Obama is reportedly an admirer of Robert Kagan’s books, which argue that the U.S. must maintain its military power to accommodate its “global responsibilities.” The persistence of neoconservative foreign-policy views in the Obama administration has often been remarked upon, though Democrats and Republicans embrace military interventionism for different reasons. The GOP sees it as an international leadership imperative driven by American “exceptionalism,” while the Dems romanticize “liberal intervention” as a sometimes-necessary evil undertaken most often for humanitarian reasons. But the result is the same, as no administration wants to be seen as weak when dealing with the outside world. George W. Bush’s catastrophic failures in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to bear fruit under a Democratic administration, while Obama has added a string of additional “boots on the ground” interventions in Libya, Syria, Yemen, the Philippines, and Somalia.
And Nuland herself, many will recall, was the driving force behind efforts to destabilize the Ukrainian government of President Viktor Yanukovych in 2013-14. Yanukovych, admittedly a corrupt autocrat, nevertheless assumed office after a free election. In spite of the fact that Washington and Kiev ostensibly had friendly relations, Nuland provided open support for the Maidan Square demonstrators opposed to Yanukovych’s government, passing out cookies to protesters on the square and holding photo ops with a beaming Sen. John McCain.
Nuland started her rapid rise as an adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney. Subsequently, she was serially promoted by secretaries of state Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, attaining her current position in September 2013. But it was her behavior in Ukraine that made her a media figure. It is hard to imagine that any U.S. administration would tolerate a similar attempt by a foreign nation to interfere in domestic politics, particularly if it were backed by a $5 billion budget, but Washington has long adhered to a double standard when evaluating its own behavior.
Nuland is most famous for using foul language when referring to the potential European role in managing the unrest in Ukraine that she and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) had helped create. She even discussed with U.S. Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt who the new leader of Ukraine ought to be. “Yats is the guy” she said (referring to Arseniy Yatsenyuk), while pondering how she would “glue this thing” as Pyatt simultaneously considered how to “midwife” it. Their insecure phone call was intercepted and leaked, possibly by the Russian intelligence service, though anyone equipped with a scanner could have done the job.
The inevitable replacement of the government in Kiev, actually a coup but sold to the media as a triumph for “democracy,” was only the prelude to a sharp break—and escalating conflict—with Moscow over Russia’s attempts to protect its own interests in Ukraine. The new regime in Kiev, as corrupt as its predecessor and supported by neo-Nazis and ultra-nationalists, was consistently whitewashed in the Western media, and the conflict was depicted as “pro-democracy” forces resisting unprovoked “Russian aggression.”
Indeed, the real objective of interfering in Ukraine was, right from the start, to install a regime hostile to Moscow. Carl Gershman, the head of the taxpayer-funded NED, called Ukraine “the biggest prize” in the effort to topple Russian President Vladimir Putin, who “may find himself on the losing end not just in the near abroad but within Russia itself.” But Gershman and Nuland were playing with fire in their assessment, as Russia had vital interests at stake and is the only nation with the military capability to destroy the U.S.
And make no mistake about Nuland’s clear intention to expand the conflict and directly confront Moscow. In Senate testimony in May of 2014, she noted how the Obama administration was “providing support to other frontline states like Moldova and Georgia.”
Nuland and her neoconservative allies celebrated their “regime change” in Kiev oblivious to the fact that Putin would recognize the strategic threat to his own country and would react, particularly to protect the historic Russian naval base at Sevastopol in Crimea. Barack Obama responded predictably, initiating what soon became something like a new Cold War against Russia, risking escalation into a possible nuclear confrontation. It was a crisis that would not have existed but for Nuland and her allies.
Though there was no evidence that Putin had initiated the Ukraine crisis and much evidence to the contrary, the U.S. government propaganda machine rolled into action, claiming that Russia’s measures in Ukraine would be the first step in an invasion of Eastern Europe. Former Secretary of State Clinton dutifully compared Putin to Adolf Hitler. And Robert Kagan provided the argument for more intervention, producing a lengthy essay in The New Republic entitled “Superpowers Don’t Get to Retire,” in which he criticized President Obama for failing to maintain American dominance in the world. The New York Times revealed that the essay was apparently part of a joint project in which Nuland regularly edited her husband’s articles, even though this particular piece attacked the administration she worked for.
As the situation in Ukraine continued to deteriorate in 2014, Nuland exerted herself to scuttle several European attempts to arrange a ceasefire. When NATO Commander Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove was cited as being in favor of sending more weapons to the Ukrainian government to “raise the battlefield cost for Putin,” Nuland commented, “I’d strongly urge you to use the phrase ‘defensive systems’ that we would deliver to oppose Putin’s ‘offensive systems.’”
To return to the initial question of where Victoria Nuland is, the long answer would be that while she is not much in the news, she is continuing to provide support for policies that the White House apparently approves of. Late last month, she was again in Kiev. She criticized Russia for its lack of press freedom and its “puppets” in the Donbas region while telling a Ukrainian audience about a “strong U.S. commitment to stand with Ukraine as it stays on the path of a clean, democratic, European future. … We remain committed to retaining sanctions that apply to the situation in Crimea until Crimea is returned to Ukraine.” Before that, she was in Cyprus and France discussing “a range of regional and global issues with senior government officials.”
But one has to suspect that, at this point, she is mainly waiting to see what happens in November. And wondering where she might be going in January.
It’s been almost a decade and a half since 9/11, but the foreign-policy establishment still cannot admit that continuous American intervention in the Middle East has been a failure.
I recently attended a conference entitled “Hindsight: Reflections on 15 Years of the War on Terror.” With a wide range of highly respectable speakers, I naively expected that the panels would conclude that the so-called “global war on terror” had been a misguided project ab initio, that the United States continues to repeat mistakes in its national security policy that promote rather than discourage terrorism—and that the terrorism threat itself has been grossly inflated for largely political and economic reasons.
Apart from a single comment by a former U.S. Army general who correctly characterized American involvement in the Middle East as an overly robust response to what is in reality a “low threat, low national interests” situation for Washington policymakers, I was greatly disappointed. Everyone seemed to accept without any real question the presumption that the United States has a preemptive right to use military force to change foreign governments, ignoring that factor as a source of terrorism and only criticizing those actual interventions that have been badly implemented like Iraq and Libya.
Some of the speakers predictably were either promoting personal agendas or the agendas of their political patrons and employers. One keynote speaker blasted Republican foreign policy positions while praising Bill Clinton, and by extension Hillary, for their brilliant foreign policy team, which tempted me to shout out the name “Sandy Berger!” followed by “the Balkans!” and “Sudanese pharmaceutical factory!” The same speaker also refused to address a reasonable question about the well-attested massive Israeli spying operation in the U.S. in 2001, denying that it existed. Indeed, neither Israel nor Palestine were mentioned at all in an hour and a half panel discussion on foreign policy “challenges” coming from the Middle East, an omission that one has to consider to be curious.
While some speakers robustly condemned erosion of personal liberties due to increased security, it was all carefully done in a legal context, which is what I personally find most annoying about existing criticism of the war on terror. What is legal and what isn’t appears to trump how certain developments actually play out in practical terms and it should be accepted that any White House can always find a Department of Justice lawyer willing to affirm that nearly anything is legal, meaning that the distinction is meaningless.
Increasing oversight was promoted by several speakers, which is also a type of legal remedy. Admittedly, some panelists did note that existing oversight does not protect against abuse as the overseers generally do not oversee at all. Officials from all branches of government instinctively and consistently collude with the expectations of the administration, meaning that oversight does not equate to either transparency or accountability. And there was no consideration by panelists whether torture, rendition, data collection and telecommunications backdoors actually enhance national security. This was to my mind a major omission as the public is generally deluded into thinking that the “enhanced interrogation” and “acceptable” ethical lapses funded by the hundreds of billions of dollars invested annually in the warfare state are “making us safe.”
Only one speaker mentioned that existing terrorism cases in the U.S. generally come out of FBI entrapment operations, that the government has rarely caught terrorists in flagrante and that fewer than 50 Americans have been killed by Islamic terrorists since 9/11, suggesting the extent to which the terror threat has been dramatically hyped for reasons that have little or nothing to do with ISIS or al-Qaeda. A “pressure cooker bomb plot” cited by New York’s Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence and Counterterrorism as a great success involved a Muslim student who was reportedly only thinking about doing something but who did not even possess the pressure cooker that he was allegedly considering using as a weapon. Muslims arrested for terrorism plots rarely have the capability to carry out any offensive actions and are frequently reliant on FBI informants to provide them with a gun doesn’t work or a bomb that doesn’t explode. Or in this case possibly a pressure cooker with a hole in it.
