I suppose that one has to accept that the US has a clear national interest to eliminate Usama bin Laden, even if al-Qaeda currently appears to be incapable of pulling off large terrorist attacks a la 9/11. I am guardedly optimistic about the Obama plan for Afghanistan-Pakistan even if it does smell a lot like Vietnam because it appears to me that it has a built-in exit strategy. Nail bin Laden, beef up the local police and army, leave. The part I don’t like is the cost of the operation, which could exceed Iraq because of the incredible pricetag on supplying the troops, and the nation building bit. No doubt Afghanistan would benefit from a nice infrastructure and civil institutions as well as a rule of law, but there is absolutely no evidence that the foundation for any of the above exists. Quite the contrary. Far better to let the Afghans figure out what works for them and as long as they do not again become a terrorist base, leave them alone.
Obama should also be given credit for realizing that there has to be a strategic plan for central Asia, something that Bush never quite figured out, and I expect that he will try to bring in all of the local players, including Iran and the Taliban, to work out some kind of modus vivendi. Again, that sounds a bit like the Paris Peace talks and Vietnam which produced an unsatisfactory result, but as long as the Afghans are not invading their neighbors or blowing up Rockefeller Center the rest of the world can just hold its collective nose and ignore them.
I would like to see more on what Pakistan might be encouraged to do to eliminate al-Qaeda since they have been trying and failing to do that for nearly eight years. Also, nothing in the Obama plan really addresses the pervasive corruption and drug dealing, which could make any stabilization program problematical and virtually guarantees that the police force will be ineffective. Karzai is hated and has to go no matter what, but with whom do you replace him.



Seems to me you can’t divorce Afghanistan from the Pakistan situation, not that Phil did. But if for example you could, and the Paki situation did not exist, it probably wouldn’t matter a whit what you did in Afghanistan. You could pull out now, or in five and maybe even ten years and I suspect the situation would quickly be the same: A pretty empty huge country with no real infrastructure to speak of and the great mass of people living in a pre-industrial situation under different warlords, courtesy of the poppies. And except for the poppy growing and warlords, what’s so bad about that? Yes you have disease and all that, and there should be aid always for same, but if the people there want to live that simple pastoral life well, geez, to the extent possible *I’m* trying to live a simple pastoral life.
Somehow though we goofed big time—maybe in the long run an even bigger goof than going into Iraq—by driving bin Laden out of Afghanistan and essentially setting him up as the big man in the frontier of Pakistan. Now all of Pakistan is destablized. Indeed, if we pulled out entirely I suspect bin Laden wouldn’t even *want* to go back to Afghanistan. He and his Pathan frontier folks are not just playing at being in the big leagues now as with 9/11 and the Cole and etc., but they are very definitely in them full-time with the possibility of all Pakistan and its nukes falling like fruit into their hands. No wonder he seems to be concentrating his effort there rather than blowing up a few buses in London or New York.
Just like with Lenin, say, often times the most evil people have the clearest vision.
So it appears to me that the question “what should we do in Afghanistan” really depends on the question “what should we do about Pakistan?”
Do we really want to get out and have no bases with which to do anything to prevent Pakistan from falling, or to do anything once it has fallen? To lose whatever facilities we have in Afghanistan that we are or should be using as a base to work with friendly Pashtun tribes to turn them all against bin Laden and al Queda? What if the situation heads so south in Pakistan that we can’t operate similarly from there at all? That the ISI gets so untrustworthy that our people in Pakistan keep getting their cover and safe houses and etc. blown?
All the talk about “global” this and “global” that and high tech launching Hellfires from drones piloted in Peoria is nice, but probably the best hope for doing anything regardless of what happens is to have people as close to the scene as possible. Working with the tribes, working with the Paki government, working with the local government people and etc.
Finding out what’s in hearts and minds from 10,000 feet so as to Influence them is difficult. And if we don’t succeed at using influence now, our choices later may well involve nuclear considerations.
One thing that puzzles me if I’m right about it is why even under Bush we seemed to stop supporting Musharef so much? Isn’t it plain that since then things there have just gotten ever more precarious? Was it the Gaza idea all over again, with Bush trusting democracy to bring milk and honey in the streets and instead getting Hamas and … God knows what exists in Pakistan now?
In any event I can see moving quite slowly in Afghanistan in terms of getting out so as to see how things develop in the region. I don’t like it, but life means choosing between less than ideal options.