Your point that Iraq, Astan, and other counterinsurgencies like Vietnam because “conventional” armies didnt get coin and therfore the delta in experience and training was decisive and produced loss is simply not supported by the historical record. However, the very batch of Coindinistas that you so glowingly shower praise over have built a cottage industry of sorts over the years and have constructed a false reality that it has.

The bloody shirt of lack of coin experience and training briefs well and ostensibly gives you a moral base for your argument, but history does not support it.

My advice to you would be to stop reading Krepinevich on Vietnam and start reading Birtle; and stop reading Ricks on Iraq and start reading On Point II by Don Wright and Tim Reese.

Despite having read your post a number of times I simply can’t understand your argument.

In the first place you take up Bacevich for supposedly not having any options, but of course his option was that we not invade Iraq in the first place and, I’m pretty sure, we didn’t stay in Afghanistan after trying to get bin Laden and try to “nation-build” it.

But as to your own option, here’s what you say:

“Having served in Afghanistan, I see the results of such immediate disengagements on our reputation in the world. The biggest fear of many common Afghans is that we will leave. It is our demonstrated pattern of action in the recent past. We have a history of rushing in, buggering things up, and leaving.”

Ergo, the solution according to you then is that we *stay*? For how long? Longer than the Brits tried in India? 25 years? 50? 100?

The problem is that a goodly chunk of the entire history of the last century is that colonialist/imperialist adventures have *never* seemed to get it right. They’ve *always* had to leave because, gee, it turns out that people tend not to like seeing their country occupied.

And of *course* the bulk of the Afghanis that talked to you and etc. seemed to fear you leaving; that always happens in colonial/imperial adventures, and even leads the colonialists and imperialists to believe “the people” love them. Except that that’s a self-selecting group; by *definition* the ones who deal with you are the ones who, in the main, don’t mind your presence or, more likely, see some advantage for themselves in you being there. But that don’t make ‘em a majority. And even amongst those who *do* talk and deal with you there’s a goodly number who only love you during the day. But when it gets dark it turns out they are storing arms for the VC, or giving Intell to the Taliban telling ‘em where to plant their next IED, or etc., etc.

You then try to lay the need for us doing as we are in the ME due to “globalization,” which for the life of me I miss. Is there any other country on the face of the entire planet that has *less* to do with globalization than Afghanistan? Burundi maybe?

You then somewhat end by saying:

“By failing to grasp realities, conservatives have abdicated any meaningful role in influencing the developing doctrines and foreign policy behaviors that will shape our role over the course of the next 50 to 100 years.”

I dunno about 50 to 100, but I certainly hope it’s the case for the next few decades at least until they get over their addiction to foreign adventuring. (If they ever do.) Adopting Vietnam, and now this ….

And it seems to me to be an admirable effort at chutzpah to condemn those opposed to the so-called conservative Bush/Republican Party foreign affairs ideas as being “unrealistic.” The entire country just spoke via some elections you may have noticed. And in terms of embracing Mr. Bush’s ideas and legacy the rather roaring sound you heard was the electoral equivalent of a horselaugh. And yet it’s those being *laughed* at (and rejected) who are the clear-eyed realists? Those “realists” who aren’t just gung-ho for *nation*-building, but indeed think we ought to embark on some *civilization*-building and “reforming” of all of Islam?

*They* are the ones with the gimlet eyes?

They don’t even seem to understand their own countrymen much less the millions upon millions of Iraqis and Afghanis they think they can mold.

Cheers

The fact is, if there are no wars to fight, the people at places like CNAS, especially the counter-insurgents, are far less relevant to the policy arena. They all have an interest in the “political reality” being shaped in a certain way, to support fighting counter-insurgencies in places like Afghanistan. If there are no COINS to be fought, what would they have to talk about?

My problem here is that some of your observations are, well, off. On top of your incorrectly identifying the positions of a couple of these people (Campbell and Exum), which shows poor journalistic effort at least, your rendering of the events is plain wrong.