There were nearly four hours of more and the same, to include hubristic snapshots of Russia and China as eternal enemies and several comments suggesting that Syria would not be so bad now if “we” had taken down Bashar al-Assad a few years back. After an unctuous hymn of praise regarding the effectiveness of the New York Police Department notably minus any mention of its domestic spying operations directed against Muslims, it occurred to me that the narrative being fed was conditioned by one overriding factor: nearly every speaker benefits personally from the continued existence of the war on terror. They are all part of the establishment and supporters of the Washington foreign policy consensus even if they don’t identify themselves that way. Even those academics and lawyers who criticize the war frequently do so in a restrained and high-minded fashion because the status derived from being a player in the continuation of the unending global conflict is as much in their interest as it is in the interests of those who are working for the government or a defense contractor.
Few in the United States and in Western Europe challenge the nature of the terrorist threat and governments have learned that if they shout “terrorism” often enough they will get a free pass on budgets and on approving legislation that restricts the freedom of the average citizen. Freedom is, unfortunately a zero-sum game, power taken from the people is gone forever and is given over to what we Americans have begun to call the “unitary executive,” a transitional process welcomed by heads of state in both parliamentary and presidential government systems.
The war on terror is the driving concern that fuels much government aggrandizement as well as spending. Depending on what one includes in the numbers it is plausible to suggest that as much as $1 trillion per year is being spent to fight against the alleged threat. The “counter-terror” wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been the most expensive in U.S. history and they are not over yet. The ongoing intervention in Afghanistan, justified by President Obama as a war to prevent a resurgence of al-Qaeda, continues to cost more than $3 billion per month and is currently undergoing a “surge,” as are also operations in Iraq, Libya and Syria.
The federal government employed 2,726,000 as of 2014 compared to 1,500,000 in 2001, not including the military, which itself has 2,100,000 personnel in uniform, including reserves. Most of the new hires have been directly related to the War on Terror for manning the 200 post-9/11 military and CIA bases that have sprung up around the world. The number of reported federal employees does not include contractors, who add considerably to the payroll. More than half of the employees in key sectors within the intelligence community and at the Defense Department are contractors and every contractor costs three times as much as a normal employee.
It is projected that Uncle Sam will spend $4.2 trillion in 2017 compared with $1.863 trillion in 2001, $503 billion of which will be borrowed, reversing 2001’s budget surplus of $127 billion. The Department of Homeland Security, which did not exist prior to 2001, gets $40 billion and employs 180,000; the intelligence agencies get an estimated $100 billion and employ 100,000; the FBI gets nearly $9.5 billion; and the Department of Defense gets $632 billion, which does not include a slush fund to cover the war in Afghanistan and other contingencies. In 2001, the Pentagon budget was $277 billion. When all the increases are added up and compared to the baseline of 2001, the war on terror currently costs the American taxpayer directly more than $500 billion per year as part of an overall defense and national security budget that approaches $1 trillion. As there may be only 100 or so terrorists interested and plausibly capable of attacking the United States directly, that works out to something like $10 billion per year per terrorist.
And that is only at the federal level. Most states now have their own departments of homeland security, and most have dramatically increased both the numbers and firepower of their police forces. There is full-time security manning the entrances of nearly all federal and state and even many local office buildings and schools. The total costs of state and local expenditures to counter the essentially bogus terrorist threat might well exceed the federal expenditures, and then there is the spending on security, often mandated by the government, in the private sector. The conference I attended also demonstrated the extent to which universities, institutes, and security firms have become part of the huge and growing terrorism business, all feeding off of the false assumption that the twenty-first century is the age of the terrorist.
Apart from the benefit to defense industries, money spent directly on the war on terror is essentially wasted. But even as bad as all those numbers in terms of current spending are, consider for a moment the legacy costs and institutional damages that are not so readily visible. Professor Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia University estimates that Iraq will cost as much as $5 trillion when all the costs, including interest paid on borrowed money and medical treatment for life for the tens of thousands of wounded soldiers, are paid off. The bill for Afghanistan, which appears to lack an exit strategy, will be proportionate, depending on how long the U.S. stays there and at what commitment level. The money spent and the debt continuously incurred explain in part why the United States stumbles along with an antiquated infrastructure and a dysfunctional health-care system. The country cannot continue wasting resources on overstated terrorist threats without paying the price at home.
A little more than one year ago Director John Brennan announced a shake-up at CIA that would, inter alia, enhance the eroded capabilities of the Clandestine Service. An earlier move to appoint paramilitary officer Gregory Vogel as deputy director for the agency’s spies signaled to the bureaucracy that shooting and droning had replaced espionage as the elite component at CIA, and there was considerable concern that the agency had to some extent lost its ability to perform traditional tradecraft. While it would be a gross exaggeration to suggest that the agency had abandoned the spy business, by some accounts it has largely given up on unilateral operations and has instead become heavily dependent on often unreliable information shared by friendly intelligence liaison services.
A recent first-person account by Douglas Laux, Left of Boom, describes in some detail new-age spying. The memoir, which has been heavily redacted by CIA censors, describes the role of the spy as foot soldier in combat zones like Syria and Afghanistan. Laux makes the point that many of the current generation of CIA case officers have done little conventional spying, having only worked in war zones where the rules of engagement are quite different than they would be on the cocktail circuit in Paris.
Laux concludes his tale with his frustration in arming rebels in Syria, but his story begins when he arrived in Afghanistan in early 2010. He had a singular advantage over most of his peers in that he was one of the few taught Pashto prior to his assignment. He was sent to a base located in a bleak concrete-block Soviet-era prison and was immediately tasked with developing information on the purveyors of improvised explosive devices that were killing large numbers of American soldiers. He cultivated local tribesmen, but when he met his agents he would wear body armor and be driven to the meetings in an armored vehicle protected by ex-Navy SEAL guards.
Laux’s success, or the lack of it, is difficult to discern from the book due to the extensive redactions, but he notes ruefully how little the military and intelligence agencies knew about Afghanistan or its people. Short tours of duty, as in Vietnam, meant that right from the beginning everyone would be counting down the days until DEROS—date eligible for return from overseas—and those leaving, who might have learned a little of what was going on during their year, would pass the baton to a newbie who would have to begin the process all over again. Laux repeats the joke that the U.S. had not been in the country for 10 years, “We’ve been in Afghanistan one year, ten times.”
Ignorance of what was happening on the ground and failure to communicate across bureaucratic lines came with a price tag. The military would broadcast the names of Taliban who were wanted without coordinating with CIA. The next day men would show up at CIA bases with allegedly “valuable information” based on the names and demand payment. The agency would pay up, assuming that the knowledge of the names of wanted terrorists itself established the bona fides of the purveyors of the information. For Laux, the confusion exemplified everything that was wrong about the United States effort in Afghanistan, an observation that might serve to enlighten certain presidential candidates even today.
Starting with Hammurabi, rulers have frequently appreciated that their subjects would be more acquiescent to being governed if they had at least a minimal appreciation that they were being treated fairly. That understanding has led to the development of law codes along the lines of the Roman Republic’s laws of the Twelve Tables, which were inscribed in bronze and posted prominently in the Forum so everyone would know what the rules were. In the Middle Ages statues of Justice erected in the Italian republics often had her blindfolded and with a scale in one hand and a sword in the other, indicating that guilt would be weighed fairly and punishment, if merited, would be delivered inexorably. For modern democracies the rule of law has often been translated into the expression “equal justice under law.”
Of course everyone knows that there is no such thing as equal justice. Certain infractions are rarely prosecuted while other crimes are pursued rigorously. Expensive lawyers reduce the risk of there being any serious consequences for the wealthy even when one is caught out. Employees of the state are rarely punished even when their felonies cost the taxpayers millions of dollars because no one wants to look closely at corruption in government.
But there is nevertheless the impression that the law exists to serve everyone equally, which is why the recent comments by President Obama regarding Hillary Clinton’s personal email account, which included 22 emails classified top secret, are so incredible. Obama made two statements regarding Hillary’s private email server while she was secretary of state. His first comment was that he would do nothing to impede the investigation and possible filing of charges against Clinton if the facts should warrant that kind of action, elaborating “That is institutionally how we have always operated: I do not talk to the attorney general about pending investigations. I do not talk to FBI directors about pending investigations. We have a strict line.” And then he followed up by stating that “There’s carelessness in terms of managing emails, that she has owned, and she recognizes. I continue to believe that she has not jeopardized America’s national security.”
Anyone who has ever handled classified material, which presumably includes the president, knows that there are a number of things that you do not do. You do not take it home with you, you do not copy it and share it with anyone who does not have a clearance or a need to know, and you do not transfer it to another email account that is not protected on a government server. If you have a secured government computer, that means that what is on the computer stays on the computer. This is not a matter of debate or subject to interpretation. It is how one safeguards classified information even if one believes that the material should not be classified. That the classification might be unnecessary is not your decision to make.
Obama is, of course, lying when he says that he will allow an investigation to proceed unimpeded. The attorney general and FBI director work for him, and he is keenly aware of what is going on. He doesn’t have to say anything at all for Loretta Lynch to understand that it might be in the administration’s interest to slow down or kill the process. As Obama has one major legacy issue in the waning days of his presidency, to make sure that the Democratic Party holds onto the White House, to torpedo Hillary Clinton through prosecution over mishandling classified information would be unthinkable for him and the people around him. He does not have to send a signed presidential memo or have an off the record conversation to make sure that his associates appreciate that point.
