The Logevall/Osgood article in World Affairs Journal is worth reading:

As the current debate over U.S. foreign policy again turns on the lessons of the past, Americans would do well to take a closer look at the country’s long wrestling match with Munich’s ghost. Such an examination would show, first, that “Munich” has retained its power in American political discourse for more than seventy years largely because of electoral calculations. Second, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, the success or failure of American foreign policy since the 1930s has to a great extent hinged on the willingness of presidents to withstand the inevitable charges of appeasement that accompany any decision to negotiate with hostile powers, and to pursue the nation’s interests through diplomacy. Sometimes these negotiating efforts failed; sometimes the successes proved marginal. But those presidents who challenged the tyranny of “Munich” produced some of the most important breakthroughs in American diplomacy; those who didn’t begat some of the nation’s most enduring tragedies.

A third finding would be that the people yelping, “Munich!” the loudest, such as Pawlenty, typically have the weakest, most superficial grasp on foreign policy and international affairs. Regarding the politics of Pawlenty’s appeasement remarks, it is clear that Pawlenty has embraced this rhetoric to mask his complete lack of experience in and lack of knowledge about foreign policy. Invoking Munich has retained power because of electoral calculations, yes, but the people who invoke it are usually sincere believers in the rudimentary, comic-book history of the 20th century they have learned. Take Rick Santorum, for example. No one could say that Santorum has been playing a super-hawk for the last few years because of the electoral advantages it brings. Heavy reliance on Munich/appeasement rhetoric is not simply a cynical move, but one derived from a hyper-simplistic, moralizing understanding of modern history.