Bacevich was invited for just this reason – to provide a dissenting voice (even though two other panelist, COL Cavoli and LTG Barno provided a much better voice). And his comments did not bring the ballroom “crashing down to earth.” As I was sitting pretty close to you, I’m sure you also heard and saw at least 50 to 100 people clap loudly (with quite a few standing) at the end of Dr. Bacevich’s comments. This conference was not a pep rally for the COIN community.

You also conveniently left out a few other occurrences. Like Exum agreeing that Bacevich had some important strategic questions, but that didn’t help commanders on the ground today. And you should know very well what he meant by “divorced from political reality.” I would assert that he means (I don’t speak for him, but read his blog daily) that the President has made a decision that we’re going to do COIN in Afghanistan and the point of that paper and that panel was to address how to do that best. Bacevich’s whole argument was being made in a vacuum in that forum because it exceeded the scope of dialog past the operational level.

And again, go listen or watch the panel. COL Cavoli tore down the paper pretty well and did so in a manner that kept to the topic at hand. Which was important as he’s going to command one of those brigades over there next year.

Bacevich raised many important strategic questions and issues that should be examined, but probably in a different forum. To call him “courageous” (as some have) or the event an “echo chamber” distorts the reality of the event.

I opposed the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 and I was told by conservative Republicans that I wasn’t “with the program.”

So, I watch quietly as more than 4,300 U.S soldiers, Marines, Air Force and Navy are killed, more than 50,000 wounded, and a country torn asunder by sectarian cleansing. Today, millions of Iraqis remain displaced because they are afraid to go home, the country’s infrastructure and social fabric remains in shambles, there has been a massive brain drain and long-term psychological trauma on an inconceivable level. An authoritarian “strong man” wielding U.S-created special forces like his own personal republican guard is now considered Iraq’s best hope. And I’m considered a fool for not believing the Surge worked.

When George W. Bush was reelected in 2004, I was called a “cynic” for not believing in his scheme to spread democracy across the globe while continuing to hold hands with Saudi princes and Egyptian autocrats who put their political opponents in jail. I was called a “pessimist” — by conservatives who said they were my friends — for calling Afghanistan a failure, and that was back in 2007.

Now, I am told that Afghanistan is deteriorating further than ever, and a new generation of Democratic policy hot shots want me to believe I have to support a “long term commitment” to resolve Afghanistan with an untested, unproven remedy that requires not only billions of more dollars, but tens of thousands of more American troops on the ground. Troops, as you know, who will be on their third, if not fourth tour overseas. Servicemen and women who are already coming home with varying degrees of brain injuries, unidentified illnesses relating to harmful environmental exposures (i.e. burn pits) and post traumatic stress disorder. Our VA health care system treated more than 400,000 OIF/OEF veterans since the beginning of the war — how much more are we willing to grind up and spit out for an amorphous plan with no timelines, no benchmarks, no guarantees and really, no exit strategy?

For these questions, I am called a “dinosaur,” an “isolationist,” and a “Rush Limbaugh” journalist. I am belittled, apparently, because I did not serve, and am “out of touch with reality” because I dare to take a different view of what my government is doing, in my name, overseas.

My observations meant very little in Washington then, and they are just as marginal now. The Long War is on and it’s all ad hominem attacks for anyone who questions it. I don’t strive to be “relevant,” just a human being, who has seen too many suffer under current war policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. I am thus cheered whenever I hear someone like Prof. Bacevich have the guts to challenge the latest unquestioned orthodoxy the way he did on Thursday; I feel less so when I hear the reactions from readers like you, because it is obvious you haven’t spent a minute trying to figure out what we are all about here.

—- KV

I consider myself conservative, and I feel that conservatives are failing this nation because they are not being a meaningful participant in the national conversation. Articles like this, with its thinly veiled sarcasm and use of the word, “meme,” is dismissive and does not add meaningfully to the national conversation. This article basically just abuses CNAS and proponents of effective counterinsurgent behaviors and does not offers neither a coherent critique nor a viable alternative other than, apparently, quitting.