And second, when Obama claims that there was no breach of security, his assessment is irrelevant, in part because he may not know that to be true. The government was not controlling the private server in Chappaqua and numerous messages both there and in Washington have reportedly been erased. Besides, the accusation being made against Hillary is that she mishandled classified information, not that she gave it to some foreign power. She clearly is guilty as messages were cut and pasted minus their classification caveats. The question should be not whether she is guilty—she is—but rather what form of punishment is appropriate. But Obama has sent a clear message that he has considered the matter and there will be no punishment.
And then there is the somewhat similar case of General David Petraeus. While CIA director, Petraeus shared classified information with his lover Paula Broadwell, who was his official biographer. He eventually plea bargained guilty to giving Broadwell eight notebooks that he was insecurely storing in his home, including classified information recorded while he was serving as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The notebooks held some of the most sensitive kinds of military and intelligence secrets, including names of undercover officers, intelligence resources, paraphrases from high-level meetings of the National Security Council, and even some comments about Petraeus’s discussions with the president. It has been argued that Broadwell had a security clearance and was writing an official biography, but she had no need to know the highly sensitive information contained in the notebooks and should not have had access to them.
Petraeus was placed on probation for two years and was fined $100,000, which he could easily afford. Proposals to demote him in rank and so diminish his pension were rejected. Some argued that he was protected by his rank and status and that his punishment had he been an enlisted man or junior officer would almost certainly have been much greater. But it is precisely due to his rank and status that the punishment was more severe than it seemed. He went from being a highly respected military officer and head of the CIA to being a man in disgrace who furthermore had his extramarital affair exposed to the nation. Some might plausibly argue that he should have also done jail time, but it is not unreasonable to maintain that the punishment hurt him in the area where he was most vulnerable—his reputation. In reality the penalty might be considered to be at least somewhat proportionate to the crime.
And then we come to Jeffrey Sterling, who is currently serving a three and a half year prison term for allegedly leaking information to New York Times journalist James Risen. Sterling first came to the media’s attention when in 2003 he blew the whistle on a botched CIA operation called Operation Merlin, telling the Senate Intelligence Committee staff that the CIA had mistakenly sent nuclear secrets to Iran. So it was perhaps inevitable that in 2006, when James Risen published a book that inter alia discussed the botched Operation Merlin, the Department of Justice focused on Sterling as the suspected source. In court the federal prosecutors relied almost entirely on Risen’s phone and email logs, which reportedly demonstrated that the two men had been in contact up until 2005. But the prosecutors did not provide the content of those communications even though the FBI was listening in on some of them. Risen has claimed that he had multiple sources on Operation Merlin, and Sterling has always denied being involved. No evidence was ever produced in court demonstrating that any classified information ever passed between them.
Jeffrey Sterling could not even testify in the trial on his own behalf because he would have had to discuss Operation Merlin, which was and is still classified, meaning he could not reveal any details about it even if they were already known through the Risen book. Indeed, some of the information in Risen’s book relating to Merlin could not have been known by Sterling as he was no longer associated with the operation after mid-2000, a detail that could also not be presented as it too was considered classified. The jury convicted Sterling based on “suspicion,” a verdict that defense witness Colonel Pat Lang, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s clandestine program, described as a “travesty.”
After conviction Sterling was sent to prison in Colorado—900 miles from his family’s home in St. Louis. According to his wife Holly, legal fees have wiped out the couple’s finances, leading some to believe that the government deliberately set out to make an example of Sterling. John Kiriakou, another CIA whistleblower who was also imprisoned, observed that “The point wasn’t just to imprison Jeffrey. It was to ruin him. Utterly ruin him. The point was to demonize him. And frighten any other would-be whistleblowers.”
So much for equal justice under law. The politically best connected abuser of classified information walks, the next one down the ladder in terms of political importance is fined but not otherwise punished, and the least institutionally protected individual goes to jail. And the real irony is that only the first two demonstrably mishandled classified information for their own convenience and benefit. It was never demonstrated that Sterling had done so.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) court battle with Apple over the security system in place on iPhones appears to be over. But some experts in the communications security community are expressing concern because of the Bureau’s unwillingness to reveal what exactly occurred to end the standoff.
According to government sources speaking both on and off the record, the FBI succeeded in breaking through the Apple security measures with the assistance of an unidentified third party. The technique used was apparently not a one-off and is transferable as the Bureau has now indicated that it will be accessing data on a second phone involved in a murder investigation in Arkansas and is even considering allowing local police forces to share the technology. That means that the FBI and whatever other security and police agencies both in the U.S. and abroad it provides the information to will have the same capability, potentially compromising the security of all iPhones worldwide.
The breakthrough in the case leads inevitably to questions about the identity of the company or individual that assisted the Bureau. It means that someone outside government circles would also have the ability to unlock the phones, information that could eventually wind up in the hands of criminals or those seeking to disrupt or sabotage existing telecommunications systems.
No security system is unbreakable if a sophisticated hacker is willing to put enough time, money and resources into the effort. If the hacker is a government with virtually unlimited resources the task is somewhat simpler as vast computer power will permit millions of attempts to compromise a phone’s operating system.
In this case, the problem consisted of defeating an “Erase Data” feature linked to a passcode that had been placed on the target phone by Syed Farook, one of the shooters in December’s San Bernardino terrorist attack. Apple had designed the system so that 10 failures to enter the correct passcode would lock the phone and erase all the data on it. This frustrated FBI efforts to come up with the passcode by what is referred to as a “brute force” attack where every possible combination of numbers and letters is entered until the right code is revealed. Apple’s security software also was able to detect multiple attempts after entry of an incorrect passcode and slow down the process, meaning that in theory it would take five and a half years for a computer to try all possible combinations of a six-character alphanumeric passcode using numbers and lowercase letters even if it could disable the “Erase Data” feature.
Speculation is that the FBI and its third party associate were able to break the security by circumventing the measure that monitors the number of unsuccessful passcode entries, possibly to include generating new copies of the phone’s NAND storage chip to negate the 10-try limit. The computer generated passcodes could then be entered again and again until the correct code was discovered. And, of course, once the method of corrupting the Erase Data security feature is determined it can be used on any iPhone by anyone with the necessary computer capability, precisely the danger that Apple had warned about when it refused to cooperate with the FBI in the first place.
Most of the U.S. mainstream media has been reluctant to speculate on who the third party that aided the FBI might be but the Israeli press has not been so reticent. They have identified a company called Cellebrite, a digital forensics company located in Israel. It is reported that the company’s executive vice president for mobile forensics Leeor Ben-Peretz was recently in Washington consulting with clients. Ben-Peretz is Cellebrite’s marketing chief, fully capable of demonstrating the company’s forensics capabilities. Cellebrite reportedly has worked with the FBI before, having had a contract arrangement entered into in 2013 to provide decryption services.
Cellebrite was purchased by Japanese cellular telephone giant Suncorporation in 2007 but it is still headquartered and managed from Petah Tikva, Israel with a North American office in Parsippany, New Jersey and branches in Germany, Singapore and Brazil. It works closely with the Israeli police and intelligence services and is reported to have ties to both Mossad and Shin Bet. Many of its employees are former Israeli government employees who had worked in cybersecurity and telecommunications.
If Cellebrite is indeed the “third party” responsible for the breakthrough on the Apple problem, it must lead to speculation that the key to circumventing iPhone security is already out there in the small world of top level telecommunications forensic experts. It might reasonably be assumed that the Israeli government has access to the necessary technology, as well as Cellebrite’s Japanese owners. From there, the possibilities inevitably multiply.
Most countries obtain much of their high grade intelligence from communications intercepts. Countries like Israel, China, and France conduct much of their high-tech spying through exploitation of their corporate presence in the United States. Israel, in particular, is heavily embedded in the telecommunications industry, which permits direct access to confidential exchanges of information.
Israel has in fact a somewhat shady reputation in the United States when it comes to telecommunications spying. Two companies in particular—Amdocs and Comverse Infosys—have at times dominated their market niches in America. Amdocs, which has contracts with many of the largest telephone companies in the U.S. that together handle 90 percent of all calls made, logs all calls that go out and come in on the system. It does not retain the conversations themselves, but the records provide patterns, referred to as “traffic analysis,” that can provide intelligence leads. In 1999, the National Security Agency warned that records of calls made in the United States were winding up in Israel.
Comverse Infosys, which dissolved in 2013 after charges of conspiracy, fraud, money laundering and making false filings, provided wiretapping equipment to law enforcement throughout the United States. Because equipment used to tap phones for law enforcement is integrated into the networks that phone companies operate, it cannot be detected. Phone calls were intercepted, recorded, stored, and transmitted to investigators by Comverse, which claimed that it had to be “hands on” with its equipment to maintain the system. Many experts believe that it is relatively easy to create an internal cross switch that permits the recording to be sent to a second party, unknown to the authorized law-enforcement recipient. Comverse was also believed to be involved with NSA on a program of illegal spying directed against American citizens.
Comverse equipment was never inspected by FBI or NSA experts to determine whether the information it collected could be leaked, reportedly because senior government managers blocked such inquiries. According to a Fox News investigative report, which was later deleted from Fox’s website under pressure from various pro-Israel groups, DEA and FBI sources said post-9/11 that even to suggest that Israel might have been spying using Comverse was “considered career suicide.”
Some might argue that collecting intelligence is a function of government and that espionage, even between friends, will always take place. When it comes to smartphones, technical advances in phone security will provide a silver bullet for a time but the hackers, and governments, will inevitably catch up. One might assume that the recent revelations about the FBI’s capabilities vis-à-vis the iPhone indicate that the horse is already out of the stable. If Israel was party to the breaking of the security and has the technology it will use it. If the FBI has it, it will share it with other government agencies and even with foreign intelligence and security services.
Absent from the discussion regarding Apple are the more than 80 percent of smartphones used worldwide that employ the Google developed Android operating system that has its own distinct security features designed to block government intrusion. The FBI is clearly driven by the assumption that all smartphones should be accessible to law enforcement. The next big telecommunications security court case might well be directed against Google.
The rise of Donald Trump has led to predictions that the neoconservative dominance of Republican foreign policy is about to end, whether or not Trump wins. The Donald has challenged the perpetual military interventionism aspect of neocon-think without doing any damage to his campaign and, in the process, he has certainly noticed who the most strident voices being raised against him are.
Admittedly the prospect of a world blissfully free of neocons is appealing, but some observers have noted how the neoconservatives are chameleon like, blending in with whoever is controlling the levers of power and capable of moving from their original home in the Democratic Party over to the GOP—and then back again to the Democrats whenever it seems tactically advisable. Their eradication is far from a sure thing and one expects to see the neocon stalwarts Victoria Nuland and Robert Kagan at the top of any Hillary Clinton administration.
The effort to disparage Trump is to a considerable extent neocon driven, featuring the usual publications, as well as frequent television and radio appearances driven by Weekly Standard editor Bill Kristol’s talking points. Recently the Washington Post, as part of its own unrelenting campaign to destroy the Trump candidacy, has been featuring numerous articles attacking the candidate from every conceivable perspective. An op-ed queried seven “Republicans” regarding their own views of the Trump phenomenon plus their advice regarding what might be done to stop him. Former Congressman Eric Cantor stated flatly that “I don’t believe Donald Trump is a conservative” while Kristol called for mounting “an independent Republican candidacy in the general election.” Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute said Trump “is no conservative and will do lasting damage to the conservative movement,” a sentiment topped by Ari Fleischer’s assertion that “Trump is not really a Republican.”
This playing of word games is an effort to excommunicate individuals who do not fit into an acceptable template drawn by those who comprise the nation’s political elite. Congressman Ron Paul suffered from such attacks labeling him a libertarian when he ran for president. Pat Buchanan had preceded him, described by the neoconservative crowd as an anti-Semite and fascist. In reality, both were attacked for not being internationally interventionist enough to be considered true conservatives, which actually tells one more about the critics than it does about the victims of the denigration.
In its current incarnation, the Republican Party leadership, in going along with the charade, is essentially yielding to the neoconservative view that willingness to assert American leadership through overseas wars was and still is a sine qua non when it comes to being considered a conservative.
All of which makes one wonder about the abuse of the word “conservative.” Perhaps it is the neocons that should actually have the word stripped from their self-designation. The Republican Party has long been regarded as the home of “conservatism,” but that value has most often been linked to what have been regarded as family and traditional values, limited government, and, most particularly, an antipathy towards foreign wars. The GOP in Congress resisted President Woodrow Wilson’s and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s efforts to get America involved in both the First and Second World Wars, and also refused to join the League of Nations after the first war had ended. If anything, nonintervention was solidly in the GOP DNA.
But traditional reluctance to go to war on the part of Republicans was challenged when John F. Kennedy discovered a fictional “missile gap,” forcing the GOP for electoral reasons to become part of the developing national security consensus. It subsequently became the party of robust defense when Ronald Reagan sought to distinguish himself from the lackluster Jimmy Carter. Reagan’s term of office coincided with the appearance of the so-called “neoconservatives,” most notably at the Pentagon (a development that was, not coincidentally, combined with the final purges of the so-called Arabists at the State Department).
While it has often been noted that a group of like-minded individuals gradually commandeered the foreign and defense policy of the Republican Party starting in the 1970s, it is less frequently observed that the hijacking of the tag “conservatism” was itself also part of the process as a way to make the transition more palatable to the public and the GOP rank-and-file.
Many neoconservatives began as Communists. One of the founders of the movement, Irving Kristol, was a radical student at City College of New York in the 1930s. Kristol has been described as an anti-Soviet Trotskyite in his leanings prior to experiencing a political conversion in middle age. That meant advocacy of worldwide revolution, which for Kristol and his later associate Norman Podhoretz later morphed into endorsement of global pax Americana by force majeure.
Kristol famously quipped that he and his colleagues were liberals who were mugged by reality. The joke is amusing, but not completely convincing, since it begs the question of whose reality and to what end. Kristol himself described neoconservatives as “…unlike old conservatives because they are utilitarians, not moralists…”
Though Irving Kristol did not study under leading “neoconservative” theorist Leo Strauss at the University of Chicago, his belief in his own peer group of dedicated “intellectuals” as the leadership elements that would direct a broader movement was at its heart Straussian. Kristol summed up the Straussian view that
There are different kinds of truths for different kinds of people. There are truths appropriate for children; truths that are appropriate for students; truths that are appropriate for educated adults; and truths that are appropriate for highly educated adults, and the notion that there should be one set of truths available to everyone is a modern democratic fallacy. It doesn’t work.
In his own words, Kristol stated his belief that a robust U.S. military would be the catalyst for positive developments globally and most particularly for Israel. In 1973, Kristol attacked Democratic Presidential nominee George McGovern, stating that
Senator McGovern is very sincere when he says that he will try to cut the military budget by 30 percent. And this is to drive a knife in the heart of Israel… Jews don’t like big military budgets. But it is now an interest of the Jews to have a large and powerful military establishment in the United States… American Jews who care about the survival of the state of Israel have to say, no, we don’t want to cut the military budget, it is important to keep that military budget big, so that we can defend Israel.
Complicating the definition of neo-conservatism is the fact that there are several currents that have more-or-less come together to form the current incarnation. The historic roots of the movement derived from Kristol and Podhoretz are radical leftist, but there is another source of neoconservatives gathered around the former senator from Washington, Henry “Scoop” Jackson, who was liberal on social policies but a hard liner vis-à-vis defense and most particularly the Soviet Union. He was the source of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which tied relaxing trade policies with Moscow to the willingness of the Soviet government to allow Jews to emigrate. Prominent Scoop Jackson Democrats who became Republicans during the Reagan administration include Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams, Douglas Feith, and Ben Wattenberg. Wolfowitz had also been a student of Strauss at Chicago.
A third element that has joined the historic and Jacksonian traditions are the second generation neocons, to include Bill Kristol, John Bolton, Michael Rubin, Charles Krauthammer, Laurie Mylroie, Jennifer Rubin, Dennis Ross, the Kagans, the Makovskys, and Elliot Abrams. It is this generation who staffs the Washington foundations and think tanks that have been associated with neoconservative policies, including AEI, the Hudson Institute, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the Emergency Committee for Israel and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. They also are prominent in the Rupert Murdoch media empire and in publications to include the Weekly Standard, Commentary, National Review and the Washington Post. Many are fixtures on Sunday morning talk television. They are also heavily overrepresented in groups like the John Hay Initiative that have succeeded in shaping the foreign policy positions being taken by nearly all of the GOP presidential aspirants.
There is, of course, considerable mixing and cross fertilization among the neoconservative groups, meaning that they sometimes differ on issues that they consider secondary to their main foreign policy agenda. They are reticent or even silent on many social conservative issues, even accommodating a progressive viewpoint on abortion and gay marriage, education, and health care reform. They support open borders or are at least ambivalent about immigration, favor free trade, promote diversity and multiculturalism. Their failure to address these issues in a serious way reveals above all that they are not genuine conservatives and are more like a one-trick pony that only performs foreign policy.
So what do all neocons actually believe? The unifying principle of neoconservatism is the conviction that the United States has a moral duty to serve as the world’s policeman, preempting the development of challenges from rogue states, which has sometimes caustically been described as “invade the world.” In practical terms, this pursuit of de facto global hegemony means that military force is by default the first option in bilateral relations with foreign states. It also becomes necessary to manufacture an enemy or enemies that theoretically pose a significant threat. This role is currently being played by Russia, China, perennial favorite Iran, and the somewhat more amorphous “Islamo-fascism.”
The fearmongering is necessary for two reasons. First it justifies inflated military budgets that in turn keep the defense contractor money flowing to neoconservative organizations. Second, a robust military, per Irving Kristol’s thinking, guarantees that the United States will always be ready, willing, and available to protect Israel, an imperative derived from the perception that both the U.S. and Israel are morally exceptional states. All neoconservatives support military buildups and interventions, plus they all are zealous in their uncritical support of Israel, to such an extent that the two issues define them.