Having served in Afghanistan, I see the results of such immediate disengagements on our reputation in the world. The biggest fear of many common Afghans is that we will leave. It is our demonstrated pattern of action in the recent past. We have a history of rushing in, buggering things up, and leaving. Bacevich’s isolationist theories are based on a history devoid of the effects of globalization, something that Americans have been singularly unsuccessful at coming to grips with, both in business and in foreign policy. The fact is that we are part of a global system, and we can either recognize it and our ability to influence it positively, or we can bury our heads in the sand and suffer the consequences.

By failing to grasp realities, conservatives have abdicated any meaningful role in influencing the developing doctrines and foreign policy behaviors that will shape our role over the course of the next 50 to 100 years. As societies around the world shape and are shaped by their emergence into the technologies that have hastened globalization, far too many conservatives are clutching buggy whips. This, being apparent to significant portions of the population who would be otherwise amenable to conservative ideas, destroys the credibility of conservative thinking as being outmoded and ineffective… or crazy (see the first comment in this string.) Talk about putting off a reasonable human being seeking information upon which to base an opinion.

Articles such as this one… which, unfortunately, is indicative of the Rush Limbaugh school of “journalism” that is alienating those in the middle who are open to reasonable influence.

So, as a conservative libertarian who cannot cast his vote symbolically towards a Libertarian candidate because I don’t like wasting my vote on “making a statement,” and therefore being left with a choice of Republicans who, when represented by articles of such incoherence, are just plain out of touch with reality, what is a conservative voter who seeks to preserve individual liberty to do? It’s all boiling down to pissing down a well at this point. Conservatives must either gain some sense of reality in the modern world or we shall all be dragged into socialism not only by the liberal left but by the irrelevance of those who “speak” for “conservatives.”

Thanks for failing us, guys. I blame liberals for plenty, but I blame dinosaurs like you for failing to be relevant just as much.

Indeed I have not, and for that I guess I owe an apology for my snarky comment.

However, the idea that the CNAS crowd is some imperialistic group full of their own power is ludicrous. The whole COIN community, whatever its faults – and those most certainly exist – argues what it does precisely because so many have seen their buddies and innocent civilians die in the poor application of force by a conventional military. Bacevich’s argument is policy and to a lesser extent, strategy centered. No more interventions; they’re inherently imperial, expensive, and not worth it. Fine.

The “COINdinista” argument is more tactical, operational, and to an extent strategic. Political bodies have decided we’re not precipitously withdrawing from the wars we’re in. How do we achieve the desirable conditions so that we can get out someday?

What’s the worst case if both are wrong?

For the COIN crowd, it’s continued involvment in costly wars that are ongoing right now anywaym

If Bacevich is wrong, and our military gets out of this “COIN business” (again), and insurgency and intrastate violence threatening the security of us and our allies become the norm in the 21st century, we will again see an American Army of big battalions and heavy firepower disastrously misapplied in conflicts, much to our collective detriment.

I say that’s a much worse outcome.

In any case, Bacevich’s argument is best given to the politicians of all parties who wish to start these operations of “imperial overstretch.” If he is worried about a COIN-able force encouraging policymakers to undertake more expensive and unending full-scale nationbuilding efforts, that’s fine. Attacking the CNAS crowd which seeking to win the wars we’re in – not start more as you suggest – is flawed.

Matt

“So a bunch of “conservative” Republicans fawning over the man who has repeatedly and loudly damned you all is priceless”

You, sir, have obviously never read The American Conservative.

Given Mexico’s downward spiral into narco-insurgency, none of us may be laughing two years from now – particularly because Mexico’s problems with decentralized but organized violence will not be confined to the Mexican side of the border. It is leaking across right now, hence the nervous laughter from the suits.