Confronting the neocons requires first of all exposing the fact that they are not actually conservatives by any reasonable definition. Peter Beinart agrees that the “incoherent definition” needs to be retired and wants to replace it with “imperialist.” Call them what you will, but exposing their exploitation of the conservative label that enables their parasitical relationship with the GOP is perhaps the simplest way to create some separation from their peculiar brand of internationalism. Whether that will make them disappear or not is perhaps debatable, but, at a minimum, it would prevent them from defining what an acceptable Republican party foreign policy might or should be. Donald Trump has for all his faults opened the door just a crack in bringing about that kind of change, including in his rant a direct criticism of the neocons. In that respect, one should most certainly wish him success.
Michael Hayden is the only official to have served as head of both the National Security Agency and CIA. Once retired from public service, the chief spy for much of the George W. Bush era has always had a difficult time staying out of the headlines.
At the NSA, the former Air Force general oversaw what many now consider to be the illegal warrantless surveillance of communications between individuals in the U.S. and alleged foreign terrorist groups. Later appointed CIA director by George W. Bush, Hayden served until 2009, when he resigned and joined the private security consulting Chertoff Group.
To publicize his new book, Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror, Hayden has ventured to criticize certain positions being taken by GOP presidential aspirant Donald Trump. He has in particular focused on Trump’s support of torture and his willingness to kill entire families of “terrorists.” Hayden has suggested that officers in the military can refuse to do either, even if ordered to do so by the president, because both actions are currently illegal under Pentagon guidelines. It is an odd position for him to take as he defends torture in his book and never challenged White House orders when he was at NSA.
Hayden also somewhat curiously disagrees with Trump and all the other Republican candidates in his unwillingness to support Obama administration efforts to obtain backdoors on security systems in place on telecommunications equipment. Hayden was referring specifically to attempts to coerce Apple to crack the security on its iPhones to obtain additional information relating to the San Bernardino terrorist attack. This position places him at odds with FBI director James Comey. Hayden, as a former director of the NSA, bases his opposition on his knowledge of how security systems can be broken. He asserts that once a breach is engineered into a system it becomes easy to compromise. If Apple were to do as the government is demanding, every iPhone could potentially be attacked down the road by criminal hackers as well as by government agencies acting without any legal authority.
Books by former top spies are generally self-serving, written to explain away the bad decisions made by the authors, a form of confession without any penance or even a mea culpa. They also frequently come with a whopping advance, $4 million in the case of the memoir authored by George Tenet in 2007. Publishers apparently think that anything written about spying is a potential best seller, even though the actual books most often turn out to be somewhat less than that and wind up on remainder piles.
The disappointment in books written by ex-spooks is derived from the fact that they really cannot tell the reader anything interesting as all of that sort of thing remains classified. That means that they talk about process and decision making, which is generally quite boring, requiring them to rely on dramatis personae to create literary tension—with characters like Dick Cheney and Scooter Libby plus assorted world leaders popping into and out of the room like players in a Pirandello comedy. But even the antics of Cheney and Libby tend to pall after the first 30 pages.
What is interesting, however, is the revelation to the public of how a senior official whose entire life has been in the intelligence profession as a top-level bureaucrat thinks. I am not speaking of folks in the middle of the machine like myself, who kvetched regularly about the layers of intransigent management throughout the intelligence community. I am talking about the true believers who ran the machine and actually had a stake in determining what it did and how it did it. In that sense, Hayden’s book and his interviews have been quite revealing.
Hayden was directly involved in two newsworthy projects—the warrantless surveillance and data mining under George W. Bush and the targeted assassination program that was developed under Barack Obama. He enabled both and also supported rendition and torture, raising no questions about the ethics of what was being demanded by the White House. In defending the warrantless surveillance program, Hayden focuses on its legality, ignoring the fact that it produced little or nothing useful while at the same time damaging relations with key allies and compromising the personal security of an untold number of American citizens.
Hayden persists in some views that have long since been discredited, believing, for example, that torture produced information that was vital to the killing of Osama bin Laden. He dismisses 2014’s meticulously researched Senate Intelligence Committee report, which criticized Hayden for misleading the committee and came to a dramatically different conclusion. Hayden has also joined the chorus insisting that the report was flawed because it was written by “Democrats.”
While CIA director, Hayden likewise resisted the release of the Bush Justice Department torture memos, arguing that to do so would damage CIA morale. In fact, when the memos were released they demonstrated how flimsy the government case was for proceeding with the “enhanced interrogation” program.
It appears that Hayden never actually was engaged in any espionage at the working level, but he managed America’s two preeminent spy agencies, dealing with his customers in the government and his counterparts overseas while making adjustments to keep up the morale of his thousands of employees after they came under attack for the Bush-era policies. As the title of his book suggests, he saw his role as director of NSA and later CIA in simple terms. That was to do anything he could to respond to White House demands for “more” information while providing options to disrupt terrorist activity by doing absolutely everything possible—“up to the edge” of limits imposed by law and the constitution. This meant in practice that he was more interested in the letter rather than in the spirit of the law, so any green light from a government lawyer was considered to be enough of a fig leaf to move ahead. And proceeding with a course of action also included routinely deferring to the hysterical demands of unreliable politicians who themselves feared not “doing enough” in the eyes of the public.
In attempting to carry out his inevitably poorly defined mission to protect the country, Hayden sees certain intrinsic obstacles. They include politicians too weak-kneed to have a clear vision of what needs to be done and those who would expose what the government is doing. George W. Bush and Dick Cheney emerge from the book as exemplary no-nonsense leaders while Obama and and a number of leading Democrats are timid, guilt-ridden, and indecisive. The lurking media is always the enemy.
But Hayden’s book also includes some moments of serious introspection. He admits that the intelligence community, existing as it does in a bubble, has often connected poorly with the public, the media and even with government oversight. He accepts that changes are needed to explain the importance of the intelligence product and almost welcomes the Edward Snowden revelations as some kind of wake-up call, even though he makes clear how much he despises the messenger.
In spite of his willingness to ignore the collateral damage caused by many poorly conceived U.S. government programs that he oversaw, Michael Hayden is not a monster. And one might even argue, relying on his first person account, that the Cheneys and Bushes of this world are often unfairly maligned as they sought to deal with a post-9/11 situation that was both unprecedented and unimaginable. It may have been beyond anyone’s ability to craft a proportionate and effective response to assuage the fear gripping the nation, as strident demands to “do something” came from politicians and the media alike.
Hayden, perhaps understandably, does not dwell much on the disasters in Iraq and Afghanistan, self-inflicted wounds far removed from any justification provided by the panic around 9/11. He focuses on terrorism, not foreign policy, and certainly thought that freedom to tap phones and take other extraordinary steps was all about the salvation of the Republic and not an attack on the Constitution or rule of law. But now, 15 years later, there is perspective. It behooves the architects of the “war on terror” policies to come to grips with the mistakes that were made then—and that continue to be winked at now. As we have seen in the case of the violent GOP reaction to Trump’s denunciation of the Iraq War, self-criticism beyond a certain point is not yet to be expected, either from the writers of insider memoirs or most of those seeking the presidency.
It is widely understood that a number of federal government agencies monitor and even seek to infiltrate jihadist websites. But a program initiated in 2009 to debate the visitors to extremist Islamic sites has yet to find a comfortable organizational niche. The so-called “counterpropaganda” effort against the terrorist Internet is run out of the White House by the deputy national security advisor for strategic communications and the National Security Council’s senior director for global engagement. The actual outreach to individuals visiting the websites has been overseen by the office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, tasked with “engaging, informing and influencing foreign publics.”
Given the layers of bureaucracy, it is surprising that anything was accomplished, but State Department linguists were finally up and running in 2012 in what was labeled a “Viral Peace” initiative, which trolled radical sites anonymously to argue with militants and sometimes confuse them. This was followed in 2013 by a program that included State Department staffers who identified themselves online as U.S. government employees. They attempted to enter into discussions refuting extremist views, but they found they were treated with little respect by would-be jihadis.
The program has now morphed into something called “Peer to Peer: Challenging Extremism,” which is run by the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, as a joint project with the Department of Homeland Security and Facebook. In conjunction with universities around the world, the project seeks to “empower students to design and pilot new digital products and tools that counter violent extremist narratives and reach those susceptible to violent extremism messaging.” It produces anti-terrorism campaigns using what is referred to as “counter-speech” to debate radical viewpoints. Organizers claim that there is little U.S.-government input into the content and reject charges that it is “a different type of propaganda.” They prefer to describe it as “authentic.”
Facebook is providing much of the seed money and operational costs, as well as training the students in online message optimization. In its current run, 45 universities competed over a period of 15 weeks. Its six finalists represented schools in Pakistan, Switzerland, Kuwait, and Finland, plus two American colleges, the University of Arkansas and West Point—which shows that the effort is not just limited to overseas. In fact, the program’s director, Homeland Security’s George Selim, has said, “the issue I’m concerned with most is the recruitment and radicalization of young people, specifically in the United States.” The first time the program ran, in early 2015, the winner was Missouri State University.
The assumption is that students will instinctively understand how best to argue points on social media, which may or may not be true. But unfortunately, these gentler efforts to reach out to those being radicalized might soon be preempted by an antsy Congress, which is seeking to compel the companies that run the social networking sites to report “terrorist activity,” and by political candidates like Hillary Clinton, who are calling for aggressive steps to “deprive jihadists of virtual territory.”
The recent carnage in Ankara comes at a good time for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan has been demanding that the United States and other NATO allies support him in his war against the Kurds of Syria, who are, incidentally, regarded as allies by Washington in the war against ISIS. The Turks have been bombarding Kurdish positions and staging special ops raids, warning the Kurds against the dangers of becoming too successful in their drive to occupy territory vacated by a retreating ISIS. Erdogan has been fulminating constantly about how the Kurds are all terrorists and therefore the real enemy, along the way insisting angrily that the United States join him in that assessment. “Choose me or the terrorists!” he recently demanded of a U.S. delegation, elaborating that anyone who is a friend of the Kurds will not have a friend in Turkey.
The Turkish president is not only calling for a war against the Kurds. The conflict is already metastasizing into something like a civil war, with The Economist describing Turkey’s southeastern region as a “simmering cauldron of violence.” Erdogan has also thrown down the gauntlet against the opposition parties in his own parliament, some of whom he has also described as “terrorists.” Having already hobbled his country’s press, its judiciary, its military and law enforcement and having made it a crime to protest against his policies or “insult” government officials, he is now intent on obtaining for himself near dictatorial powers as president. Erdogan is currently seeking to force through legislation that would grant him the new authority he seeks even though he lacks sufficient votes to do so. His language in dealing with his own countrymen is replete with the usual fabrications, threats and admonishments that have made him a worldwide sensation over the past two years.
As Erdogan passionately wants his war and his mandate, the Ankara bombing comes at a perfect time for him. Which should be suspicious. The Turkish military high command is known to be strongly opposed to any large scale intervention in Syria, but the killing of soldiers by the bombers might be intended to undermine its resistance. Inevitably, a Syrian Kurd of unknown antecedents has been blamed by name for the attack and also linked to Turkey’s own Kurds. Kurdish leaders both in Syria and Turkey deny any knowledge of the incident, though one spokesman conceded that it might have been a rogue attack staged by victims of the recent Turkish crack down on the Kurdish region of the country. A Kurdish splinter group the Kurdish Freedom Hawks (TAK) has taken credit, but it contradicts what Turkey is claiming about the provenance of the attack and might be a ploy intended to enhance the group’s reputation. But to be sure, apart from revenge the Kurds logically would have no motive to provoke an onslaught by the overwhelmingly more powerful Turkish military. Quite the contrary.
The bombing comes on top of Turkey’s dangerous—and suspicious—shoot-down of a Russian warplane, in which the decision to take decisive action against Moscow must surely have come from the top level of the government in Ankara. The Russian plane could not have been construed as being hostile to Turkey and a relatively minor incursion, if it indeed took place, could only explain the incident if there was actually a Turkish plan in place to engage a Russian plane as soon as it could be plausibly claimed that there had been a violation of airspace. Why? Because Russia was demonstrating considerable success in pushing back the rebels which, pari passu, was enabling the Kurds in Syria to expand their area of control. For Erdogan, it always comes down to the Kurds.
One can reasonably argue that Turkey’s present desperation is a direct product of President Erdogan’s miscalculations. He deliberately abandoned efforts to maintain a ceasefire with the Kurds and instead escalated the conflict with them when he began bombarding their positions in Syria in the Summer of 2015. The return to the “Kurds as terrorists” meme was politically motivated, intended to discredit the opposition People’s Democratic Party (HDP), which is largely Kurdish, prior to national elections. Erdogan also continued to insist that Bashir al-Assad be removed in Syria, even though that has proven to be an unattainable goal and his decision to bring down a Russian plane was tactically unwise as well as bad news for a struggling Turkish economy.
Given Erdogan’s apparent willingness to take seemingly high risk steps in support of his domestic and foreign agendas, one must inevitably pose the question: “Was this bombing in Ankara a false flag attack carried out by Erdogan to justify a war and give him increased authority, both of which are linked?” Those who discount such a possibility would no doubt argue that no contemporary government leader would conspire to kill his own people under such circumstances. Or would they?
The Turkish people wisely are resistant to military engagement outside their country’s borders so the government of Erdogan has considered desperate expedients to create a casus belli to justify waging its own personal war against the Kurds on Syrian soil. The reality is that Turkey has suffered a number of “terrorist” attacks over the past two years, some of which are certainly suspicious in that they came at a time when the government was fearmongering before elections or seeking popular support for a war in Syria. In each case the attribution to Kurds or ISIS has been somewhat suspect or based solely on assertions made by the Turkish government, seemingly without any independent corroboration. If they were indeed false flag attacks, some steps would likely have been taken to delude the actual bombers or shooters regarding who was actually ordering the attack. Kurdish speaking Turkish intelligence officers could easily and plausibly have represented themselves as Kurds, for example.
Recent attacks inside Turkey that have been credited to ISIS or the Kurds might just as reasonably be credited to the Turkish intelligence service MIT based on the principle of “Cui bono?” or “who benefits?” One bombing in Ankara last October, attributed alternatively to ISIS and to Kurds, killed 102 and was particularly suspicious coming as it did shortly before elections. It targeted a peace march that included many Kurds, making it a perfect target to sow discord. It was inevitably exploited to increase government pressure on the Kurdish minority and to weaken the opposition HDP. The tactic was, in the event, successful as Erdogan succeeded in reestablishing his parliamentary majority.
Several so-called ISIS attacks directed against Turkish soldiers and policemen have also been used to create the impression to the U.S. and NATO allies that Turkey was actually in the fight against the Islamic State even though it really was not. One complaint made by the Kurds in 2015 was that the Turks were facilitating the movement of ISIS along the border to attack Kurdish positions. The White House, frustrated by the Turkish inaction, was not fooled by the charade but it felt that it was in no position to contradict Erdogan as it needed to be able to use the NATO airbase at Incirlik, which the Turkish president controlled.
But perhaps the most telling, and chilling, incident relating to Erdogan and his intelligence service cronies is something that did not happen. Back in 2014, a secret telephone recording made by police investigating criminal activity by some family members within the government inner circle revealed that the then-prime minister had conspired with his intelligence chief Hakan Fidan and his Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to stage a false flag attack on the tomb of Turkish Sultan Suleyman Shah, which for historical reasons is located inside Syria and is guarded by Turkish soldiers. Davutoglu told Fidan “The Prime Minister [Erdogan] said that in current conjuncture, this attack (on the Suleyman Shah Tomb) must be seen as an opportunity for us.” Fidan responded “I’ll make up a cause of war by ordering a missile attack on Turkey.” In the event, the attack did not take place but if it had it might have meant killing fellow Turks to create a casus belli that would have justified massive retaliation and direct intervention in Syria.
Would Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan be willing to kill his own soldiers to create an incident that would enable him to advance his own agenda? The answer is apparently yes. Were the bombers in Ankara on February 18 somehow instigated or set up by the Turkish intelligence agency MIT? The answer might never be known, but President Obama, in his phone call expressing condolences to Erdogan over the bombing, carefully avoided endorsing Turkish claims that Syrian Kurds had been behind the attack. As the actual perpetrators remain somewhat of a mystery, it would behoove Washington to be very cautious before climbing on to the Turkish bandwagon.
The question of how to balance government surveillance with individual privacy is really quite simple. On one side the government believes that the investigation of someone who is either planning or has actually carried out a crime should be without any conditions, that all evidence potentially relating to the event should be accessible to law enforcement. On the other side, citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their day to day activities, meaning that the government should have to demonstrate indisputable “probable cause” to a judge before undertaking any intrusion into an individual’s private space. And even then, the intrusion should be narrowly defined to include only the actual criminal activity under investigation.
The problem comes in where the two principles collide, particularly as the new national security relationship between government and governed is still being laboriously defined in the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelations about the extent of American and British communications monitoring. The manufacturers of telephones and the providers of internet and phone services, which inhabit an uncomfortable space between the government and the public, have inevitably become the new zone of conflict. Apple, maker of the world’s most well known smartphone, has recently found itself in these crosshairs.
Companies such as Apple market hardware and communications services globally based on a presumption that the systems are secure, meaning that they are resistant to being hacked or accessed by either criminals or the government. As a result, security features have been incorporated that are at least in theory unbreakable, some of which are referred to as “end to end encryption” where only the sender and receiver can have access. Sophisticated security systems reportedly have so many variables built into them that they can only be broken by a computer capable of running thousands or even millions of numerical combinations. Such computers exist at NSA but they are unable to defeat a second feature that some phones have, which is a delete function that wipes the phone memory clean of data after 10 tries to break the security system are attempted.
The national security community, for its part, maintains that any communications system must have a “backdoor,” that is a point through which access can be obtained that bypasses or disables the security or passcode and reveals the contents. To further complicate the issue, a federal judge has now entered into the conversation, ordering Apple to “unlock” the iPhone that was used by Syed Rizwan Farook, one of the two terrorists who killed 14 people in San Bernardino California on December 2. The FBI reportedly has been seeking to access the phones for over two months without success and is claiming that Apple has been uncooperative in revealing the technology involved.
Apple’s Chief Executive Tim Cook responded to the demand with a refusal, saying that the “U.S. government has asked us for something we simply do not have, and something we consider too dangerous to create.” Cook went on to state that any attempt to create a backdoor would weaken the overall integrity of the security system, making it susceptible to hacking and other cyber intrusion. And he also correctly noted that many people store substantial information on their phones, meaning that the government or a criminal would have access to personal data far beyond the record of who has been calling whom and when.
All the phone’s peripheral information would become vulnerable and there is no way to guarantee that the government would not access information that has nothing to do with its investigation. Indeed, the past 15 years would suggest that the government cannot be trusted whenever it is presented with an opportunity to overreach. And once a key is developed to compromise the security of even one phone it can be used on all phones that use the operating system, which means any one of the millions of Apple phones.
Cook did not note his other concern—creating a backdoor for the U.S. government would cost Apple much of its huge overseas market, after consumers there turned to other phones with unbreakable encryption. It would be devastating for the company.
The Apple chief also expressed another concern, that bowing to the FBI demand would inevitably lead to new administratively imposed requirements, where the “government could extend this breach of privacy and demand that Apple build surveillance software to intercept your messages, access your health records or financial data, track your location, or even access your phone’s microphone or camera without your knowledge.”
Apple quite likely also understands that any key provided to the FBI would not just be destroyed after use. It would be shared with the CIA and NSA and likely with foreign partners like the British and Israelis, who would not be reluctant to use the new toy. Cook is certainly aware of legislation pending in Great Britain. The British government security services, like the FBI, are particularly concerned over phone encryption and a new law would require the companies involved to “decrypt” desired information when presented with a warrant to do so. It is unclear what would happen next if the company cannot comply because no such technical option exists, as Apple argues, but the British government might well demand that such a feature be incorporated into new operating software. If the company failed to comply, it could be subject to punitive fines or even have its business operation shut down in the UK.
And there is also considerable debate over proposed British government monitoring of the internet, which is likely a harbinger of what might be coming worldwide. Additional legislation being proposed by Home Secretary Theresa May as part of a package of new laws designed to enable the police and security services to have freer access to a whole range of communications services would require technology companies to retain all “internet connection records” for 12 months.
That means that any time you send or receive something or go to a website, the information would be saved and would be accessible to the police. And it would all take place without either judicial oversight or any requirement for a warrant. Interestingly, the legislation is being promoted as a tool to investigate child pornography sites, but it would no doubt be used much more extensively if it becomes law. As in the frequently abused FBI surveillance using National Security Letters, the target of the investigation would have no knowledge that he was being looked at and the communications provider would be forbidden by law from revealing to the customer that anything was taking place.
Nearly everyone would likely agree that revealing the contents of terrorist Syed Farook’s phone would be desirable. But if doing so would also make all Apple smartphones vulnerable to government intrusion, it would be the devil’s own bargain—trading away a fundamental liberty for a tool that the security services would undoubtedly find helpful, though it is unlikely to be a game changer. And as soon as militants learn that some of their phones are vulnerable, they would undoubtedly find other ways to communicate, as they have done in the past.
Government inevitably pushes for more power to define the rules it operates under in such a way as to sanction behavior that once upon a time would have been considered unacceptable. In this case, it is important to understand that the Farook iPhone is not just a single phone owned by a terrorist, as the FBI would have one believe. It instead constitutes a wedge issue, representing the government’s insistence that everyone’s zone of privacy should be defined by some bureaucrat’s interpretation of “making you safe.” Developing an iPhone backdoor to find out whom Farook talked to would be a very bad bargain.
Earlier this year, Seymour Hersh, America’s leading investigative journalist, published an intriguing article on U.S. policy towards the growing conflict in Syria and Iraq. “Military to Military,” which appeared in the London Review of Books, maintains that the Pentagon’s intelligence analysts have, since 2013, been advising against the White House policy of removing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, arguing that it would create a power vacuum in the country that would inevitably be exploited by groups like ISIS. The analysts cited the examples of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya as examples of what might go wrong. They also argued that arming a group of “moderate” rebels to overthrow the Damascus government was delusional because even moderates were of necessity entering into “accommodations” with radical groups.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also observed that the more extreme rebels were being supplied with weapons by feckless allies, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, who were exploiting the crisis in support of their own narrowly construed agendas. They attributed the White House obsession with al-Assad to a Cold War type of mentality born of the view that Syria is a client state of Russia, which continues to be seen as the principal challenge to U.S. global hegemony. It is not a view that the Pentagon embraces, seeing a much more complicated evolving threat situation in the heart of the Arab world that has little or nothing to do with great power rivalry.
According to Hersh, after being ignored by the White House, the Department of Defense began pushing back behind the scenes to undermine the administration policy on al-Assad by sharing intelligence with a number of foreign liaison services—to include Russia, Germany, and Israel—that it knew would be leaked to the Syrian government. The “leaks” of intelligence started in the summer of 2013 and continued until 2015, with the intention of strengthening Damascus’s ability to resist opposition forces, most particularly al-Nusra and ISIS. The information being shared was regarded as “military to military” exchanges and neither the White House nor the State Department was briefed regarding it.
As the United States has also been simultaneously arming and training the so-called “moderate” opposition forces, the possible support of al-Assad would suggest that Washington has been engaged on both sides of the conflict, which is quite possibly an accurate assessment. One expects a certain lack of coherence in the foreign policy emanating from the Barack Obama White House, but what is particularly disturbing is the “Seven Days in May” suggestion that the Pentagon might be running its own unconstitutional foreign policy without the consent of the nation’s civilian leadership.
To be sure, there have been rumblings of discontent from the Pentagon that might have suggested that something was not quite right. Former Defense Secretaries Leon Panetta and Robert Gates have complained in their memoirs that the national security policy process was increasingly being micromanaged by the White House, which itself was nevertheless unable to exercise effective leadership to establish priorities.
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel resigned in late 2014 reportedly because he had been disconcerted by a lack of clarity coming out of the White House. He reportedly objected to the increasingly secretive National Security Council (NSC) usurpation of security policy decision making that hitherto had been shared with the Defense Department. He also had sharp disagreements with National Security Advisor Susan Rice over contradictions in the policy against ISIS, arguing that a well-articulated program to address the terrorism threat as a regional issue rather than as distinct problems in Iraq and Syria was essential. He also questioned the lack of any clear policy towards the Syrian government. Hagel, a decorated Vietnam War veteran, was eventually asked to resign and was replaced by non-veteran bean counter Ash Carter, who has carefully not made waves while characteristically pushing issues like gender equality in the military’s combat arms to the fore.
Hersh’s article has only received limited reviews, most of which have been somewhat disparaging, quite likely because a rogue Pentagon is the worst nightmare of every establishment politician and journalist. And, to be sure, there has been some questioning of the “facts” as well as judgments made in his piece, though they have not refuted his central thesis. To be fair, Sy Hersh undoubtedly has top-level sources in the Pentagon and he is meticulous in his fact checking but there is always a possibility that a source might well be embellishing a tale or exaggerating his or her own involvement in it.
As chance would have it, I have recently had candid discussions with two current members of the National Security Council who will have to remain nameless. The first one dropped a bombshell, to my mind, by observing that President Obama, like Bill Clinton, is largely indifferent to intelligence reports. He rarely reads the digests that are presented to him each morning and prefers to make decisions based on his own instincts and what he is being told by his advisors.
The second official, who has been on the NSC since Obama took office, explained the Obama world view. He said that Obama has been convinced by his three closest foreign policy advisors—Rice, Valerie Jarrett, and Samantha Power—that the top U.S. foreign policy priority should be the “responsibility to protect,” or R2P as it is abbreviated. He described how the Obama team sees the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, in which at least half a million mostly Tutsi tribesmen died while the world looked on, as equivalent to the way in which neoconservatives view the Holocaust, leading them to act as if it’s always 1938 in Munich. The interventions in both Libya and Syria can be explained in those terms: a bid to prevent mass slaughter of civilians without any particular regard for what comes afterwards or what the strategic consequences might be. If Obama agrees in principle to keep substantial numbers of American troops in Afghanistan past 2017, the reasoning and possible consequences will be the same.
Given the basic White House prejudice of protecting civilians as the top priority, it becomes easy to understand why Bashar al-Assad is seen as the fundamental problem in the Syria fandango. Al-Assad, it is generally agreed, has killed more Syrians than have the rebels, which makes him the principal enemy. What is ignored in that calculation is the actual U.S. interest in the conflict, which is, to put it in its simplest terms, that ISIS and al-Nusra actually directly threaten the United States while al-Assad does not.
This deliberate unwillingness on the part of the White House to discern a simple truth regarding the conflict has been noted recently by an increasing number of journalists and even politicians. Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard and Virginia State Senator Dick Black, both of whom are veterans, have publicly challenged the implications of the current U.S. policy.
The White House inclination to respond to claims of genocide as the principal driver of policy was prominent in the 2011 intervention in Libya. Investigative journalist Gareth Porter has described how the Defense Intelligence Agency studied the Libyan situation and concluded that probability of mass killings taking place if Gaddafi were to remain in place was based only on “speculative arguments.” It warned correctly and presciently that no actual U.S. interest would be served by intervention, which would only open the door to an extremist takeover of the government.
Porter also recounts how in an eerie parallel to later developments in Syria, the White House approved a plan to cooperate with Qatari government attempts to arm the Libyan rebels. Washington soon discovered that the weapons went mostly to the most radical groups, including the al-Qaeda affiliate.
According to Porter, the U.S. military’s African Command persisted even after the bombing began, arranging a cease fire directly with Gaddafi which would enable him to step down and turn over the reins of government to his army, which would preempt an extremist takeover. The State Department under Hillary Clinton refused to consider such an option. When it was reported that Gaddafi had been killed she laughed and quipped, “We came, we saw, he died.”
The heaping-Ossa-upon-Pelion history of regrettably poor policy choices made by the White House brings one back to the beginning. Is Sy Hersh possibly correct in describing Pentagon pushback against administration policies? And if so, what does that mean in terms of civilian control of the military? As both Hersh and Porter observe, the activity by the generals did not change policy one bit—and one might also imagine that it would be a brave flag officer who would jeopardize his career by engaging in activity that would be unlikely to have any real impact.
I would suspect there is more than a touch of hyperbole in the tale of generals engaging in derring-do to tweak the nose of the White House and I would add that the rebellion by the Joint Chiefs, if it occurred as described, is really little more than a display of petulance. But it is nevertheless interesting to note the depth of unhappiness among professionals in government with the administration’s stop-and-go policies in the Middle East. It is also important to recognize that the collaborative bureaucratic process that once upon a time generated foreign policy has largely been abandoned under the Obamas and one might observe, parenthetically, that U.S. president presumptive Hillary Clinton was part and parcel of the new reality both for Libya and Syria. More recently, she has called for a no-fly zone for Syria which might well lead to the shooting down of Russian planes. I wonder what the Joint Chiefs of Staff think about that?
In his final State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama noted in passing that the United States spends as much on defense as the next eight countries combined. He might have added that the proportions are similar for the Foreign Service and the intelligence community, which cost $50 billion and an estimated $80 billion respectively. The president might well have asked why, if that is so, is there so little bang for the buck in terms of what the U.S. taxpayer gets in return.
To be sure, no one has invaded the United States since Pancho Villa in 1916, but every war fought after 1945 has been either unnecessary, inconclusive, or a failure while the intelligence community is repeatedly caught flat footed in terms of anticipating the moves of both competitors and enemies. And a string of 294 fortress-like diplomatic missions around the world has done little to lessen foreign concerns over the seemingly persistent blundering of an imperial Washington that sometimes seems to be more concerned with style than substance. The Embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan is, for example, currently sponsoring an “I Love English” video contest.
With that in mind, I carefully followed the commentary on 2012’s Benghazi incident in which four Americans, including J. Christopher Stevens, the Ambassador to Libya, were killed. The tale has become something of a political football, but I was more interested in trying to determine how the response actually worked once it became clear that the consular offices were under attack.
The printed and cinematic accounts of the events in Benghazi are very similar but the Washington Post provided some additional insights through its interview of the CIA’s chief of base in the city, who was identified only as “Bob” as he is retired but still under cover. Bob was willing to talk to the newspaper because he believed that the both the book and film had maligned him, having the character who played him order a “stand down,” which delayed by at least 20 minutes the arrival of the Agency security response team at the site where the ambassador and a State Department colleague were in hiding and subsequently found dead of smoke inhalation.
Bob and at least one other CIA officer have stated that no one was ever ordered to stand down but two other officers from the security team, the sources for both book and movie, claim otherwise. Part of the delay in sending off the team, according to Bob, consisted of attempting to contact local Libyan militias for clarification of what was occurring as well as for armed assistance, if needed. Help was not forthcoming but finger pointing over what had occurred and why continued after the CIA base was attacked the following morning. The diplomatic and CIA facilities were both evacuated on the following day. Clearly there was no love lost between the chief of base and his security team.
The Post article describes Bob as a CIA case officer who had served in Latin America but who had also done tours in Afghanistan and Iraq. I do not think I know Bob, but I do know enough about Agency personnel management to guess that he speaks Spanish pretty well but no Pashto and, more to the point, little or no Arabic. Which means he was not an ideal choice for the position because he would be in a highly volatile environment working through an interpreter and in all likelihood the interpreter would be someone provided by the local militias or even someone who walked into the compound and who could speak good English. The interpreter, who might represent almost anything politically speaking, thus becomes the key link in trying to determine what was occurring, and the American officer on the ground would have to defer to the judgement and translating skills of someone whose actual loyalties would be difficult or impossible to assess.
The Benghazi brouhaha recalls an incident at Camp Chapman, near Khost in Afghanistan. The killing of seven CIA officers in 2009, the largest single toll of Agency officers since the Beirut Embassy bombing in 1984, appeared to have been a wake-up call, but perhaps not. The after-action assessment had noted that the Chief of Base Jennifer Matthews, a career analyst, may have been at least partly responsible for the security lapses that led to the deaths. She had been given the position because she aggressively lobbied for the field assignment to help advance her career and the Agency, foolishly, ignored the fact that she had not had the appropriate training and was not experienced enough to be in charge in a war zone.
So people sometimes wind up in the wrong places and as a result people die. But one has to suspect that having the wrong person in the wrong place at the wrong time is somehow systemic in the federal government, particularly related to those individuals who have to do official tours overseas. When I was a non-commissioned officer in the United States Army during the Vietnam War, complaints from officers and non-coms about the rotation system were frequent. One-year tours in Vietnam meant that soldiers were just learning how to do their jobs when they were replaced by someone new who had to learn all over again how to survive. Many did not live through the learning curve and one might reasonably suppose that some thousands of American soldiers might have come home alive if the system had been able to maximize combat effectiveness.
At that time, career officers going to Vietnam would seek safe billets whenever possible but would also speak of having their “tickets punched,” meaning that they needed to have Vietnam active duty on their service records if they were to have any hope of promotion. Currently, both CIA and the Foreign Service as well as the military rotate personnel through countries like Afghanistan and Iraq on one and two-year assignments unaccompanied by their families. The short tour is designed to make up for being unaccompanied but it results in inexperienced officers regularly replacing other officers who have only limited experience. It is a form of “ticket punching” and is a formula for failure.
To be sure, there are administrative problems in having a sufficient number of highly qualified Arabic and Pashto speakers available to fill sensitive assignments, but one would think that after 15 years of the global war on terror someone might have figured out a solution. It takes two years to learn Arabic up to a functional level and no one in mid-career is willing to spend that time and effort, particularly as language training is not particularly career enhancing. So American military officers, intelligence personnel, and even diplomats often tend to be the blind leading the blind when they arrive at an overseas post where the local language is challenging.
And the situation for easier European languages is not necessarily much better as even college-educated Americans rarely learn how to speak a foreign language. In the 1980s a run of five chiefs of station in Italy included only one who could speak Italian. Of 20 or so officers serving in Turkey only one could speak Turkish. A deputy director for operations was so perturbed by the inability of CIA case officers to speak the local language that he blocked assignments for those whose test scores were woeful. After a couple of months he gave up, aware that the problem was insoluble.
In truth the language problem is just one symptom of the “ticket punch” career management that prevails in certain parts of the federal government. Like musical chairs, everyone moves every two years, more or less. And it is not because it is necessary to operate that way because not everyone else in the world of diplomacy and intelligence does the same thing. Back in the old Cold War days, Soviet case officers studied foreign languages and cultures for years before arriving on post. They would even buy clothing and shoes locally to fit in visually. And they would stay on target for years, becoming over time experts on the nuances of their working environment. The British and French operate the same way, having officers in place for years at a time, building up their local expertise. For Americans, the constant rotation of officers was often explained by management not wanting its foot soldiers to “go native.” That chicanery aside, who would be able to work better in the foreign environment, the American or the Russian? Who is more effective today?
So the United States has a lot of its representatives overseas who do not speak the local language and who do not have a clue regarding what the local people are doing or thinking. They generally only serve short tours and their countdown to departure sometimes starts on the day they arrive. It is a bad bargain and it is the reason why disasters like Benghazi and Khost happen. And they will continue to happen because the government fails to address the real problem in training and doctrine—while continuing to spend ever more money on building bigger and better security bubbles for its facilities and people overseas.